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PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO ARAB GULF STATES' DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: 
THE CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL BASIS 
ABSTRACT 
In designing a viable approach to development cooperation, on two 
planes, horizontal (gee-economic circles) and vertical (function and form of 
cooperation) analysis was conducted of AGS' development structural needs for 
development. Forms of cooperation found both in development literature 
and in practice were surveyed. 
Analysis of the opportunities and constraints associated with the 
structural characteristics of the AGS' Sub-region, indicated that, whilst 
current development is concentrated on material production i.e. 'quantitative' 
aspects, the need for structural change demands priority for 'qualitative' 
development. 
Quantitative development is concerned with the structural and infra-
structural base, in broad terms, including fields such as human-resources 
development, training, research, science and technological base, development 
administration, the industry of finance, environment preservation, and the 
socio-cultural values necessary for 'mobilized development' rather than 
'passive pseudm-development'. 
The present situation can be more accurately described as 'development 
diversion rather than ~evelopment creation'. Development determinants of the 
AGS produce strong motivations to, even the necessity for cooperation. 
Such cooperation, between relevant gee-economic zones- the 'horizontal' 
element - is found to be viable if based on a Trilateral approach involving 
three circles: the Sub-region stimulates the AGS to pooling their financial 
surpluses within an investment strategy, which is based upon the qualitative 
needs within the Sub-region, wider opportunities for AGS investment on 
productive activities and which will also benefit the recipients of 
investment motivate cooperation within the Regional and International circles. 
To achieve the structural change necessary for self-sustaining 
development, a viable, functional 'vertical' approach is necessary, identified 
as: piece-meal, partial, development-oriented and based upon programmed 
cooperation within an integratory realm. This approach, within the Trilateral 
framework, would create new development forces, counteracting the limitations 
of absorptive capacity and other constraints inhibiting AGS economic 
diversification. It would establish the platform on which to build self-
sustaining economic development onward into the post-oil era. 
OAPEC projects and the AAAID programme on food security within the 
Region are especially significant operational examples of the applicability 
of our approach, since the food security issue is identified as a strong 
motivation for trilateral cooperation. 
The operational side of the proposed approach is determined by an 
investment strategy which is based upon the principles of equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits, reciprocity, additionality, and, through 
cooperation the harmonious relationships V1ithin all three circles which are 
necessary for but also created by successful development cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Arab Gulf States now possess economic structures characterized 
by nearly complete dependence on depleting resources of oil and gas, very 
limited populations, very small geographical size in most cases and a 
restricted resource base (Fig. 1). These states have been experiencing 
recently some forms of development cooperation designed with the 
objective of diversifying their economic base in preparation for the 
future non-oil era. 
In this situation any strategy for economic diversification which 
does not take into consideration wider regional and international factors 
as well as those of the Arab Gulf Sub-Region is misleading. At the same 
time as cooperative movements between the Arab Gulf States (AGS) have 
been emerging, regionally and internationally there have occurred 
frequent and sharp changes in the political, military, economic and 
financial systems and there has appeared some loss of confidence in the 
ability to achieve Arab Economic Unity. 
Given this context (which is analysed in Parts 1 and 2) then 
development cooperation between the AGS must be examined in terms of how 
fundamental factors available within Regional - Arab - and International 
circles as well as within the Gulf Sub-Regional Circle are basic to a 
trilateral approach which in turn is necessary for fruitful cooperation. 
Consequently the primary purpose of this study, is to explore the 
feasibility of a trilateral approach (involving Sub-Regional, the 
Regional and International circl~ for development cooperation in such a 
way that will define: 
(a) How sub-regional cooperation between the six Gulf States can be 
of optimum benefit to their development and which of the various known 
forms of economic cooperation and integration will suit these countries, 
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taking into consideration the experience gained from recent cooperation 
and integration movements in the Gulf Sub-Region. At the same time 
establishing, in broad terms, the rank order of activities that compose a 
cooperative movement ladder. 
(b) How cooperation within the Arab Region can be of vital importance 
and effectiveness to AGS development, this to be explored in particular 
with reference to Arab component inputs to AGS development activities. 
At the same time we have to explore the sound avenue for AGS cooperation 
within the regional circle on the light of recent Arab Economic 
integration experience. Examples will be given of sectoral cooperation 
to illustrate the feasibility of cooperation within the region, mainly 
in Agriculture and Investment activities. 
(c) How the international circle constitutes a basic element in the 
current development process and how this should be developed on a sound 
basis. 
Thus the main objective of this research becomes the exploration of 
the feasibility of development cooperation within a pragmatic approach. 
In order to achieve the main objective of this thesis analytical 
procedures for this study were divided into four parts, a division which 
is not a rigid progression but rather a framework for analysis and 
discussion. 
Part One assesses the development resource base and potentials 
including an evaluation of current conditions, achievements, the prospects 
for growth and the obstacles to development. 
Part Two describes and analyses the AGS current sub-regional cooper-
ation movement which has recently been crystallised through the 
establishment in 1981 ~f the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC} in addition 
to AGS regional and international economic relations and cooperation. 
Part Three will analyse the potential motivation for cooperation 
within the Sub-regional, Regional and International circles, the basis for 
analysis will be conceptual as well as practical. AGS' real 
motivation to cooperation will be ex~~ined throughout various sectors 
of analysis. 
Part Four will be devoted to examining basic issues with respect 
to the proposed pragmatic approach to AGS cooperation within a trilateral 
approach. On the basis of the first two chapters of part four on the 
Sub-regional approach, examinations will be extended to clarify practical 
aspects of cooperation within the region, while ·~Chapter 14 
crystallizes arguments for AGS investment strategy, within which a 
trilateral pragmatic approach will be formulated. 
The pragmatic approach adopted, will be based on two aspects which 
are termed, for this research analytical purposes, as 'horizontal' 
and 'vertical'. The horizontal approach deals with circles of 
cooperation from the gee-economic or spatial point of view and will 
be explored in part three, motivation for the trilateral approach. The 
vertical approach deals with various forms of avenues for economic 
cooperation as covered by development literature and applied .in practice. 
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Part Four is devoted to case studies and the conclusion. Here the 
pragmatic and conceptual approaches earlier established are examined in 
the context of actual cooperative activities which have already been 
initiated and which tend to confirm the validity of the general trilateral 
approach. 
It is thought that this study is the first among various recent 
studies and researches which deal holistically with the development of 
AGS and their cooperative movement. No previous study has tried to 
explore a sound, pragmatic approach for development cooperation from an 
over-view which considers the basic fundamental elements that are provided 
by a trilateral approach. This study has the widest coverage among 
studies of a similar kind, both in the sense that it deals with Sub-
regional cooperation within the three circles, Sub-regional Regional and 
International and in being directed towards serving the development 
drive of the AGS. 
This study is not intended to provide a definitive history of all 
cooperative efforts within the Sub-region and other circles. Neither do 
we intend to recapitulate fully the many economic and other 
justifications for cooperation as opposed to national approaches to 
development. Some detail is given on past cooperative movements within 
the Sub-region, but concentration will be directed to the recent and 
current movement. The subject of feasibility of cooperation has been 
dealt with extensively elsewhere and there is little need to repeat these 
findings extensively here. However, reference will be made as needed to 
cooperation feasibility forms and problems of various recent known 
cooperative movements. We can also note that general studies of inter-
national development strategy have realized the importance of Sub-
regional groupings within the larger ones. 
Methodology and Conceptual Framework 
Completion of this research required large amounts of data on the 
economic structure, resource base in each of AGS. Once gathered, 
checked for plausibility against other sources and systematically 
examined, each piece of data was synthesized with other existing 
information. Additionally, considerable information was gathered from 
extraordinary numbers of official national and international reports, 
discussions, analysis and from seminars. 
The lack of accurate information and statistics and wide differences 
between some sources sometimes became very clear during the course of 
analysis. In addition the extent of coverage for these statistics 
constituted a problem from time to time when the author of this thesis 
was using the tools of economic analysis, such as balance of payments, 
national income, foreign trade statistics, Government budgets, investment 
abroad etc. The associated problems of weakness of statistical base will 
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be illustrated further in Part One of this research. 
One of the key references used in this thesis is the collection of 
development plans of the AGS. Not only do such plans present explicit 
data on their economies, useful analyses of past economic performance 
and interrelationships among the various sectors of their economies, they 
also provide skeleton backgrounds to the course of their programmed 
projects. The latter when analysed help in identifying joint needs and 
fields of duplication, as well as joint objectives, this facilitating the 
formulation of Sub-regional joint development objectives. 
Although aspects of cooperation could not be restricted to what is 
included in AGS development plans or programmes, since up to now they 
do not consider the Sub-region in planning their programmes and projects, 
however the writer has to assume that the main course of objectives, 
, 
programmes, projects and policies included reflect their countries real 
needs. This of course does not mean that such plans or development 
programmes are not left with some gaps. 
Because, not only of the doubtful quality of much of the 
statistical datas, this study is mainly concerned with recently evolving 
human and socio-political behaviour and attitudes to cooperation for 
development, the author has not used rigorous econometric analytical 
techniques; these are felt to be inappropriate to this study. As Sayegh 
put it: 
"Being the transmission lines via which the power 
generated in the realm of ideas, values and generally 
intangible determinants can reach the field of 
development, its mechanisms properly speaking, are 
near-impossible to quantify."(!) 
This study is not designed in terms of any special model, ideology 
or doctrine, but with the maximum degree of flexibility consonant with 
a conceptual approact1 to development and its determinants to discover to 
w~at extent cooperat:Jon within the three circlus could be considered one 
·.·t> 
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of these basic determinants, and to what extent and how this determinant 
can affect the efficiency of development processes. 
The examination of development cooperation and forces behind it in 
this study proceeds, then, along pragmatic rather than ideological or 
theoretical lines. However, the course of analysis bears in mind the 
sociocultural framework of development and analysis based on well known 
economic cooperation and integration forms and uses the tools of economic 
analysis if not econometrics: 
"There has been no economist, from the early times when 
economics emerged as a science until today, whose angle 
of vision of the factors of economic growth or 
development has not been wide enough to include some 
non-economic, and specifically some political factors."(2) 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis 
Cooperation as a term used in this thesis includes all forms of 
joint economic action purporting to enhance development. 
We will examine the situation actually in existence both for 
· development and development cooperation, then turn to the course cooperation 
ought to take if it is to be influential in development; this will be 
done within the context of the three circles of cooperation earlier 
identified. It is hypothesised that development cooperation can be 
extended into a very powerful determinant of far-reaching and profound 
development. 
"The drive for economic complementarity require a 
deliberate regional vision of and approach to develop-
ment for the best results to ensue, rather than the 
fragmented, accidental and haphazard approach still 
characteristic of the region's behaviour."(3) 
The writer of this thesis will follow this course of analysis 
throughout the research topic, bearing in mind his adoption of a meaning 
of the term 'Development' which is different from the terms 'Growth' 
and 'Modernization'. Essentially this study is concerned with those 
factors which contribute to the real and profound changes which 
characterize the real development process. 
"Development is taken to mean growth of a.magnitude 
or speed, of a content and comprehensiveness, and in 
directions that could not have taken place without 
important changes having occurred, or occurring, in 
socio-cultural., political and technological instit-
utions, structures and forces, - in addition to 
significant changes in the economic sphere proper."(4) 
Compared with this, 'Growth' is restricted to the characterization 
of change in national product (or national product per head) in real 
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terms, within the given institutions and non..:.econorilic.factors relevant to 
growth within the circular flow. 
Development conditions that should be provided to allow the process 
of development to take place and arrive to self sustained growth are 
as follows: ( 5) 
1. The growth should be the outcome of the performance largely by 
the society itself, not of foreign islands of capital, entrepreneurship 
and technology that can be seen in the major foreign projects or 
activities such as copper-mining, large plantations or petroleum 
concessionary activities totally managed by foreign companies. 
2. The political and social environment should be able to provide the 
economy with many of the ideas, knowledge, attitudes, and institutions 
essential to efficient functioning. 
3. The preceding two conditions must make possible a sustained 
improved rate of growth. Thus, technological and other change should 
continue in considerable measure in order to enable the economy to sustain 
the rise in the rate of growth, or to sustain the rate itself if it has 
reached a high level. Otherwise, short-lived windfalls of brief duration 
reflected in steeply rising national product per capita should not be 
considered for real development~ 
4. Real growth of income should not merely mean improvement per head, 
in the mechanistic sense of a higher ari thme.tic mean; more important is 
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its association with a more equitable distribution of income. This in 
the sense of distributive justice that those who make a major contribution 
to the increase in the national product should share in the fruits of 
their mental and manual effort. In other words, development should be 
oriented to the needs of the masses. 
"Those objectives ar·e usually presented as reference 
points against which performance is measured, where 
very commendable rates of growth are reported and 
praised but where the mass of people feel the blessing 
of 'the development' only marginally."(6) 
5. Wide ranging participation by the population in the design of 
development strategies and policies and in the allocation of development 
resources. 
6. Self reliance in the sense of importing only those systems of 
thought and models of organisation and operation which can usefully evolve 
within the framework of inherited values. 
To summarise we understand the 'development' process from an 
enlarged angle of v-ision, with its true dimensions sought through the 
interplay of a large number of determinants found in many economic, 
social, cultural and political-administrative fields. This leads at 
the end to considering development to emerge as a truly revolutionary 
process. 
7. The difference between the terms Industrialization' and 'development' 
is now well established since the works of the late nineteen forties 
and early fifties used both terms almost intercnangeably. The identif-
ication of one process with the other is unjustified, both conceptually 
and empirically, due to the following reasons: 
(a) Development is much wider than industrialization; whilst 
industrialization is considered to be occupying a central position in the 
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process and state of development, it cannot be considered to be the whole 
process. 
Sayegh has examined the experience of Denmark and New Zealand as 
examples while mentioning that development could be identified without 
industry being the major sector in the economy.(7) 
(b) Industrialization cannot be considered developmental if it is not 
integrated with other sectors of the economy. This is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of cooperation within the Arab-regional circle 
on agriculture. This is of urgency in view of the facile tendency in 
development to emphasise speedy industrialization at the expens·e of 
development of the agricultural sector, 
"even though the latter is the unavoidable under-pinning 
for all development and societal structure in most of the 
developing countries of the world, and even though a 
mechanistic and simplistic over-emphasis of industrial-
ization might subvert the very foundations that support 
·>the building of a healthy and viable industrial sector."(B) 
8.- Development is different from modernization in that the latter is 
essentially limited to technical and organizational improvements in 
particular activities.(9) 
The first hand experience of the research in the on-going Arab 
region economic integration movement as well as acting for a period as 
an adviser participant in Sub-regional Gulf cooperation movemenU$ has 
also been a primary source of much of the information and conclusions 
presented in this analysis. 
As the issue of time constitutes a basic element in the whole 
analytical process of the subject of this thesis, it should be noted that 
the most reeent decade, that of the nineteen-seventies will be taken as a 
base for most of the analysis and examination of development and 
development cooperation. This last decade has witnessed profound changes 
with respect to petroleum prices especially in 1973 and 1979,with their 
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financial surpluses which, as examined later in this thesis, played a 
leading role in shaping AGS development. This decade has witnessed also 
another and strong food security dilemma which first impressed the 
world in 1972/73. It also witnessed the most important developments 
with respect to developing cooperation within the Sub-regional, Regional 
and International circles. However, the analysis will be backed, as needed 
by the examination both of earlier developments and of plans for the 
~ighties. At the same time the prospects for development and development 
cooperation necessitated also an outlook further into the future, 
particularly as far as the post-oil era is concerned. 
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PART ONE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-RESOURCE BASE, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, CONSTRAINTS AND 
PROSPECTS 
CHAPTER 1 - RESOURCE BASE AND DEVELOPMENT 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the available physical and Human resources, 
both qualitative and quantitative. This aim at defining possibilities 
for widening the existing economic base of the Arab Gulf States (AGS), 
based on one hand, on their real resources as well as on the other 
opportunities which could be created through sub regional, regional 
and international development cooperation. In this way analysis of 
development cooperation approach, priorities and possibilities will be 
based on an objective evaluation of natural and human resources 
endowment. 
Secondly, this chapter analyses the economic structure of the 
AGS to identify the positive and negative aspects of this structure as 
a first basic step towards assessing how trilateral economic cooperation 
could lead to positive structure changes for the build-up of the non-
oil economic base. 
1.2 AGS -Historical Introduction (Political and Economic) 
Highlights of the recent history of AGS include the following 
elements summarised below.(1) 
AGS have only recently achieved their political independence. 
Terminating their treaties with the U.K., Qatar, Bahrain and UAE gained 
their independence in 1971, while Kuwait reached its independence earlier 
in 1961. Saudi Arabia was established as a political unity in 1932, 
however development only rapidly proceeded with Faisal's reign. UAE 
was established following many efforts towards unity starting with the 
Trucia.l States Council in 1962. It is thought that security motivation 
was the main driving force behind the establishment of UAE and had 
the blessing of the U.K. A deeply-rooted relationship seems to have 
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been built with the U.K. It is very clear in the Omani example which 
continued from the early eighteenth century into the present regimeof 
Qaboos. 
Consequently the AGS include new-born political entities with 
recent political experience, recently established government machinery 
-
and recent independent regional Arab and international economic 
relations. 
Economic Background 
Economic activities in the pre-oil period: 
Prior to the discovery of oil the people of the AGS earned their 
livelihood by herding in the desert and in the coastal zones by fishing, 
pearling, boat building, and the transportation of goods to and from 
India and the orient. (2) 
The competition from Japanese cultured pearls in the 1920's and 
30's, the great depression in 1929, the Second World War and lastly 
the better employment prospects directly and indirectly created by the 
oil industry, all these factors lead to the decline of the prosperous 
pearling industry.(3&4) 
Trade and Mar:!. time Transport: 
The people of the Emirates have a long history of seafaring and 
trade. Since the region was a coastal one with few natural resources, 
the population was forced to look to the sea to meet. their essential 
needs long before the time of the famous Arabian seafarer Ahmed Bin Majid. 
Seafaring and shipping activities were among the principal occupations 
of the Gulf Arabs, who.were the principal voyagersbetween the Gulf and 
the other parts of Asia and Africa, and became the most expert in 
seafaring in these parts of the world. 
In the nineteenth century, the Gulf Arabs were faced with the 
competition of cheap and regular steamer services and consequently their 
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maritime activities became less important. Nevertheless, some shipping 
services were retained between the Gulf port and other ports in the Red 
sea, East Africa and South-East Asia, and shipping remained the second 
industry in the Emirates. Bahrain for example had about 100 ships 
occupied in maritime transport in 1905. 
During the First World War, when regular steamer services were 
interrupted, the shipping services provided the Emirates resumed their 
old scale. During this period, Kuwait was the principal country on the 
Arabian side of the Gulf engaged in transport by sea. By the end of 
the 1920's, the Kuwait commercial fleet consisted of 150 ships with a 
load capacity of 40,000 tons. This activity again came to a halt 
between the two world wars and resumed during the Second World War. 
nne main reason for this elasticity, was that the shipping trade was 
complementary to the pearling industry. 
The Gulf Arabs traded not only with neighbouring countries but 
also with all the ports they visited on their voyages to in East Africa 
and South Asia, buying and selling from one port to another. 
The main trading centres on the Arabian side of the Gulf were 
Kuwait, Bahrain and from the beginning of this century, Dubai. These 
three cen'tres supplied the interior parts of the Arabian peninsula, 
South Iraq, the lower Gulf, and Oman. 
Boat Building: 
The Emirates were famous for building all the local craft used in 
the pearling and shipping industries. Bahrain and Kuwait were the main 
centres for this industry, Bahrain's production amounting to 119 boats 
in 1926, 74 in 1927 and 89 in 1928. During the 1920's this industry 
succeeded in applying sea diesel engines to the local craft, and in 1930 
succeeded in building a small "tanker" for carrying oil products from 
Abadan to Bahrain. ln Kuwait the industry was able to build yachts of 
E:uropuan deH.i.gn of G~i fL length in 1931 and 80 ft length in 1932. 
Other Activities: 
.Agriculture. Agriculture was one of the principal activities in 
Bahrain and the interior oases of the UAE and the eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia, but was very minor in Qatar and Kuwait. Even so in the 
1930's, cultivable land in Bahrain was estimated at only five percent 
of the total area. The main crop was dates of which Bahrain's 
production in 1905 was 5,200 tons. In addition to date palms, limes, 
bananas, oranges, tomatoes, onions, melons, and a wide range of other 
vegetables were grown in the Emirates, whilst in some eastern areas of 
the southern region, tobacco was also cultivated. 
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Pastoralism. In the Emirates this was mainly a complementary 
activity for the coastal settlements, while it was the principal activity 
in the interior. However, nomadic life and the tribes movements and 
loyalties played a major part in local politics. Consequently the 
tribes in the interior were subsidized by local sheikhs and did not 
depend entirely on their nomadic herding.(5) 
1.3 Physical and Human Resources 
Evaluation of natural resources in this area is recent and as yet 
incomplete. For the region as a whole there are no comprehensive or 
consistent surveys of water resources, soils, land classification or 
land use. While this situation is improving, progress is slow, despite 
the introduction of new techniques into the process of resource 
evaluation. Estimates of the quantities and qualities of basic natural 
resources are inevitably, therefore, imprecise and open to different 
interpretations.(6) 
In the following we will refer to the current situation relating 
to the resource base of AGS and its reflection on development prospects, 
mainly in relation to agriculture activities in general. This will 
assist in illustrating some areas of needed joint cooperation which 
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conform with development priorities. 
1.3.1 Physical Resources 
Area, water and land resources: 
The Arab Gulf states occupy a very vital and strategic location 
in the Middle East. These countries constitute the largest part of the 
Arab peninsula, lying on the Western side of the Arab Gulf and extending 
along the Gulf of Oman. The total area of the six countries is 
approximately 2,459,000 square kilometers (see Table 1.1). 
Country 
S. Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Total (AGS) 
Total (Arab League Countries) 
AGS/Arab proportion 
Table 1.1 
AGS Area 
Area (000 sq. km.) 
2150.000 
17.818 
77.600 
1.100 
212.457 
0.622 
2459.597 
13,658.500 
18% 
% 
87.4 
0.7 
3.1 
o.o 
8.6 
o.o 
100.00 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
3 
Source: UNESCO, National Science and Technology Policies in the Arab 
States- Present.Situation and Future Outlook, Scien<::e Polic.v 
Studies and Documents (France: The Unesco Press, 1976). 
IBRD, World Development Report 1980. 
Water resources and Agriculture (see also Chapter 3): 
The general feature characterizing AGS is the scarcity of water 
r~sources caused mainly by having the largest part of their land either 
desert or arid subtropical. 
In the Arabian peninsula precipitation is generally about 60 mm a 
year, and only in the uplands of the south and west do annual totals 
rise above 200 mm. As a result desert conditions prevail almost every-
whcre.(7) 
This results in the drastic limitation of cultivated and potentially 
cultivable land for the six countries (see Table 1.2). 
Agriculture and water resources development are still at the 
resource exploration and proving stage. There are indications however, 
that prospects and potentialities in this sector are being increasingly 
understood. However, after near two decades of development effort 
Saudi Arabia for example continues to be a net importer of food' grains, 
meat, milk and milk products, vegetables and fruit. 
Kuwait: 
The cultivated land is only 1000 hectares (0.06% of the total 
land) but the cultivable area is 2.7 thousand hectares (0.15 percent of 
total land) (Table 1.2). Rainfall, which occurs mainly in winter time, 
varies between 23 mm and 206 mm with an annual mean of 118 mm (1952-
1971). (8) 
The cost of water from desalination plants as an alternative 
source for water is too high and the availability of reasonable quality 
groundwater too low to permit any agricultural expansion •. Given othe~ 
economic opportunities, normal agricultural work has ceased although 
considerable experimentation has been carried out with artificial 
environment systems and specialised production units.(9) 
Qatar: 
Qatar is a peninsula situated midway along the western shore of the 
Arabian Gulf, about 100 miles in length, and between 35 and 50 miles 
in width, composed mostly of desert where annual rainfall ranges between 
25 mm (1 inch) and 212 mm (8.5 inches).(10) 
Agricultural production is limited by the scarcity of arable land 
and water. Generally the soil consists of shallow layers of silt 
deposits above clay and is suitable for growing only a limited number 
of vegetables, feed grains and dates.(11) Qatar, as with many of the 
other AGS, faces a serious problem in ensuring adequate food supplies 
over the next 20 years, and any undue delay in implementing detailed 
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Table 1.2 
AGS Agriculture - Areas, Cultivated, Potential and Available Water Resources 
(l) (2) ( 3) 
Country Total land Cultivated land Columns Area well or Columns Available Water Resource 
Area 000 ha. (1977) 2(a):1 moderately 3:1 for Agr. (1975) 000 ha. suited to irrigated 
(1977_) -- cultivation (000 ha.) 
Total Irrig. % Total cu.f. per 
(a) (b) b:a (cu.f.million) ~ed ha. 
S. Arabia 214,969 1,ll0 390 35 0.5 3000.0 1.4 1,500- 1,900 10,100 
Bahrain 62 2 1 50 3.2 6.0 4.3 100- 150 83,000 
Kuwait 1,782 1 1 100 .06 200.0 11.2 100- 150 125,000 
Oma."l 21,246 36 36 100 0.2 N.A. N.A. 300- 400 15,900 
Qatar 1,100 2 2 100 0.2 29.0 2.5 80- 100 60,000 
UAE 8,360 ll 5 45 0.1 20.5 0.02 200- 300 23,200 
· AGS 247,519 1,162 435 37.4 0.47 2,280- 3,000 52,866 
ECWA 29,880-40,400 13,400 
Total Arab. 1,365,846 46,356 7,634 16.5 
AGS:ECWA 3.7 5.9 
AGS:Arab 18% 2.4 6.2 5.7 3.7 7.6- 7.4% 
Note: Areas indicated in Column 3 are derived from FAO mission's estimates based on reconnaissance surveys of varying depth 
and quality carried out between 1969 and 1979. 
Source: Bm·:en Jones, H. 'Agriculture in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE .' In, Issues in Development: Arab Gulf States, Edited 
by :.:ay Ziwar-Daftari tLondon: M.D. Research and Services Limited), 1980. 
El-Khalidy, G. Food Dilemma and Food Security in the Arab World, Part 1, (Amman: CAEU, March 1980), Table no. 1-1 
and l-3, p. 3 and 6 (Arabic). 
1:\:1 
0 
investigation into a number of options and controls will bring about a 
crisis within the next 15 years.(12) 
The very nature of the land resources, climatic conditions and 
groundwater quality seriously mitigate against an expansion of con-
ventional irrigated agriculture. Only 29,000 ha. of the land area are 
considered to have irrigat.S~. soils and these are fragmented and dis-
persed over numerous small depressions. Only 25 percent of farm areas 
are usually under irrigation at any one time. These constraints may be 
devalued by adoption of improved irrigation including recent advances 
in hydroponics using the nutrient film method, by which agricultural 
production has shown dramatic results in arid regions.(13) 
While the developmen+. of modern technology for the desalination 
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of sea water has revolutionised the water economics of the arid ~one, 
particularly in the Arabian Gulf where abundant energy from vast oil and 
gas accumulations exists, in contrast, the role of ground water reserves 
in Qatar and their potential for phased expansion is becoming increasing 
less practicable due to limited resources and over-extraction.(l4) 
Rainfall and water are scarce about 50% of the needed water supply is 
provided by desalination, and the remainder from 300 artesian wells in 
the northern part of the peninsula.(l5) Not only is there a deterioration 
in the quality of cultivable land but the declining quality of pumped 
water is one indicator of a general depletion of water~resources following 
rates of extraction consistently higher than recharge. The expected 
useful life of the northern aquifers, for example, at present 
extraction rates, will be shorter than that of the oil-fields; some 20-
30 years.(l6) 
The major absolute constraints therefore is that of water supply. 
About two-thirds of domestic and indur.::trial water consumption (involving 
about 98% of the population and 95% of economic activity) is met by 
sea-water desalination plants but a f~w hundred farms and between 1500 
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and 2000 farmers and labourers consume about 43 million cu. metres of 
ground-water per annump 75% of the total extractedp and are mainly 
responsible for rapid and irreversible depletion.(l7) Given this, 
the critically sensitive crop-climate relationship, the shortage of 
labour and lastly, the low degree of full commitment to commercial 
farming by landownersp th~ only way open to viable non-subsidised 
agricultural growth would seem to be in a very small number of highly 
specialised production units. Capitally intensive, employing high 
technology and skills in multi-cropping of vegetables and non-tree-
fruit, and efficiently utilising irrigation water at no more than half' 
the present rates, these would seem to be the best way of utilising 
scarce resources and producing marketable commodities. 
The real problems herep as else where in the Gulf, remain 
quantitative and qualitative limitations of water, soil and labour. 
UAE: 
In UAE rainfall is erratic and low, generally_between 25 mm 
(1 inch) and 125 mm (5 inches) a year, slightly higher in the mountains. 
The cultivated area is estimated at 11,000 hectares all irrigated. 
Much of the UAE is desert or scrub, and because of scarce water resources 
and limited arable land. less than h·alf of one percent of the tot::l.l. 
land area is cultivated.(l8) 
Cultivation is limited mainly to parts of the Emirates of 
Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah and to a few scattered ~e~s such- as Al-Ain 
and Liwa in the other Emirates. In these areas cultivation is mainly 
on small private holdings which depend on underground water resources.(l9) 
Oman: 
. 2 Oman extends over some 300,000 km of which only about 37.000 ha. 
(0.12%) are cropped. Most of the area consists of desert, sparsely 
populated by nnrn:1dic herdsmen. The agricultural areas are located where 
sui table water hm; b!Jc-n found and developed, ci thcr through the aflaj 
system of man-made underground channels, as in much of the interior, 
or, increasingly, from wells, equipped with motorized pumpsets.(20) 
Availability of water, and to a lesser extent suitable soil, is 
the major technical constraint to expansion of cropped area. No 
systematic studies of Oman's soils have been undertaken, although 
information based on limited surveys suggests that cultivable lands are 
restricted in extent and widely scattered. Unusually great contrasts 
in soil quality exist within short distances in presently-cropped areas. 
In these locations, deep medium textured soils with considerable 
potential for irrigated agriculture are closely associated with sandy 
or stoney soils which offer little or no potential for crop production. 
With yearly rainfall averaging less than 150 mm in most areas 
with suitable soils, all crop production requires irrigation. Until 
recently, little was known of the extent of potentially arable new lands 
and the amount of surface and underground water available for 
agriculture and livestock production. 
In 1973-75, a series of land and water resource studies were 
carried out which covered nearly all potential development areas. While 
of varying quality and coverage, these studies strongly suggest that 
the country has little unexploited water supply •. Excluding consider-
ations of water availability and the economics of development, up to 
10,000 additional ha. are suitable for crop production. More than 900 ha. 
of this to.tal are in Northern Oman (2,000 in Sharkiya; 2,000 in Wadi 
Quryat; 5,000 in the Batinah coast; and less than 1,000 in Dhofar). 
In uorne arf!<-lH limited unused quanti ties of water exist and its 
coincidence with suitable soiJ. would permit some increase in cropped area. 
The Sharkiya was identified as one of the most promising areas 
for expansion, with more restricted possibilities in the Interior, in 
Dhofar and, with improved management of the existing water resources, 
in the Batinah Coast. The studies suggest that even with favourable 
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economic conditions for development, an expansion in cropped area by 
something considerably less than the 10,000 ha. indicated by soil 
considerations would be possible. 
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Given the high costs of developing relatively small scattered 
areas which appear to be suitable, opportunities for economically-
viable expansion are likely to be limited. More efficient use of 
existing water would permit additional expansion, although this would 
require considerable expenditure on field reorganization, introduction 
of new methods of irrigation and agricultural extension work. 
Over exploitation of available water is a growing phenomenon in 
several areas, e.g. parts of the Batinah Coast, the Sur area and 
Buraimi in the Interior. This is resulting in falling fresh-water 
tables and deterioration in water quality through salt-water intrusion. 
The major effect until now has been to reduce crop yields, particularly 
for saline-sensitive crops such as citrus and some vegetables. Some 
abandonment of land has occurred. Continued deterioration of water 
supplies would lead to more serious, lasting effects on soil 
productivity.(21) 
Bahrain: 
In Bahrain annual rainfall averages about 70 mm (3 inches). Apart 
from a narrow fertile zone in the north, Bahrain is rocky and bare. 
The limestone rocks are covered by varying depths of sand which is often 
too poor and saline to support much vegetation apart from a few hardy 
desert species. Agriculture, traditionally important, has declined as 
a result of industrial competition for water, land and labour.(22) 
There are no rivers in Bahrain, but some springs provide fresh 
drinking water which is also used for irrigation. Agricultural 
productj.on in Bahrain is restricted by the small land area, the 
increasing salinity of the water supply, and the movement of labour to 
the urbanized sectors.(23) 
The total cultivated land area in Bahrain is estimated at about 
2000 hectares corresponding to 3.2 percent of the total land area 
25 
of Bahrain (Table 1.2). Agriculture uses over 120 million cubic metres 
of water out of a total consumption of about 170 cu. m. 
The problem is not whether water can be made available at a certain 
site, but rather, primarily, if it can be obtained cheaply enough to 
fit into the budget which handles it, and secondly, if it can be 
supplied in such a way so as to be assimilated as a new cultural amenity 
by the consumers. 
In effect, there is doubt whether governments here and elsewhere 
in the Gulf are educating their populations adequately in the costs and 
means of utilising new and expensive water sources in a way that will 
both protect the environment from ill-considered ventures into irrigated 
agriculture leading to soil salination and also constrain demand for 
water so that the energy sources used in desalination processes are not 
wastefully diverted from higher value operations. 
There is evidence that almost all the cultivable land in Bahrain 
was once used but by the mid 1970's the number of agricultural holdings 
had fallen to 885, covering some 3700 ha. of which less than half was 
utilised. Two-thirds of all agricultural employees (totalling almost 
1000) were non-Bahraini, and 34% of all holdings were, worked entirely 
by employees.(24) Poor quality water availability from the shallow 
wells which supply almost 90% of holdings individually, and the loss 
of land to non-rural demand were significant physical disincentive to 
existing farmers. Low returns on effort, relative to perceived urban 
opportunities, encourages a move out of farming and, as many holdings 
are retained only for residential purposes and for non-commercial family 
mw, the quality of effort and other input:;; and the eff'icir~ncy of water 
use have remained low :md in many cases declined. 
At present agriculture utilises 75% of extracted groundwater, 
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already over exploited.· It is P therefore P difficult to see how 
more planned intensive livestock productionp which would be dependent 
on locally grown fodder and/or imported feeq and make greater demands on 
water resources, can be justified economically. Artificial environ-
mental systems, devoted to vegetable and some fruit growing, would 
increase water-use efficiency but require considerable capital invest-
ment? labour and operational skills if costs·are not to be excessive. 
In Bahrain these demands compete with those of other sectors in a 
diversified economy. 
Saudi Arabia: 
Water Resources: There are regions, such as Buraidah and Qatif, 
where water is relatively abundantp but other regions such as Wajh, 
Dhiba and Asir lack water resources of sufficient quality. 
The growing population and the industrial development of the 
country have put water resources under pressure and current demand 
exceeds available supplies. Inadequate supply of water has proved to be 
a major impediment to a morerapid expansion in agricultural output. 
Of a total cultivated land· area estimated at 1.1 million hectare$in 
1971 only 390,000 hectares were irrigated and the rest were sparsely 
fed by rain. Recent surveys conducted in several regions of the 
country have indicated substantial groundwater resources, but their 
effective utilization is likely to be slow and costly.(25) 
Investigated more and more intensively since the 1930's, basic 
knowledge of g~oundwater resources was well-established by 1972. More 
detailed studies have been and are needed for speci.fic develop~ent 
areas but the general situation is clear.(26) 
The general wealth of groundwater resources in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is very large. In 1970 the chief geologist of the 
Mini~trt of AgriculL~re and w~ter st~ted:(27) 
"In the regions where sedimentary formations occur, 
groundwater conditions are favourable, at least in 
terms of quantity ••• the water stored in these form-
ations is fossil. However, the reserves are so huge 
that they will meet all the requirements of the 
kingdom for many centuries." 
Although requirements have vastly increased since this statement 
was made, it remains true that the aggregate national demand-supply 
ratio remains favourable. However, sectoral and spatial variations, 
both in demand and supply, alter the position very considerably.(28) 
In the Eastern province, as an example of Saudi agricultural 
expansion possibilities, studies proved the existence of notable 
possibilities for expansion as reflected in the following table, 
Table 1.3: 
Table 1.3 
Possibilities of Agricultural Expansion according to Water Availability 
(hectares) 
Region Cul.ti vated 1968 Max. Cultivable Could be Developed 
Jabrin 5,000 5,000 
Haradh 4,000 4,000 
Al Hassa 7,070 20,250 16,180 
Coastal Belt ( Qatif) 4,300 6,000 1,700 
Wadi Al-Miyah etc. 350 10,000 9,650 
Total 11,720 45,250 33,430 
Source: Bowen Jones, H. 'Agriculture and the use of Water Resources in 
the Eastern Provine~ in Saudi Arabia', in Issues in Development: 
The Arab Gulf States, edited by May Ziwar-Daftari (London: MD 
Research and services limited, 1980) p. 119. Table 1, p. 121. 
Desalination. To an increasing extent, the supply of water for 
urban.and industrial needs will come from desalination plants. Al Khobar 
already has one 75 million gallons a day plant and phase II will add 
another 76,000 cubic meters a day. Jubai 1' s t:hree phasfJS when completed 
during the third plan may produce almost 200,000 r:u. m/day - equivalent 
to double the annual maximum flow at Al Hassa! Nevertheless, the 
immense cost and complexity of building and operating such installations 
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and associated pipelines (the saline water conversion corporation 
supplies free to municipalities water which cost almost H 2 a gallon) 
places great onus on irrigation agriculture, the main water user, to 
utilize efficiently this most precious of resources.(29) 
A domestic production response to demand changes is inhibited 
by environmental limitations, and by shortages of indigenous labour 
and investment, neither of which can find rewarding attractions in 
agriculture. (30) 
1.3.2 AGS and ECWA 
In illustrating water resources and agriculture base of AGS from 
comparative view, we refer in the following to the situation in com-
parison with ECWA of which AGS constitute a part. 
(a) The irrigated cropped area of AGS constitutes 7-8 percent of 
total ECWA cropped area. (Table 1.4.) 
(b) Potentially permanent irrigated areas of AGS are estimated to 
constitute 6.2 percent of corresponding percentage of ECWA in 1985 and 
from 7.1 to 7.3 percent in the year 2000. (Table 1.4.) 
(c) Table 1.5 reflects the non-existence of surface water resouces 
of AGS, while other parts of the ECWA region, mainly in Iraq and Syria 
are relatively well-off in this respect. AGS' share of irrigated 
cropped area was only 8.9 percent in· 1975, while Iraq and Syria's share 
was more than 75 percent. 
(d) The comparatively weak AGS resource base in this respe.ct becomes 
very clear when referring to AGS: ECWA population percentage ratio 
which is 25.3% while area percentage is 66.2% (see table 1.6). 
Area, Water and Land Resources (Summary) 
This section has shown the existence of water and soil limitations 
in the AGS, limitations wich seem to constitute a serious constraint 
on agricultural development. This situation in addition to the 
inadequacy of information and comparative weak management o:f this 
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Table 1.4 
· Irrigated and Potentially Irrigated Areas in ECWA in 1975, 1985 
and 2000 (000 hectares) 
Country 
(a) fl.GS 
Saudi Arabia 
Other AGS 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Libanon 
Syria 
P!D.R.Y. 
N. Yemen 
(b) ECWA 
aib 
Irrigated Cropped 
Area 
1975 
205 
168 
37 
1567 
29 
60 
516 
63 
170 
2610 
7.8 
Potentiall~ Permanent Irrigated Areas 
1985 2000 
269 425- 500 
228 350- 400 
41 75- 100 
2825 3850-4400 
80 125- 140 
103 135- 150 
769 1050-1250 
115 150- 175 
160 200- 250 
4321 5935-6865 
6.2 7.1- 7.3 
Source: ECWA, 'Irrigated Agriculture in ECWA Region'. In Agriculture 
and Development, No. 2, May 1979. Table 2, p. 57. 
Table 1. 5 
Irrigated Areas According to the Source of Water (1975) (000) hectares 
Countr~ Surface Water Resources Ground Water Total % 
Resources 
Permanent Ephemeral 
flow flow 
AGS 247,000 8.9 
Saudi Arabia 98,800 91,200· 190,000 6.9 
Oman 36,000 36,000 1.3 
Other AGS 21,000 21,000 0.7 
Other ECWA 
Iraq 1,547,000 20,000 1,567,000 56.8 
Jordan 23,000 1,500 4,500 29,000 1.1 
Lebanon 47,500 12,500 60,000 2.2 
Syria 456,100 40,000 20,000 516,100 18.7 
P.D.R.Y. 84,000 26,000 110,000 4.0 
N. Yemen 73,000 120,000 37,000 230,000 8.3 
Total ECWA 2,759,100 100.0 
Source: Ibid., 'Table 4, p. 60. 
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Table 1.6 
AGS & ECWA Population and Area 
Population 1978 million Area 000 sg. kms. 
AGS 
S. Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Bahrain 
Oman 
Iraq 
Syria 
N. Yemen 
Jordan 
Libanon 
S. Yemen 
ECWA 
AGS : ECWA 
Sources: Table 1.1 
11.39 
8.20 
1.20 
0.71 
0.20 
0.28 
0.80 
12.2 
8.1 
5.6 
3.0 
3.0 
1.8 
45.09 
25.3% 
IBRD, World Development Report, 1980 
2459.5. 
2150.0 
17.8 
77.6 
1.1 
0.6 
212.4 
435 
185 
195 
98 
10 
333 
3715.5 
66.2% 
resource base tend to support the need for AGS joint efforts to carry 
out the following: 
1. Intensive and widespread surveys to identify we.ter and soil 
resources of the area should be adopted. Cooperation within the inter-
national circle seems to be important.in this field. 
2. As water resources are comparatively scarce and prospects are not 
promising joint efforts should be directed towards the more efficient 
use of existing water resources, applying modern methods and techniques. 
These activities necessitate joint research and training projects. 
This activity seems to demand high priority as it relates directly to all 
aspects of agricultural development in particular and the whole 
development process in general. 
3. Research and training are badly needed in the fields of science 
·based agricultural activities as well as in desalination processes. It 
has been shown that the best way of utili zing scarce resources and 
producing marketable commodities seem to be connected with highly 
specialized production units, capitally intensive, employing high 
technology and skills in multi-cropping of vegetables and non-tree 
fruit and efficiently utilizing irrigation water at no more than half 
the present rates. 
1.4 Hydrocarbon Resources 
It is of vital and logical importance to study the hydrocarbons 
resourc~s of the Arab Gulf states as these resources alone make basic 
development possible through providing the funds generated from oil 
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and gas exports. At the same time most of these countries rely on their 
hydrocarbon resources in planning to widen the base of their economics, 
which is reflected in the major programmes to build-up petrochemical 
industries based on hydrocarbon resources in Saudi Arabia, Ku·,.,ai t, . Qatar, 
UAE and to a less extent in Bahrain. 
1.4.1 Oil discovery 
The discovery of ol.l in the various A.G.S. extends over several 
decades. 
In Bahrain oil in commercial quantities was found in 1932 and 
export commenced in 1935. 
Bahrain's oil production is relatively small compared to 
neighboi.tring countries. It reached a maximum of 28 million barrels in 
1970, and has been gradually declining ever since. It has been 
estimated that the 1976 rate of production will last ·about 15 years.(31) 
Th~ Government.shares production revenue from Abu Sa'fa field 
which straddles the off shore boundary with Saudi Arabia; field output; 
in mid-1976 had dropped to 100,000 barrels a day from 200,000 bld. 
12 months earlier. 
Oil accounts for approximately 80% of the GDP and a similar 
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portion of the Government revenues.(32) 
In Saudi Arabia oil was first produced in commercial quantities 
in 1938 at Dammam Dome near Dhahran (the depth of the well was 4727 feet). 
This proved to be an important oil field. From that date Saudi Arabia 
as a whole has been transformed from being a land of total scarce 
resources to one of the richest countries in oil resource all over the 
world. 
The discovery of the above mentioned well was followed by the 
drilling of other wells in the Eastern province. The outbreak of war 
in 1939 brought many difficulties against investigation. By the end of 
1945 three further fields had been discovered. 
The production of crude oil has shown an average annual increase 
from 1940 to 1950 of about 53.4 percent; from 1951 to 1961 about 9.3 
percent and from 1962 to 1972 about 14.0 percent. The rate of increase 
was not constant, the production fell during the Second World War 
to its lowest in the years 1941-43. In 1944 production jumped 60.1 
percent over 1943, but after this production increases were associated 
with the rate of discovery of more fields, and from 1955 to 1958 
increases were moderate compared with most of the post war years.(33) 
In Kuwait, the second test well, in the Burgan area south of 
Kuwait bay, discovered oil in April 1938 and opened up what is perhaps 
the most prolific single oil field in the world. Eight additional 
wells were drilled before the war forced suspension or--field work, 
in 1942. Consequently the first commercial production in Kuwait was in 
~·O·C 
1946. Post war period permitted~to develop the Burgan field and 
pipeline, refinery storage and large berthing facilities at Mina 
Alhmadi were completed by the end of 1949. 
Four of the eight producing fields in Kuwait are prOlific. Burgan, 
the initial discovery in 1938, has a capacity of close to 1 million bjd. 
Magwar and Raudhatain fields are in the 200,000 bid. class and Ahmadi, 
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over 1-50,000 b/d. (34) 
The Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone was established in 1922. 
In March 1953, oil was discovered from Wafra field with moderate 
size.(35) Combined production capacity of three onshore fields is 
about 200,000 bld. Offshore are the Hout and Khafji oil fields with 
a normal capacity of 300,000 bld. and nearly 50,000 bld.(36) 
In Qatar the first discovery of oil was made onshore in 1939 
at Dukhan. In 1942, the company plugged all wells and suspended 
operations for the duration of the war. Field activities were resumed 
in 1947, and the first shipment was made in 1949 (Table 1.7) from the 
Umm Said terminal. In UAE, Abu Dhabi is the largest oil producer 
accounting for over 80% of UAE output. Offshore areas of Dubai and 
Sharjah also produce oil, and there is a chance that Ras Al Khaimah 
may join the ranks of producers. There has been drilling offshore 
Umm al-Qaiwain, but no commercial oil has been found.(37) 
The search for oil in the seven Emirates began in January 1939. 
But it was not until July 1962 that exportation began from ADMA's 
(Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited) offshore Urn Shaif field and this was 
followed in December 1963 by the first exports from ADPC'S (Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company) offshore Bab field. In Dubai o11 was discovered 
in commercial quantities in 1966 and exportation commenced in September 
1969, from the offshore Fateh field operated by Dubai petroleum company 
(DPC). Oil was discovered in Sharjah in 1972, and exportation 
commenced in July 1974, from the offshore concession of Crescent 
petroleum company (CPC). 
In Oman prospecting for oil began in 1937 but oil was not found 
in Yebal, Fahud, and Natih in northcentral Oman until 1964. Regular 
commercial exports of crude oil began in August 1967.(38) 
Oman's crude oil production, while modest in comparison with 
most_other oil producing countries in the Arabian peninsula, is vital 
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to the country's economy, accounting for nearly two-thirds of GDP, more 
than ·go percent of government domestic revenue and virtually all 
export earnings. All of Oman's crude oil output is exported except 
for a small amount used for power generation.(39) 
In the AGS as a whole the revenue from oil have exceeded the 
needs for the current as well as the capital investment .expenditure and 
permitted the achievement of large surpluses. Saudi Arabia alone has 
built up two-thirds of the whole Arab petroleum surpluses, followed by 
Kuwait with 21% and UAE with 13%. These three AGS countries have 
achieved around 98% of the total A~ab petroleum financial surplun.(40) 
(Further relevant analysis in Chapter 14.) 
1.4.2 Oil Participation 
The potentially most important innovation in the oil producing 
countries has been the introduction of the concept of participation. 
By the end of 1972 Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.reached 
agreement with the major petroleum companies operating in their 
respective territories giving each signatory government a share in the 
oil companies in its territory that would rise by stipulated stages 
from 25 percent at the beginning of 1973 to 51 percent in 1982 with 
compensation to be paid in a manner specified in the agreement. But as 
we will see later, the terms of participation were later changed.(41) 
In January, 1973, Qatar acquired a 25 percent share in the equity 
of QPC and SCQ (Shell Company of Qatar) and this was raised to 60 percent 
effective from January, 1974. On September 16, 1976 an agreement was 
signed where by Qatar acquired the remaining 40 percent foreign owned 
share of QPC. Subsequently on February, 1977 a similar agreement was 
signed for the acquisition of the remaining 40 percent foreign owned 
share by ~;CQ. 
ln Kuwait approximately 90 percent of crude oil output i.n recent 
years was p~oduced by the Kuwait Oil Company (KUC), until 1973 
equally owned by BP and Gulf. The Kuwait Government acquired a 25 
percent share in KOC effective January 1, 1973; this participation 
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was raised to 60 percent effective January 1, 1974 and in December 1975, 
an agreement was reached for full nationalization of KOC effective 
ret~~ctively to March 5, 1975.(42) 
In UAE, effective January 1, 1974, Abu Dhabi acquired a 60 percent 
participation share in the equity of ADPC and ADMA (the two companies 
developing petroleum in the country) under a participation agreement 
which replaced the 1973 participation agreement under which the 
Emirates had acquired a 25 percent share in the equity of the 
operating companies. 
In Bahrain an agreement giving 60 percent participation to the 
Bahrain Government was reached in November, 1974, and in March, 1975 
the Bahrain Government announced that it intended to take over full 
ownership of BAPCO. 
In Saudi Arabia the structure of the oil industry has, in recent 
years, been undergoing a basic change, with the position of the 
concessionary companies altering radically. A major innovation related 
to the introduction of the 50-50 profit sharing principle of 
participation, and the Government-Company relationship has been 
changing its fundamental character. The Saudi Government first took 
a 25% equity interest in Aramco, but increased it to 60% in the summer 
of 1974, and announced its intention to have 100% control and owner-
ship of Aramco, to'which the four original Aramco shareholders agreed 
in principle by the end of 1975. 
In Oman, Petroleum Development Oman, (~DO), ·is the sole 
operating oil company. The Government acquired a 25 percent share in 
PDO effective January 1, 1974, and in July, 1974 this share was 
increased to 60 percent retroactive to January 1, o~nership of each of 
the other partners being reduced proportionate+y~ Sirice January 1974 
·-~· 
foreign partners have paid royalties and taxes on their 40 percent 
equity share, the Government 60 pe:"'cent part,icipation, oil being 
bought back by the foreign partners or sold directly to third parties. 
A new financial arrangement was negotiated in May, 1977.(43) 
To summarize, this AGS group of countries has extremely 
important oil wealth achieved through a high rate of exploitation 
development. Collectively these countries are second only to the U.S. 
in terms of cumulative production. 
The most important innovation in the oil producing countries 
has been the introduction of the concept of either participation or 
full control over oil development. Most of these countries now own 
100% of the companies assets. Thus they have become either partici~ants 
or full controllers in the full spectrum of oil industry functions: 
"upstream", or exploration, development and the p·roduction of crude 
oil and natural gas, and "downstream", or operations of transport, 
refining, marketing, and distribution.(44) 
Finally, it is important to refer to the major new developments 
in the pricing of crude oil and in the financial arrangements between 
the governments of oil producing countries and the operating foreign-
owned oil companies. which took place in late 1973. A sharp increase 
in posted prices was decided in December ].973, and .f::ffecti ve from 
January 1974. The posudprice for the Market crude was set at U.S. 
dollar 11.65 per barrel representing an increase of 350 percent over the 
January 1973 level. 
As a result of. these changes as well as of the increase in the 
Government's participation the average government take per barrel of 
the market crude rose, i~ Saudi Arabia for example, as of January 1, 1974 
to 5.7 times the level on January 1, 1973.(45)· Since this time it has 
·been the producer countries which have taken the initiative, mainly 
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through OPEC, in setting the official prices at which they will sell 
oil. These, in turn, have become very strongly influenced by AGS 
national needs for development revenue and, vice versa, development 
planning has become affected by changes in oil revenue flows. 
1.4.3 Depletable Resourc~ 
Although an enormous amount of oil reserves exist in the AGS, 
these reserves are expected to be depleted inbetween 12-168 years 
at 1981 level of production, given the existing·potential of creating 
other sources of energy at competitive prices to petroleum (Table 1•7). 
Total oil reserves in the AGS are estimated at the end of 1981 
to be 273.9 bn barrels. In Saudi Arabia these reserves are estimated 
at 167.8 bn barrels (61.3% of all Countries of t~e sub-region) 
with estimated 46 years of production at 1981 level of production. 
In Kuwait reserves are estimated at 67.7 bn barrels (24.7~) with 
estimated 168 years of production at 1981 level. In the Neutral Zone 
Reserves are estimated to be 6.2 bn barrels (2.3%) with 37 years of 
production. (Neutral Zone estimates are for the year 1976.) 
In UAE reserves are estimated to be 32.3 bn barrels with 58 
years of production. (Dubai reserves 1,400 mn barrels with 14 years 
of production, and Sharjah reserves of 25 mn barrels with 20 years 
of production, Dubai and Sharjah estimates are for the year 1976). 
UAE reserves correspond to 11.8% of AGS reserves. Qatar reserves 
are estimated at 3.4 bn barrels (1.~~) with 22 years of production 
whilst Oman reserves are estimated to be 2.6 bn barrels (0.9%) with 
22 years of production. Bahrain reserves are estimat~d to be 0.2 bn 
barrels (0.1%) with 12 years of production. 
However, these published reserves figures are estimated to be 
conservative to different degrees by many experts who consider that 
a more realistic level or recoverable reserves would be higher.(46) 
\~ile AGS production percentage to OPEC and World was 59.1 and 23.6 
respectively in 1981, AGS reserves' estimates corresponding percentage 
\'las 62.7 and 40.8 respectively (Table 1. 7). 
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Table 1.7 
AGS, OPEC & World Oil Production, Reserves and Years of Production 
Country First Production Reserves Reserves Years of 
Commercial 1981 bn barrels % Production 
Production (000 b/d) 31.12.81 1981 level 
Saudi Arabia 1938 9,827 167.8 61.3 46 
Kuwait 1946 1,101 67.7 24.7 168 
UAE 1962 (1) 1,512 32.2 11.8 58 
Qatar 1949 Op414 3.4 1.2 22 
Oman 1967 0,317 2.6 0.9 22 
Bahrain 1934 0,044 0·2 0.1 12 
Total AGS 13,215 (2) 273.9 (2) 100.0 56 
Total OPEC. 22,354 436.5 
Total World 55,886 670.9 
AGS:OPEC 59.1 62.7 
AGS:World 23.6 40.8 
(1) Abu-dhabi 
(2) Excluding Neutral Zone (Reserves estimated in the end of 1977 at 
6,200 bn barrel) 
Source: CAEU, Arab Central Bureau of Statistics and Documentation. 
at 
EIU, Oil in the Middle East, Annual Supplement, 1978, London, 1978. 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
UAE 
Bahrain 
Oman 
Total AGS (1) 
Total OPEC 
Total World 
AGS:OPEC 
AGS:World 
Table 1.8 
AGS 2 OPEC & World Gas Production and Reserves 
Production (1980) Reserves 
cu. m. mn cu. m. bn 
(21.12.1981) 
54,082 3,345.6 
0,878 981.2 
6,400 1,699.0 
14,859 658.4 
4,757 242.7 
N.A. 76.4· 
88,896 7,003.3 
270,412 28,915.0. 
1,675,010 82,440.7 
32.9 24.2 
5.3 8.5 
Reserves 
% 
47.8 
14.0 
24.2 
9.4 
3.5 
1.1 
100.0 
(1) Excluding Neutral Zone, (Reserve estimated at 1 Jan. 1977 to be 142 
cu.m.bn). 
Source: CAEU, op. cit. 
International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1977 (Tusslo: The Petroleum 
Publishing Co., 1977). 
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1.4.4 Gas Resources 
Another development indicating a new pattern emerging in AGS 
hydrocarbon activities is the discovery and exploitation of gas. Gas 
exploration and exploitation permitted these countries in general terms, 
to become more and more preoccupied with the post-oil era endeavouring 
to develop their economies and diversity by their revenue resources. 
Natural gas which was often a waste by-product of oil lifting 
that was flared off in earlier years, is now being utilized, through 
reinjection, as a source of energy for domestic industry, as a feed 
stock in petro-chemicals, and increasingly, for export in the form of 
liquified gas. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries have already 
instituted, or are instituting, schemes for more complete utilization 
of gas. 
Saudi Arabia: 
In addition to its crude oil reserves, Saudi Arabia also possesses 
large reserves of natural gas, estimated on 31 December 1981, at 3,345.6 bn 
cubic meters representing 47.&~ of the whole gas reserves of the sub-
region (Table 1.8). 
Considerable amount of gas are produced together with crude oil 
but most of the gas is presently flared. One of the major projects 
in the Second Five-Year Plan, estimated to cost between US i 5-10 
billion depending on its ultimate scope, is the development of a 
national gas grid system involving the gathering, transmission and 
treatment of some 3.5-5.5 billion cubic feet daily of natural gas. 
Some gas will be used as fuel for planned large new domestic 
projects, including major petro-chemicals and other industrial ventures 
as well as an extended electric power network, and the remainder will 
be exported in the_ form of natural gas liquids (NGL). After the 
completion of this project in the 1980's Saudi Arabia is thought capable 
of supplying over 10 percent of the world market of NGL.(47) 
Kuwait: 
At the beginning of 1982~ Kuwait's proven reserves of natural 
gas were estimated at about 981.2 billion cu.m., i.e. at about 
1 percent of world reserves and 14.0% of the sub-region reserves 
(Table 1.8). 
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Natural Gas has so far been produced entirely in association with 
crude oil as the only non-associated gas field~ discovered offshore 
in the neutral zone in 1972~ has not yet been commercially utilized. 
Additionally non-associated gas fields may be discovered in conjunction 
with the deep drilling programme which is currently being conducted. 
Natural Gas is used in Kuwait for reinjection into the oil 
fields to maintain their reservoir pressure, for water desalination, 
for electricity generations,and as raw material in the petrochemical. 
and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) industries. The remaining gas output 
is flared. 
The ratio of utilized to .produced gas is currently the highest 
in the Middle East.(48) 
Qatar: 
There are substantial natural gas deposits in Qatar, but until 
recently these have not been utilized. Associated gas produced in 
conjunction with oil, has for the most part been flared with only 
small amounts used for the operating companies power generation 
requirements, to power desalination, cement and fertilizer factories. 
But with the opening of the Natural Gas Liquid~, NGL~ plant at Umm Said 
in January, 1975~ greater utilization of Gas has followed, including 
new electricity generating stations and a polyethylene plant.(49) 
Gas deposits in Qatar were estimated to be on 31 December 1981, at 
around 1(,99 b i. I I :i.on c:u. m • representing 24.2% of the AGS reserve~ 
(Table 1.8). 
U.A.E.: 
.The exploitation of gas began in May, 1977 with the commissioning 
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of the Das Island plant. Gas reserves were estimated on 31 December 1981 
to be around 658.4 billion cu. m., (9.4% of AGS reserves).(50) 
In February, 1975, an agreement was signed to build an LPG plant 
to utilize associated gas from Dubai's two offshore fields, this 
plant designed to produce 70 million cubic feet of LPG daily for 
domestic co"nsumption and 700,000 tons annually for export, as well as 
providing dry gas (methane) for use in the aluminium smelter project 
and for electricity generation.(51) 
Bahrain: 
Bahrain has vast reserves of natural gas. The gas is of 
especially high quality as it has a low sulphur and moisture content 
and is not associated with oil. Initial estimates of the gas reserves 
ranged from 16 trillion cubic feet to as high as 24 trillion cubic feet. 
Gas reserves are estimated to last 80 years at 1974 levels.(52) 
First used for municipal electricity generation and in the refinery, 
gas has become the main energy source.(53) 
In Bahrain it is this gas availability which made possible the 
Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) plant and which leads the.state to hope for 
f~trther heavy industrial development. It provides a cheap and constant 
source of eriergy for.Alba's 300 MW power station and the Aluminium 
Company is now using 104 mm cubic feet per day of the 227 mm cubic feet 
daily production. The rest goes to run Bapco's LSFO Unit and the. 
Government's 95 MW power station or is field injected.(54) 
1. 4. 5 Flare Gas 
"Flare gas/oil ratio on the whole Arab Gulf countries 
may average somewhere between 600-700 cubic feet per · 
barrel. This figure could be on the low side •. For a 
crude oil production of 11 million barrels per day 
- and the quantity is still rising- this means more 
than seven billion cubic feet of gas per day. To put 
the figures into proper perspective, however, this is 
enough gas to provide more than the entire world 
fertilizer consumption of ammonia."(55) 
Much of the AGS natural gas contains size~ble perc~ntage of ethane 
and heavier hydrocarbons. It thus provides a suitable raw material 
not only for Ammonia but also for such chemical building blocks as 
ethylene, propylenep butylene;butadrene etc. AGS also have large 
resources of sour gas from which sulphur can be economically recovered.(56). 
Production Costs 
The Middle East produces oil at a relativel~ low cost when com-
pared with producers outside the region and consequently its price 
contains a certain element of economic rent.(S7) The relation between 
different costs of producing oil and the creation of economic rent has 
been recognized by economists and, in a lecture, delivered in February, 
1971, Mr. F.S. McFad~ean, a Managing Director of Royal Dutch Shell 
said: 
"Where wells are prolific and shallowp costs cari be less 
than 10 cents a barrel; at the other extreme; in the 
North sea and the USA for example, costs can be ten or 
twenty times greater: and there are all points of 
variation between these two wide differences in costs, 
which therefore have produced fairly substantial 
economic rents in certain areas."(58) 
1.5 Mineral Resources 
1.5.1 Ferrous Metal Ores 
Iron Ore: 
Inspite of efforts undertaken by some countries of the AGS, no 
commercially exploitable iron ore deposits have been found yet in the Sub-
region and the problem of securing adequate domestic supply of iron 
ore for the existing and planned metallurgical industries remains 
unsolved. At the present time, established enterprises are oriented 
towards the utilization of imported iron ore or pellets.(59) 
At present, the most promising areas for iron ore deposits of some 
economic value are located primarily in Western Saudi Arabia. Although 
exploration and investigation activities are continuing in some of 
tpese areas, no iron deposits of commercial value have yet been 
discovered. ( 60) 
The following iron ore deposits in Saudi Arabia are worth 
mentioning: 
- Wadi Fatima, according to some calculations, reserves of the iron 
ore in Wadi Fatima deposit amount to 48.5 million tons of 46.2% iron, 
15.0 million tons of which can be mineable in an open pit operation 
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to a depth of 200 m. Many factors, including the size of reserves and 
costs of underground mining prevent further development of this 
deposit, however feasibility studies of this deposit with a view to 
assessing it as a source of supply for metallurgical uses have been 
suggested. 
- Sawawin iron ore deposit, total reserves amounting approximately 400 
million tons of 42% iron grade and 0-6% phosphate. The deposit is 
suitable for open pit mining, but its high phosphate content prevent 
this deposit from being economically exploitable. 
- Jabal Idsas, at the present time, reserves of this deposit are 
estimated at 80 million tons of 55-65% grade iron ore.(61) 
Manganese Ore: 
Manganese is mainly used in ferrous metallurgy, chemical and 
electro-chemical industries, and to a lesser extent in c~ramic and paint 
production. At the present time, manganese deposits and occurrences are 
known to exist in Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
In Oman, a manganese deposit which was discovered in Ras Al Modo, 
was studied and evaluated in 1969, 1973 and 1974 by experts, but results 
are not yet available. 
In UAE several manganese oxide lenses were discovered in metamorphic ~.; 
rocks north of Asimah. At the present time, the commercial value of 
those deposits is not clear, but preliminary geological investigation 
showed that the discovery of manganese deposits of commercial grade is 
posuible. (.G;2) 
In Saudi Arabia, analysis of two samples from Wadi Bidah show 
12.5% and 12.9% content of manganese and 9.5% and 16.8% of iron.(63) 
Chrome Ore: 
At the present time, in the AGS, there are no exploitable chromium 
deposits although, mining operations for chromium ore took place earlier 
in Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
In Oman, chromium mineralization is related to the large ophi olite 
belt and extends over 600 Km along the north-eastern coast. The Farfar 
area has been investigated in more detail, with five chromite deposits 
occurring within an area of less than 1 Km2 in precipitous terrain to 
the east of Farfar village. Among many deposits identified, Farfar 1, 
where 160,000 tons of ore may be found, can be considered as one of 
economic value. 
"But the complex chemical composition of the ore and the 
location of the deposit in a particularly inaccessible part. 
of the mountains would pose considerable problems to 
exploitation. 11 (64) 
The Jinah chromite deposit is easily accessible, but is small in 
size. A preliminary evaluation of this deposit indicated that the ore 
is of low grade. 
Preliminary investigations for metallic and industrial minerals 
in Dubai, Ras al Kha1map, Ajman, Umm al Quawain, Fujarah and Sharjah led 
·to the discovery of potentially rich chromite ores.(65) 
1.5.2 Development of the ferrous industry 
The development of the ferrous industry in the ·AGS area faces the 
problem of nonavailability of local mineral raw materials in general 
and of iron ore in particular. Since none of the AGS has economically 
e~ploitable iron ore deposits at the present time, establishment of 
metallurgical plants is mainly oriented towards the utilization of 
imported iron ore or pellets, as was previously mentioned. 
One of the basic advantages of AGS is the availability of enormous 
cheap gas reserves which, when used in a direct reduction process for 
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iron production, would result, in saving US ~ 10 per ton if iron 
produced. This method offers possibilities for establishing profitable 
mini-plants of a relatively small capacity, but which would be enough 
to meet local demand. 
1.5.3 Non-ferrous metal ores 
Copper: 
Copper plays an important role in world economy, being second in 
value in world trade to petroleum. 
In AGS, no copper deposits have yet been developed. However, 
some countries, notably Oman, are starting the exploitation of copper.(66) 
In Saudi Arabia, several hundreds of copper occurences have been 
discovered in the area of the Arabian shield. Inspite of numerous 
copper ore manifestation only some of them can be considered as 
promising ones and are worthy of further development. Copper at Jabal 
Sayid, 300 m north east of Jeddah was discovered in 1965. The largest 
reserves of copper ore has been as certained in the fourth ore body 
grading 1.5%-2.5% copper, with total reserves (including probable) 
are in excess of 20 million tons. Insufficient data on the size, grade 
of ore, metallurgical concentration characteristics and economic 
evaluation, prevents immediate development of this deposit.(67) 
North and south Nuqrah deposits have probable reserves of 175,000 
tons each, but possible reserves in south Nuqrah reach 1 million tons with 
the following average grades of metals: Cu - 3.44%, Pb and Zn - 7.6%, 
Au - 5.86 gltp Ag - 235 glt. Further work will aim at the investigation 
of possible ore bodies between north and south Nuqrah and in the deeper 
zones of the known mineralized areas. Inspite of the small reserves of 
the north and south Nuqrah deposits they can be considered by world-wide 
experience as economically exploitable. The existing reserves in both 
deposits could be economically exploited for a period of 10 to 12 years 
at a rate of 100 to 140 thousand tons of copper ore per annum. Due to 
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small ore reserves smelting and refining are not advised.(68) 
Sha'ab El Tare deposits have total ore reserves estimated at 
4,000,000 tons containing 0.36% copper; 1.09% zinc, 0.55 grams of gold and 
3.46 grams of silver per ton of ore.(69) 
The Jadmah deposit has the following ore reserves: 0.2 million 
tons of 4.8% copper ore, 3.0 million tons of copper ore with 1% copper, 
and 1.0 million tons 2.3% copper ore plus recoverable amount of gold, 
silver and zinc. 
"At present, because of insufficient reserves of high 
grade copper ore and the complication of the mineralized 
zone by various intrusive rocks, additional drilling both 
in the main and in the western zone of the deposit, 
geophysical survey and geological mapping have been 
planned and some are under way aiming at economic 
evaluation of this deposit."(70) 
S'afra deposit has been estimated to have ore reserves of about 
2 million tons with 2% cu, without assessment of the economic value of 
the deposit. 
In Oman, one of the most important results of geological 
investigations and prospecting was the discovery of a copper deposit 
near Sohar, comprising approximately 12 million tons of copper ore, 
with a 2.1% copper content. The deposit consists of four ore bodies, 
Lasail, Aurja, Bayda and Rakah. 
"It is strongly indicated that tributary peripheral 
deposits wip be found. Tb~.se will extend life or increase 
through put· as the case may be." ( 71) ·. · 
"A treatment plant of 3,000 metric tonnes per day is 
planned, providing 11 years operation on the current 
reserves.''.( 72) 
Preliminary evaluation showed in some deposits a rather high 
content of copper (up to 6.25%) but no estimation of ore reserves 
was carried out for them.(73) 
Lead and Zinc Ore: 
In the AGS the most important lead and zinc mineralization occur 
mainly in polymetallic complex ores in association with copper, gold 
and silver, but until the present time no lead and zinc deposits have 
been exploited. 
In Saudi Arabia complex polymetallic ores of the Nuqrah North and 
Nuqrah South deposits can be considered as a lead-zinc ores as well 
since the total lead-zinc grade is much higher- than the minimum required 
for commercial grade. The size of lead and zinc reserves in both of 
these deposits alone is according to international-standards large 
enough to justify their mining.(74} 
A1-Amar deposit, proven reserves are estimated at 3.75 million 
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tons with 5% Zn in rich zones; probable reserves amount to 25 million tons 
with an average of 1.5% Zn in the whole stock work. The economic value 
of this deposit is riot clear and further evaluation is required. The 
Samrah deposit, proven .ore reserves estimated at 300,000 tons with 5% 
of Zn, 1% of Pb and 446 g/6 of silver potential reserves amount to 
800,000 tons. Gold is also present in the ore but its average content 
was not determined. At Jabal Dhaylan the weighted average grade of all 
drilled intersections is 4.9% zinc and 1.39% lead. Further exploration 
will assess the feasibility of mining the deposits. 
Nickel: 
Nickel ore deposits are known to exist in Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
In Oman the economic value of the deposits is ndt c.lear. InS_a.udi Arabia 
nickel grades range from 0.5% to over 3%, the ore reserves have not yet 
been estimated but preliminary investigations and exploration indicated 
that this deposit may be economically exploitable.(75} 
Rock Salt: 
This mineral plays an important role in the life of human beings 
and are used in various branches of industry. Rock salt is not only 
used as a .food product but is also used as a fodder and for the 
production of various chemical products. It is also used in soap and 
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paint production, oil and pharmaceutical industries and for at least 
1500 other uses. 
In Saudi Arabia, although a large rock deposit was discovered in 
1969 in the Jizan area, with possible reserves of over 1 billion tons 
there are many factors which make it uneconomic, notably the low grade 
of salt rock (20% less than the desired quality) and the limited loading 
facilities at the seaport of Jizan. Given the geological background, 
salt deposits of economic value may also be found in Oman. (76) 
1.5.4 Industrial Minerals 
Magnesite: 
No magnesite deposits have yet been exploited in the AGS: 
"However that during the next few years, mining may start 
and discoveries of new magnesite occurrences and 
deposits of economic value may be made. 11 (77) 
Some deposits of high quality magnesite have been located in Saudi 
Arabia containing reserves over 1 million tons of a good grade magnesite 
(MgCQ3 7/95% and Sio2 ~ 2%). This is under detailed exploration by 
a private company. 
Magnesite was reported to be found in Oman and UAE, but without 
commercial value till now. 
1.5.5 Building mineral raw materials 
Marble and Stone: 
The mining and processing of marble has been conducted-in Saudi 
Arabia for many years. About fifteen marble deposits in Saudi Arabia 
are now under operation, the most important located at Wadi Fathma, Jabal 
Farasan, Madragah and Bahra. Saudi Arabian marble is extensively used 
in public and private construction and occasionally exported to neigh-
bouring countries. ·At the same time the country is continuing to 
import large quantities of marble.(78) 
Oman is planning to produce about 1 million tons of marble blocks. 
In the,UAE a small plant, situated between Dubai and Sharjah uses 
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a mixture of imported and local materials in the 'production of small 
dimensional stones. All large blocks of high quality marble are imported. 
Ras al Khaymah produces aggregate from crushed igneous rocks. 
In Bahrain, dolomite is the most commonly used and is quarried 
regularly at several sites on the east central side of Bahrain Island. 
Gypsum: 
Adequate gypsum for domestic needs and export is available in 
western Saudi Arabia along the Red Sea coastal plain, in the Gulf of 
Aqaba area, in central Arabia near Ar-Riyadh and along the Arabian Gulf 
coastal plain. 
The National Gypsum company constructed in the early 1960's a modern 
plant in Riyadh for the processing of gypsum using rotary calciners to 
produce 200 tons of plaster per day. Part of the production is exported 
to other Arab countries. A market study is planned to determine the 
competitiveness of Saudi gypsum in the world markets of Mediterranean 
and East African countries before expanding its production.(79) 
Clay: 
Clay is found in many areas in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, 
further studies are being conducted to evaluate its feasibility and 
uses. 
1.5.6 Mineral resources and development 
(a) Inspite of the availability of relatively large potential reserve~ 
of mineral raw materials in the region, and their economic importance, 
imtentorization and evaluation of these deposits remain a problem of 
first priority. 
(b) "Unfortunately, the present situation in the field of· 
mineral resources (other .~han oil and gas) in the AGS is 
not encouraging.· Among all kinds of metallic raw 
materials, only copper is mined in Oman. Despite the 
existence of a ferrous industry in a number of countries 
in the region, all metallurgical plants still depend in 
their production on imported iron concentrates. Further-
more, the aluminium industry established in some 
countries of the Arabian Gulf is completely dependrmt on 
imported bauxite. The demand of all kinds of metal 
is therefore met by imports of raw materials, semi-
manufactured and manufactured products."(80) 
(c) Exploitation of mineral resources, other than oil and gas 
constitutes an important means of economic diversification and an 
important factor in establishing a solid economic structure. However 
they seem to be of long-term nature. 
1.5.7 Mineral resources : Summary 
The above-mentioned review concerning the current situation 
relating to the mineral resources in the AGS proves that the richness 
in hydro carbon deposits in the Gulf area is in no way matched by 
wealth in other minerals. 
With the proved feasibility of extracting copper in Oman, rock 
salts in the UAE and the probable feasibility of copper exploitation 
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and some other minerals (iron, phosphates etc.) in Saudi Arabia and some 
other parts of the AGS area (including copper, sulphur, uranium in the 
UAE) increasing levels of exploration may reveal new deposits. 
Consequently the following joint activities seem to be of priority 
in the AGS: 
(a) Sub-regional geographical and geophysical investigation mainly 
in the promising areas. This is needed because most of the territory 
still needs to be studied and surveyed before a proper evaluation 
of its mineral resources can be undertaken. 
(b) Compilation of geological, structural maps. 
(c) Using the results of previous studies and analysis, compilation 
of regional metallogenic prognostic maps should be carried out. 
These activities will make sub-regional exploration work on a 
regular and scientific basis possible and efficient. Such activities 
require at the same time the establishment of sub-regional or regional 
machinery to assist member countries in the implementation of projects 
relating to exploration and investigation. This kind of work is very 
costly and is too often not sufficiently profitable to be undertaken 
by private companies alone. Assistance from regional, international 
organisations, Arab funds are needed. (81) 
Clearly the relative profitability of mineral extraction in the 
AGS will change over time and the value of the resources will depend 
on how and for what purposes they are utilized. The way in which 
relevant decisions are affected by the level at which decisions are 
taken, i.e. national, sub-regional, regional or international, will 
be examined in Chapters 9 and 10. The danger at the moment is that 
the availability of revenue derived from one type of extractive 
industry - oil and gas - will be used to subsidise the extraction of 
what are at the moment relatively high cost metallic minerals. This 
can happen both directly through strictly non-commercially viable 
mining enterprises - as with Oman copper, as well as indirectly through 
very low transfer prices of o.il and gas energy charged to metallurgical 
industries. 
1.6 Marine Resources 
1.6.1 Introduction 
The statistics on the fish resources of the Arabian Gulf compiled 
in the early literature published by F.A.O. were mainly based on 
assumptions that the fish density of Gulf waters should be the same as 
in other areas having the same oceanographic conditions. The 
information printed in F.A.O.'s Year Book of Statistics is also based 
on th~ official sources of various governments who until rec~ntly, ·huve 
been quoting the old statistics or providing exaggerated figures 
collected through un-scientific means, i.e. on the activities of the 
local fishermen. 
The fishery oceanographic surveys was conducted in the lat~ 
1960's by Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research and the Truciai 
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States were concerned with qualitative studies rather than quantitative 
estimates. 
Gulland (1971) reported that the potential yield of demersal fish 
in Gulf waters is about 600,000 tons. Following this in 1977 Faidi 
compiled FAO and other information on the fish resources of Arabian Gulf 
and Arabian peninsular countries titled 'Arab Economic integration of 
Fisheries Wealth'.(82) Faidi's estimates of production capacity of the 
Arabian Gulf were as follows: 
Optimum Yield 
78,000 tons 
Maximum Yield 
1,000,000 tons 
Potential Yield 
200,000 tons 
These statistics include various kinds of fish i.e. pelagic, 
demersal and crustaceans (shrimps) etc. Since however they were still 
based on the earlier oceanographic assumptions they have to be accepted 
with reservation particularly in the presence of the statistics provided 
by the more recent F.A.O./U.N.D.P. Survey mission. 
1.6.2 Gulf-Regional Survey and Development Project 
Resources Survey Results: 
A joint programme between 8 Gulf countries and U.N. (F.A.O./U.N.D.P.) 
resulted in survey work which started in 1975 and ended in 1980. The 
survey covered the area from the head of the Arabian Gulf to Ras-el 
Had in the Gulf of Oman. (See Chapter 5.) We refer here to the results 
published in the reports of this survey.(83) 
1.6.2.1 Demersal Resources 
A biomass estimate of 1,000,000 tons of demersal varieties has been 
made of which 600,000 tons are commercially valuable (500,000 tons for 
the Arab Gulf and 100,000 tons for the Gulf of Oman) giving a potential 
annual yield .of 216,000 tons (180,000 tons for the Arab Gulf and 
36,000 tons for the Gulf of Oman) considering present exploitation ~d 
commercially exploitable concentrations. 
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1.6.2.2 Pelagic Resources 
Small Pelagic Resources: The survey also indicated that the small 
pelagics which are made mostly of sardines, (Sardinella sp); anchovy, 
· (Stolephorus sp); and chub mackerel, (Rastrelliger kanagurta) constitute 
the major resource. A potential yield of about 400,000 tons/annum 
has been considered to be feasably commercially exploitable. Some 
110,000 tons from the North Western Gulf, 250,000 South Eastern Gulf 
and 15,000 from the Gulf of Oman. Upon consideration of the economic 
factors, a quantity of 200,000 to 250,-000 per annum could alone be 
exploited from the small pelagic resources, of which it is estimated 
that nearly 60% would be sardines. The total biomasswas estimated at 
one time during the survey to be as high as 4.6 million tons. The main 
problems in exploiting these resources are first, the limited local 
experience in large-scale harvesting, and secondly, limited use other 
than for fishmeal. Large fishing vessels are probably required which 
means that the need for technical assistance, training and management will 
become greater. 
Large Pelagic Resources: The larger pelagics- contribute less in 
tonnage than the small pelagics, but their commercial value increases 
their importance. The main species are king mackerel, (Scomberomorus 
commerson); lingtail tuna, (Thunnus tongol); and little tuna (Euthynnus 
affinis). The estimated potential annual yield from these species is 
- - . 
about 20,000_tons/annum from the Arab Gulf and 20,000 tons from the Gulf 
of Oman. 
1.6.2.3 Shrimp Resources 
The industrialised shrimp fishery which started in 1959 has been 
mainly located in the Arabian Gulf. At the beginning the industry 
re.mained at a modest level but fishing intensified and developed faster 
from 1963. Shrimp catches increased from about 900 tons in 1963 to 9000 
tons in 1968 due to increased fishing intensity by the local fleets apd 
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foreign fleets which came into the area at that time, but has 
subsequently dropped. 
Consequently, the catch per unit effort for the different areas 
of the Gulf declined steadily with varying degrees according to the 
number of shrimp boats and degree of fishing intensity. The situation 
has forced the Kuwait shrimp fleet to fishing grounds away from its 
traditional ones in the Gulf, and later cutting the size of its fleet 
to one-third. Therefore, any potential expansion of the shrimp resources 
at present are not feasible. However, management and conservation 
measures are needed to protect the resource in an effort to revive it 
again for the future. 
In summary, the annual maximum yi~ld from the project area from 
all fish species is estimated at about 631,000 tons per annum, divided 
as follows: 
Arab Gulf Gulf of Oman Total 
Demersal Tons 180,000 Tons 36,000 Tons 216,000 
Small Pelagics 350,000 15,000 375,000 
Large Pelagics 20,000 20,000 40,000 
Total Tons 550,000 Tons 71,000 Tons 631,000 
It should be mentioned that the above quantities are given before 
subtracting the present catches from the area. In the absence of 
reliable statistics, it is not possible to give the actual additional 
quantities of catch from the Project area. 
1.6.2.4 Mariculture 
The possibility of introducing mariculture as one of ·the sources 
of fish is being studied by some of the countries of the project area. 
At present, however, whilst there certainly appears technical 
possibilities for mariculture in the sub-region, the economic 
feasibilities of ·such cultural activities still have to be demonstrated 
and proven. Studies of shrimp culture, for example, have been pursued 
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in the Gulf for severa.l years, but as yet have not led to commercial 
application. In general, the biological and hydrobiological character-
istics of the potential areas of coastal lagoons are not very well 
known and there has been little practical production experience with 
which to evaluate the nature ahd extent of the technical and 
economic problems which may arise. 
At this juncture, therefore, any meaningful development does not 
seem possible. However, as experimental investigations are mainly at 
laboratory level, it is possible that the results from any of the 
project countries involved will be of direct benefit to other countries 
interested.(84) A UAE sub-regional marine research centre could be of 
much benefit. Already the value of integrated sub-regional resource 
surveys are apparent in the project survey results. 
1.6.3 Gulf and Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea Resources 
There are indications that the Arabian Gulf is not nearly as 
productive as either the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea, although its 
resources are probably sufficient to support small trawler operations 
operating from local bases.(85) As FAO/UNDP Project covered the Area 
from in the Arabian Gulf till Ras-el Had in the Gulf of Oman 
consequently, it is of special importance to explore the existing 
biomas in the area from Ras-el Had to the Oman border with PDRY. 
To date, our knowledge about standing biomass (abundance of 
resources) of Omani fish wealth is available from three survey reports 
recently carried out in the Gulf and Arabian sea, inclusive.of Omani 
coast. These are: 
(a) M/S. Mardella and Associates (final report, 1975) 
(b) R/V Frid of Nansen' s LOP /UNDP survey of the Indian Ocean 
(final report, August, 1977) 
(c) FAO/UNDP Regional survey (1975-1980) {as mentioned above) 
M/S: Mardella and Associated failed to quantify the pelagic biomas of 
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the Omani Coastal waters, but provided an estimate of the demersal 
stocks. According to their findings high commercial value fish is 
·available as standing stocks in the order of 48,100 tons to 100,500 
tons off the south east coast of Oman and from 3,700 tons to 4,700 in 
the Gulf of Oman. The lower commercial value demersal fish totals 
in both regions from 26,000 to 51,200 tons. The total demersal biomass 
off the south east coast of Oman and in the Gulf of Oman is thus 
estimated at between 78,400 and 156,000 tons. 
Dr. R.V. Fridjof Nansen's survey of the Indian Ocean, yields the 
following statistics for the Oman offshore zones: 
Pelagic biomass: 
Average 1975/76 ranges from 580,000-770,000 tons. 
Demersal biomass: 
Average 1975/76 
· Gulf· of Oman 
South east coast 
130~000 tons to 348,000 tons 
10,000 tons to 168,000 tons 
120,000 tons to 180,000 tons 
As information on the fisheries resources of Oman remains 
comparatively poor, despite its great importance relative to other AGS 
countries, we have supplemented it by figures of actual fish landings in 
Oman (see also Table 1.9). 
Oman fish catches: 
Two types of fishing are ·under operation, the artisanal fishery 
which still provides the bulk of the catches, and the commercial 
fishery (using modern trawlers) recently introduced into the country. 
The la:tter is being operated by the Government (3 tra~llers), and with 
joint ventures with foreign companies in the concession area around the 
South east coast of Oman. The Government trawlers are being operated 
from a Muttrah base. 
1976 
1977 
Total 
Total Landings 
Average 1976/77 
tons 
36,000 
39,000 
7!:?,900 
37,500 
57 
The percentage proportion of the total landings excluding small 
pelagics such as Sardines and Anchovies is about 24%. 
Commercial Fishery: The statistics on landings of this fishery 
are actual records at the port of landing or on board the vessels: 
1976 1977 1978 
( i) Japanese vessels 6,301 tons 6,868 tons 
(ii) Government vessels 23 tons 505 tons 105 
(iii) R/V Darbat 480 600 
(iv) Korean vessels 1,589 (before May) 
Total 6,804 7, 973 . 1,694 
For a realistic analysis of the actual fish landing, one has to 
ignore the 1978 catches (as it is incomplete) therefore, the total 
landings through commercial fishery during 1976 and 1977 were 14,777 
tons. According to the concession agreement the Government received 
40% share from the Japanese company (about 5,264 tons), but how much out 
of this share was actually marketed in Oman is not accurately known. 
Artisanal Fishery: The information on statistics of the· catch 
efforts and total landings by artisanal fishery were collected in 1976 . 
and 1977 by the Directorate General of Fisheries from six main stations 
along the entire coast of Oman. 
It is difficult to make any comments regarding this data on the 
artisanal fishery because the estimates are more hypothetical than 
actual. However, these statistics were released through official channels 
and were referred to in FAO's year book volume 42 (1976) and by the 
Regional fishery ·survey and Development project programme (FAO/UNDP) 
carried out ~Y· Feidi and Anderson in 1977. The final analysis is as 
follows: 
1. Pelagic catches including sardines and anchovies: 
1976 1977 
Sardines 63,180 tons 60,000 tons 
Anchovies 98,000 tons 80,000 tons 
Total 161,180 tons 140,000 tons 
Average 1976/77 150,590 tons 
Percent of the total landings excluding demersal and other larger 
pelagic fish about 76%. 
2. Demersal and other large pelagic fish (tunas, barracudas and 
Jacks etc.): had average catches during the two years of 45,000 tons. 
The best estimate available of the total catches during 1976 and 
1977 is 391,277 tons,-of which the: 
(i) Commercial fishery contributed 
(ii) Artisanal fishery contributed 
(iii) Fish other than sardines and anchovies 
(iv) Sardine and anchovies 
AGS Fish Catches: 
3.7% 
96.3% 
19.3% 
77.0% 
Table 1.9 indicates the relative importance of AGS fisheries 
within the Arab Regional circle and the world. Although the only 
comparative statistics available are for 1974 the general position has 
changed little since that time. 
1.6.4 Fisheries Resources Summary 
It is clear 0~1 the light of the preceding analysis on fisheries 
resources and available statistics on the size of catch that the catch 
from the marine fisheries of AGS area (206,500 tons in 1974) is below 
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its apparent potential (Annual maximum yield from the Project area which 
does not include Oman waters from Has al-Had to S. Yemeni borders is 
estimated at 631,000 tons). Higher catches could be obtained if the 
resources were adequately exploited and managed. 
The development of these resources might follow two complementary 
approaches, the better management of these resources which are already 
over-exploited (shrimp fisheries) and optimum use of those resources 
which are presently under-exploited, the situation exists mainly in the 
pelagic fisheries and to a more limited extent in some demersal fisheries. 
To some extent the spatial and mobility characteristics of fish 
resources encourage motivation for cooperation in resource exploitatin 
within the AGS sub-regional circle. Whilst mineral and water resources 
Table 1. 9 
Annual Catches of AGS (1974) and other Arab Countries 
State Catches (000 ton's) % of Arab Catch 
(a) Arab Gulf States % 
Oman 100.0 48 11.2 
s. Arabia 31.3 15 3.5 
U.A.E. 65.0 31 7.3 
Kuwait 7.7 4 0.9 
Bahrain 1.5 1 0.2 
Qatar 1.0 1 0.1 
Sub Total 206.5 100 23.2 
(b) Other Arab Countries 
Morocco 288.1 32.2 
South Yemen 133.5 14.9 
Egypt 96.2 10.8 
Tunisia 42.7 4.8 
Algeria 35.8 4.0 
Mauritania 25.6 2.9 
Sudan 22.6 2.5 
Iraq 17.5 2.0 
North Yemen 11.5 1.3 
Somalia 5.0 0.6 
Libya 3.8 0.4 
Lebanon 2.5 0.3 
Syria 1.3 0.1 
Jordan 0.1 0.0 
Sub Total 686.2 76.8 
(c) Total Arab Countries 892.7 100.0 
(d) Total World 69,844.6 
Source: Faidi, I.H. Arab Economic Integration of Fisheries Wealth, 
Seminar on Agricultural Aspects of Arab Economic Integration, 
Alexandrian 2-7 April 1977, FAO and CAEU. Table 1, p. 46 
(Arabic). 
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are firmly located within national boundaries and are associated clearly 
with ideas of national sovereignty, the movement and migration of fish 
across marine boundaries and the case of physical access to this 
resource by fishermen from anywhere, makes the position more open. 
The consequences of this for cooperation are examined more fully in 
Chapters 3 and 12. 
1.7 Human Resources 
1.7.1 Population 
The AGS population was estimated in 1978 to be 11.682 million 
corresponding to 7.6% of the total Arab countries population (Table 1.10). 
The population characteristics of the AGS can be characterized as follows: 
(a) First, the small size of populations. Saudi Arabia is relatively 
the exception with a population estimated in 1978 at 8.229 million 
corresponding to 74 percent of the population of the AGS, followed by 
Kuwait with a 1.212 mn of population constituting 9% of the AGS 
population, Oman with 839 thousand of population (7%). The Government 
of Oman estimate the population at 1.5 million for planning purposes 
although no general census has been achieved. 
Table 1.1Q 
Arab Gulf States Population (1978) 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Oman 
Bahrain 
(a) Total AGS 
(b) Arab Countries 
Population. 
(million)-
8.229 
1.215 
0.811 
0.220 
0.839 
0.368 
11.682 
153.280 
a:b 7.6% 
Source: IBRD, World Bank Atlas. 
% 
74 
9 
6 
2 
7 
?. 
100 
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Table 1.11 
Arab Gulf States Population Growth and Density 
Country ,PoQulation o_/o Growth Density persons 1960-75 1970-75 per square Kilometer 
Saudi Arabia 1.8 2.4 40 
Kuwait 8.6 6.2 58.0 
Oman 3.1 3.0 4.0 
U.A.E. 13.9 19.7 5.0 
Bahrain 3.4 4.2 416 
Qatar 8.9 12.7 9.0 
Total 6.6 8 
Source: U.N., Demographic Yearbook, 1976, pp. 121-122. 
(b) The rate of population growth in this region is compar~tively 
high. Intraregional migration is largely accountable for the high 
national growth rates in the Gulf states although this rate is more 
moderate in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The rate of population growth in the 
Sub-region i~ estimated to be 8% during the period 1970-75 whilst the 
rate in Saudi Arabia was 2.4% and Oman 3% for the period 1970-75. In 
Kuwait the growth rate was 6.1 percent, 2.2 percent due to the inflow 
of foreign labour and 3.9 percent to indigenous growth.(86) In Qatar, 
the population growth rate was officially estimated in 1973 to be 
about 8 percent, 5 percent due to the inflow of foreign labour and 3 
percent to indigenous growth (87), it is worth mentioning that the:: 
growth rate during 1970-75 was 12.7 although no census has been taken 
since 1968. 
In the UAE, the population growth rate was estimated in the 
period 1970-75 to be 19.7%, 80% of which was attributable to immigration. 
In Bahrain the estimated population growth was 4.2% in the period 
1970-75. 
(c) Population composition in the AGS is characterized with a large 
percent of non nationals, as shown in Table 1.12. 
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Table 1.12 
AGS Non-National Population Percentage 
~ Year Estimates 
Saudi Arabia 25.4 1974/75 estimates 
Kuwait 53.0 1975 
Oman N.A. 
U.A.E. 69.5 1975 
Bahrain 23.9 1975 
Qatar 61.9 1975 official estimate 
Source: Askari, H. and Commings, J.T., Middle East Economies in the 
1970s, (London: Praeger Special Studies in International 
Economics and Development, 1976) p. 286. 
The inflow of immigrants into the Arab Gulf states has enabled 
them to save a large amount of effort and money needed to build up a 
labour force. However, it has its social integration problems, mainly 
when the language, religion and culture are different, in addition 
to the reliance on a source that might not be guaranteed.(88) 
(d) The adult rate of illiteracy is comparatively high especially 
for females. While this percentage was 50% in the capital surplus 
oil expo'rters in 1975, it was 1% in the industrialized countries and 
29% in the middle-ilxome countries.(89) 
(e) Very low crude activity rates. Table 1.13 details the 
population and indigenous work force of five AGS. Their combined 
indigenous work force which amounted to about 1.2 million in 1975 was 
reflected in a very low crude participation rate of 22 percent. The 
utility of this small number is further restricted by a limited level 
of educational attainment and a low level of motivation.(90) These 
factors additionally contributed to the heavy reliance of AGS upon 
migrant labour resulting from the small indigenous population, and the 
scale and rapidity of economic development upon which they have 
embarked. 
Several factors are responsible for the very limited work force 
_generated by AGS indigenous population, namely, the low participation 
for women in the labour force, and recent improved access to health 
facilities contributing towards fast growing youthful populations. 
The indigenous communities are increasing at about 3% per annum with 
the result that large numbers are too young to enter the work force. 
Enrolment in higher education alsc delays their entering economic 
activity. (91) 
1.7.2 Labour Force (Tables 1.13 and 1.14) 
A shortage of skilled and unskilled labour is a feature of all 
oil producing developing countries. This is reflected in the massive 
immigration streams to these countries raising the proportion of the 
non-national labour force. 
The total active non-nationals proportion in the AGS Sub-region 
was about 51.0% in 1975. In Saudi Arabia this was 43%, in the UAE 
84.8%, Qatar 81%, Kuwait 69.4%, Bahrain 39.6%. 
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The number of persons engaged in technical skills and other key 
professions (engineers, doctors, teachers, ac~tants etc.) is very 
small in these countries. As an example in 1971, in Kuwait there were 
only 29 Kuwait doctors out of 581 and 56 Kuwait engineers out of 1211 
and 79 percent of Kuwaiti civil servants were either. illiterate or -had 
completed only primary education.(92) 
In fact, labour, skilled and unskilled, is a constraint on all 
AGS countries' development effort. This is reflected in the authorities' 
comparative liberal attitude toward immigration and their effort to 
encourage education and vocational training.(93) 
The following further negative features can be identified in 
the AGS labour force: 
(a) Actual deficit in the professions needed for economic and 
industrial development projects. 
Table 1.13 
Indigenous Population and Indigenous Work Forces of AGS, 1975 
Population Work force Crude Participation rate (%) 
Saudi Arabia 4,592,500 1,026,500 22.3 
Kuwait 472,100 91,800 19.4 
Bahrain 214,000 45,800 21.4 
UAE 200,000 45,000 22~5 
Qatar 67,900 12,500 18.4 
Total 5,546,500 1,221,600 22 
Source: Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A., Nature and process of labour 
importing: The Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain 2 Qatar 
and the U.A.E. (Geneva, ILO, Aug. 1978) mimeographed world 
Employment programme research working paper (WEP 2- 26/30 Wp) 
Table 1.14 
Employment by Nationality in AGS (1975) 
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Active Nationals Active Non- Total Active 
Nationals 
No. % of total No. % of total 
Bahrain 45,800 60.4 30,000 39.6 75,800 
Kuwait 91,800 30.6 208,000 69.4 299,800 
Qatar 12,500 18.9 53,800 81.1 66,300 
Saudi Arabia 1,026,500 57.0 773,400 43.0 1,799,900 
U .A.E. 45,000 15.2 251,500 84.8 296,500 
Total 1,221,600 48.1 1,316,700 51.9 2,538,300 
Source: Ibid. 
(b) Preference given to office employment rather than technical work. 
(c) Unbalanced participation in the labour force between males and 
females. 
In. the Sub..:.region, generally speaking, there is no unemployment 
and ·labour shortages exist in all areas of the economy. For exam.ple, 
in Qatar non-Qataris account for about 85 percent of private employment 
and somewhat more than half of the public sector employment.(94) 
The rising demand for labour coupled with supply bottlenecks and the 
lack of housing have created temporary labour shortages, especially with 
respect to skilled workers. 
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In the UAE manpower shortages, in the technical and managerial 
categories, are a major bottleneck; housing shortages and high rents 
compound the difficulties in the way of accelerated and diversified 
development.(95) 
1.8 Resources Base ~ Summary 
This necessarily brief and selective survey of basic resources 
in the Arab Gulf states has sought to bring out the very significant 
contrasts between an area over-whelmingly rich for the most part in 
crude oil and natural gas reserves but seveniy lacking in any other 
appreciable natural resources except fisheries. 
By definition, these states have an extremely poor relative 
endowment of natural resources, other than hydrocarbons. Crude oil 
exports dominate their economies and it is to oil income that all 
other activities ultimately return for financial sustenance as will be 
illustrated in the coming chapters. 
It follows from this that the creation of new productive assets 
by the oil-exporting states will be very considerably inhibited by the 
constraints of a difficult and hazardous environment and the lack of 
basic elements of development, water, mineral resources and manpower 
especially in skilled and managerial cadres. Oil wealth may be used 
to buy ways around some of the difficulties. Water can be produced from 
desalination plants at a price for domestic, industrial and agricultural 
use. Soils can be cultivated at the cost of high inputs of fertiliser, 
human skills and energy. Labour can be imported, however, with negative 
socio-political repercussions on societal structure and behaviour. 
It may be questioned however, whether these activities are appropriate 
to anything but an extremely capital-rich oil economy and whether any 
will survive the passing of oil wealth. 
Moreover, the highly skewed resource base of the AGS clearly 
limits the absorptive capacity of wealth generating sectors. This 
particular effect which is a fundamental determinant of development 
possibilities will be examined further in Chapter 8 in the context 
of motivation for cooperation in development. 
In the following chapters on the development of AGS we will 
explore how-these countries' resource base affects the whole process 
and how it creates structural problems. 
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CHAPTER 2 - AGS DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION TRENDS 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the brief appraisal of the resource base of the AGS, 
we commence in this Chapter the review and evaluation of the main 
characteristics at· development policies in the AGS, first by 
summarily describing the national planning machinery of each state. 
Secondly, we examine the implicit and explicit national development 
strategies as indicated by sectoral investment and expenditure. We 
note in particular the general assumption within the AGS that the 
planned development of manufacturing industry must be given priority 
among the production sectors and illustrate this trend by briefly 
analysing the approaches to manufacturing in Kuwait, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia. 
This is followed in Chapter 3 by an examination of the second 
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major production sector of agriculture and fisheries. Chapter 4 evaluates 
the development processes of the AGS countries acting individually.· 
This treatment allows us to identify a joint strategy that the 
countries could aspire to through development cooperative effort. Such 
an effort would not only provide,generally.benefits through developmenL 
cooperation but would also enable individual countries to make more 
correct individual policy decisionsfor achieving national objectives. 
This approach to the identification of priorities allows us to 
view the proposed priorities in relation to the development plans of 
each of the countries and in relation to each other. The approach is 
therefore dynamic and based on the inter-relationship of the past and of 
the planned future. 
Secondly, because this approach takes into consideration all 
ser:tonJ and al.l plnnrwd projecbJ, not rr11:rr:ly onr: indu:;t;ry <Jr (Jrtr: 
project in i:.-;olatiun, it can better Gal.i:;fy the cri Lr~ria rJf r<Jciprr.ci t,y 
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and equal advantages for the participating countries. The importance 
of analysing development trends is also related to the process of 
identifying various components of development activities, thus helping 
to formulate a sound approach for development cooperation that takes 
into consideration, Sub-regional, Regional and International components. 
This approach of identifying coinmon elements in country 
development strategies through the analysis of countries development 
plans is consistent with the practical approach followed by this 
research to achieve development cooperation as it leads the way to 
elicit positive response and overcome the countries cautious attitude 
to programmes of Sub-regional or Regional cooperation. The knowledge 
that a proposed Sub-regional arrangement is constructed within the 
countries development plans objectives and policies would reflect 
""'415 
mutual benefits and tend to ensure the cooperation frameworktaccepted 
by these countries.(!) The listing of main development priorities, 
problems and policies may also indicate areas in which unnecessary 
duplication of effort might take place which could be avoided through 
regional co-ordination. 
Not all AGS countries have formal development plans, particularly 
in Bahrain, Qatar and to some_ extent the UAE, but we depend on varied 
available information on the development priorities, policies and 
planned projects for these countries. 
The intention here is not to restrict the -opportunities for 
development cooperation to those mentioned in the-development plans of 
the_se countries, as we believe that there could be projects and 
opportunities other than those simultaneously appearing in the individual 
development plans of some countries of region that would if undertaken 
on a co-ordinated basis, be superior. Hence, secondary criteria such 
as market size relative to minimum efficient comparative costs, etc, 
have to be considered throughout the whole analysis.(2) 
2.2 Development Planning Machinery 
2~2.1 Qatar 
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There is no formal institutional arrangement for development 
planning in Qatar and no comprehensive development plan. Major projects 
are co-ordinated by the Council of Ministers, and the industrial 
Development Technical Centre assists with -feasibility studies and 
provides technical assistance to various industrial and infrastructural 
projects. 
By the end of 1973 a plan for development was drawn up and 
accepted by the government. The following areas of priority were 
emphasized(3): 
1. Housing. By 1990s about 17,000 new houses were to be built, with 
the constructed houses to average annually 1100. 
2. Education. Thirty-eight new schools were to be completed by 1985. 
3. ·Health Activities and Projects. 
4. Development of Doha, with two new industrial estates, several 
work shops, the construction of industry was to be greatly modernized. 
5. Diversification of the economy. Substantial outlays were to be 
devoted to new non-oil industries such as iron and steel, aluminium, as well as 
petrochemicals and natural gas. 
6. Revival of traditional economic sectors. The fishing industry was 
to be modernized through better boats and refrigeration warehouses, 
as well as agriculture to be encouraged by government. 
Since the outline plan was produced, development policies have 
only been announced piecemeal in association with statements of projected 
annual budgetary expenditure. 
2.2.2 Bahrain 
No institutional arrangements for formal planning exist in Bahrain. 
Projects are evaluated individually by a cabinet sub-committee which 
formerly comprised the Minister of Finance and National Economy and the 
Minister of Development and Engineering Services and to which, 
following a Cabinet reorganisation, three other Ministers (Foreign 
Affairs, Commerce and Economy and Information) have been added. This 
Cabinet sub-committee also has broad responsibility for approving 
budget estimates. The Ministry of Development and Engineering Services 
is responsible for the implementation of major projects while the 
Ministry of Public Works and Utilities is responsible for much of the 
work on infrastructural projects.(4) 
2.2.3 UAE 
Development Planning: 
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Planning in the UAE has been largely confined to anntial investment 
programs; in general government investment has not taken place in the 
context of a medium-term macroeconomic framework. Development 
expenditures have been undertaken both at the Fede~al Government level 
and at the Emirates level. Federal Government investment has been mainly 
confined to infrastructural projects, including roads, communications, 
electricity, water, schools, hospitals and post offices, while the 
Emirates have been responsible mostly for local industrial projects and 
some infrastructural projects, such as mtra~city roads, ports and 
airports. There is as yet no effective co-ordination in planning between· 
the individual Emirates. 
To a considerable extent this reflects the history of revenue 
availability in the UAE. Since the mid 1960's, before -the UAE was 
created, the main oil derived wealth has flowed into and out of Abu 
Dhabi and it has become assumed that most Federal development 
expenditure will be met by Abu Dhabi contributions ·to federal budgets. 
As a result, the individualist tendencies of the component Emirates have 
become strengthened rather than weakened and no strong central control 
exists. 
At the Federal level, each Ministry has the responsibility 
for proposing projects within its domain. Project identification is 
usually done on the Ministry's initiative, sometimes, however, it is 
done in consultation with or upon the recommendation of the Emirates. 
The project proposals are forwarded to the Ministry of Public Works 
for engineering feasibility and cost studies. These studies are then 
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sent to the Ministry of Planning which makes a recommendation based on its 
examination of the financial, economic and social aspects of the project 
and the past record of the initiating Ministry in implementing projects. 
The recommendation is submitted to the council of Ministers, which 
decides on the projects to be implemented. The responsibility for 
project execution varies depending on the capabilities of the Ministry 
concerned, some Ministries, such as those responsible for electricity 
and water, implement their own projects, while the projects of other 
Ministries are executed by the Ministry of Public Works.(5) 
For annual development programs, the project selection process of 
Abu Dhabi is similar to that of the Federal Government; it starts with 
the submission of development expenditure requests for specific projects 
by the local departments to the Planning Department's Projects Committee. 
The Committee then discusses these requests with both the department 
executing the proje~ts (usually the Department of Public Works) and 
the initiating department before formulating a plan for the approval 
of the Executive Council and the Ruler. In preparing the 1977 Three-
Year Plan, however, a somewhat modified system was adopted. Some 
sectoral Surveys were conducted and formed the basis· for the technical 
preparation of the plan, the responsibility for which lay with the 
administrative department and the Department of Planning. The final 
approval of the plan still rests with the Executive Council and the 
Ruler.(6) 
Abu Dhabi's first five year development plan (1968-1972) was 
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drawn up under the direction of a planning council headed by its 
ruler §haikh Zayed. This plan was not comprehensive. It neither 
considered private sector investment nor dealt with implementation 
problems.(7) Since this plan s:ame to an end in 1972, no comprehensive 
further forward planning has been attempted as development was carried 
out through allocations in the annual budget on a project b-asis unt.il 
the·initiation of the three years development plan (1977-1979), but this 
plan had not been adopted officially.(8) 
There is no co-ordination in the implementation of development 
projects among the seven Emirate. The Federal Government has not 
itself started any industries although the Ministry of Finance and 
Industry was set up in 1973 and seemed not to have any basic influence · 
over the numerous bodies which are involved in actually setting up 
factories. 
A Federal Ministry of Planning was established in 1978 and begun 
preparatory work for a 3-5 year plan starting in 1981. The Ministry 
of Planning however has not yet developed the power to stop individual 
Emirates doing what they choose, and the trend of locally and regionally 
uncoordinated investment continues. It is thought that the situation 
seems unlikely to alter until the federation matures politically, and 
in the meantime there is a danger that industrialization may take a 
course which could damage UAE economically and socially. ( 9) 
Apart from the relative newness of the planning agencies and the 
lack of qualified staff to study and evaluate proposals, planning in 
the UAE is handicapped by the lack of co-ordination among the Emirates 
and is reflected in the duplication of projects such as the construction 
of four (and one planned) cement factories in four Emirates, and the 
development of four harbours and airports in close proximity on the same 
strip of the coast.(lO) The absence of an adequately data base for 
planning purposes as well as the administrative syt;tem which is poorly 
co-ordinated at the Federal level and extremely centralized within 
each Emiratep constitute two further problems. Thus the information 
and administrative base for decision making and long~range planning 
has been inadequa~e 0 (11) and resulted in considering economic 
development planning to be one of the major areas where UAE is 
extremely weak. (12) 
In Dubai the.Ruler has allocations for development expenditures 
b~t the exact am~unts of these are not known. The Ruler's office 
handles the large projects while Dubai town planning is centralized 
in the hands of the municipality and other projects are handled by 
the government departments. Most of these projects are directed to 
the improvement of Dubai's trade and services facilities. 
In Sharjah planning is mostly done from the Ruler's office but 
here: the extent of the private sector's participation in the financing 
and execution of projects is considerable.(13) 
Planning implementation has been least successful for agriculture 
and industrial projects and most successful for infrastructure and 
social over~ead investments. 
"As in many other Opec countries, planning imple-
mentation is least effective in the productive sectors 
since projects in industry and agriculture are the 
most difficult to implement."(14) 
2.2.4 Kuwait 
Development planning -in -the form of a general-' guide -for project 
preparation began in Kuwait in early 1976 when a Planning Board was 
created.(15) 
This board has played an important role in influencing the course 
of development. It selected consultants, carried out background and 
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macroeconomic studies, was involved in manpower planning and incorporated 
the central statistical services.(16) 
A fiv~ year plan was ~aunched covering the period from March 1967 
to March 1972. The plan's implementation, however, was suspended 
after the 1967 Middle East War. In an effort to accelerate the 
development process in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner, a 
Five Year Development Plan covering the 1976/1977-B0/81 period was 
prepared and submitted to the Cabinet for approval. To expedite the 
implementation of the plan, a Ministry of Planning was established in 
early 1977 to replace the Planning Board.(17) 
This first effort by the Kuwait Planning Board was not ratified 
by the National Assembly, howevert and until 1975 no other official 
plan was considered. Increased oil revenues then prompted another 
attempt, for the period 1975/76-1979/80. Although the first plan was 
not legally enacted, its indicated priorities were reflected in the 
Kuwaiti budgets for 1967/68-1971/72. 
2. 2. 5· Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia had no centralized authority until the early 1930's 
when the last of the major tribal rebellions was crushed by the House 
of Saud. Under King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud (1902-1953) the first ~teps 
were taken to modernize Saudi Arabia's organizational structure. 
Ministries were established that expanded and institutionalized the 
role of. the king and his advisors. 
In 1953 the first steps were taken'· to establish a Council of. 
Ministers. The Council's executive powers were expanded in May 1958. 
An Economic Development Committee was established in 1958, following 
the advice of the IMF, for evaluating Ministerial projects for the 
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next five years (1959 to 1964); however, this committee was ineffective.(18) 
In December 1959, when King Saud took over the government, he 
established a Supreme Planning Board with broader powers. However, 
it was hampered by the lack of autonomy from the Ministries, by inter-
ference from the king, lack of experienced staff and the absence of a 
statistical pase 'fqr planning. 
"Moreover, because the government's attention 
was 'focused on the Saud-Faisal power struggle and 
the Egyptian-Saudi diplomatic and military conflict 
over Yemen, development planning was neglected."(19) 
Four months after Faisal replaced .Saud as King in November 1964 a 
Central Planning Organisation (CPO) superseded the supreme Planning 
Board. Long-term _planning was i·mproved by limiting CP_Q responsibility 
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to the formulation of plans. However, CPO was undermined by the powers 
of Petromin which was established in 1962 to develop and utilize 
petroleum and mineral resources (including refining and internal 
distribution petrochemicals and fertilizers) and also in the initiation 
of' industry and trade based on these resources. In particular the CPO 
had little influence over the country's oil and foreign investment 
policies. 
Some extra attention must be paid to the series of formal plans 
which have emerged since 1970 because the scale of' development investment 
in Saudi Arabia is incomparably larger than 'found eisewhere in the AGS 
and has tended to set the 'economic fashion' in the Sub-region. 
The 'first Five-Year Development Plan (1970-1975) was submitted to 
the King but it su'ffered from a weak statistical and methodological 
base. 
-The 'fol·lowing re~sons contributed to hamper the implementation 
of' the first plan in many areas(20): 
(a) The 1973 jump in oil prices resulted in more revenues th~ Saudi 
Arabia could spend effectively and rapidly caused severe inflation. 
(b) Lack of capable administrators and skilled labour. 
(c) Insuf'ficient infrastructural capacity. 
The 'formulation of the second Five-Year Plan (1975-1980) started 
with a good deal of confusion and uncertainty. It was clear that Saudi 
Arabia would receive far more oil revenues than it could spend. At 
the same time the CPO had more proposed projects than it could analyse 
and evaluate as each ministry made numerous proposals with little regard 
for the country's limited manpower and infrastructure. It is thought 
that the second Five-Year Development Plan is 'by far the least 
realistic development plan of any of the OPEC Countries'.(21) 
"It envisages a financial allocation of over ~142 
billion in 5 yearsp but it projects that labour demand 
· will inc.rease by 800p000 persons and non-oil GDP will 
increase by only 17 'billion riyals (~5 billion). Given 
the low literacy and skill levels of the population, 
projected labour demand is far too low for the 
projected expenditure. 
Similarlyp it is not credible to expect non-oil GOP of 
any country, even one as dependent on imports as Saudi 
Arabia, to grow by only ~5 billion while spending ~142 
billion in the public sector. Finally, it is unrealistic 
to expect Saudi Arabia, with a non-oil GOP of less than 
~6 billion in 1975p to implement a ~142 billion develop-
ment plan in 5 years."(22) 
Spending a development investment allocation 12 times greater 
during the second plan than the first planp as illustrated in Table 2.1p 
seemed beyond the capacity of the country. 
It is worth noting from Table 2.1 that under the second planp 
mining and manufacturing were planned to receive over. 40 times the 
investment under the first plan. 
"This is far more than one would normally regard as 
feasible."(23) 
To summarize the situation relating to Saudi development planning 
efficiencyp it seems that its statistical as well as capable organisational 
and administrative base is still extrem~ly ppor. Further analysis of 
more recent development is made in the context of the sample study of 
industrialisation and other trends in 2.3.3. below. 
2.2.6 Oman - Organization Structure of Government(24) 
Before 1970 there were no ministries in the modern sense and only 
a limited number of government units. Top priority was therefore 
given to the establishment of an administration to carry out the 
different administrative and executive functions of government schemes 
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Table 2.1 
Saudi Arabia. Sectoral Planned Allocations under five-year Plans 
Sector 
Economic Resource 
Development 
Agriculture 
Mining and 
Manufacturing 
Electricity 
Water and 
desalination 
Human Resource 
Development 
Education 
Social Programs 
and Youth 
Health 
Holy Cities and 
Hajj 
Physical Infra-
First Five-Year Plan 
(1969/70-1974/75 
Billion 
Saudi 
Riyals 
2.6 
(1.5) 
(1.1) 
(-) 
(-) 
9.3 
{7.4) 
{-) 
(1.9) 
{-) 
Percent 
6.3 
(3.6) 
(2.7) 
(-) 
(-) 
22.5 
{17.9) 
{-) 
{4.6) 
{-) 
structure Development 12-.1 29.3 
Transport and · 
Communications 
Municipalities and 
housing 
Government and Aid 
Defence 
Administration 
Foreign and domestic 
subsidies 
Other 
Total 
{7.5) 
(4.6) 
17.3 
(9.6) 
(7.7) 
0.1 
41.3 
(18.2) 
(11.1) 
41.9 
(23.2) 
(18.6) 
(-) 
0.3 
100.0 
Second Five-Year Plan 
(1975/76-1979/80) 
Billion 
Saudi 
Riyals 
90.1 
(4.7) 
(45.1) 
(6.2) 
(34.1) 
111.1 
(74.2) 
{14.6) 
(17.3) 
{5.0) 
107.9 
(40.3) 
(67.6) 
179.9 
(78.2) 
(38.2) 
(63.5) 
9.2 
498.2 
Percent 
18.1 
(0.9) 
(9.1) 
{1.2) 
{6.8) 
22.3 
{14.9) 
(2.9) 
(3.5) 
{1.0) 
21.7 
{8.1) 
(13.6) 
36.1 
(15.7) 
{7.7) 
(12.7) 
1.8 
100.0 
Source: Abul Fathi. F., et.al. The Opec Market to 1985 (Canada: 
Lexington Books. 1977). p. 245. 
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in particular. This organizational and administrative reform was 
effected gradually and in phases, keeping in mind the development of 
the country's resources. The outcome of this reform was the emergence 
of an organized administration which assumed the responsibilities and 
funr;t~.ons of a modern government. 
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The economic planning and development units have undergone several 
organizational phases since 1970. Following the accession to power 
of Sultan Qaboos Bin Sa'id the Development Board was dissolved to be 
replaced by the Department of Planning and Development and an 
independent Tender Board was formed. Thereafter a temporary Planning 
Council was created which was renamed as the Supreme Council for Economic 
Planning and Development in accordance with the Sultan's Decree No. 
15/1972 issued on September 27, 1972. The Centre for Economic Planning 
and Development was responsible to this supreme Council. 
All the above-mentioned and development organizations exercised 
both planning and executive functions. This was necessary in the 
absence of fully operational government executive units at that time. 
On April 25, 1973 a Sultan's Decree was issued regarding the 
establishment of the General Development Organization, the functions 
of which included those of the Centre for Economic Planning and 
Development. 
On November 17, 1973, in accordance with a Sultan's D_ec!'ee·, the 
General Development Organization became the Ministry of Development. 
In common with other units this ministry continued to exercise both 
planning and administrative functions. Under its executive jurisdiction 
it continued to carry out the activities relating to the economic 
sectors for which no separate Ministries existed. These were the 
sectors of agriculture, irrigation and fisheries, mining and petroleum, 
commerce and manufacturing. 
On November 17g 1974 the Council of Ministers was reconvened 
and executive functions were separated from planning functions as a 
result of which the Ministry of Development was dissolved and its 
executive functions were distributed amongst other ministries, 
including two new ministriesg the Ministry of Agricultureg Fisheriesg 
Petroleum and Minerals and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
The Development Council was established to exercise planning 
functions in accordance with the Sultan's Decree No. 41/1974 issued 
on November 17g 1974. The Sultan is the President of the Council, 
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs was appointed as Deputy 
President. A Technical Secretariat was formed to assist the Council 
and to follow up the implementation of its resolutions. 
One of the first tasks which the Development Council performed 
was the preparation of the Economic Development Law 1975 which was 
issued in the Sultan's Decree No. 9/1975 on February 1g 1975. 
The functions of the Development Council as defined in this 
law are as follows: 
Firstp to set objectives and a strategy for economic developmentg 
to propose policies and measures to carry out these objectives and to 
lay down development plans in harmony with it. Such development planS 
will be subject to approval by His Majestyg the Sultan. 
SecondlyD to discuss and establish an annual development budget 
and to refer this budget to the Council for Financial Affairs. 
ThirdD to set and approve priorities for development projects 
submitted by ministries and government departments before they are 
irnplementedD with a view to ensuring conformity with the approved 
prioritiesD and to achieving complementarity and consistency of 
projects in terms of time and substance. 
The Development Council has produced two Five-Year Development 
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Plans which are briefly examined later in this Chapter. 
2.2.7 Summary 
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In view of the preceding information on AGS development planning 
administration it was clear that the governments of Kuwait. Saudi 
Arabia. Oman and recently UAE have accepted planning. whether imperative 
or indicative. as an indispensable instrument needed 'Lo direct the 
economic and social development. The governments of Bahrain and Qatar 
have no planning machinery as yet and development activities in the 
public sector have been undertaken through periodic development budgets. 
However. these two countries seem to be following partial planning 
as reflected in the Five Year Industrial Development Programme (1970/71-
1974/75) of Qatar. More recently. the need for a development planning 
body has been felt in Qatar and Bahrain. In all cases planning 
procedures have been nationally individualist although some reference 
is frequently made to the need for cooperation. 
Although there are signs of the growth of established government 
planning machinery. especially in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. all AGS devel-
opment agencies embody weaknesses in their technical capabilities. 
with extremely poor statistical and organisation bases. 
Deficiencies in public administration (viz. over-centralization. 
inadequate organization. procedures and methods. lack of coordination 
between planning and decision-making. poor staffing and others) have 
been iargely responsible for inadequate formulation and implementation 
of development programmes and projects. It is increasingly recognized 
that administrative capabilities, as well as financial resources and 
technical expertise. are an 'integral part of planning. Consequently. 
the question of strengthening development planning machinery in 
particular and government machinery in general must become a priority 
and an essential pre-requisite for the sound development of AGS. 
2.3 AGS ~ Development Trends and Sectoral Evaluation 
This section and those following are devoted to an analysis of 
development objectives, and trends in the AGS in broad terms, 
illustrated sectorally. We begin with industrial development as 
industrialization has been the main instrument adopted to achieve 
development objectives relating to economic diversification. 
The situation in the AGS is exemplified here through Kuwaiti, 
Omani and Saudi industrial development trends during the 1970's, 
ending this section with joint analysis to development objectives, 
trends and strategies. 
2.3.1 Kuwait - Development and Industrial Trends 
86 
The state has long allocated a substantial part of oil revenues 
to the creation of social and economic infrastructure and the 
development of industry through allocations in annual budgets and in 
other ways. In industry, special emphasis was being given to projects 
assured of market outlets abroad and those which can substitute for 
essential imports. 
A major goal of Kuwait, at least up until 1973, was the 
development of a comprehensive modern welfare state. The major non-
social programs included oil-based industries and a modern transport-
ation network. Light industries and fisheries, on the other hand, were 
not promoted as rapidly as might have been expected nor has the 
admittedly slight productive potential of agriculture been notably 
exploited. 
Industrialization played an important part in Kuwait'.s planning 
for diversifying its economy and reducing the country's dependence on 
oil and gas resources. Since 1966, industrial output has been growing 
at a rate of 11% a year but by 1973-74 still contributed only 3.6% of 
the GDP, of which almost half was from oil refining. The major 
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constraints on this development were the lack of any natural resources 
apart from oil and gasp the limited size of the domestic market and 
the lack of trained manpower. The largest industries remain State 
owned or joint sector companies.(25) The State sponsored the formation 
in November 1974p of lndustrial bank of Kuwait (49% Government and 
51% State and public financial institutions) in order to provide long 
and medium term industrial finance. 
In 1976p Kuwait's ministry of planning completed a five year 
development plan covering the years 1976f77-1980j81. This planp 
provided for total fixed investments of KD 4.4 billionp of which more 
than 75 percent were to be made by the public sector. The plan called 
for a substantial increase in investments over the level of previous 
years. In an effort to broaden the country's economic basep the plan 
placed special emphases on industrialization; about 38 percent had to 
be spent directly on this sector (see Table 2.2). Priority had to be 
given to capital-intensivep export-oriented industries that use oil 
and gas as feedstocks and/or as a source of energy. In support of 
this industrialization programme about 30 percent of all planned 
investment was allocated to the expansion of such infrastructural 
projects as electric power generationp water desalination and the 
improvement of transportationp port and storage facilities. 
To ensure adequate housing accommodation and to expand the 
educational and health facilitiesp 31 percent of investment was to be 
made in the construction sector.(26) 
Planning Objectives: 
The long-term economic objectives for Kuwait are based on the 
building of a society characterised by the following: 
(a) Self-sustaining economic development. 
(b) Maintaining minimum guaranteed standard of welfare for all 
citizens. 
Table 2.2 
Kuwait Five-Year Development Plan (1976/77-1980/81) Allocations 
(In billion of Kuwait dinars, at 1975/76 prices) 
(a) Total investment allocations for 
fixed capital formation 
Public sectop 
Private sector 
(b) Allocations for the rise in stocks 
(c) Distribution of total investment by sector 
Oil and Gas sector 
Manufacturing other than oil 
Transportation and communication 
Water and electricity 
Construction 
Other 
Amount 
4.441 
3.393 
1.048 
0.444 
4.441 
0.765 
0.910 
0.782 
0.537 
1.377 
0.070 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Central Bank of Kuwait 
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Percent 
100.0 
·76.4 
23.6 
100.0 
17.2 
20.5 
17.6 
12.1 
31.0 
1.6 
The Five-Year Plan (1976-1981) prepared to meet the above-
mentioned objectives based on the following strategic factors: 
(a) The development of the labour force through training, and planning 
so as to meet the needs for labourp encouraging the participation of 
women in production, increasing productivity especially in relation 
to wage rates. 
(b) Economic diversification and the broadening of the productive 
base through the use of technology, setting up industrial plantsp and 
creating a favourable atmosphere for the encouragement of local 
investment in productive sectors. 
(c) Co-ordination and economic integration of different national 
sectors. 
(d) Strengthening regional and Arab co-operation in joint development 
projects. 
(e) Building of a non-polluting society within the framework of 
correct values.(27) 
The explicit inclusion of item (d) is noteworthy here. 
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In Kuwait development planning there is also recognition of the 
vital importance of human resources. Owing to the small size of 
population and the country's need to import the needed labour force, 
the human being is the base for all social and economic plansp 
consequently the development plans are based on the long terms which 
conside~a full generation (round 25 years).(28) 
Industry: 
Kuwait's industrial sector consists of a few large-scalep 
export-oriented petrochemical industries and a wide range of small 
manufacturing industries. In 1974 the number of industrial establish-
ments totalled 2p985, employing 26p822 workers. Their contribution 
to Kuwait's non-oil GDP is estimated at about 11 percent in 1973/74. 
The traditional industriesp such as those producing foodp furniture 
and clothingp consist of a large number of small firms employing less 
than 10 workers each. In 1974p their fixed assets were valued at KD 
4.4 million and their total output amounted to KD 24.2 million.(29) 
In-addition there were 25 firms employing more than 100 workers 
eachp with total fixed assets amounted to more than KD 60 million. 
These larger firms jointly employed more than half of the total labour 
force and contributed more than 75 percent of the total value added 
of the industrial sector. While some new establishments have been 
added to Kuwait's industrial sector in recent years, its further 
expansion is hampered by the lack of suitable raw materialsp the limited 
size of the domestic marketp and the shortage and high cost of labour. 
Among the major manufacturing industriesp fertilizer plants are 
the most important and account for the major part of Kuwait's non-
oil exports. Fertilizers are produced by Petrochemical Industries 
Company (PIC) in which Government has a 92 percent interest. The PIC 
operates the Kuwait Chemical Fertilizer's complex which emoloys a 
labour force of over 1,000. Its major products are ureap liquid 
ammonia, ammonium sulphate and sulphuric acid. Ammonia and nitrogenous 
fertilisers are also produced by Kuwait Chemical Fertilizer Co. (KCFC) 
and Kuwait National Petroleum Co. (KNPC), the latter also handling 
KOC refined products and marketing refined products within Kuwait. 
Efforts are being made to modernize the fertilizer industry in 
response to changes in demand patterns, and the capacity of the urea 
plants is currently being increased. 
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Another large industrial concern is the Kuwait National Industries 
Company (KNIC) in which the Government holds a 51 percent share. The 
KNIC produces building materials such as bricks, cement, asbestos and 
prestressed concrete. Three companies affiliated with KNIC produce 
prefabricated buildings, metal pipes and cement. 
Output of the wheat milling industry stabilized in recent 
years as the mills had reached their capacity limits, and there are 
plans to expand capacity in the near future. Output of public 
utilities, including generation of electricity and production of 
desalinated water, continued to rise sharply in 1975 and 1976 because 
of the installation of new and larger facilities to meet the increase 
in demand.(30) 
Although statistical. coverage of industrial products is 
incomplete, available data show that considerable production increases 
have taken place in recent years. Production of chemical products 
other than fertilizers witnessed sharp increases. in 1974 and 1975; 
production is believed to have continued to rise substantially in 1976 
as a result of strong demand. 
Because of the heavy dependence on oil revenues {68.9 percent 
of GDP in 1979) the Government has ambitious plans to expand and 
diversify the industrial base. The most immediate areas of new 
activity are expected to be gas and petrochemicals. Thus, a liquified 
propane plant and a large petrochemical complex are in the planning 
stage. In addition the Government intends to handle the marketing 
and shipping of LPG, petrochemicals and crude oil, and plans have 
been made to establish factories for, amongst other things, cement, 
air-conditioning units, industrial detergents and a solar energy 
company as well as atomic power stations for water-distillation 
purposes. Thus in the coming years, Kuwait will witness the start of 
many major industrial projects which together with large public schemes 
(housing, roads, schools, hospitals, etc.) should stimulate the economy 
as a whole. Business activity will also flourish in the service 
sectors especially airways, shipping and transport etc. 
Nevertheless, against Kuwait's positive features (vast sources 
of capital, abundant supplies of natural gas, access to a great variety 
of refined petroleum products, a favourable geographic position, freedom 
to repatriate earnings and profits, duty-free imports of machinery and 
spare parts, tariff protection against foreign competition etc.), 
foreign investors must particularly consider the shortage of water, the 
absence of raw materials, other oil and natural gas, the smallness of 
the domestic market, high labour costs and a paucity of technical and 
organisational skills. 
It is thought that petrochemical industries are the most con-
venient for Kuwaiti economy as they use local raw material and resources 
(oil and capital), enabling to make the advantage of selling 
industrialized oil instead of raw oil.(31 & 32) 
2.3.2 Oman - Development and Industrial Trends 
The Development Council was charged with preparing the first Five 
Year Plan (FYP) for 1976-80; this was approved in the second half of 
1976. 
The main objectives of the plan were:(33) 
(a) To shift the concentration of investment from infrastructure to 
income generating projects in order to supplement and eventually 
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replace oil revenues. 
(b) To develop local human resources with the aim of increasing 
Omanisation of the labour force to replace expatriates. 
(c) While maintaining and developing the existing population 
centres to effect a wider geographical distribution of investment 
with the objective of improving the distribution of income and reducing 
the rate of migration to major centres. 
(d) To achieve the basic requirements of~free market economyp with 
the private sector playing an increasing role through the provision 
of an appropriate legal and incentives framework. 
(e) To pay more attention to the development of water resources. 
(f) To improve the efficiency of government administration. 
Industrial Development: 
Although the first five year plan forecast very high growth rate, 
this was from a very lew base in 1976. The major projects in the 
plan were the gas pipeline, oil refineryp copper mining, cement and 
flour milling. There is a much larger list of 51 projects (does not 
include the gas pipeline) in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
However, most of the projects on this list are in preliminary stages of 
preparation or represent no more than project ideas for consideration. 
A register of purely manufacturing firms recorded only 15.in 1975 
but 339 in 1979. A separate survey in 1980 indicated that of the 570 
active industrial firms which responded (out of an identified total of 
930) 315 started during the First Plan period. Most of these were 
fairly simple processing plants, with small labour units and mainly 
concerned with building materials. 
Of the major Government investment projects identified in the 
first FYP only the National Flour Mill at Muttrah and the desalination 
and power-plant at Ghubra were completed before 1980. Of the more 
than 50 projects listed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry almost 
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all were only at preparatory and consideration stages in the first 
FYP period. As can be seen from Table 2.3 9 between 1976 and 1980 the 
bulk of actual Government investment was still in physical infra-
structure (22% in transport and communications and 11% in electricity 
and domestic water supplies) and in social welfare (almost 10%), as 
compared with 0.5% in industry other than oil. 
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The second FYP ratified in November 1980 covers the period 1981-85. 
Planned Government investment in industry makes up almost 10% of the 
total 9 including,as major projects already completed or to be completed, 
by 1985 an oil refi.nery and asphalt plant to meet the main domestic 
demandp a cement plant 9 a copper mining and smelting complex at Sohar 
and a general industrial estate at Rusail. The energy for most 
industries will be supplied by the gas pipeline from the interior and 
a north coastal distribution system.(34) 
Oman's manufacturing sector is still very small, howeverp 
the Government has taken a number of measures to encourage private 
sector industrial investments.(35) 
2.3.3 Saudi Development Trends 
The huge scale of Saudi development expenditure and the influence 
which this has had on other AGS attitudes requires a relatively lengthy 
analysis here. 
The First Development Plan (1970-1975): 
The first FYP (1970/71-1974/75) had three br9ad objectives: (1) the 
achievement of an average annual rate of growth in GDP of 9.8 percent 
in real terms; (2) the development of human resources through manpower 
planning and investment in social infrastructure; (3) economic 
diversification to reduce the country's dependence on oil production. 
Total Government expenditures in the plan period were initially 
estimated at SRLs 41.3 billionp of which SRLs 18.4 billion (44.6 percent) 
Table 2.3 
Sectoral Distribution of Omani Government Investment 
(O.R. millions at current prices) 
1971~1975 1976-1980 
Oil 31.1 215.3 
Natural Gas 17.6 20.7 
Mining 0.4 11.7 
Agricultyre 9.7 12.6 
Fisheries 2.0 5.7 
Industry 0.4 0.6 
Transport and Communicati~n 107.8 258.8 
Electricity and Water 61.8 130.6 
P.T.T. 13.5 16.0 
Water Resources N.A. 4.2 
Commerce and Tourism 2.3 17.6 
Housing 20.5 29.7 
Education and Training 5.7 34.8 
Health 20.1 22.1 
Cultural, information, 
religious and social 20.7 15.7 
Municipal 19.4 39.4 
Finance and Banking N.A. 6.2 
Government Administration 62.7 55.7 
1981-1985 
588.9 
29.0 
58.2 
51.9 
30.4 
166.2 
352.2 
186.2 
66.8 
56.0 
69.5 
134.2 
88.1 
34.4 
58.8 
25.8 
59.0 
99.4 
Total 430.6 1203.6 2155.0 
Source: Omani Second Five-Year Development Plan 1980-1985. 
was for project expenditures and the remainder for recurrent expend-
itures. These estimates were made at a time when oil revenues had been 
growing at a relatively slow rate and the fiscal and balance of payments 
positions were in near balance. In fact, in the first year of the plan 
period the budgetary allocations fell short of the plan target because 
of a strained financial situation. As a result, the budgetary 
allocations were expanded far beyond the initial targets 0 and in the 
final year of the plan period the allocation for project expenditure 
was about six times higher than the target (Table 2.4). While actual 
expenditures fell short of the budgeted allocations in each year of 
the plan period, they exceeded the original plan target by 67 percent 
because of the rapid growth in the latter part of the plan period. 
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Table 2.4 
Government Expenditures under the First DeveloEment Plan 
(In millions of Saudi Arabian riyals) 
Saudi Arabian 1390/91 1391/92 1392/93 1393/94 1394/95 Total 
Fiscal Years 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 197'=1/75 
Project exEenditures 
Planned 3.6 3.3 3.7 4.0 3.8 18.4 
Budgeted 2.6 4.7 6.5 13.5 23.4 50.7 
Actual 2.3 3.0 4.3 9.5 16.8 35.9 
Recurrent exEenditures 
Planned 3.5 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.5 22.9 
Budgeted 3.5 5.7 6.3 7.9 14.7 38.1 
Actual 3.4 4.1 5.0 8.0 12.4 32.9 
Total exEenditures 
Planned 7.1- 7.5 8.3 9.1 9.3 41.3 
Budgeted 6.1 10.4 12.8 21.4 38.1 88.8 
Actual 5.7 7.1 9.3 17.5 29.2 68.8 
Source: IMFP Saudi Arabia 2 An Economic and Financial Surveyp SM/76/57p 
March 26p 1976. 
Development Trends 1976-1980: 
In this period Saudi Arabiap as noted earlier, moved very rapidly 
from underdevelopment and stagnation to economic dynamism and advanced 
technology. Total investment under the second Five-Year Plan (1975-80) 
was projected at more than ~US 140 billion and the main emphasis was on 
the production sector. In order to diversify the economy, Saudi Arabia 
launched a broad drive towards industrialisation. The biggest 
investment has been in energy-based industries, where Saudi Arabia is 
at great advantage both because of the immense energy resources and an 
almost unlimited supply of capitalp both long and short term. 
The plan also emphasised agriculture, to reduce dependence on food 
imports from about 60 percent to about 20 percent by the end of the 
century. Gigantic irrigation schemes were plannedp as well as dams to 
conserve run-off, and there was envisaged the biggest desalination 
programme in the world. In addition, Saudi Arabia was investigating 
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the possibility of importing fresh water in supertankers 
returning in ballast after discharging their oil. 
Construction of roads, airports and the expansion of communication 
facilities also received a considerable share of project allocation 
since industrial development was hampered by the inadequacy of the 
infrastructure. Special emphasis was also given in the plan to 
education and other aspects of social welfare, such as health and low-
cost housing, as to enormous defence expenditure. 
The Government's new industrial policy aimed at encouraging the 
private sector in industrial projects, with foreign capital and 
experience participating in the development of the country. Business-
men enjoy the full support of the Government during all stages of 
preparation, establishment and operation of industrial projects. In 
fact, no other developing country offers so many investment incentives 
(tax exemptions, provision of industrial zones, loans, etc.). 
The weak points of Saudi economy remained an insufficiency of 
manpower and skilled labour at all levels, the existence of a 
relatively small domestic market and the inadequacy of infrastructure.(36) 
Infrastructural Development: 
Inspite of great progress over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's 
infrastructure is inadequate for efficient implementation of its 
ambitious plans. Demand is expected to stay ahead of capacity in the 
areas of transportation and communication. This will cause delays, 
increase the cost of projects, and hinder the implementation of Saudi 
Arabia's huge development programmes. The scale of these programmes 
is so great that the economy will sustain a high growth rate even if 
only a fraction of the planned investment is actually implemented.(37) 
Saudi Arabia's communication services, such as mail, telegraph, 
and telephone, are not adequate and several projects are under way to 
correct this situation. These include a microwave systemp a network 
of telephone cablesp a satellite communication system with two earth 
stations and over 20 automatic telephone charges. Due to a severe 
shortage of skilled work forcep the overall quality of communication 
services remained poor.(38) 
Planned allocations for economic infrastructure under the 
second Five-Year Plan (1975-80) could have given Saudi Arabia one of 
the most modern infrastructure in the world. 
"It is unlikelyp howeverp that it can be finished in 
the cause of only five years. Moreover modernization 
is not equivalent to increased efficiency." 
11The lack of skilled. labour and other bottlenecks will 
hamper efficient operation and utilization of Saudi 
infrastructure well into the 1980s. A more serious 
problem is the short-run inadequacy of infrastructurep 
causing delays and leading to cost over-runs in 
construction projects for the development plans. 
Howeverp these factors are not expected to prevent 
Saudi Arabia from experiencing a high rate of economic 
growth or continuing to increase imports rapidly. 11 (39) 
Saudi Arabia Third Development Plan (1980-85): 
Within the same general strategy of development which was followed 
in the second Year Plan 1976-80p the third p~an document has shown 
the same elements of prioritiesp policies and development projects 
adopted. Howeverp there is a sj_gnificant change of emphasisp in that 
'strategic priority to structural change rather than to growth' as 
exemplified in the introductory statement of development philosophy.(40) 
It is clear from the special interest directed to the problem 
of inflationp despite its expected lesser burden with the current plan 
periodp that the Government realized the structural factorswhich 
remain controlling the economy and necessitate structural change and 
development. 
'The strategy for third Plan' contained an appreciation of all 
forces which reflect structural imbalances and the power of inflationary 
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pressures within the economy as follows (sub-section 3.5): 
(a) the gap between Government-financed demand on the one hand 
and the required supply of goods, services and labour on the other.' 
(b) '···a steep rise in the level of Government expenditure could 
generate serious inflationary pressures.' 
(c) '··· the danger depends not so much on the pressure of demand 
for goods and services as on that for skilled manpower.' 
(d) 'Outside the Government, there could be inflationary pressures 
arising from the private sectorts own autonomous' development.' 
(e) 'The rate at which imported inflation could affect the domestic 
cost and price levels remains subject to the efficiency of protective 
measures.' However, the author of this thesis does not believe that 
any feasible protective measures will tackle decisively the problem 
of imported inflation. 
Despite the plan's statement to 'introduce new policies to limit 
expenditure and to reduce the inflation rate so that it will not 
exceed tolerable levels, which are considered to be between 7 and 10 
percent per year' (section 3.1.2.4) however, such policies are 
questionable. 
The adopted strategy of structural change has been reflected in 
the following indicators: 
(a) Need for administrative change; as stated to be 'its primary 
objective, the introduction of basic changes to the Government'.s 
administrative organisation' the need was profoundly felt to the need 
for greater coordination and planning, budget and follow-up' _(section 
3.1.3.1). 
This objective seems to face a real challenge as in the Kingdom's 
increasingly complex economy -and society the role of spending 
ministries, of SAMA, of Petromin and of the Ministry of Planning can 
be only coordinated by the Council of Ministries and senior members of 
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the House of Saud.(41) 
The other aspect recognises 'the need to plan for the private 
sector' (sub-section 9.2.3.1) however, while 'the Government has made 
it clear that its intention is to transfer a number of its interests 
to the private sector at the earliest possible time' (9.2.3.2) it 
seems very clear that as Bowen Jones rightly indicates: 
"It is equally clear for a number of structural and 
resource-base reasonsp ranging from the opportunities 
for capital formation through the ineluctable dominance 
of the hydrocarbon-based industries in the manufacturing 
sector to critical need, by means of a National Water 
Plan, to co-ordinate and organise the activities of each 
of the implementing and operating Government agencies 
as well as those of the water-consuming private sector, 
that disengagement by the State from massive and 
pervasive activity and intervention is only possible 
in a few very limited fields."(42) 
(b) The second key medium-term objective of achieving 'structural 
change of the economy' (1.4.3.1) is based on devoting less investment 
to physical infrastructure and more to production as reflected in the 
following Table 2.5: 
Table 2.5 
Total Government Civilian Expenditure on Development, 1980-1985 
Function Current Prices Proportional SR billion Percentage 
Economic Resource Development 261.8 37.3 
Human Resource Development 129.6 18.5 
Social Development 61.2 8.7 
Physical Infrastructure 249.1 35.5 
Total 701.7 100 
Source: Saudi Third Five-Year Development Plan 
The economic resource development share is 37.3 percent of the 
plan total expendituresp compared to the second plan (1975-80) 
percentage of 18.1 as shown in Table 2.1. However, when examining the 
expenditure components of this major sector one can realize the immense 
-) 
·.• 
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amount of expenditure which is directly required still in the 
preparatory provision of production requirements as reflected in 
Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 
Financial Requirements: Economic Resources Development 
(SR billion, current prices) 
Sector Recurrent Project 
Agriculture and Water 12.8 59.3 
Energy and Mineral Resources 14.0 79.5 
Manufacturing and Commerce 3.6 92.0 
Total 30.4 230.8 
Source: Saudi Third Five-Year Plan. 
Total 
72.1 
93.5 
95.6 
261.2 
This situation tends to raise the question in relation to the 
accuracy of dividing priorities between productive projects and 
infrastructural projects. The above case tends to make it inevitable 
that expenditure on essential infrastructural requirement will remain 
high~ Bowen-Jones concluding that real estimation of physical infra-
structure becomes within 60-70 percent of the total allocations of 
the plan. (43) 
(d) 'Against an employment increase of 725,000 during the Second 
Plan, the projected net growth in the Third Plan will be only 155,000 1 
(3.4.2.1), with an annual growth of only 1,200 as reflected in the 
following Table 2.7. 
Despite the clear trend towards lessening drastically the 
dependence on imported labour, however, even with a planned limitation 
of numbers, almost 40 percent of all those employed at the end of the 
plan would still be expatriates. Government concentration on 
substituting imported labour by increasing productivity of the Saudi 
workforce necessitates further stress on the need for education and 
training activities which are of medium and long term prospects. 
Table 2.7 
Projected Civilian Employment 1979/80-1980/85 
(Thousands) 
Nationality/Sex 1979/80 1980/85 Net change 
Saudi men 1,308 1,473 + 129 
Non-Saudi men 1,015 1,024 + 9 
Saudi women 103 120 + 17 
Non-Saudi women 45 45 
Sub-total, Saudis 1,411 1,557 + 146 
Sub-to·tal , non-Saud is 1,060 1,069 + 9 
Total 2,471 2,626 + 155 
Source: Saudi Third Developmen+. Plan. 
Manufacturing Industry: 
Annual Growth 
i.9 
0.2 
3.1 
1.9 
0.2 
1.2 
Outside the oil sector, the value of Saudi industrial production 
was only 1.75.percent of GNP in 1971. Out of approximately 9,000 
industrial enterprise, only 4 employed 200 persons or more, and 13 
employed between 100 and 199. Thriving non-oil industries were highly 
consumer oriented, namely tobacco, bottling, tires, furniture, and 
leatherwork. 
The major drive for Saudi industrialization has come with the 
establishment of Petromin (General Petroleum and Mineral Organization), 
a public corpora+.ion involved in the domestic distribution and 
marketing·of oil-related .commodities, refining, petrochemicals, steel 
production, and the development of mineral and metal industries. The 
steel factory near Jeddah produced about 100,000 tons in 1971, and 
in the same year, the nitrogenous fertilizer plant in Dammam put out 
92,000 tons. Moreover, sufficient capital to finance industrial 
expansion was available well into the foreseeable future.(44) 
In 1973-74, manufacturing activity (excluding-oil refining) 
accounted for around 1.5 to 2 percent of gross domestic product, 
while the production of crude oil ~nd natural gas, and refining 
activity provided nearly 70 percent of GDP during this period. 
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Official pronouncements made in 1974-75, set down the following 
guidelines and goals for the development of the non-oil manufacturing 
sector. 
(a) The establishment of a wide range of industries producing 
consumer and producer goods which can compete on both the domestic 
and the export market. 
(b) The utilization of existing potentialities and external economies 
in the form of cheap fuel, petroleum refining by-products, mineral and 
agricultural resources. 
(c.) The extensive use of advanced industrial technology. 
(d) Ensuring a regionally balanced pattern of industrial growth. 
(e) The gradual reduction of dependence on expatriate labour and 
expertise through spreading technical education and on the job training 
of the native labour force. 
A statement on industrial policy issued in 1974 outlined Saudi 
industrial strategy in clear terms. To quote.(45) 
"The Government realised that the goals of industrial 
development can be achieved most effectively if the 
private sector assumes responsibility over the long term 
for the initiation of industrial projects. For this 
reason, the Government will give full support to private 
investors in the design, construction, and operation of 
industrial enterprises which are of benefit to the 
Kingdom. The Government will also complement efforts. in 
the private sector by financing or co-operating in the 
setting up of industries which require large outlays of 
capital or specialised skills and know-how, and which 
may be beyond the capabilities of the:private sector on 
its own." 
·.·. 
In the case. of projects which are initiated by the public sector, 
the Government has indicated that private sector participation in such 
projects, or in some cases the complete transfer of ownership from 
the public to private sectors, will be allowed at the earliest possible 
and practicable date. 
In March 1974, The Saudi Industrial Development fund was established 
with an initial capital of SR 500 million to provide medium and long 
term credit with no interest charges (but against a small fee to cover 
administration costs) for the setting up of new industrial enter-
prises in the private sector 0 or the expansion of existing ones. 
Loans are now provided for a maximum period of 15 years, and on 
condition that the feasibili~y of a project is established, and that 
the total size of the loan does not exceed 50 percent of the total 
capital required. 
In addition to the various measures mentioned above, and by the 
end of 1975 0 around 30 industrial products ranging from chocolate 
to carpets and plastic sheets and tubes were being protected from 
foreign competition through a 20 percent advalorem tax on imported 
substitutes. 
As Table 2.8 shows, new enterprises were established in most 
of the main branches of manufacturing industry. The largest capital 
outlay by far was made in the cement, marble and marble products 
industries, which produce a variety of construction materials (cement, 
tiles 0 polished marble, pre-cast concrete, prefabricated houses and 
parts thereof, etc.). In the early seventies, three large cement 
plants were completed in Jeddah, Riyadh and Damrr.am with a combined 
annual capacity of 3.13 million tons, and a capital outlay estimated 
at around SR 800 f11illion. A relatively fast growth in the number of 
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new establishments in recent years is alsoobservable in the food 
processing' industry, and in ind~stries producing paper and wood products, 
basic chemicals and associated products, and metal products for 
construction and other uses. 
From 1971 up to and including the second quarter of 1976, 
licenses were granted for the setting up of around 10 plants to 
produce simple glass and fibre glass products. In 1975, the 
Industrial Studies ,and Research Centre approved plans to set up for 
Table 2.8 
Main Characteristi~s of Saudi Arabia's Manufacturing Industry in 1972-73 
Number of Total Net value Paid-up Net value Gross value 
establishments number of fixed capital added of output 
employed assets (mi\l•Riyals) (mil\• Riyals) (mn .. Riyals) 
(m~·Riyals) 
Food processing, 
beverages, tobacco 2,526 10,601 91.0 18.2 119.1 320.3 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather, leather 
.products 3,563 5,959 14.3 2.8 41.6 88.6 
Paper and paper 
products, printing 
and publishing 67 1,594 34.0 6.8 26.9 59.3 
Wood and wood products 
including furniture . 1,474 4,429 18.8 3.8 35.7 76.2 
Chemicals, chemical 
products, petroleum 
products, rubber, 
plastics 38 2,042 103.3 20.7 47.8 170.8 
Non-metallic mineral 
products (excluding 
oil) 793 6,065 364.7 72.9 155.5 253.0 
Basic metals 33 1,022 62.9 . 12.6 19.2 35.8 
Metal products, 
equipment, machinery 864 4,260 26.5 5.3 51.9 99.58 
Other industries 2 40 0.5 0.1 1.0 5.1 
Total 9,360 36,012 716.0 143.2 498.7 1,108.6 1-' 
0 
~ 
Source: Industrial studies and Development Centre. Manual of Industrial Investment in _1:;l'le Ki_ngd_om of Saud!__:_Ara.b_ia, 
1975; pp. 34-35. 
the first time a sheet glass plant which will use domestically 
available raw materials and natural gas to produce a projected 130,000 
tons of sheet glass annually. 
The basic metals industries which have or are being set up, are 
licensed to produce a range of heavy metal products such as pylons, 
large metal structures, pipes, wrought iron products and cables. 
As an example, work started in 1975 on a copper wire plant which will 
produce 6000 tons of cables a year. Electrical and other types of 
~hines which were being produced early in 1976 consisted of washing 
machines, air conditioners, water pumps and heaters, electricity and 
telephone switching boards, car batteries, and a number of other 
similar products. The vehicle industry has so far concentrated on the 
production of truck bodies. In 1974 and 1975, however licenses were 
granted to General Motors, Daim ler-Benz, the Japanese vehicle firm 
Hino, and Berliet of France for the setting up of four separate car 
and truck assembly plants in Saudi Arabia. The plants were scheduled 
.for completion before 1980, and according to official reports were 
planned to have a combined starting capacity of 8000 General Motors 
cars, more than 4000 Mercedes lorries and buses, 400 Hino trucks, 
and 3500 Berliet trucks and lorries. 
In line with the policy guidelines mentioned above, public 
sector. investment in the development of manufacturing industry centres 
on a number of large scale projects in the petrochemical and basic 
metals industries. 
Another important project which is expected to be completed 
during the third five-year plan period is a new steel plant at Jubail 
with a reported annual capacity of 3.5 million tons a year of raw 
steel. Upon completion the Jubail plant will supply the steel mill 
at J eddah with its requirements of raw steel ?;;,.:,.nets. The cost of 
this latter project was met from Petromin 1 s budget under the second 
five year plan. 
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During the second FYP period 0 work also commenced on the huge 
industrial complexes at Yanbu' and Jubail. These complexes will take 
about 10-12 years with costs for each about 20=25 billion U.S. 
dollars.(46) In 1976 the Saudi Corporation for Basic Industries was 
set up to take charge of these two complexes which include some of 
the above-mentioned industries. 
Industrial Development Trends 1£81-85: 
Sauai Arabia's third five-year plan which started in 1980 lays 
emphasis on building industrial production capabilities. The second five-
year plan of ~142 billion is thought to successfully laid the 
foundations to enable Saudi Arabia to become an industrialised nation. 
However, that reducing the country's dependence on oil exports for 
most of its income will be a very long-term process, and further heavy 
infrastructure! outlays will be necessary. 
The natural gas collecting system under construction by (Aramco) 
in the country's eastern province is now planned to be completed by the 
end of the third five-year plan to supply the multi-billion dollar 
energy intensive industrial complexes at Yanbu' and Jubail. The new 
third five-year plan aims at adding steel, petrochemical and 
fe-rtiliser plants, oil refineries and natural gas liquification plants. 
,_ 
2.4 Development Strategies within the AGS : Conclusion 
Development trends in the AGS in the _ 'seven~i~s _first gave priority _ 
to the buildup of the infrastructure needed for the second stage which 
gave more attention to productive sectors, particularly industry. 
However, the second stages, mainly during the period 1976-80 while 
concentrating on diversifying their economies through ambitious 
industrial programmes, continued infrastructure! investment and remained 
giving special attention to social and welfare programmes. AG~ 
develop!f1ent objectives during the 'seventies seemed to concentrate in 
107 
broad terms on .the two objectives of (a) striving towards self 
sustaining economic developmentp whilst alsop (b) maintaining 
relatively high guaranteed standard of welfare for all citizens. In 
other words. the AGS countries remained committed to consumerism whilst 
also attempting to improve their production bases. 
The components of national planning aims which are common to 
all the AGS could therefore be summar.ised as follows: 
1. Economic diversification and a broadening of the productive base 
through the use of technology and industrialisation. 
2. The training of labour forces and human resource development. 
3. A greater emphasis on the quality -of life and on the need for 
environmental safeguards. 
4. Achieving the basic requirements of freep market economiesp with 
the private sector playing an increasing ·role through the provision 
of appropriate legal and incentive frameworks. 
5. The development of water r~sources. 
6. The improvement of the efficiency of Government administration. 
2.5 AGS Industrial Development : Conclusion 
Available data on industrial activities in the Sub-region are 
inadequate for a comprehensive evaluation of the way in which the 
industrial sectors are developingg and studies of demand for the 
products of existing and planned industries remain limited. However, 
it is evident, from the preceding survey that among the key elements is 
an urgent need to diversify the structure of output in the AGS. 
One of the basic requirements for accelerating the industrialization 
process in the Sub-region is still further improvement in infra-
structural facilities, both physical and institutional. The former 
include the development of transportation, communications, power 
generation and the creation of industrial areas, whilst the latter 
include the establishment of: industrial planning and regulatory 
bodies; institutions for training, research and quality control; 
financing and advisory services. 
Furthermore, the dependence on imported technology, combined 
with shor-tages of skilled workers, technicians, specialists and 
managerial talents, often results in low capacity utilization of 
plant. To prevent aggravation of these shortages, immediate action at 
the National, Sub-regional, Regional and International levels is 
required, through more effective use of existing training facilities, 
including in-plant training, and through the intensive setting-up of 
vocational training centres to meet the projected needs of each branch 
of industry. 
More generally, Governments of countries in the Sub-region will 
have to adopt specific long-term strategies of industrial development 
so that successive industrial development plans \•Till fit coherently 
within the framework of long-term overall development strategy 
perspectives. The adoption of such strategies at the sectoral and 
overall levels will also imply a greater co-ordination between the 
sectoral plans and will allow better implementation rates of development 
plans which so far have fallen short of their targets.(47) 
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Although all AGS generally favour private ownership of manufacturing 
activities, the public sector in these countries has found it 
increasingly necessary to take the initiative, especially in export-
oriented, energy related industries. The public sector role was very 
clear from the Kuwaiti example where 75 percent of the five-year plan 
(1976-80) development allocations were for this sector. 
Industrialization in the AGS is generally of quite recent origin 
and is still at an early stage, though progress is being accelerated. 
In recent years, while continuing to industrialize along import 
substitution lines involving light manuracturing processes, these 
countries have almost all been giving increasing attention towards 
capital intensive and export oriented industries, notably in the field 
of petrochemicals and other energy intensive industries, fertilizers, 
steel, cement etc. Some of the latter also use natural gas as a raw 
material input. Light industries in food processing are restricted 
because of the generally low agricultural potential of the Sub-region. 
The private sector which is encouraged to play a more important role 
in the industrial movement has entered mainly the fields of import 
substitution, consumer goods and construction materials. 
Oil and gas, therefore, today and in the foreseeable future, are 
generators of capital, and simultaneously, offer the physical base for 
viable .tndustry in the Sub-region in the future. Moreover should 
petroleum lose its dominant place in energy consumption by the year 
2000, the amassed capital could allow the continuation of large-scale 
financing of industrial development,(48} whilst the large gas reserves 
would remain as energy and raw material suppliers. 
Major constraints on ind~strial development, as mentioned 
earlierp have been centred on the lack of natural resources apart from 
oil and gas, the limited size of the domestic markets, the lack of 
trained man power, high cost of labour, paucity of technical and 
organisational skills as well as the inadequacy of infrastructure. All 
this tends to encourage national j_ndustrial trends in the AGS which 
rely to a grea~ degree on external economies. One further result has 
been to limit the movement towards inter-industry linkages within each 
of the countries. All these factors have contributed, also, to make 
industrial unit costs in, for example, refining, gas liquidation, 
petrochemicals, fertilizers, some 30-40 percent higher than are found 
in the industrialized countries.(49) 
Some preliminary evaluation comments can be made at this stage 
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of analysis. The first is that whilst the principle of the planning 
approach to development has been formally accepted (to varying degrees) 
in individual AGS countries,this has been more nominal than real. 
Insufficient effort have been directed towards creating the necessary 
skilled administrative and technical machinery for effective planning 
and the necessity for a sound information and data base has not been 
appreciated. These two deficiencies have resulted in considerable 
gaps appearing between development itentions and achievements. 
The second po:i.nt is that individual AGS countries have given an 
exaggerated priority to industrialization in a gross quantitative 
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sense. In other words industrial goals have been stated in simple terms 
of producing volumes and tonnages of e.g. fertilizers, aluminium, 
polyethyleneg whilst the associated implications for industrial 
infrastructure, e.g. labour skills, technical and marketing research, 
communications, public utility supplies of water and energy etc. have 
been under~estimated. Too little appreciation has been made of the 
full range of requirements for successful industrialisation. 
The heavily skewed resource base outlined in Chapter 1 creates 
some severe constraints for general as well as industrial development. 
This makes it even more t},1an no:rmal,ly necessary for the AGS countries 
to provide highly developed infr~structural and management bases for 
development although, in practiceg the States concerned have tended to 
assume that a rapid movement t~wards productive, income-generating 
activities - particularly in industry - can be rapid and easy. The result 
has been the creation of a large number of prestigious production 
projects and great volumes of programme documentsg against which the 
number of actual viable achievements appear rather disappointing. 
These points will be examined further in following chaptersv and 
in part 2 their relevance to AGS cooperation will be explored. 
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CHAPTER 3 - AGS AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Development of Agriculture 
Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the main features of agricultural and 
fisheries development of AGS 0 the sectors traditionally most product-
ively important. A general review is made of the structure of 
AGS' agriculture, bearing in mind the resource base analysed in 
Chapter 1, and the efforts to develop agriculture, including various 
forms of Government assistance and encouragements. Constraints on 
agricultural development will be identified 0 the chapter ending by 
su~arizing the features for agricultural development common to the 
AGS, and prospects for such development. 
3.1.1 Qatar - Agriculture Development 
As part of the diversification effort, the development of 
agriculture has been intensified. Agricultural production in Qatar 
is limited as noted in Chapter 1, by the scarcity of water and 
arable land. In recent years, however, several experimental 
programmes have been initiated and the production of vegetables, food 
grains and alfalfa has risen substantially. Agricultural production 
is based on private land ownership and is supported by substantial 
Government assistance; _seeds, fertilizer and water pumps are provided 
-
free while grants are given in the even of damage to land or crops. 
Animal husbandry is being considered as part of Qatar's long-
range agricultural development programme and pilot projects have been 
undertaken in sheep raising (13,000 head) and dairy farming (300 head). 
A Government poultry project, which.commenced operations in October 1975, 
is now producing 1 million broilers and 10 million eggs per year, 
providing 60 percent of domestic consumption. 
Most important is vegetable production which in 1980 supplied 
68% of the domestic demand in summer and 42% in winter. 50% of 
the local market for all fruit is supplied locally but 4/5 of this 
is made up of dates.(l) 
Howeverp the harsh environment makes the development of 
Agriculture, at best, a long term enterprise.(2) Tne government's 
greatest ambition is to achieve inqependence in food supply, at some 
times of the year. QR 5 mn ($ 1.3 mn) is being spent on a 
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veterinary institute, and some QR 51 mn ($ 13.3 mn) on poultry production. 
Output from the dairy farm is expected soon to reach 1,000 tons of 
milk a year, and some 5,000 sheep and goats will be slaughtered from 
the planned 13,000 strong herd on which QR 19 mn ($ 4.9.mn) has been 
spent, although the latter project has fallen below expectation.(3) 
3.1.2 Bahrain - Agricture Development 
Agricultural production in Bahrain is restricted by the 
small land area, and as elsewhere the increasing salinity of the 
water supply and the.movem~nt of labour to the urbanized sectors. 
Efforts are now being made to increase the production of eggs 
(local output of which satisfies about one third of total domestic 
requirements), vegetables and milk. Bahrain is likely to continue to 
depend on imports of food commodities and has recently signed 
agreements with some. neighbouring countries to provide for duty-
free trade among them in·agricultural products.(4) 
3.1.3 Kuwait - Agriculture Development 
The agricultural sector contributes less the.n 1% of the 
domestic product. The total area under cultivation was in 1976/ 
1977 about 907 hectares (8 square metres per head), and was 
less than 0.3% of the total labour force workers in agriculture. 
These indicators emphasise the very small importance of agriculture 
in the economy of Kuwait.(5) 
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Potential for agriculture development is severely limited as 
only 5 per cent of the land is suitable for farming. Agriculture 
is concentrated on experimental stations and small-scale private 
farms. There is, however, a growing interest in livestock and poultry 
farming, commercial-scale production of vegetables in glasshouses, outdoor 
cultures, and hydroponics.(6) 
In the first sectoral investment plan for 1967/68 to 1971/72 
very little was budgeted for Agriculture and Fisheries.(7) Table 3.1 
illustrates the weak progress which was achieved in agricultural 
development of Kuwait as well as its limited potentials. The 
paucity of data available is'also an indication of the low status afforded 
to agriculture. 
Table 3.1 
Land Use in Kuwait 
1970-75 (In thousands of donums) 1/ 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Total area 17,818.0 17.818.0 17,818.0 17,818.0 17,818.0 
Cultivated land 1,369.5 1,370.8 1.370.8 1.372.1 1,372.0 
Vegetable and Crops (6.8) (8.1) (8.1) (8.4) (10.0) 
Fruit and wood trees (22.7) (22.7) (22.7) (22.7) (22.7) 
Pastures (1,340.1) (1,340.0) (1~340~0) (1,340.0) (1,340.0) 
Unused Cultivable 168.9 167.7 167.7 166.4 165.8 
land 
Total Cultivable 1,538.5 1,538.5 1,538.5 1,538.5 1,538.5 
land 
Non-cultivable land 16,279.5. 16,279.5 16,279.5 16,279.5 16,279.5 
1/ One donum equals 1,000 square metres 
Source: Ministry of Planning 
3.1.4 UAE - Agriculture 
Scarcity of water and poor soil limit the role of agriculture 
which employs about 18 per cent of the economically active population 
to (a proportion rising to 45 per cent in Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah). 
The FAO sees considerable commercial potential in concentrating on 
fresh vegetables, fruit, livestock and integrated fishing. Actually, 
agricultural production is confined to a few oasis, experimental 
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farming (notably successful for strawberries and flowers), and specially 
favoured localities in some parts of Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. In 
additon, Sadiyat Island houses the Arid Lands Research Centre, a joint 
project of the University of Arizona and the Government of Abu Dhabi, 
for vegetable growing in artificial environments and associated 
agricultural research. In fact, the output of Sadiyat is estimated 
to meet a large proportion of the requirements of the town of Abu 
Dhabi, although at very high cost. 
There is a belief in the Union that developing agriculture and 
fishing is a good way of decreasing reliance on food imports, creating 
jobs, and broadening the base of the economy.(8) By 1978 the total gross 
value of agricultural production equalled c.20% of food imports into 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi.(9) 
To counter the rising cost of farm labour and expand agricultural 
production, the UAE authorities have encouraged mechanization and provided 
financial support and various services to farmers. The Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has sold seeds, pumps, and 
mechanical equipment to farmers at subsidized prices and has also given 
them grants and generous:loans; these support programmes amounting 
to Dh. 6.7 million in 1974 and Dh 23 million in 1975. In Abu Dhabi, 
the Government has provided equipment and inputs free of charge 
and has further helped farmers financially by establishing guaranteed 
prices and undertaking crop marketing. The Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries has undertaken resource surveys and land 
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improvement projects as a result of which total land under cultivation 
has been increasing. 
Between 1973 and 1975p the area under cultjvation increased by 
over 50 per cent. The Ministry has drilled wells and repaired 
underground water tunnels in addition to the establishment of small 
irrigation schemes such as the one at Heleiha. It has also built 
earth dams to store rain water and prevent fla~h flooding.(lO) 
3.1.5 Oman - Agriculture Development 
In agriculturep greater emphasis will need to be placed on 
increasing the yields on already cultivated lands, along with a 
limited programme for new land development in suitable areasp where 
water and appropriate soils can be found. One recommendation is that 
the major effort in increasing yiel4s should be in dates and Hmes, 
in which little research has been done to control the incidence of 
pests and diseases. New land development should be largely devoted to 
high value fruits and vegetables, partly to replace imports and 
partly for exports. Efforts to raise agricultural production are 
essential not only to develop non-oil sources of income but also 
to increase the income of the 7~~ of the Omani population living in 
rural areas.(ll) 
Total cultivated area is 36,000 hectaresp or 0.0012% of the 
total areap fruits .occupy more than half the cultivated area of which 
palm trees occupy;70% 9 Alfalfa-15.4% of the cultivated areap onions 
10%, wheat 2%. (12) It is estimated that about 'one million hectares 
are useful for grazing. . 
3.1.6 Saudi Arabia - Agricultural Development 
Although relatively neglected in the second Five year plan 
there is considerable need and scope for productive investment in 
the development of the country's agricultural resources. The larger part 
of agricultural development expenditure has been on development 
projectsp including desalination plantsp water networks and the con-
struction of dams. Cash assistance is introduced to farmers for 
the purchase of agricultural machineryp fertilisers and other 
inputs with subventions to growers of wheat and rice. After nearly 
two decades of development effortp the Kingdom continues to be a net 
importer of food grains, meat, milk and milk productsp vegetables 
and fruitp although it is claimed that self-sufficiency in wheat 
may be achieved by 1983. 
The key to agriculture lies in the development of water 
resources, which is highly cost-intensive in Saudi Arabia. Up until 
now, the same Ministry, with the same budgetary controls, has dealt 
with both water and agriculture (other than desalinated water)P 
but what is required is a national plan for the development of 
water resources, based on the 1965-1970 Resource Surveys and subs-
equent smaller scale investigation.(l3) 
To promote agricultural production in the long term the Saudi 
Second Development plan envisaged a number of schemes including 
increasing the efficiency in the use of water from underground 
sources together with improvements in water resource management and 
conservation. Agricultural credit was expanded and training facili-
ties were provided by the establishment of five vocational training 
schools. 
Research and study programmes were stren~ened with the 
particular objectives of increased production and development of 
rapid and economic marketing facilities, especially for fruits and 
vegetables. 
Greater use of improved seeds, fertilizers and insecticides 
were encouraged through enlarged extension services and continu-
ation of subsidy programme. Extensive use of suitable farm 
machinery was encouraged for a more productive use of land and 
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labour. Agricultural output was planned to be adequately subsidized 
to protect domestic production against imports of food stuffs and 
livestock without raising their domestic prices through higher 
protective tariffs.(l4) 
Agricultural production: 
As a result of certain non-financial constraints the actual 
growth of approximately 3.6 per cent per annum in the agricultural 
sector during the first plan period fell a little short of the plan 
target of 4.6 per cent0 11~is sustained steady growth is nevertheless 
encouraging and raises hopes that with the gradual completion of the 
infrastructure, the removal of these constraints. and the various 
incentives provided by the Government, this sector will show higher 
growth rates in future.(l5) It was envisaged that as a result of 
the above-mentioned programmes together with the distribution of 
fallow land and the extension of irrigated land, the real output of the 
agricultural sector was expected to show a sustained growth of at 
least 4 per cent per annum during the second plan period. 
The subsidy programme basis are reflected in the following 
Table 3. 2. This programme may be suitably enlarged when and where 
it is felt necessary in the larger interest of the country's agricu-
ltural development.(16) 
Wheat production: 
Total wheat production in the Kingdom rose by 68 per cent from 
90.000 tons during 1973/74 to 93,000 in 1975/76 (table 3.3) to 
400.000 tons during 1981/82. This significant increase in production 
may be attributed to the various incentives offered by the Government 
to wheat cultivators and to the higher yield of the Maxi-pak variety of 
wheat which is now being increasingly used in the Kingdom. By the 
end of the first plan period (1974/75) a total of 72,000 hectares of 
land was under wheat cultivation of which about 7.000 hectares was 
cultivated with the Maxi-pak variety. The Ministry planned to 
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Table 3.2 
Saudi Subsidy Programme to Agriculture 
Inputs: Year of Present Amount or % 
Introduction 
Farm machinery 1973 500~ of price 
Fertilizers 1973 50% of price 
Animal feed concentrates 1973 50% of price 
(36% protein) 
Poultry equipment 1974 30% of price* 
Dairy equipment 1974 30% of price* 
Transportation of 200 or 1975 total cost of transportation 
more dairy cattle 
Outputs: 
Wheat 1973 Rls 0.25 per Kilo 
Sorghum 1973 Rls 0.25 per Kilo 
Rice 1973 Rls 0.30 per Kilo 
Sheep 1974 Rls 10 per head 
Camels 1974 Rls 50 per head 
* 20% if financed by the Agricultural Bank. 
Sources: Central Planning Organization, Development Plan, 1975-80. 
A Guide to Agricultural Investment in Saudi Arabia, 
M.A.W., l979. 
Table 3.3 
Estimates of Production of Major Crops in 
Annual crops 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Millet 
Maize 
Barley 
Alfalfa 
Water melons 
Tomatoes 
Dry onions 
Other vegetables 
Permanent crops 
Dates 
Grapes 
Citrus 
Saudi Arabia 1975/76 
Area 
(Thou~ ha.) 
74 
302 
33 
9 
9 
10 
13 
16 
5 
8 
60 
5 
4 
Production 
(Thousand Tons) 
93 
154 
17 
7 
12 
542 
248 
165 
75 
43 
257 
42 
21 
Source: Saudi·Ministry of Agriculture and Water, A Guide to, 
Agricultural Investment in Saudi Arabia, 1979. 
Table 3.9 p.42. 
extend the cultivation of this variety to the entire. wheat 
cultivated area in the Kingdom by 1980.(17) 
Livestock production: 
The growth and expansion of poultry farms in the Kingdom has 
been highly encouraging. In 1964 there were only 34 such farms with 
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a production of 464 metric tons of chickens and 11 million eggs. 
By 1971 the number of farms rose to 104 and production reached 
4,634 metric tons of chickens and 43 million eggs. Production rose 
again to an estimated 7,000 metric tons of chickens and 90 million 
eggs in 1974/5, and contines to rise. 
According to the second plan projections, a total of 20,000 
metric tons of chicken and 140 million eggs would be produced by the 
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end of 1980. In fact, by 1982 projects approved had a 1 billion a year egg 
capacity. This increased production has had a salutary effect on the 
prices of chickens and eggs which remained stable in spite of the 
generally rising prices, particularly of fresh meat. The Government 
is also promising the establishment of livestock and dairy farms. 
Some such farms have already been established while others are 
expected to be established in the near future. It is hoped that as 
a result the supply of domestically produced meat and dairy products 
will expand, thus helping fulfil plan targets. 
Land Reclamation and Distribution: 
By the end of 1975 a total of 485,000 dunums of fallow land 
had been distributed by the Government to farmers in pursuance of 
the programme initiated in 1968/69. In accordance with the regu-
lations governing this programme,individual cultivators are granted 
not less than 5 hectares·and not more than 10 hectares of Government 
land while companies are granted a maximum of 400 hectares. The 
emphasis in the regulations was on the proper utilization of the land 
grant for agricultural development. A trial period of three years 
is prescribed during which the utilization is monitored. The 
Minister of Agriculture is empowered to withdraw the land granted 
to anyone who has failed to utilize it during the specified period. 
Transfer of land ownership does not in fact officially take place 
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until the trial period has been completed to the satisfaction of the 
Ministryo 
Agricultural Development and Third Plan: 
Third plan policy will maintain the large subsidy payments and 
incentives which have encouraged 'the farmers and ranchers who 
remain.;Jd in agriculture, plus new investors in large·-scale paul try 
and dairy enterprises who were attracted in' (section 4.3.2.1) and 
includes further disbursements of SR 5 billion in loans and SR 2.5 
billion in subsidies (4.3.5o4). Along with this incpme large land 
development and improvement projects (increasingly involving the 
private sector), and the reinforcement of efforts to improve low 
productivity and inefficient resource use in that large section of 
traditional agriculture which can only be described as residual - partly 
because of out-migration to the citieso(18) 
Agriculturep the major remaining producing sectorp is and 
will remain the largest single employer (Table 3.4), even though 
the numbers involved will continue to fall by 11 percent and the 
percentage contribution of agriculture to the non-oil GDP will also 
fall from the 5.8 percent estimated in 1979/80, but rise in absolute 
terms by about 30 percent (constant prices) during the plan period.(l9) 
"Plans for Agriculture, as in most countries in the 
throes of change, are complicated by the linkages 
. between production and regional and rural policies, 
but in Saudi Arabia particularly by the critical 
relationships with other sector's demands for labour 
and the overall limiting factors of water supply. 11 (20) 
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Table 3.4 
Employment and GDP by Sector 1979/1980-1984/85 
in the Non-Oil Economy at 1979/1980 prices 
Sector 1979/1980 1984/1985 
Employment GDP Employment GDP 
(thousands) (SR bn (thousands) (SR bn 
Agriculture 598.8 3.26 528.8 4.23 
Mining 7.3 1.50 9.8 2.40 
Manufacturing 104.2 6.75 164.2 16.00 
Utilities 31.5 0.35 47.0 1.27 
Construction 330.1 45.99 245.1 40.56 
Trade 310.6 17.45 339.6 26.14 
Transport 214.6 20.23 274.6 37.16 
Finance and Property 34.8 13.14 44.8 18.68 
Other Services 482.3 5.26 505.3 6.08 
Government (excluding 
non-civilians) 321.0 21.04 421.0 29.72 
Total 2435.2 134.97 2580.2 182.23 
Source: The Third Saudi Arabian Five Year Plan (1979/1980-1984/1985) 
3.1.7 AGS -Agricultural Development 
Summary: 
From the above-mentioned illustrations it was very clear that 
despite various forms of generous government's assistance, large and 
serious constraints on agricultural developments combined to weaken 
agricultural structure in all AGS, although to different degrees, 
and contributed to make agricultural contribution to their 
economies comparatively small. At the same time these factors 
also limit future agricultural development prospects. Government's 
assistance programmes included a wide range of forms, which included 
as illustrated in the Saudi examplep subsidies to all inputs (farm 
machinery, fertilizers, animal feed concentrates, poultry and dairy 
farms, transportation of dairy cattle) as well as outputs (wheat, 
sorghum, rice, sheep and camels). Despite some achievements in 
relation to import substitution in foo~ production, however AGS 
ttl I 
after)continued to be a large net importer for all products.(2l) 
The structure of agriculture and its development prospects seem to 
be comparatively better in Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE than in Qatar, 
Bahrain and Kuwait. Agricultural development course has shown the 
importance of conserving and developing water resources on which 
agricultural development prospects depend extensively. At the same 
time a general trend towards commercial production of vetetables in 
glasshouses, hydroponics and specialised arid zone technologies is 
observable in the area. 
Prospects for horizontal expansion are good in Saudi Arabia, 
while limited in all other countries. In Oman concentration is 
directed mainly to vertical expansion. In each case, unlike the other 
AGS, these two countries retain significantly sized agricultural 
communities. 
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3.2 AGS Fisheries Development 
3.2.1 AGS Fisheries Structure 
The total number of traditional, artisanal fishermen 8 inclu-
ding subsistence fishermen was estimated at 23 8 257 in 1977.(22) 
(Table 3.5). 
In proportion to the total population, the number of fishermen 
in most cases are of course, highest in the countries where the 
great majority of population reside along the coast. The number of 
fishermen in proportion to total population is particularly high in 
Oman and UAE where fishing is the main way of life on long stretches 
of the coast.(23) 
Among AGS Oman, with about 15,000 (64.5%)(24) fishermen, has 
the largest number followed by UAE with 4964 (21.3%), Qatar with 1200 
(5.2%) fishermen, Saudi Arabia with ~000 fishermen (4.3%) 8 Kuwait 
843 (3.6%) and Bahrain with 250 (1.1%) fishermen (Table 3.4). 
It should be mentioned that in some countries 8 especially those 
with small total populations, (Kuwait 8 Bahrain and Qatar) there are 
fishermen from other countries in the region operating in their 
waters such as those from Oman and Iran. Due to the absence of 
complete, relfable statistics, the magnitude of such interchange 
is not clear. Similarly, there exists, an exchange ~ the points of 
landing fish. Fishing boats owned by a fisherman of one country may 
land his catch in another country. This practice is mostly induced 
by the proximity of the nearest landing point at the end of a fishing 
trip, or due to the prices of fish prevailing at the time.(25) 
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Table 3.5 
AGS - Fisheries Labour Force and Population (1977) 
Country Number of Traditional Total 2:3 Population 2:4 
Fishermen Labour 
Force 
(1) (2) % (3) ( 4) % 
Bahrain 250 1.1 67,600 0.4 306,000 0.1 
Kuwait 843 3o6 312,000 0.3 1,129,000 0.07 
Oman 15,000 64.5 214,000 7 .o 814,000 1.8 
Qatar 1,200 5.2 89,000 1.3 202,000 0.6 
S. Arabia 1,000 4.3 2,440,000 0.04 7,640,000 0.01 
UAE 4,964 21.3 487,000 1.0 884,000 0.6 
Total 23,275 100 3,609,600 0.6 10,975,000 0.21 
Source: Feidi, I. Fisheries Industries Development in the Member 
Countries, Regional Fishery Survey and Development Project -
RAB/71/278, Draft Final Report, Aug. 1979, Table 2, p. 48. 
CAEU, Arab Countries Economic Indicators, No. 1, Nov. 1980, 
Amman, (Arabic). 
As was seen earlier, many natives of the UAE, as of Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar and Bahrain were traditionally seafarers, fishermen and pearlers. 
Although some activities have disappeared, fishing is still an 
important source of living for much of the population of some States. 
In Ajman, 27 percent of the working population are fishermen, 
and in Umm al Qaywayn its 460 fishermen correspond to 30 percent 
of the total work force.(26) Overall AGS fishermen constitute a small 
percentage of the total labour force, 0.6 in 1977. However, it was 7 
percent for Oman (Table 3.5). 
Fisheries Contribution to GDP: 
The absence of statistics, the deficiencies in the data 
collection system in the Sub-region as well as the wide variety of 
operations of traditional fishermen and large-scale industrialised 
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ventures make it very difficult to evaluate, accurately the role of 
the fish industry in the economics of the AGS. In addition: 
(a) Data on the costs and earnings of the fishermen is absent. 
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(b) The diffP.rence in prices between the main landing places and the 
smaller, more isolated ports and open beaches, apart from any other 
factors, results in substantial differences in net fishermen's earnings. 
(c) The prevalence of various sharing systems is difficult to 
evaluate. 
However, the following crude estimates give some indication of 
the position: 
1. Earnings of fishermen seem to be higher in the larger points of 
landings and at least 50 per cent lower in the smaller villages and 
open beaches, where facilities are generall~r poor. In more remote 
areas with poorer market situations monopoly bargaining has reduced 
prices to a minimum economic, almost subsistence level. 
2. If we refer to the Omani situation, as an example, despite the 
small percentage contribution of fisheries sector to GDP (estimated 
at 3 percent) this sectorill ~illof special importance for the following 
reasons.(27) 
(a) Fishermen are estimated to constitute t~ percent of the total 
labour force. 
(b) Fish is a basic component in the Omani diet and demand is 
increasing. 
(c) Oman is wealthy in fisheries resources; this sector is considered 
to provide of the basic opportunities to broaden the economic base of 
the country. 
3. Fisheries resources are renewable, while oil and gas are depletable 
resources. Thus fisheries resources play an important role in any 
long-term strategy for non-oil era. 
4. Food security considerations necessitate giving special 
attention to this resource; this is discussed further in Chapters 9 
and 13. 
5. Investment in fisheries has some advantages over agriculture, 
above all because as noted in Chapter 1, and later, all agriculture 
in the AGS is dependent on irrigation water and all natural ground-
water supplies are now seriously over-exploited. Compared with the 
problems of not only transforming agricultural methods to produce a 
stable water-use situation, the poss~.bility of the sound management 
and conservation of fish stocks seems much less difficult. Although 
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in both cases the development of human resources not only in production 
but all other sectors has to be integrated with technical improvements, 
this task is far more complicated in agriculture than in fisheries. 
3.2.2 Recent Fisheries Development 
3.2.2.1 Artisanal: 
Although the AGS has considerable potential for development of 
fisheries in terms both of manpower and fish resources, it was the 
developments associated with the oil industry from the 1950's that 
provided the impetus to indigenous fisheries' change and development. 
Oil-based development had two major effects on the artisanal 
fisheries. First, the wealth derived from oil allowed the financing 
of modernization both by the fishermen and by governments. Secondly, 
on the other hand there was a movement by fishermen out of active 
fishing to the other more attractive jobs provided directly or indirectly 
by the developing oil industry.(28) In each case these changes appeared 
from the 1950's onwards. 
In Oman, in contrast to the other AGS the lateness of oil 
exploitation delayed the financial favourable framework needed to 
promote and modernize fishermen's activities until the late 1960's, 
causing, at the same time, a pendular movement of fishermen from their 
home coasts to the other Gulf countries. These fishermen together 
with fishermen from the Yemen, South Arabia and from the southern 
coast of Iran, gradually replaced local Saudi, Kuwaiti, Bahraini, 
Qatari, Abu Dhabi and Dubai fishermen from the 1950's onwards, in 
meeting, to some degree, the increasing demand for fish in those 
centres.(29) 
Human Resources and Fisheries Development: 
This migration movement has been reflected in almost the who~e 
fishing workforce in Kuwait being Iranian by 1978,(30), even though 
some vessels remained in Kuwaiti ownership. 
"In Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai the·active 
fishing force is almost wholly from the northern 
states of the UAE, from the Sultanate of Oman, and 
to a lesser extent from Iran, while in Jedda and 
other towns on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia the 
active full-time fishermen are Yemenis almost to a man. 
Most nationals of these oil states who do still retain 
a link with fishing do so only as a part-time on leisure 
activity, or else as non-sea-going owners of fishing 
vessels with foreign crews."(31) 
This migration movement had been directed by the demand pattern for 
fish, and this demand factor is of major importance to motivate 
artisanal fisheries d~velopment. Consequently the improvement of 
marketing systems has priority in the development of artisanal fisheries, 
especially in Oman and the. UAE. These trends also imply that the 
improvement of the infrastructure of fisheries marketing activities 
as well as production occupy special importance within the framework 
of cooperation for the development of fisheries in AGS. 
Fisheries Promotion Systems: The role of Governments -
(a) The governments of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman operate schemes 
to assist fishermen on the basis of easy conditions loam; with grant 
components (grant-loan basis). 
In the UAE the Government finances as a grant - fifty percent 
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of engine costs, subject to an upward price limit, currently standing 
at Dh 50,000, while from 1977 certain items of gear have also been 
included in the scheme. In Saudi Arabia, the Government programme 
aims ·to assist the fishermen to invest in larger boats and engines. 
The fishermen should pay immediately half of the cost of new investment 
whilst a quarter is a Government interest free loan repayable over one 
to five years. 
The Sultanate of Oman applied the same grant-loan basis scheme, 
distributing boats and engines to fishermen through a fund for the 
encouragement of fishermen which was established in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries 1 Petroleum & Mineral:::; (nmlf the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries) in 1976. The Government consider 25 percent 
of the boat or engine cost as a grant, the remaining 75% available as 
an interest-free loan for three years. 
(b) Repair Workshops. Of greater potential help to the fishermen 
have been Government schemes to establish repair workshops. In the 
UAE about one dozen marine engine repair workshops have been set up 
since 1973.(32) 
In Oman many servicing and repairing workshops were planned, 
but the administrative capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries could not allow the complete follow-up of implementation, 
establishing only 5 workshops up to 1980 out of about 10 workshops. 
3.2.2.2 Industrial Fisheries Development: 
Industrial fisheries enterprises are radically different from 
the artisanal sector in two significant respects. First, their 
technology is of a much more advanced order, their capital to labour 
ratio is high, and the basic unit tends to be a large public or private 
company rather than a family. Second, the primary object of all the 
large scale enterprises so far set up in the peninsula has been, or has 
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come to bep to produce a refined product for export (or at least for 
non-local consumption) and any supply of fish for local consumption has 
been a by-product.(33) 
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These characteristics impose three conditions on industrial projects. 
These can be viewed as follows: 
(a) Regular and dependable supply of fish throughout t;he year as well 
as from year to year to justify the large capital investment needed. 
(b) Markets should be found and productsshould meet consumer's taste 
as well as possible competition. 
(c) . Handling and servicing and spare parts guaranteed.(34) 
Industrial Shrimping: 
Industrial projects on a large scale first made the~.r appearance, 
and are now furthest developed, on the Arabian Gulf side of the 
peninsula in the late 1950's, and were, at least initially, the result 
of private enterprise. 
Bahrain and Kuwait have had large fishing companies since 
1959. During the 1960's Gulf shrimp fishing grew and companies were 
set up in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia and in Qatar. Kuwait 
with its four shrimping companies retained the largest part of the 
total fleet with seventy of the total of about 130 vessels in 1967.(35) 
From 1959 the commercial shrimp catch of the Gulf companies rose 
steadily to a peak in the 1968-69 season estimated by Ellis at 16,500 
tons liveweight. At the same time the total shrimping fleet of the 
companies had risen roughly proportionally. The 1969-70 se8son however 
saw a large drop in the catch to only 11,000 tonnes, and in the 
period from 1970-71 season to that of 1973-74 the catch per season -
averaged only 10,000 tonnes. Since then no detailed statistics have 
been found. However, there are signs that the catch has continued to 
fall, at least in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (Table 3.6.) 
Table 3.6 
Catches of shrimp by Gulf countries 1961-62 to 1973-74, as estimated 
by R.W. Ellis 
Season 
(July to June) 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
Estimated total catch 
of Gulf in tonnes 
(live weight) 
1,300 
1,900 
4,000 
10,000 
12,000 
13,000 
16 0200 
16,500 
11,000 
9,000 
9,500 
10,200 
11' 500 
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Source: Donaldson, W.J. Fishing. and Fish Marketing in Northern Oman: 
A case study of artisanal fisheries development (Ph.D. Thesis 
submitted to the University of Durham, 1979). 
Fishmeal Factories: 
The experience of fishmeal production in the UAE recently has been 
striking. As there existed no major shrimping or fishing operations, 
except for two Japanese boats operating under license on the west 
coast, the main commercial large-scale activity centred around the 
establishment of fishmeal plants. 
Several plants were planned to be built to exploit the rich 
reported pelagic species, mostly sardines. The only plant in Ras-el 
Khaimah that reached actual production had the capacity of 250 tons/day 
raw material supplied by seven purse seiners of 80 tons hold capacity, 
and actual operations began in October 1976. The plant had to close 
down in 1978 due to insufficient quantity of raw material.(36) 
This lead to the halting of the erection of an Ajman fishmeal 
plant, although the installation of the equipment was about 80% 
completed with a plant capacity supposed to reach 1400 tons of raw 
material per day. This was a joint project between the Ajman Government 
with a 60% interest and a Pakistani/American consortium with 40%. 
All other fishmeal plants in the UAE were also then cancelled. both 
those under construction in Sharjah and Fujairah, and those which 
were under consideration. 
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These plants were projected against the advice of the Fisheries 
Development financing authorities of the UAE and FAO, and provide 
class examples of the incapability of individual small emirates to 
evaluate accurately heavily promoted initiatives by dubious foreign 
concerns. 
3.2.3 Fisheries Development Constraints 
In view of the present writer constraints on fisheries development 
are mainly structural derived mainly from the long period of gradual 
collapse of fisheries activities in the area and have been reflected 
into the folJ.owing situation. 
1. The lack of infrastructural facilities needed for traditional 
fishermen's activities. Few of these facilities have been established 
and then mainly to serve the industrialized shrimp fisheries and mostly 
centred in the major cities. Infrastructural facilities at the 
villages and smaller coastal towns have been inadequate to serve the 
traditional fishermen who carry out their activities on open beaches 
without shelter, and without ice or cold storage facilities to.service 
the surplus. The fish markets are mostly inadequate, the majority 
being simply palm frond thatched shelters beneath which the retailers 
squat b~side their fish displayed on the ground. 
2. There is a low standard of literacy among the fishermen who may 
be experts at operating their traditional craft and geqr, but lack the 
ability to comprehend the complexities of modern·fishing vessels 
sufficiently well to operate them profitably. Moreover, men educated 
to a level suitable for fishing skippers and engineers are highly 
unlikely to choose a career in fishing when there are more rewarding 
opportunities ashore. 
3. The weakness and inefficiency of Government machinery has been 
responsible for poor fisheries development. This has been reflected, 
for example, in the inefficiency of projects' implementation during 
the First Five-Year Plan for Omani Fisheries. This weakness appears 
both in planning identification and the follow-up implementation 
of projects. To highlight the importance of strengthening the 
Government machinery, we would like to refer to the following facts 
from the Omani experience: 
(a) The lack of needed staff for fisheries administration reduced 
the implementation ratio of approved projects in the First Five-Year 
Plan. 
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(b) Inefficiency of working staff including most ranks, contributed 
to delaying the implementation of many vital projects such as the Omani 
National Fisheries Company, at the same time preventing the country 
from benefiting from U.N. aid based on proposed projects. 
4. Fishing activities all over the areaor~ believed to be suffering 
from a manpower drain as the accelerated growth of other sectorE 
continues to attract fishermen to the urban areas. 
5. The wea~ness of the statistical and information base. What is 
available is scanty, of doubtful reliability and subject to a wide 
margin of error. It should be stressed that the collection, analysis 
and interpretation of fisheries data is of special importance for 
assessing current development as well as in planning future development. 
6. Financing. The key financing requirement of fisheries development 
is not of money resources, but rather of experienced credit officials 
who are well trained in c~edtt evaluation and in extension techniques. 
3.2.4 Fisheries Development Evaluation 
We can summarize the current development situation of fisheries 
in AGS and prospects for this sector as follows: 
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1. Small scale, artisanal fishermen who have been responsible for 
supplying the largest part of the fish catch in the Sub-region should 
be given, in the opinion of the present author, top priority in 
the general development policies of fisheries sector, but within an 
integrated context which takes into consideration, production, handling 
and marketing facilities. 
As in the artisanal fisheries of the area there is insufficient 
knowledge and experience of handling and preservation of the catch, 
of proper transportation methods, as well as of fish processing, to 
ensure acceptable products to the consumers. 
Consequently the main objective for fisheries development should 
be improving economic, social, technical standard of all fishery 
activities - through the fishermen. In the AGS, Oman and the UAE, 
as with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar until recently, the traditional 
experience of seafaring fishing and pearling supports this direction. 
But as the general trend for fishermen is to drift away to other work, 
all efforts must be made to encourage them to continue in the fisheries 
sector. 
2. The experience relating to industrial fisheries projects in the 
area suggests the need for a very conservative approach to the 
evaluation of the success of any industrial project either national 
or regional. However, the present author thinks that there is scope 
. . 
for some large-scale fisheries projects that could be viable, mainly 
off the south and·.south-east coasts of the Arab peninsula, but the 
following preliminary steps should be taken: 
(a) Fishing exploratory tests should first be applied in the area, 
as it has not been included within the Gulf Project surveys. 
(b) Smaller scale units should be chosen for any industrial project 
(fishmeal, canning of sardines, etc.) at the beginning until it proves 
to be feasible to add larger and more units. 
3. Although the research and information base is being improved, 
more steps should be taken towards strengthening this base, mainly 
in the following areas: 
(a) A standardised sub-regional statistical system to provide needed 
data for planning fisheries development and the evaluation of various 
activities. 
(b) Up-dating the resource base information in the area from Ras el-
Hadd on the Gulf of Oman to the Omani borders with South Yemen on the 
Arabean sea. 
(c) Establishing socio-economic data on AGS fishermen on the lines 
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of the proposed Omani Survey of fishermen. Although censuses in the 
UAE and Kuwait (1975) gave a number of fishermen, none of them, however, 
give a detailed socio-economic breakdown of the fishing population. 
Too little is known or understood about the human resources involved. 
4. As fish prices are too high in the AGS, we recommend a short-
term policy based on fixing the prices of fish caught by Government 
agencies or imported through Government channels, but in a way that 
does not damage the fishermen catch prices, which should be left to 
supply and demand forces. In the medium term the Governments are 
advised to withdraw gradually from price fixing policies as they are 
difficult and costly to administer, concentrating rather on providing 
inputs and other facilities needed to increase the size of catch, 
improve marketing opportunities and other conditions. 
5. Fisheries education and training should be geared to include, 
in addition to teaching fishermen to handle modern gear and boats, 
the building-up of a cadre of managerial, technical and administrative 
staff at various levels. 
Development Prospects: 
In order to develop the artisannl fiHhcries in various fishing 
communities, FAO, while following an integrated approach, proposed 
the establishment of fisheries development centres in the rural 
communities where most of the traditional small-scale fishermen 
live.(37) 
"Therefore, the general concept in establishing 
fisheries development centres which include the 
various facilities of fisheri.es development such 
as landing sites, ice plants, workshops, cold stores 
etc. aremeant to build up the infrastructure for 
fisheries development which has so far been inadequate 
to a large degree. It is not enough to capture fish; 
passing the fish through the various steps until it 
reaches the consumer is equally important."(38) 
We tend to support this direction in the light of the above. 
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The need for diversification of the AGS economies necessitates 
the continuing development of agriculture as well as the development 
of fisheries. However, the fisheries sector has some advantages over 
the agricultural sector as noted earlier. 
3.2.5 A Framework for Fisheries Development Cooperation 
On the light of the above-mentioned analysis cooperation for 
fisheries development between AGS should concentrate on building-up 
and strengthening the infrastructural base in broad terms which include 
the following activities: 
1. Fisheries Development Administration (Planning, Information 
and Statistics base, Training and Educational activities etc. 
2. More research work and surveys should be done on fisheries 
preservation and development. The U.N. seems to be of vital help on 
this direction. 
3. Cooperation to face the dangers of pollution to fisheries wealth. 
4. A joint marketing system could be designed in the light of the 
current activities; this is examined in Chapter 4 on current 
cooperation between the AGS. 
5. Oman and UAE appear, in the light of this review to be the main 
centres for fisheries development in the Sub-region. 
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CHAPTER 4 = EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT FULFILMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to evaluating the main features of 
the AGS development process and achievements. Special attention will 
be directed to the main problems facing the development process in 
addition to the main constraints that were concomitant to the 
development achievements. The chapter ends with the identification 
of development prospects and priorities. 
This analysis completes the preliminary part of this thesis, 
Part 1, in which we have reviewed the setting within which development 
cooperation between the AGS has grown and, hopefully, will continue 
to grow. This review of the background situation and the accompanying 
evaluations allow in Parts 2 and 3 the identification of those 
fields :!.n which such cooperation could solve many current and recent 
development problems and the type of approach necessary. 
4.2 General Development Achievements and Directions 
In ambitious imaginative d~ives towards breaking the under-
development cycle, in trying to win the race against time associated 
with the reliance of the whole basis of AGS current economies on 
depletable oil resources, AGS planners and top decision-makers have 
followed, as noted earlier. an approach which rejected both limitation 
of expenditure and a relatively low rate of economic growth. Instead 
. ·~ ' 
the AGS have adopted policies that feature high rates of investment 
and expenditure in social and economic projects, aiming at providing 
rapidly rising levels of living and introducing a large number of new 
industries and enterprises. However: 
"When the gates of prosperity were opened wide for the 
oil producing countries in 1974, the fact did not escape 
their Governments that the prosperity could be flawed."(l) 
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Consequently, most plans for broadening the economic base of 
AGS started with a simple principle: to invest oil revenues today in 
such a way that tomorrow, when oil revenues ~ay no longer be important, 
they will have an alternative base for generating the same standard 
of income and standard of living as achieved in the oil era. 
This means the transformation of a temporary comparative 
advantage into a permanent comparative advantage in international 
economic relations and the AGS national interests will be optimally met 
if the oil resource is depleted only when the highest possible level 
of self-sustaining economic development has been attained. 
The earlier review of structural development of AGS economies 
indicated considerable progress, this based on formal planning in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, but in Qatar, Bahrain and UAE without 
comprehensive development planning. What then has been achieved? 
The diversification policy of these countries has been based, 
mainly, on industrialization. The petrochemical industry has been 
the centre of this processing as do certain characteristics 
facilitating its establishment. These supportive features include 
particularly two of the chief input demands - natural gas and oil 
energy and hydrocarbon, raw materials and high capital requirements, 
both of which can for a period be relatively easily supplied in the 
Gulf. The petrochemical industry requires a very high capital/labour 
ratio, and investment per new job created is estimated at i20,000 
to ilOO,OOO. The AGS appear as unique developing countries in which 
this scale of investment is no barrier to industrialisation. The 
feasibility of hydrocarbon chemical complexes is equally strong. In 
addition to present oil and gas production in the AGS, at present 87 
percent of the natural gas produced is flared and presents an obvious 
production opportunity. Further, whilst natural gas liquids are in short 
supply throughout the world and are likely to remain so far into the 
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foreseeable future, the AGS proven and probabl~ reserves are enormous 
(see Chapter 1).(2) 
Import-substitution light industries have also received attention 
in the AGS, consisting mainly of F.D.T., clothing and construction 
material manufactures. 
The service sector has also received the attention of planners 
in States such as Kuwait and Bahrain and there is some logic to 
this. Since the region has virtually no industrial tradition, it 
seems unrealistic to expect traders or nomads to respond enthusiastically 
to calls that they should become engineers or operatives in industrial 
plants. Despite clear evidence of this not all Governments in the 
Sub-region, however, have shown clear realization of its implications. 
All the evidence shows that the bulk of the Sub-region's citizens 
will opt for some form of bureaucratic job if given the choice, and 
that many of the region's entrepreneurs will move from trading to 
property speculation to financial manipulation on a wide scale, given 
the opportunity. Kuwait and Bahrain present ample evidence of this 
trend.leaving the less popular industrial processes to be carried out 
elsewhere. This may be a more sustainable strategy, in. the medium 
term at least, than trying to turn societies such as these into centres 
of manufacturing which is alien to the Sub-region's experience. The 
long-term viability of dependence on highly specialised financial 
services does however, depend on many factors, not least a sound 
involvement ih the Regional and International circles. 
Evaluation of Development Achievements: 
The gro1~ing value of oil exports, mainly since 1973 have greatly 
increased the AGS, financial resources. Oil revenues have enabled the 
Governments to forge ahead with the development of the countries' 
infrastructure, broaden the economic base by undertaking a number of 
oil and gas based projects and by encouraging agricultural activities, 
and expand the scope of social programmes. Furthermorep the AGS. 
except for Oman and Bahrainp have provided substantial assistance 
to other developing countriesp in the form of grants and loans. 
and at the same time have increased their external reserves (see 
Chapter 14) • 
However P the ::;hal-·p expansion in public sector-expenditure and 
the concomitant growth in private sector spending. have not been 
matched by a correspnding increase in real resources because of various 
supply constraints. Given the small population base and the paucity 
of skills. labour shortages have emerged despite a large inflow 
of foreign workers. Housing and utilities have been in short supply 
and port congestion reached its peak in 1976. Consequentlyp domestic 
pricesp especially for housing. rose substantially. everywhere and 
inflation rose during the 1970's. 
Kuw~it and Bahrain also illustrate two relevant elements in 
these AGS economic trends. In guwait the foreign exchange income from 
the oil sector has provided Kuwait during the last 30 years with the 
means to develop the country's basic infrastructure and to provide 
the population with an extensive welfare programme. The dearth of 
natural resources. other than oil and gas. has limited the development 
process to a few oil-related enterprises. small industries and the 
service sector. That de~elopment which has taken place necessitated 
the importation of foreign labour on a large scale· and-Kuwait was the 
first of the AGS in which citizens became a minority. Because of 
the limited absorptive capacity of the economy. Kuwait has for many 
years followed the policy of saving a major part of its income for 
investment abrt)ad. (3) 
The economy of Bahrain grew at moderate rates in the years prior 
to the substantial rise in oil prices and .income in 1973. Increased 
availability of financial resources in the subsequent years enabled 
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the Government to increase substantially both current and capital 
expenditures. Spurred by this expansionary fiscal policy, private 
investment rose rapidly, and the economy witnessed a considerable 
upswing. 
As Bahrain's known oil reserves are limited as indicated in 
Table 1.7, the development strategy for over a decade has aimed at 
diversification of the economy mainly through expansion of the service 
sector, improvement of infrastructure and the creation of auxiliary 
industries. Increasing emphasis has also been given to social welfare 
programmes. The IMF Mission of 1976 advised the replacement of the 
current adhoc development arrangements with more formal planning 
machinery, to contribute to a more efficient management of public 
sector development spending and provide a framework for establishment 
of priorities in what is perhaps the most diverse as well as least 
capital rich of the AGS. The increased injection of oil receipts into 
the domestic income stream by the Government and the accompanying 
boom in private sector activity have put considerable pressure on 
domestic resources and with high import costs have led to sharp 
increases in prices in recent years. (4) 
In general, it is fair to say: 
"the large scale funds passing through the treasuries 
of the Middle East oil exporters were not effectively 
used to accumulate real and productive assets within 
their domestic economics."(5) 
The effects of the oil price boom since 1973 on the AGS have 
been extremely mixed, though on balance many of their Governments 
may look back on the period 1973-77 as a dubious blessing. Income on 
the oil account certainly rose rapidly, but so did price inflation, 
wage rates and reliance on imported labour. Above all, the growth 
of the oil sector as a contributor to national income tended to 
reduce the role of non-oil sectors to insignificance in most states 
of the region~(6) 
While oil revenues have played a very significant role in 
developing many aspects of the AGS economies, their impact differs 
greatly from one field to another. Whatever development intentions 
may have been the main stress has be~n on channelling oil revenues 
to consumer sectors rather than investing in productive activities. 
This has not only failed to solve some of the problems and overcome 
some of the obstacles facing the AGS but has even raised new problems 
which, if unsolved, will hinder structural change and sustained 
development.(7) Below, in section 4.3 some of these problems and 
obstacles are briefly discussed. Two preliminary general points 
concerning industry in the context of the foregoing must first be 
made, the first concerning import-substitution industries. 
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Import substitution industries particularly appeal to the entre-
preneurs of the Gulf Sub-region, on the basis of their trading exper-
ience. However, there are no strong reasons for Gulf planners to put 
too much stress currently on import-substitution industrialization, 
which makes most sense when countries are faced with severe balance 
of payments problems or where employment generation is particularly 
pressing. Since none of the AGS are faced with either of these 
problems to any serious extent, they might be better advised to 
concentrate on other strategies, such as building up industries 
supportive to the ·oil industry or financial institutions. This 
possible trend is discussed in Chapter 14. 
The second point relates to the basic chemical industry. The 
diversification policy of AGS has been adversely affected by the 
inability of the industrial sector to respond fast enough and on a 
sufficient scale to the incentives and the development measures of 
Governments. The successes which have been recorded lie mainly in the 
area of oil and gas-based heavy industry. However, even these 
industries hqve their own dangers, as mentioned before, in particular 
as they transform liquid financial capital into fixed capital with a 
high capacity of construction materials, capital equipment and labour, 
in very large inflexible units which will carry a heavy cost if they 
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proved unsuccessful after they are put on stream.(B) (See also Chapter 10.) 
Those features of the petrochemical industry which pose some 
difficulties in the immediate future are particularly related to two 
factors. First, the industry is characterised by sophisticated 
technology, along with a high level of competition. Installations must 
utilise the most modern technology and highly skilled manpower. Moreover, 
the industry is exceedingly dynamic and research into new processes 
and products plays a crucial role. None of this sophistication and 
dynamism is created by the simple fact of the importation of plant. 
Other considerations include the following: 
1. Oil-based industrial development has suffered from considerable 
wastages, notably of massive wasteful consumption of all inputs which 
the volume of oil revenues permits and even encourages. Very common 
are exorbitantly inflated prices of and costs of contracts too rapidly 
signed to import machinery, without sufficient consideration for the 
suitability of the technology imported. 
2. A misconception of the notion of development whereby concentration 
is directed to high rate of growth in some sectors remote from the 
needs and experience of most members of the communities. This arises 
from transplanting elements of fully operational and economically 
viable modern economies in the style of advanced countries into 
traditional societies still containing significant areas of poverty and 
economic backwardness.(9) 
3. Insufficient resources and attention devoted to the development 
of science and technology within the AGS. 
Most large-scale industries in the Sub-region suffer from 
149 
under-utilization of productive capacity. Given the scarcity of 
skilled labour, advanced management techniques, advanced technology 
and marketing know-how and, in some cases, the duplication of 
industrial projects, the inevitable result has been that productivity 
is low, from both capital and labour standpoints. The small size of 
the internal market itself limits development. Indeed, for five of the six 
Gulf states, with populations of round a million or less, there is no 
alternative to heavy industrialization except via export markets, and 
here of course competition is most intense and risks greatest. 
The problems of heavy industries, generally based on petrochemicals, 
are acute, though disguised by the size of the schemes and the length 
of time they take to mature: 
"Put bluntly, most of the heavy industries now operating 
have been disastrous and there is little reason to 
suppose that new ones will be different."(lO) 
There can be no doubt that the future of large-scale industry in 
AGS rests heavily on world prices. Such prices are notoriously hard to 
predict, even for two or three years ahead, especially in a recession. 
AGS may have some comparative cost advantages in petrochemicals, but 
together with oil refining is suffering from a glut and severe 
competition. For example oil refineries in Britain during 1980 
operated at only 62% capacity.(ll) The argument in favour of current 
policies rest mainly on the fact that some of the AGS, Saudi Arabia for 
example, are of tQe-few countries which can afford to take a genuinely 
long-term view. Thus, plants which are due to be operational in the 
early 1980's, may loose money at first, but may pay eventually. In 
the meantime, oil revenues carry the cost. Whether this is the best or 
only way of building a productive base for an economy is questionable, 
though it must be said that industrialization in many under-developed 
countries has been much more successful than was once thought possible.(12) 
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4.3 Main Negative Features of the Development Movement 
In addition to the above mentioned development trends in the AGS, 
the development process has been characerized by the following 
features which have already briefly been mentioned. 
Concentration on prestigious development projects. 
- Weakness of development planning machinery. 
Low rate of implementation. 
- Unbalance~ growth. 
Intensive dependence on international economic relations. 
These features 8 of coursep have to be set in the context of structural 
constraints which include the following: 
- Small markets. 
Overwhelming dependence on oil revenues. 
Lack of manpower and managerial capacity. 
The skewed natural resource base which constitute the main structural 
constraint on AGS development has been discussed in Chapter 1. 
4.3.1 Prestigious Projects 
Those which stand out supreme here are the petrochemical 
industries. Many of their characteristics are associated with all the 
problems associated with the introduction of large-scale advanced 
techno+ogy to under-developed countries. 
1. The lack of experienced labour at all levels to run such projects 
_!.WU(~dS 
affects production cost astrestricting the range of-products. 
2. As the first national heavy industries in small countries the 
necessity of importing everything (except crude oil and gas) affects 
fixed as well as running costs and causes a considerable lengthening 
of lead-time. The high fixed cost for refineries 8 for example, appears 
from a capital investment need in OPEC countries, per daily barrel of 
intake of $676 8 while the corresponding cost of refinery facilities 
of a not too complex nature built by Shell in the same period was between 
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$250 and $350.(13) 
3. The exiRting excess capacity of petrochemical industries in 
the major industrialized countries renders the export outlook less bright 
now than in 1974. especially with the protectionist attitudes of these 
countries against the enetry of foreign products. Such difficulties 
could. however. be overcome it. world demand for petrochemical products 
picks up. 
4. The exorbitantly rising costs of plant investments. It is 
estimated that the cost of petrochemical projects in the OPEC countries 
is generally more than 30%. and often 60% higher than in similar 
projects constructed in Western Europe. Inflated costs are partly 
due to the inadequacy of infrastructure, the lack of technical and 
managerial skills. etc •• and partly to the discriminatory prices imposed 
by suppliers of equipment and technology. 
5. The uncoordinated investment policies of the oil-producing 
countries in the face of powerful groupings of suppliers of plants. 
patents. equipment. 
It is noticeable. that because of the unusually high cost of such 
investments the net return on invested capital is very low. The per 
barrel cost of producing one barrel of LNG is estimated to be in the 
order of U.S. $12. an amount which is marginally below its sale price.(14) 
To many energy experts and policy-makers. such investment represents 
a real loss compared with other types of utilization including gas 
re-injection for future use. and makes the developed energy-importing 
countries the real beneficiaries. since they acquire this highly 
efficient source of energy at a price close to that of crude oil. 
against huge investments incurred by the producers. 
Moreover. the transportation cost of liquified natural gas is very 
high. due to very high capital outlay as well as high ship operating 
costs. including insurance. fuel and port dues. The estimated cost of 
transporting one ton of LNG in U.S. ~44 0 or more than 7 times that 
of crude oil. An alternative type of gas investment is to construct 
export-oriented LPG plants 0 whose costs are much lower in terms of 
both capital investment and operation and transportation costs. 
4.3.2 Weakness of Development Planning Machinery 
In common with other less developed countries the AGS have from 
an early stage had their eyes set on general development, although 
their approach has varied. 
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In some countries the early ways of thought have persisted and 
developments take place as the situation demands, largely as a result 
of individual initiatives, e.g. UAE, Bahrain. and Qatar. Other countries 
have preferred to rely on a formal development plan. However, the 
development plans in themselves have tended to be of the type which 
professional planners refer to as aspirations rather than plans, 
consisting of a long list of the targets the Government would like to 
see achieved. There has been some theoretical assessment of the 
likelihood of fulfilment, of the interactions of the targets on each 
other, and of the availability of resources, but a sense of the 
practical has been lacking. With ·the far greater financial resources 
available in the mid-70's a new series of such plans appeared, but again 
showing a lack of realism regarding the availability of real resource 
inputs and viability.(15) 
In UAE, the weakness of central planning-machlnery, noted in 
Chapter 2, is reflected in a very dangerous duplication of development 
projects. Apart from the differences between Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
over participation in the oil industry, these two main Emirates do not 
cooperate in the building of their hydrocarbon industries and other 
projects, and indeed there seem to be outright rivalry. When Dubai 
announced its plans in 1967 for a major industrial complex and special 
port in J;~bal /\ll, a few weeks later Abu Dhabi announced plans for 
.. ,. 
similar complex and port at Ruwais. The smaller Emirates also do not 
want to be left behind and as a result there is in the UAE as a whole 
already a surplus of international airports and an excess of cement 
plants.(16) 
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In Dubai Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum ventures his own money 
on projects of which he agrees, and keeps only a small but competent--
staff to meet all Dubai's development plans and enable those approved 
to proceed without bureaucratic delays.(17) This highly individualistic 
approach however becomes more risky as investment units grow in size 
and other AGS also invest. Thus the large dry~dock built in Dubai 
as an independent venture has been consistently under-used and 
financial returns are negative. 
Difficulties have traditionally been experienced by companies 
based in Sharjah but wanting to do business in Dubbiand these show 
little sign of easing. Many import-substitution industries set up 
in the UAE were adopted without being studied or planned, creating 
mutual problems, and contradicting the long-term planning objectives 
for UAE . ( 18) 
The duplication of development projects among the Emirates is also 
due to the existence of many investment bodies without any coordination 
between their activities. Recently six investment companies were set 
up, two in Abu Dhabi, one in Dubai, two in Sharjah, and one in Ajman. 
This has lead to competing projects and impedes the implementation-
of a development strategy~(19) This lack of sound planning machinery 
with the capability to control the identification and implementation 
of successful opportunities is evidenced by the failure of Ras El-
Khaimah's fishmeal plant (see Chapter 3) which was closed down after only 
just over six mohths production. 
Recently Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Federal Minister 
of Finance and Industry and son of Sheikh Rashid of Dubai, publicly 
criticised industrialization policies in the Gulf, saying: 
"All our industPial projects in the Gulf are running 
at an annual loss of not less than 10-15 percent 
of their capital."(20) 
Nowhere has the private sector been adequately integrated into 
the planning process. Moreover in countries where an important role 
is played by the private sector in some sectors of manufacturing, 
trade, finance, and agriculture, the absence of accurate data on the 
private sector means that even those plans which'are produced only 
really cover the public sector's level and direction of expenditure. 
Whilst the Omani First Five Year Plan (1976-80), for example, 
projected planned expenditure by the private sector, this was done 
without much basic information on the pre-existing private projects. 
It was therefore impossible to evaluate the achievements of the 
plan's objectives in this sector and all forward projections were 
e~1sentially bland assumptions. This was particularly very clear in the 
agricultural private sector.(21) In Abu-Ohabi the five-year 
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development plan 1968-72 was more a catalogue of many things that needed 
to be done to found a modern state than a settled orderly plan.(22) 
In Oman planning as a separate exercise from the executive 
functions of Ministries started only in November, 1974 as noted in 
Chapter 2. Consequently, theplanning staff both in the Technical 
Secretariat of the Development Council and in the individual 
Ministries is limited and needs strengthening~ Together with lfmited 
data availability, the uncertainties on oil production and the short 
period over which the country has experienced rapid economic development, 
this has resulted in rather simplistic planning. The macro-targets 
of the plan were projected on the basis of simple assumptions taking 
into account the many projects already in the preliminary stages of 
preparation. Although efforts have already been made by the 
Government, partly with assistance from the World Bank, further emphasis 
on project identification and preparation is needed.(23) 
"In a period when the prevailing political and social 
mood was to rapidly transform the society from the 
isolationist and conservative philosophy prevalent 
until 1970 and speed was a keynote in official Omani 
thinking, the introduction of planning and its 
concern: .itant discipline had to be a gradual process. 
Every effort should now be made to expand the 
technical staff in the Technical Secretariat and other 
- - -- -- - - ~- - -
Government bodies in order to gradually develop the 
process of planning."(24) 
Saudi Arabia Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) problems further 
illustrate the situation in AGS Development bodies, four particular 
difficulties with SIDF being identified. Its staff are not up to the 
job; there is insufficient economic data to decide for example, 
whether another concrete block factory is needed; the role of SIDF 
is confused with that of other Government departments; and it does not 
know either how to present its own services or to teach others to 
market their products.(25) 
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4.3.3 Low Rate of Implementation 
AGS implementation rate of development expenditure has been low. 
In the UAE, Federal Government development expenditures increased 
sharply from Dh 73 million in 1973 to Dh 748 million in 1976. Inspite of 
(or possibly because of) this sharp increase, the implementation ratio 
has remained relatively low, averaging about 40 percent during 1973-76, 
as the execution of projects was hindered by physical bottlenecks and 
adminis-trative problems. 
In Kuwait though Government sources claim that about 90 percent 
of development allocations have actually been spent in recent years, 
other observers place the figure much lower, estimating the implementation 
rates at 50 percent to 70 percent. In 1976 and 1977 several factors, 
including severe labour constraints and heavily overloaded port 
facilities, were combining to slow the rate of actual expenditures. The 
notably conservative Government was reported to be reassessing several 
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major projects already on the drawing boards.(26) 
In Oman reports on the follow-up of the first FYD as illustrated 
in the following Table 4.1 shew that the implementation rate was during 
the period 1976-79 comparatively low for the non-oil productive sectors, 
financial institutions and social infrastructure, (21.5% for industry, 
52.3% for agriculture and t·isheries, 47.7% for financial institutions 
and 64.1% for social infrastructure). Higher implementation rates 
were achieved for oil and minerals, trade and tourism, public 
administration (203.8%) and economic infrastructure. The higher 
implementation rate which exceeded 100% for some sectors reflects rather 
under-estimated expenditures than effective implementation. 
Table 4.1 
Planned and Actual Government Investment Expenditures Accumulated 1976-79 
Sector Planned Actual Implementation OR mn. OR .mn. Rate 
Oil and minerals 142.3 148.3 104.2% 
Agriculture and fisheries 28.5 14.9 52.3% 
Industry 24.7 5.3 21.5% 
Trade and tourism 11.9 17.2 144.5% 
Economic infrastructure 279.2 261.2 95.2% 
Social infrastructure 89.2 57.2 64.1% 
Public administration* 141.2 287.7 203.8% 
Financial institutions 13.0 6.2 47.7% 
All sectors 830.0 897.8 108.3% 
* Includes civil expenditures on defence and national security. 
Source: Oman-Development Council 0 Follow-up Report on the First Five 
Year Development Plan. Results of the first four years 
1976-79. Table 8, p. 26 (Arabic). 
4.3.4 Unbalanced Growth 
Apart fromfue theoretical arguments concerning the relative values 
of balanced and unbalanced growth strategies (see Section 4.4.1), in 
practice many disadvantageous imbalances have appeared in the AGS. 
Other than the strong linkage between oil revenue and national budgets 
the petroleum sector has, so far, been deficient in creating significant 
spread~effects in AGS economies, and has failed to supply significant 
production linkages. Firstp as we have notedp it involves highly 
capital and skill intensive technology which is highly divergent from 
domestic factor endownments. Secondly, there is only relatively 
modest domestic industrial capacity that uses petroleum and natural 
gas as feedstock and/or fuel. Because the oil sector technology has 
generally low labour demandp it has contributed little direct 
consumption linkages with the rest of the economy. Finally the 
education and training opportunities created by the petroleum sector 
were absolutely few.(27) 
In Saudi Arabia one of two States with relatively large rural 
populations, coupled with a lack of policies design~o prevent an 
over-concentration of urban populations in the three growth centres 
of Riyadh, Jeddah and the Dammam conurbation there is a lack of policy 
for making it attractive for people to remain on the land. While 
the AGS generally acknowledge the importance of agriculture, they have 
been slow to devise plans and provide administrative support to make 
country life prosperous enough to attract back the shanty dwellers 
on the edges of the cities. It is far from easy and there are not 
many countries, developed or undeveloped, that can be satisfied with 
their achievements in this field. For the individual farmer to remain 
on the land it is clearly necessary that he can attain a reasonable 
degree of prosperity for himself, and Governments can assist by 
various fiscal policies to ensure this is so. On the social side, 
both for the farmer and for his growing children, it is also of 
importance that the small towns in rural districts should be pleasant 
places and offer services which are not totally inferior to those 
of the cities. Government action is needed since the 'spread-effects' 
and 'trickle-down' processes which are assumed by Hirschman and others 
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to operate in conditions of growth are not strong enough to counter 
all the concentration fo :rces.(28) 
4.3.4.1 Human Resources and Social Problems: 
The AGS policies for developing and utilizing human resources 
have failed so far to create the skills and develop the talents most 
needed for economic development and have failed to utilize existing -
skills in efficient productive activity. 
Indeed their policies have even resulted in a great waste of 
these resourcesp for they have resulted in some diversion of nationals 
from the most productive activities to well-paid disguised unemployment 
in the public sectors and they have caused some groups to be offered 
sources of income that make them reluctant to join the labour force.(29) 
The AGSP with their capital-surplus economies and lack of 
varied natural resources, should concentrate on the development and 
full utilization of their human resources which are the most precious 
of all resources in any society. They are the only positive factor 
in production and hence their development and effective utilization in 
productive activities will be the precondition for structural change 
and sustained development. The development of these resources is so 
outstandingly important that Harbison concluded that: 
''A nation which is unable to develop and utilize 
its labour force effectively will be unable to 
develop anything else."(30) 
The role of human resources in economfc devefopment-is considered 
by increasing numbers of economists to be one of the most important 
factors. Singerp taking the view that the capacity to create wealth 
resides essentially in the people of a countryp wrote: 
"The fundamental problem is no longer considered to 
be the creation of wealthp but rather the creation 
of wealth itself becomes almost incidental; it 
follows quasi-automatically. "(31) 
Disguir:;ed Unemployment: ln the public sector disguised 
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unemployment of citizens is a very clear phenomenon in Kuwait, Qatar, 
Abu Dhabi and Oman, where every citizen is entitled to a job in this 
sector whether his work is needed or not. This problem was not 
serious to begin with but later, in addition to imposing a 
financial burden on the Government budget, it has diverted considerable 
numbers of citizens from the private sector to thf:l public sector-·, 
where production is lowest. 
Thus it is not strange that the Kuwaiti and Qatari employment 
percentages are very low in most production sectors, while they were 
highest in Government services. 
The main reasons for this low proportion are: 
1. The social conditions which prevent women from seeking economic-
ally active employment outside their homes. Women's illiteracy rate is high. 
2. The high birth rate prevailing since the 1950's, has increased 
the sector of the dependent population aged under 20. Free education 
has also encouraged young people to continue their formal education 
and raised the school population. 
3. Though unemployment in the strict sense is low another sort 
of unemployment exists; this includes many people who have left their 
traditional occupations and live on social security allowances, as 
well as members of the ruling families and considerable numbers of 
their relatives and dependants. 
Education: Orientation and Motivation: The AGS until very 
recently have not been considered to be very successful in orientating 
education to and encouraging training for the skills most needed to 
promote economic development. The choice of subject and the type 
of study were left to the students who were assured, no matter what 
they studied, of a job, by right of birth, in the public sector 
(Bahrain excluded). This directed most students from science and 
technology to 'softer' subjects, which are not only easier to study 
but may also secure white-collar jobs with high prestige later on. 
Thus most students choose to go into the general section of 
secondary education instead of going into the specialized sections 
i.e. teacher training. commerce and technical schools - even if they 
plan to leave school after this level. Such a preference is 
--
demonstrated by Table 4.2 which shows the pattern of education at the 
secondary leveL (32) 
Table 4.2 
Selected AGS: Distribution Pattern of Students at Secondary Level 
1970/71* 
Number 
Level Bahrain Kuwait Qatar 
General section 5,242 15.997 911 
Commercial section 490 489 66 
Teacher section 289 2,103 237 
Technical section 439 1.656 59 
Total 6.460 19.154 1,273 
General Section as 
percentage of total 81.1 83.5 74.6 
* Excluding religious studies. 
Source: Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari. Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates, 
Patterns of Allocations and Impact·on Economic Development, 
(London: Bowker in Association with the Centre for Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Durham, 
1978). p. 190. 
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As Table 4.~ shows, about 80 percent of the students entered the 
general section of secondary education. Qatar had the highest 
percentage in specialized education at the secondary level, but even 
this has now fallen. 
Social Problems arising from Side Effects of Development: 
The region is beset by the possibility of environmental damage 
and pollution as its industrialization progresses. Similar problems 
are facing the countries of the region regarding industrial safety 
and occupational health, traffic congestion, increasing tensions for 
the individual and on family structure: 
"Alleviation of these problems, which were of only 
secondary importance to us a decade ago, has now become 
one of the key problems facing us as planners. 11 (33) 
Social and Political Institutions: Although social and 
political institutions have undergone considerable change in AGS, 
changes quite remarkable over the short period they still in many 
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respects require to be changed even more to provide the right conditions 
for development. 
Economic development, being a complicated process and not a 
simple one, depends not merely on economic circumstances but on social 
structure and the attitudes to life as a whole. Thus the social and 
political structures are important factors which need to change 
progressively and continuously if they are not to form an obstacle 
in the way of progress. 
Societies may be compared to individual human beings, their 
economic power may be compared to energy and the muscles of men, their 
political institutions and practices to man's brain power and 
experience. Thus, unless these important aspects are developed 
together, the society will face a bottleneck problem which will 
inevitably cause considerable waste. 
Social and political institutions may promote economic progress 
-
in many ways, the principal ways being: (1) by associating effort 
with reward; (2) by maintaining respect for productive work, manual 
or intellectual; (3) by encouraging contempt for idleness; (4) by 
linking status with individual achievement rather than family 
connection; (5) by encouraging belief in cause-and-effect relationships; 
(6) by discouraging ways of life which put a great premium on current 
consumpt~.on rather than provision for the future; (7) by encouraging 
an abhorrence of corruption in general, and in the public administration 
in particular; (8) by allowing scope and freedom f~r public 
participation in public affairs; and (9) by freeing economic policies 
from undue political considerations.(34) 
Social Structure: Sayigh has illustrated this situation thus: 
110ne can safely say that the most widely observable 
social characteristic of the region as a whole is 
traditionalism and tribalism. Social organization, 
loyalties and values even in a society as sophisticated 
by Arabian standards as Kuwait, the large urban centres 
of Saudi Arabia, or Dubai, still betray the clear 
underlying streaks of traditionalism and tribalism."(35) 
He added: 
11Tribalism is a serious problem across the course of 
development in Arabia, furthermore tribalism need not, 
and indeed must not. be sought only among the 20-25% 
of the population still in a nomadic state; for tribalism 
dies hard even in old, established urban centres. 11 (36) 
4.3.4.2 Investment Opportunity and Land Speculation: 
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Increasing urbanization and AGS Government's expenditure on land 
purchase schemes have increased the price of land very rapidly. This 
incre.ase, coupled with the lack of sufficient investment opportunities, 
makes the purchasing and selling of land the most profitable activity 
in the AGS. This activity has attracted much of the private money 
invested in the Emirates and diverted it from other fields of their 
economies. Many people have left their previous jobs and confine 
their activities to this field. and many merchants and Government 
employees. particularly in Kuwait and Qatar. have borrowed money and 
invested it in land. 
This problem is a serious one. Firstly. it diverts effort 
and capital from productive activities to these transfer activities. 
Secondly, most of the proceeds of these activities go to the real-
estate speculators who spend a considerable part of their profit on 
consumption, while reinvesting most of the remaining profit in the 
same activities. Thus the price of land is pushed higher and higher 
and everybody else is attracted to the business of buying and selling 
it. Thereforep while trying to increase opportunities for investment 
in productive activities, AGS should at the same time restrict 
land speculation. 
4.3.4.3 Lack of Incentives to Produce: 
In the AGS there is a dangerous belief that because these 
countries are wealthy each individual is entitled, without contributing 
to the nation's development, to a large number of free benefits in 
many forms. Hisham Nazarp the Minister of Planning in Saudi Arabia 
illustrated this phenomenon in Saudi Arabia, but common in all 
countries of the Sub-region: 
"That is to say there is a very human tendency for 
people to take things for granted and to rely too 
much on welfare benefits in many forms without giving 
a thought to the obligations and contributions towards 
a society that the individual is expected to make. 
Whereas tPe older members of our society can feel 
entitled to a special measure of welfare benefits 
as they are the ones who lived under conditions of 
relative poverty and hardship with little opportunity 
for advancement for so long - this is not true of the 
younger generations who have unbounded opportunities· 
before them."(37) 
He added: 
"They must learn that their progress and advancement 
are dependent upon dedicated hard work and although 
the Government will extend to them every basic 
opportunity it r.an, it will not provide any healthy 
young person with a welfare programme so complete that 
it effecUvely discourages him from productive activity."(38) 
In Kuwait it is felt that the new generation of Kuwaitis does not 
feel the urge to participate in work of such a nature (oil and 
related activities) and indeed the movement of labour away from the 
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oil industry has been a notable feature of Kuwait employment statistics. 
Many of the existing well-trained and capable staff in the oil 
industry are approaching retirementp and how to replace them is a 
problem Kuwait and other Gulf Governments will have to face.(39) 
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4.3.5 Extreme Dependence on International Economic Relations 
1. Imported Technology: AGS Governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, 
are importing advanced technology wholesale and on a large-scale. 
The population is hardly at all prepared f0r this sudden transformation, 
and very serious manpower problems already exist, and threaten in 
our v:lew to lead to resource waste on a colossal scale, and to 
economic strangulation because of the manpower bottleneck. The 
populations are almost mesmerised by the impact of this vast exposure 
to the new technology. with its machines and tools. its organisation, 
and its power. 
"The scale of the technological importation and the 
almost total unpreparedness will necessitate the 
passage of some time for the first phase of acceptance 
to be gone through. The second and third phases, 
namely those of adaptation and indigenous creativity, 
and of profound transformation in attitudes to science 
and technology, are in this writer's view matters for 
the distant future."(40) 
It can be said that the acceptance of technological change and 
the more profound technological transformation, which have a manifestly 
important role in the process of development, are still at an early 
phase of materialization. Their potential is great. but the present 
level is modest. 
Existing financial resources could help in building a new 
generation which is not only able to know what imported technology to 
choose, what specifications and designs to make, what adaptations to 
introduce and what innovations to contribute. In other w.ords, the 
spread of progress must reach the whole society, and Arab society 
must develop its internal capability to advance science and technology 
if development is truely to benefit from technology as a determinant. 
In illustrating the implications of heavy reliance on imported 
technology and joint undertakings in Saudi Arabia, for example, 
Sayegh indicated that: 
"The implications of this structure are very serious. 
For although the pattern is supposed to lead to the 
richer inflow of technological innovation and know 
how, it is highly doubtful that it actually leads 
to the implanting in Saudisoil of the new technology 
and its acclimatisation. Furthermore, the leakage to 
the foreign partner in profits, salaries and payments 
for patents is considerable. Finally, the optical 
illusion of the speeded development effectively disguises 
the true slowing-do11m of real, home-based, homP.~manned 
and internally propelled development."(41) 
Although the author of this thesis agrees with this concern, 
however, he believes that it is within the capability as well as 
being the responsibility of the AGS to direct their economic relations 
and joint undertakings in ways which secure the development of home-
based technological advancement. 
4.3.6 Structural Constraints 
4.3.6.1 Small Markets: 
The smaJ.l size of markets is due mainly to the small size of 
populations reinforced by the fragmentation of national in the UAE. 
For example, in Oman the limited domestic market size precludes 
the establishment of large plants, but there is market potential for 
developing simple food and consumer good indsutries e.g. soft drinks, 
soap, batteries, brick, nails and screws. The appropriate size of 
plant needed will have to be carefully studied.(42) In Kuwait 
the small local market has been considered to be one of the main 
constraints impeding economic development, ever since the IBRD 
published its study of the national economy in 1963 but many of the 
potentials then recommended, viz. batteries, detergents, paints etc. 
have been realised.(43) 
4~3.6.2 Overwhelming Dependence on Oil Revenues: 
The AGS high per-capita income, their prosperity, indeed every 
aspect of their nocial economic and administrative life, is mainly 
supported by these revenues. Thus, if anything happened to decrease 
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these revenues considerably~ a possible prospectp the whole 
economic structure will inevitably, collapse completely unless new 
alternative sources of national income can be rapidly developed. 
That AGS growth and prosperity is overwhelmingly dependent on oil 
revenues is beyond dispute. The degree of this dependence is shown 
in Table 4.3, -which shows that in 1979 the AGS oil sector share of-
the GDP was 63 percent, and the oil income contribution to public 
revenue was 89.2 percent, and the oil share of total exports was 92.5 
percent in 1980. 
Table 4.3 
Percentage Contribution of the Oil Sector and Revenues to: GDPe 
Public Revenues and Exports 
Kuwait Qatar Oman S.Arabia Bahrain UAE Total 
Oil sector share in 
the GDP (1979) 68.9 N.A. 61.5 62.9 N.A. 54.9 63.0* 
Oil revenue share in 
Public Revenue (1979) 
Oil and oil products 
share in total 
exports (1980) 
* Four Countries only. 
85.2 
89.8 
91.9 84.2 
94.9 99.6 
89.6 70.5 98.0 89.2 
99.9 80.7 93.8 92.5 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1981. Central 
Banks and Monetary Agencies of AGSp Economic Bulletin-, Vol. 2~ 
No.1, June 1981, Table 7 and 11. (Basic data.) 
This overwhelming dependence constitutes a great danger, 
particularly when the temporary nature of this -source of income is 
realized.(44) However, for the immediate future the oil and oil-based 
industries do create a demand for other supportive industries and 
services and some potential exists in these fields.(45) (and see 
Section 4.4.1) 
4.3.6.3 Lack of Manpower and Managerial Capacity: (See also Chapter 9) 
As we have seen there is little or no open unemployment in the 
region. Nationals seeking employment are guaranteed jobs (mainly in 
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Government service) and whatever unemployment occurs is usually of 
the frictional type. In fact labourp skilled and unskilled, is a 
constraint on the Sub-regions development effort. Thi5 is reflected 
generally in liberal attitudes towards immigration and efforts to 
encourage education and vocational training. In particular there 
is a problem of managerial and supervisory staff.(46) 
Economically Active Population: The economically active 
population among the AGS nationals is the lowest in the world, as may 
be seen from Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Economically Active Populations among AGS Nationals: Comparative data, 
1970 
Country 
Kuwait* 
Bahrain* 
Qatar* 
Libya 
Iraq 
USA 
UK 
Japan 
* Excluding t-xpatriate populations. 
Percentage of total 
population 
17.2 
21.8 
18.1 
25.6 
39.6 
40.9 
46.7 
49.8 
Source: Al Kuwari, A.K. Op. cit., Table 9.15, p. 180. 
Today however. the appreciation of the high social costs and 
other dangers of a high proportion of imported labour 1n total labour 
forces, (82% in Qatar and UAEP 70% in Kuwait, 50% in Saudi Arabia), 
may require a complete review of the whole existing pattern of 
development.(47) 
Imported labour occupies a very vital and sensitive position. 
The proportion is high in the science based activities, and senior 
positions, e.g. in Kuwait 76.7% in 1975, 65% in Saudi Arabia 1973, 
85% in Oman 1975, 80.7% in Qatar in 1973.(48) 
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In the UAE it is estimated that non-nationals constitute over 
90 percent of the labour force in the private sector and the 
proportion is about 70 percent in the public sector. The oil minister 
Al Otaiba has said that for some time Abu Dhabi will have neither 
the administrative nor the technical staff to run its own oil 
business, and -industrial developments being planned will face similar 
difficulties. On a lower level most of the manual work is being done 
by Baluchisp Pakistanis and others and although it is hoped that there 
will be a turnover of individuals there seems no escape from dependence 
on foreigners in the foreseeable future.(49) It is thought that 
manpower and inflation are the main problems facing UAE.(50) 
In Saudi Arabia domestic investment suffers from the lack of 
skilled technicians and management. The main problem facing the 
implementation of planned capital investments is not one of financial 
resources, but is the availability of human and natural resources.(51) 
In Oman a major constraint in the development of manufacturing 
activities remains the inadequate quantity and quality of management 
and skilled labour: 
"Considering the high cost of expatriates, extensive 
training must be initiated paralleled to project 
preparation and implementation.'' (52) 
Although the return of Omanis studying or staying abroad should 
help to relieve the shortages of skilled Omani manpower, the 
replacement of skilled foreign workers may take-somewhat longer than 
anticipated and the reliance on expatriates is likely to continue at 
a higher level than assumed.(53) 
To summarisep the dimension of the AGS dependence on foreign 
labour was outlined in Chapter 1. Here it is simply stressed that 
this dependence holds serious political and social implications. For 
these countries local Governments face a dilemma: they do not want 
to have such large numbers of foreign residents but at the same time 
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the present and future economic health of their communities would 
seem to depend on foreigners. 
4.4 Development Prospects and Priorities 
In the light of preceding sections here we attempt to crystallize 
development priorities for the future beginning with an outline of a 
conceptual framework for these priorities. 
4.4.1 Conceptual Framework 
All analysis of the development movement strategies and 
directions, of AGS indicates that the Gulf states are still in a kind 
of experimental period in which they are still finding out exactly 
what future their oil and gas sectors have, ru1d which kind of industrial 
and other sectors diversification make most sense for their societies. 
At the same time various misconceptions regarding development seem to 
have become established in the AGS. 
Misconceptions are particularly centred around a distorted meaning 
of the term 'development', reflected in a naive concept which consider 
scientific planning and high allocations of oil revenues to industrial 
projects as if they were in themselves able to buy 'development like 
a commodity'.(54) Here we should emphasise the points made in the 
Introquction including the fact that development involves more than 
material growth, as Galbraith has put it recently: 
"The test of social achievement is not the annual 
increase in output of a society, but how-welf the 
society addresses itself to the tasks which 
improves the lives of its members."(55) 
In Section 4.3.4 we outlined some of the imbalances which have 
appeared in AGS economies and societies. Conceptually it is important 
that the AGS countries, individually and/or in cooperation, address 
themselves to the problem of balanced and unbalanced growth. This is 
not the place to review the many studies, particularly following the 
work of Myrdal and Hirschman, which have advocated one or the other 
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of balanced or unbalanced strategies but some relevant points need 
to be made here. 
First, balanced growth in the literal sense of all sectors 
expanding at the same rate is impossible for individual AGS countries 
and unlikely even in the Sub-region as a whole, although this latter 
point will be discussed later. As appeared from Chapter 1, the highly-
skewed and quantitatively and qualitatively limited resource base of 
the AGS does not allow symmetrical multi-sectoral development. 
Secondly, the enormous size and dominance of the oil-industry both in 
production value and through its concentration of revenue in the hands 
of Governments, has produced many distortions which cannot easily be 
counter-weighed. 
Earlier in this chapter we have also identified ways in which 
unplanned unbalanced growth has led to damaging and dangerous con-
sequences, and it is clear that a 1 laisser-faire 1 attitude to these 
will at least inhibit true development. Therefore, here and later 
in this thesis, it becomes necessary to identify ways in which the 
adverse consequences of unbalanced growth can at least be mitigated. 
As we shall see, without cooperation within the Sub-regional AGS 
circle, within the larger Regional Arab circle and even within the 
International circle, such efforts are unlikely to be successful. 
This analysis tends to support the following proposed priorities: 
1. Priority should be given, within the industrialization process 
to the development of research and of training managerial and 
technological capabilities in various fields of petrochemical industry, 
otherwise these huge projects will remain as imported factories without 
contributing to the build-up of a highly trained and qualified 
generation. Sub-regional cooperation seems to have an important role 
in this directJon, aR 1s demonstrated in Parts 2 and 3. 
2. The development of the AGS should take a more independent line, 
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direction less concerned with conventional wisdom, because the Sub-
region has its many unique features, structural problems and objectives. 
In the current stage of development in particular more attention 
should be directed towards the build-up of infrastructure in its 
broader terms (human resources development, Government machinery 
and planning, training and research, etc.). The conventional advice 
to move rapidly towards productive material income generation should 
be discarded with no sense of guilt, and the opportunity presented by 
the favourable finances of the AGS to spend more time on the 
preparation of the platform for sound future development should be 
siezed. In particular, the managerial and organisational capability 
for successfully running future projects in a changing world could be 
thus greatly improved beyond existing capacity. 
3. As the role of Government necessarily expands in the public 
sector (including ownership of substantial productive assets, and 
the planning and execution of development works) there should be a 
parallel P.Xpansion in the capability and efficiency of relevant 
administration. Greater emphasis will have to be placed on merit and 
less on tribal or party loyalty, either for appointments or promotion.(56) 
4. Another area where AGS Governments should redouble their efforts 
are to improve the developmental data base. The quality and quantity 
of data needs to be improved in all countries and fields since without 
good data, rational planning and implementation is-very- difficult. 
In Oman, for example, there are no accurate agricultural statistics 
on production and prices, labour utilization and the ownership of land. 
An improvement in Kuwait's statistical data in particular with respect 
to national accounts and prices, would help in formulating appropriate 
policies measures. (57) 
5. A development oriented civil service is needed instead of a 
commercially oriented one. The author, from personal experience 
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realizes the existence of the phenomena of civil services in which 
personal commercial interests conflict with national interests. in some 
part of the Gulf area if not in all. and to a dangerous and 
detremental extent. This has emerged in the evaluation of development 
projects. both on a national and a Sub=regional basis. in which decisions 
were controlled by personal commercial views as against a development 
view. 
For example, an IBRD project was proposed for Oman in 1974 for 
the development of small-scale fisheries. with its components directed 
mainly to improve t.he fishermen catch capabilities through suitable 
fishing vessels and supporting their marketing outlets through the 
provision of cold storage network facilities. Despite the support 
being obtained for the project from the technical staff working with 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Fisheries. Petroleum and Minerals. and 
other Government bodies however, the Minister insisted on replacing 
the project with a larger and more prestigeous commercial scheme; 
the project consequently failed. Additionally. from personal 
experience of work with the Omani Fund for the Encouragement of 
Fishermen. it became clear that many decisions which were taken in 
relation to the type of fishing boats provided to fishermen during 
1978-79 were not being chosen for development suitability. but rather 
for motives of commercial self interests. Such examples could be 
multiplied from other AGS countries. 
6. It seems justifiable to claim that many of the priorities listed 
above would be more easily achieved and more likeJy to contribute to 
sound development if set in the context of AGS cooperation. A better-
directed and more successful development engine based on Sub-regional 
cooperation could better mobilize existing and potential resources and 
create the right setting for productive activities. 
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4.4.2 Sectoral Priorities 
Industry: 
Sayegh's words in describing industr~alisation in the Arab world, 
seem to be applicable to the AGS: 
"What is witnessed is more an outward 9 mechanistic 
expansion in industrial investment and activity 9 than 
a deep and far~reaching prm.:e~~ of industrialization. 
In the Arab world Algeria and to a lesser extent Egypt 
and Lebanon are to be exempted from parts of this 
judgement 9 but elsewhere the process is still slow and 
of modest volume. This is true even in such countries 
as Saudi Arabia 9 where huge investments are being made 
in industry. 11 (58) 
The degree of modernity is of special importance here 9 involving 
newness in the products manufactured 9 sophistication in the technology 
used, efficiency in industrial organisation, recourse to research and 
innovation, and the development of a good structure of management 
and labour relations. All this in such a way as to be capable of 
coping with modern industrial problems and requirements.(59) 
Industrialization in the light of all preceding analyses 
requires first, qualitative rather than quantitative development 
activities. Such qualitative activities include strengthening the 
infrastructural as well as the structural platform for industrial 
development (industrial training, research 9 relations, managerial 
capacity in various fields 9 etc.). 
Agriculture and Fisheries: 
Comparatively speaking 9 in terms of poptilation 9 area and 
resources, Saudi Arabia 9 followed by Oman and to a lesser extent by 
UAE seem to constitute the most promising areas within the Gulf 
Sub-region. However, as noted earlier, the prospects are not 
sufficient to solve the problem of food security within the Sub-regional 
circle. Specific priorities activities were identified in Chapter 3. 
For fisheries development 9 as recommended in Chapter 3 9 efforts should 
be centred around the development of traditional fisheries. A major 
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strategic ~onsideration in this sector is the future role of 
traditional fishermen. Modern fishing methods, such as those employed 
in joint ventures now operating in Oman, will not produce widely 
distributed benefits to traditional fishermen or generate a significant 
number of new jobs. Without p~oper control, operations of this type 
could disrupt domestic markets for traditional fishermen and reduce 
their incomes. With careful planning, the simultaneous development 
of both systems could contribute to the country's growth and income 
distribution objectives. Joint venture arrangements in commercial 
fishing, which focus on export markets and are carried out over 
restricted fishing areas, seem appropriate in this regard.( 6~ 
4.4.3 Development Cooperation 
Recent developments have shown a growing interest among AGS 
to cooperate either within the Sub-regional circle, or within the Arab 
Regional circle. Their economic structures, resources, as well as 
the factual situation in international economic system seem to 
support this move. While motivations for and an approach to cooperation 
will be analysed in later chapters, at this stage of analysis it is 
reasonable to conclude this section with brief, relevant notes on 
three example country situations. 
Qatar is an extreme case of an oil economy. It has limited human 
and very poor natural resources, however the Sheikdom is trying to 
maintain a separate identity and secure economlc-viability. To th1s 
end, it considers that it must identify with, and actively develop Sub-Regional 
and Regional institutions within the Gulf. Its absorptive capacity 
depends now, and will continue to depend for some time to come on the 
effectiveness of these efforts. It is not surprising therefore that 
Qatar has been taking a leading part, at the personal initiative of 
the Amir and the ruling family, in trying to secure, co-ordination in 
oil matters through the OPEC and the OAPEC (joined in January 1961 and 
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May 1970 respectively) the establishment of a Gulf currency, and the 
possible formation of a Gulf Common Market. Close economic ties have 
been established with a number of States, including Saudi Arabia, 
and Bahrain, and there is every indication that Qatar has realised 
that its decision not to join the UAE will necessitate greater 
co-operation with neighbouring States if it is to survive as w1 
independent entity. 
Qatar's surplus revenues have been flowing into (a) joint projects 
in the Gulf, such as the Bahrain dry dock, a joint shipping and a 
joint freight airline, (b) contributions to larger Arab causes, such 
as financial assistance to front-line Arab States, help in the 
construction of SUMED, subscriptions to the capitals of the Arab-
African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, etc., and 
(c) bilateral assistance to Muslim Countries, such as Pakistan, Sudan 
and the West African States.(61) 
Saudi Arabia brings into ~harp focus both the problems and the 
promise that massive oil revenue has brought to the Gulf. There is 
an embarrassment of riches. The country cannot possibly absorb 
in productive investment all its current oil revenues (estimated at 
il02billion f0r 1980) and therefore, has little incentive, in an 
inflationary world to produce more. At the same time, however, because 
of its oil reserves, the needs of the consuming countries depend very 
largely on its production levels. This means that productive 
investment of Saudi Arabia's surplus oil revenue becomes a matter of 
joint concern and joint purpose for the Kingdom and the consumer 
countries alike. The situation presents a challenge in technological, 
economic, financial and banking terms.(62) 
The above trends reflect the inter-related economic interests 
between Saudi Arabia and the world economy. 
In Kuwait planners have clearly indicated that Kuwait regards 
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long-term investment in productive assets in the Arab world quite as 
safe as those in the West.(63) Given the basic date about the country, 
it is not surprising that Kuwait finds it difficult to absorb its 
current oil revenue (estimated at~ 18 billion for 1980), together 
with the already existing foreign assets o~6.7 billion, in productive 
investments. It is of impm·te~nce to note in relation to Kuwai-t, -
however, that Kuwaiti investment, particularly private investment has 
become very sophisticated and qualified in finding profitable and 
sound investment outlets both at home and abroad. 
At home the possibilities are somewhat limited at present, but 
good in capital intensive petrochemical industries and, given a 
growing population and educational and technical skill levels, also 
in certain other manufactures and semi-manufactures. Abroad Kuwait 
capital is moving towards real estate and equities, the Eurodollar 
market, and international and regional banking channels, often joint 
banks with Western interests. 
4.4.4 AGS - Development Prospects and Priorities 
Summary: 
As the course of analysis has shown, the countries are seeking 
with increasingly enthusiasm and strength of political will, to drive 
development to the ultimate objectives, based on the available and 
potential natural and human resources. These countries seem to face, 
in the current stage of development, the need-to achieve the f6llowing: 
1. To deepen the role of planning with the needed strengthening 
of Government machinery and the statistical and information base. 
2. Human resources development in an integrated sense should have 
the highest rank among development priorities. 
3. A profound qualitative change in development capability is 
badly ncoded in the fluid of industrlalizalJun, rather than merely 
quuntl tativo ar_.;pccts. 
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4. The industry of finance which in some States seems to be emerging 
with many signs of an ability to play a strategic role in the future 
of AGS economies, should be deliberately adopted within development 
strategies (see Chapter 14). 
5. Already the economies of these countries have become deeply 
interdependent with other components of the world economy. It is now 
necessary to obtain the optimum benefit from organised development 
cooperation, whether Sub-regional, Regional or International. By then, 
the desired image of the future has been defined, the objectives, 
qualitative and quantitative targets determined, the priorities 
established and the development strategy formulated within the context 
of various determinants and forces provided on Sub-regional, Regional 
and International levels. 
Thus the whole analysis which follows will be directed to serve 
the above~mentioned prospects. 
At the end of Part One of this thesis it is useful for the course 
of analysis which follows to refer to the main conclusions derived 
from analysing the AGS resource base, development achievements and 
constraints. 
The preceding analysis has shown national development movements 
which have been hampered by common structural constraints, based 
particularly on the very limited resource base which has resulted.also 
in limiting the absorptive capacity of AGS economies. Common problems 
which emerged during recent development in the AGS, such as the very 
weak development administration base, smallness of markets, the 
scarcity of needed labour force and low managerial capacity, tend to 
encourage these countries to pool their efforts in tackling these 
problems in order to pave the way towards diversification of their 
economic base, in preparation for the non-oil era. 
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At the same time, one of the common features of their development 
processes has been the concentration on those activities and projects 
measurable in quantitative, rather than qualitative terms, and as 
with most other developing countries regarding manufacturing industry 
as the main sector which could gear their development engine towards 
diversification. Unfortunately the AGS have mistakenly assumed that 
they have already built up the infrastructural base which could justify 
their proceeding towards income generating projects. This proposition 
is clearly unfounded as shown by their continuing pressing problems. 
Consequently, there now seems to be emerging a common need for joint 
efforts in completing the build-up of their infrastructural base, 
on one part and in proceeding with joint development projects and 
activities of a qualitative type, such as research, training, and 
development administration. This has become very clear in the fisheries 
sector. The AGS development movements have also exposed some competing 
activities, mainly in industrial projects which if left without 
a reasonable degree of coordination such trends could be extremely 
damaging. 
The structure of AGS economies and development have also shown 
very special characteristics, strong financial-monetary based rather 
than diversified resource based economies which differ completely from 
those of any other region. This regional uniqueness makes it necessary 
to use all conventional economic indicators and assessment tools in 
the development literature with special care. This situation also 
makes it possible as well as necessary to choose unconventional approaches 
to their individual and/or cooperative development, different from any 
other previously followed either by developing or developed countries 
and groupings. 
In other words, the particular and unique characteristics of AGS 
economies and development processes tend to shape common priorities 
which would seem to encourage cooperation in translating these 
priorities into joint policies programmes and activities. 
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We turn 9 now in Part 2 9 to evaluate cooperation in its various 
degrees and forms, within the Sub-region, the Region as well as within 
the international economic relations circle in order to identify 
where these countries stand within the various types or regional 
cooperative movement and to lay down the basis for a pragmatic approach 
to their development cooperation. 
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PART TWO 
EVALUATION OF RECENT AND CURRENT SUB-REGIONAL~ REGIONAL COOPERATION AND_ 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
CHAPTER 5 - EVALUATION OF CURRENT SUB-REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
5.1 Introduction 
In this study of the approach to and strategy for Sub-regional 
Development Cooperation between the Arab Gulf Statesp we started by 
examining in Part 1 the background to the present situation in terms 
of the resource basis and the main characteristics of national 
development trends. In Part 2 we reviP.w and analyse current Sub-
regionalp Regional and International economic trends and cooperation. 
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In this chapter is examined the existing Sub-regional institutional 
framework so far devised for development cooperationp as well as the 
achievements of the various institutions. This idP-ntification of 
the current stage of cooperation paves the way to evaluating the 
approach followed so far and the requirements for further progress. 
All the institutions established and their achievements cannot be 
examined in detail but their basic characteristics are outlined and 
some case-study Sub-regional cooperative projects are consideredp 
mainly in the fisheries sector. 
In general terms, the various aspects and forms of current 
cooperation can be classified basically into two groups. The first 
relate broadly to tradep planning and economic cooperation, bilateralp 
multinational and Sub-regional. The second group concerns sectoral 
cooperation including industrialp agricultural,-fisheries, monetary, 
financial and marine conservation fields. Although arrangements are 
being made for cooperation in social affairs e.g. annual meetings of 
Ministers of Healthp Ministers of Social Affairs etc. these are not 
studied here, most attention being directed to economic development 
cooperation aspects. 
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5.2 Historic and Political Background 
Two major factors lie behind the current cooperation movement 
among the Arab Gulf States. The first factor can be related to the 
British Government announcement on 16 January 1968 of its decision 
to militarily evacuate the Arab Gulf area not later than 1971. The 
political and economic implications of this lead the AGS to discuss 
possible future independent structures. 
The second factor can be related to the general framework of 
Arab economic cooperation and movements towards integration, 
involving most of the Arab Gulf States. 
These trends, which faced and still face many problems, paved 
the way to Sub-regional approaches to cooperation and to integration 
between geographically neighbouring countries, such as, for. example, 
the movement towards coordinating economic activities among the Arab 
countries in North Africa which began in 1963.(1) 
5.2.1 The British Withdrawal and the UAE Experience 
At the time of the British announcement of military evacuation 
the political situation in the Gulf area was characterised by general 
tension. This was caused ~by the Iraqi claim to sovereignty over. 
Kuwait, the similar Iranian claim to Bahrain, Bahrain's claim on some 
islands near to Qatar borders and Qatar's counter-claims and Abu 
Dhabi's claim on an area in south-east Qatar.(2) In addition, the 
small and scattered Emirates realised that their wealth of petroleum 
resources, toge.ther with individual political weakness made them 
subject to real dangers w~ich might arise from external threats. All 
these reasons were behind the strong feeling and motivation to unity 
among +.he Rmirates.(3) These also lay behind the strong British 
encouragement in this direction. 
On 18 February 1968 a statement by Sheikh Zaied Bin Sultan, Ruler 
of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid Bin Saied, Ruler of Dhabi, announced the 
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establishment of a Federal Union between the two Emirates and invited 
the other five Trucial Emirates to join them into this union. The 
statement called on Qatar and Bahrain for mutual consultations on the 
future of the area and the need for joint action to secure its 
stability and security. 
In Dubai, after a meeting was held and attended by representatives 
of the nine Emirates on 25 February 1968, the Rulers issued a statement 
of a Dubai Agreement creating the United Arab Emirates, this agreement 
effective from 30 March 1968. 
The trend towards developing cooperative relations among the 
Arab Gulf States which was dominated by the above-mentioned attempts 
to create a nine-state federation of the Trucial States, Bahrain 
and Qatar, culminated in the failure of the original scheme but in the 
establishment of the United Arab Emirates linking the seven southern 
Trucial States.(4) Essentially this was in the first instance a 
political movement: 
"The impulse to integrate clearly came from the desire 
(shared by the regimes themselves and by external forces 
with interest in the area) to protect the states and 
regimes from any instability which might arise after 
the withdrawal, not from a conviction that economic 
needs of the population could be catered for more 
effectively within a unitary framework."(5) 
5.2.2 Arab Cooperation Experience 
The Arab economic cooperation and integration movement which 
began in the 1950's was not very successful, although numerous 
agreements and proposals were published. The failure to achieve real 
progress towards pan-Arab economic integration, paved the way in 
~1e Arab countries to consider whether the large geographical area 
which comprised all the Arab countries and containr~d many rJj fft~rent 
economic and political systems, was jtself a basic obstacle to 
economic integration. Consequently, the idea of establishing cooperation 
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and integration movementsp on smaller scales within Sub-regions in 
the Arab world appeared as worthy of application. The North African 
Arab countries took the lead in 1963, hut this trend also helps 
to explain the motives behind the ~cattered current cooperation 
efforts among the Arab Gulf States. An evaluation of the Arab 
economic cooperation movement, and its effects on our ppoposed approach 
to AGS Development cooperation is made in 'Chapters 6 and 9. 
5.3 Forms of Current Economic Cooperation 
5.3.1 Broad Economic Cooperation 
5.3.1.1 Bilateral Cooperation: 
Many joint Committees or agreed cooperation arrangements were 
established during the 1970's, on an ad hoc basis, following top level 
visits among the AGS leaders. The main joint committees established 
are listed below and some are examined in more detail later.(6) 
- Saudi-Kuwait transit arrangements in 1970. 
Saudi-Qatari transit arrangements in 1971. 
-Kuwait-Oman arrangements for cooperation on economic, cultural and 
information affairs, in 1972. 
-Kuwait-Bahrain cooperation arrangements on economic, cultural and 
information affairs (c. 1972). 
- Kuwait-UAE economic cooperation arrangements in 1973 including: 
encouragement of joint investments; 
free movement for capital and profits of joint projects; 
customs abolition; 
follow-up Committees for: joint projects 
labour and economic activity 
investment and monetary affairs 
trade and customs 
information and culture. 
- Saudi-Qatari economic agreement in 1973 including: 
equal treatment of citizens; 
equality of treatment of capital; 
encouragement of jo:i.nt projects; 
customs duties abolition; 
follow-up Committees. 
- Saudi-Kuwait cooperation arrangements in March 1975 (memora~dum of 
understanding). 
- Oman-Qatar cooperation 1976 
Following the Qatari Amir's visit to Oman in 1976 0 committees 
were established to discuss various aspects of cooperation among the 
two countries. 
Three of these bilateral arrangements are examined in more detail 
in order to illustrate the characteristics of these early actions. · 
First 0 the Omani-Qatari discussions in 1976. (7) 
The following items were proposed by Qatar: for discussion with 
the Omanis on matters relating to monetary and financial subjects: 
1. Exchange of daily information on foreign exchange rates between 
the Qatar Monetary Agency and the Central Bank of Oman. 
2. Opening jQint accounts between both Central Monetary Agencies. 
3. Regular consultations and coordination relating to the applied 
banking systems 0 in particular: 
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(a) Control of banking activity 0 lending and interest rate and licencing 
of new banks policies. 
(b) Investment of each country's foreign assets. 
4. Exchange of monetary and banking development's information. 
5. Reviewing the latest developments of the proposal to establish 
a Gulf Monetary Union between Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain and 
inviting Oman to participate in it. 
6.. Coordinating the tax system applied in both countries to avoid 
duplication. 
7. Exchange of technical investment information on international 
financial markets and the coordination on the investment of their 
general reserves. 
The following items were proposed, for joint discussion by the 
Omani officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Petroleum 
and Minerals: 
1. Petroleum exploration, marketing and industrial: the coordination 
of various policies relating to production, pricing, marketing and 
industrial oil products. 
2. Mining and mineral production: Omani studies purported to show 
the existence of commercial quantities of copper and raw materials for 
fertilizers as well as the believed existence of wealthy underground 
water reserves. It was proposed to discuss the coordination of the 
exploitation of these resources. 
3. Oman was thought to have relatively large livestock wealth 
potential mainly in the Dhofar area, as well as fisheries wealth, which 
could provide possible feasible joint ventures which could serve the two 
countries interests. 
4. Monetary and Financial Needs: (a) Studying ways and means to create 
an atmosphere leading to monetary unification; (b) The establishment of 
joint banks for the development of both countries and the Gulf area. 
When we examine both sets of proposals for discussion and consider 
what actually happened it becomes apparent that not only had no real 
foundation of mutual interests been laid but that the apparent enthusiasm 
of the rulers was not effectively translated into action by the 
bureaucrats. Some noteworthy points are: 
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(a) It was a strange decision to appoint the Minister of Agriculture. 
Fisheries, Petroleum and Minerals to head the Monetary and Financial 
Committee from the Omani side because he was not in charge of this sector. 
The Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely passed the Qatari proposed 
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agenda to the above mentioned Minister, who in turn passed them to the 
Director General of fisheries, to study them and arrange for the actual 
meeting which was held on 15 of October 1976. 
(b) The agenda was prepared only four days before the Committee 
meeting, allowing no proper study of various items. This explains why 
they included false information e.g. in Fishery production, it was 
exaggeratedly premissed that annual catches could be some 14 million 
tons! No study was made or identification suggested of those subjects 
that were of national interest, e.g. water exploitation, those likely to 
be of multilateral interest, e.g. Fisheries and Mineral Production, as 
well as those of regional interest such as petroleum policies which 
would better be discussed within OAPEC & OPEC frameworks. 
(c) The agenda included, as simple items, highly complex matters such 
as monetary unification, which needed to be studied very carefully to 
clarify the stages necessary for implementation even supposing that the 
countries accepted the idea. As a result of these and other defects 
the Committee failed to achieve any objective, neither was any kind of 
progress achieved on the subjects discussed. 
Ku~ait-Qatari Cooperation Agreement: 
' During the top level visit of Sheikh Sadd El-Abdullah Al-Sabah, 
Deputy Amir and Prime Minister of Kuwait to Qatar on 9-12 December 1978, 
an agreement of cooperation on economic, education, cultural and 
information fields was signed by Qatar and Kuwait on 11 December 1978. 
In the field of economic relations the two countries, proposed to 
coordinate their economic and monetary policies, their commercial, 
industrial, customs and financial legislations applied in both countries. 
The two countries decided to base economic and trade cooperation on the 
free movement and right of residence for citizens and capital ownership 
of land and Bhare-cquities. Companies were to be established in the 
U.ght of detHrm.inantu, rm;tri.ctionu, way::; and mearmret~ to be agreed upon 
later between their respective Governments. A special committee was to 
be established to submit its proposals and measures to the Governments 
within a maximum period of six months and was to meet within two 
months. 
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The agreement further stipulated unification policies relating to 
the systems and rates of customs duties~ as well as commercial laws and 
systems of supplying food-stuffs. It included general approval of the 
principle of the unification of legislation relating to the protection 
of local industries~ and the promotion of establishment of joint projects 
between citizens of both countries. Other items included were: 
exemption from customs duties on local agricultural products~ natural 
resources and industrial production with local inputs of not less than 
40%~ transit facilities. In addition there were articles regulating 
scientific cultural, information joint activities. This agreement was 
subject to ratification by both sides and for five years.{8) 
In practice there have not been any signs of success in the 
implementation of this agreement. 
Saudi-Kuwait Bilateral Cooperation Agreement (December 1978): 
The top-level Saudi-Kuwaiti bilateral talks which were held in 
Riyadh in December 1978 resulted in an agreement to strengthen political 
and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as part of a broader 
design to achieve greater coordination in all fields among the Arab 
countries of the Gulf. 
As far as economic relations between the two countries were 
concerned, the communique was more specific: 
-Agreement was reached on a set of general principles for partitioning 
the Neutral Zone offshore area between the two countries in a manner 
defining responsibilities and permitting the development of the offshore 
area in a way which safeguards the interests of thP. two sides. 
- Agreement was reached on measures to be taken for the i~plementation 
of the agreement between the two countries for the demarcation of the 
median (partition) line of the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone (January 1970) 
as of the memorandum of understanding signed in March 1975.(9) 
- The two sides reviewed the progress achieved in promoting economic 
relations between them since the signature of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Economic 
Agreement of 12 March 1975p and decided to broaden the scope of this 
economic cooperation in order to ensure a greater measure of economic 
complementarity, including the establishment of joint industries and 
the study of existing industries with a view to determining the 
feasibility of joint investments in them. Agreement was also reached 
to extend the list of goods exempted from customs duty by both Governments. 
- The two sides decided to expand the scope of the joint follow-up 
committee set up under the 1975 Economic Agreement to include the 
Foreign Ministers of the two countriesp their Ministers of Finance and 
Economy, Trade, and oil and mineral resources.(lO) 
In general we can say that whilst a greater understanding was 
achieved through this agreement, no actual practical measures or results 
can be identified. 
Bilateral Cooperation Evaluation: 
Most of the listed arrangements and established committees were 
not effective in the implementation of joint projects nor in themselves 
did they result in serious steps being taken towards practical aspects 
of cooperation. In all cases they suffered from the lack of preliminary 
stud5.es and of advance arrangements, as is illustrated in the Omani-
Qatari example. 
5.3.1.2 Multilateral Cooperation: 
A joint Economic Committee of Oman, Qatar, UAE and Bahrain was 
established after 5 June 1972 when it was first promulgated between Qatar 
and Bahrain and joined by Oman and UAE later in 1973. 
This committee specifically studied a joint Gulf Marine Transport 
192 
193 
Company. A feasibility study was prepared by a Canadiau consulting 
company 1 'Alcan Shipping Services Limited' and many technical discussions 
were held simultaneously in Oman and Doha. The Committee advised the 
four countries to sign the agreement establishing the company and 
the Foreign Ministers met in Bahrain in 1974 to discuss the final 
phase of the project agreement and to sign it. At the last moment 
the Ministers failed to agree because Bahrain~ the host country 1 under 
a pressure from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait proposed the postponement of 
the signing of the agreement.(ll) 
This project in its original form was scrapped due to Kuwaiti 
and Saudi Arabian wishes to be involved. Later, the project was re-
established in Kuwait involving participation of all the AGS but 
excluding Oman. This second agreement establishing an Arab Shipping 
Company was signed on January l9p 1976.(12) 
The Economic Committee also discussed the situation in relation to 
airlines and the possibility of establishing a joint airline company. 
However, this idea has not been implemented.(13) 
5 .• 3 .1. 3 Sub-Regional Cooperation: 
5.3.1.3.1 Development Planning Cooperation:(l4) 
The first Planning Conference of the AGS was held in Riyadh-Saudi 
Arabia in June 1979p and a memorandum of understanding signed on 12 June 1979 
was ratified by all Governments concerned. The main items were as follows: 
(a) Each State, if it wishesp can circulate through the technical 
secretariat of the participating countries, information on its projectsp 
existing, under construction or at the final stage of feasibility study. 
If the State concerned welcomedthe participation of other countries in 
its projects it should state conditions for such participation. Countries 
should exchange this information one month before the meetings of 
Ministers of Planning. 
The Ministers' meeting will also decide upon their countries' 
formal atUtudes towards proposed regional projectf:l and identi 1'y Ute 
steps which should follow. 
(b) The study of and recommendations for action on: 
1. Coordination between existing projects 0 whether either competing 
or integrated. 
2. Joint efforts relating to the training on computer use with a 
view to spreading computer services through participating countries, 
this relevant to the problem of scarcity of skilled labour. 
3. Current efforts to develop transport and communications 
infrastructures to connect the Sub-region with a single network. 
4. Coordinating marketing policies for export-oriented industries 
which otherwise may seperately fa.ce dangerously competitive situations 
in world markets, these efforts to include coordinating policies towards 
developed countries. 
(c) Institutional proposals included the following: 
1. The setting up of a Council of Ministers of Planning. 
2. Urging all countries to establish formal planning machinery within 
convenient institutional structures. 
3. The establishment of a coordinating and follow-up unit, in relation 
to the Conference, in each country. 
This 1979 memorandum of understanding in some respects was one of 
the foundation stones for the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
5.3.1.3.2 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 
The decision to form the Council was announced at the beginning-of 
February 1981 when Foreign ministers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the UAE and Oman met in Riyadh on February 14, 1981 to discuss 
questions relating to their joint interests on the light of the latest 
drastic international as well as regional political, security and 
economic developments. The following excerpts from the text of the AGS 
charter establishing 'the Co-operation Council for the Arab Gulf States' 
as released by the foreign ministers illustrate the philosophy behind 
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the formation of the GCc.(15} 
"In recognition of the special ties. common .character-
istics and similar institutions linking each of the 
United Arab Emirates. Bahrain. Saudi Arabia. Oman. 
Qatar and Kuwait, and due to the importance of 
establishing close cooperation in all fields. particularly 
economic and social, the aforementioned States see a need 
for the establishment of an organisation aimed at 
strengthening the ties and cooperation between its members 
in all spheres." 
"This organisation. to be known as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. It shall be a means of achieving a greater 
degree of coordination and integration in all fields 
and of forging closer relations between its members. 
To this end it will form corresponding organisations in 
the fields of economics and finance. education and 
culture. social affairs and health. communications, 
information media. nationality and passports. travel 
and transportati0n, commerce. customs and the movement of 
goods. and finally in legal and legislative affairs." 
GCC Organisational Structure: The Cooper~tion Council shall be 
composed of ( 16} : 
(a} The Supreme Council of Heads of State. This will be followed by 
an arbitration body for solving disputes between States. 
(b) The Ministerial Council. 
(c) The Secretariat-Gene~al. 
(a} The Supreme Council is composed of the Heads of the member States, 
the chairmanship of the Council to be alternated according to 
alphabetical order. 
The Council will meet in two ordinary sessions every year but 
emergency sessions can be held. 
(The first session was held on May 26. 1981 in Abu Dhabi.) Each 
member ruler has the right to call for an emergency meeting which will 
be convened after the invitation has been supported by another member. 
Functions of the Supreme Council include: the laying down and 
issuing higher policies of the Cooperation Council; it will debate 
recommendations, laws and by-laws submitted to it by the Ministerial 
Council and the Secretariat~Genera+ before approval; it will form the 
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body for settling disputes. 
The Arbitration Board will be attached to the Supreme Council 
and will undertake the settling of current disputes or those that might 
occur in future among the member States. It will be the auth?rity to 
outline and interpret the laws of the Cooperation Council. 
(b}- The Ministerial Council is composed of the Foreign Ministers 
representing the AGS. It will lay down the laws of the Secretariat-
General. It will prepare for the meetings of the Supreme Council 
and also prepare all studiesp topics, rer.ommendations, by-laws and laws 
that are to be submitted to the Supreme Council and set the agenda for 
the meetings of the Council. The Ministerial Council will hold six 
meetings every year - once every two months. Emergency meetings may 
be held at the suggestionoftwo member States. It will lay down the 
policies, recommendations, studies and draft laws that aim at developing 
cooperation and coordination among the member States in the varicus 
fields. It will encourage the means of cooperation and coordination 
among the various activities of the private sector. It will approve 
the reports and regulations and internal by-laws connected with the 
administrative affairs proposed by the Secretary-General and also 
approve the budget and the final accounts of the Secretariat-General 
of the Cooperation Council. It will equally encourage, develop and 
coordinate current activities among the member States in the various 
fields. Those activities will be considered binding on all members when-
approved by the Ministerial Council. 
The Ministerial Council will make recommendations to the individual 
Ministers concerned with the laying down of policies aimed at realising 
·the goals of the Cooperation Council. 
(c) The Secretariat~Gener.al will be directed by a Secretary-General, 
appointed by the Supreme Council which will define the conditions and 
the period of appointment. The Secretary-General will be chosen from 
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the citizens of the States - of the Cooperation Council. 
He will be directly responsible for the work of the Assistant 
Secretaries, the Secretariat-General, and for the good performance of 
its various sectors. The Secretariat-General will have an Information 
Department. The functions of the Secretariat-General are listed as 
follows: 
1. To prepare studies on cooperation and coordination. 
2. To follow up the implementation of resolutions and recommendations 
of the Higher Council and the Ministerial Council. 
3. To prepare reports and studies as required by the Council of 
Ministers. 
4. To prepare progress reports on the Cooperation Council's 
achievements. 
5. To prepare budgets and final accounts. 
6. To prepare administrative and financial draft laws commensurate 
with the required development of the Cooperation Council and its 
increased responsibilities. 
The statutes of the Cooperation Council have been described as 
similar to those of the European Common Market. The Council's statutes 
called the Constitution, were prepared and debated by the six Foreign 
Ministers during the conference in Muscat on March 9, 1981 and were 
referred to the Supreme Council for final approval in Abu Dhabi on May 
26-27, 1981. 
The decision to form the Gulf Cooperation Council, can be 
described as the first solid institutional base for crystallising all 
the steps taken by the six member States towards Sub-regional Cooperation 
for development, the movement which began in a faltering way during the 
1970's. 
Despite the clear importance of security consideration, the 
motives that geared the creation of the GCC in particular the effects 
of the Iraq-Iran war. the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion 
of Afganistan and the announcement of •us President Ronald Reagan's 
Policy• regarding the deployment of US troops in the Gulf(17), the 
Council can be viewed as having a significant role to play in Sub-
regional cooperation for the development of the Arab Gulf States.(18) 
The newly established machinery for cooperation in particular-
seems to meet the framework of institutional requirements to gear all 
economic as well as other aspects of cooperation activities. 
GCC Achievements: 
The GCC Council has held two major sessions; the first was held 
in Abu Dhabi on 26 May, 1981, the second in Riyadh on 10 October, 1981. 
Many other meetings on various levels were held and attended by 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Economy and Finance and 
Ministers of Planning. 
The main achievements of the GCC so far in economic and 
financial fields, are as follows: 
1. Economic Agreement: an agreement to a common market approach was 
approved between the six member countries at the Riyadh summit meeting 
(Appendix 1). 
2. Establishment of seven sectoral committees to follow-up 
implementation of economic agreements: 
- Committee on Financial and Monetary Cooperation 
Committee on Trade 
- Committee on Planning 
- Committee on Transport and Communication 
- Committee on Labour and Labour Movement 
- Committee on Industrial Coordination 
- Committee on Petroleum. 
3. Establishment of Joint Investment Organisation: The ministers 
of Finance approved the terms of reference and constitution of this 
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organisation, to be established with the capital of ~ U.S. billion. 
The Finance Ministers were to sign the organisation agreement during 
1982. 
4. Arab Gulf Fund for Development: Established in April 1981 to 
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provide assistance to developing countries, it provides annual 
assistance to UNICEF of 10 million US dollars and i-50 million to other 
organisations. 
5.4 Sectoral Economic Cooperation 
5.4.1 Trade Cooperation 
The first conference aiming at coordinating AGS ~mports, 
(excluding Saudi Arabia) of mainly the basic foods (wheat. rice. meat) 
and cement was held in Bahrain on 10 December 1973, attended by the main 
importing agencies and representatives of Ministries of Trade from some 
countries.(l9) 
The conference discussed a proposal to establish a joint committee 
to take charge of bargaining with the exporters of the above-mentioned 
items in order to guarantee the best conditions for the AGS countries 
in the light of their consumption needs. The conference was held without 
any information on AGS consumption needs, and it failed in achieving 
its objectives because of competing interests among bodies in charge of 
importing foodstuffs. 
General Conference of Arab Gulf Trade_~ini~t~rs: 
Regular Conference Meetings have been held on ministerial level 
by the six AGS with the addition of Iraq. The main direction and 
decisions taken in the first conference are examined below, followed by 
a review of developments at subsequent meetings, including ideas 
discussed by the Technical Committee.(20) 
The first conference was held in Baghdad during the period 
2-4 October 1977. Its final official statement stated that its main 
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objective w~s to study various ways and means to develop and strengthen 
tradep economic cooperation and coordination between the AGS. The 
main points included in the conference statement were:(21) 
1. The conference noted that its efforts did not begin in a vacuum, 
but followed many bilateral, multilateral and Sub-regional agreements 
covering various economic fields. However, these agreements' 
achievements were below their ambitions. 
2. With full confidence in the existence of factors favouring 
cooperation among the States, the conference invited with confidence and 
optimism the study of the possibility of establishing a Regional 
Integrated Arab Society in the Gulf Area, a society which is one of the 
richest among the developing economies. 
3. This proposed integrated society is considered to be a basic 
cornerstone for General Arab Economic Integration, and one of the main 
paths leading to Arab Economic Unity. 
4. The conference was assured of the importance of developing 
cooperation among various bodies, including the private sector, in the 
participating countries. 
5. The existing lack of information on possible joint projects made 
the conference recommend the strengthening of the Gulf organization for 
Industrial Consultancy to play a role in the coordination and cooperation 
and the setting-up of joint industrial projects.(22) (Also see Section 
5.4.2.) 
6. As the conference realized the shortage in supply of local labour 
it urges collective effort among the participating States to encourage 
the employment of the Arab labour force to secure homogeneous human 
resources that are uniform in cultural, historic and social aspects so 
as to guarantee social stability for the countries of this Sub-region. 
Second Conference Statement of Decisions(23): 
On 6 January 1979 a committee of Experts held a preparatory 
meeting for the second conference held in Riyadh-Saudi Arabia on 8 and 9 
January and made recommendations that were reflected in its decisions. 
(a) Trade. 
1. 'l'he conference noticed the progress in trade relations among -the 
participating countries during the last five yearst noting at the same 
time that trade between these countries is composed mostly of re-export 
products. The conference invited measures to increase the size of trade 
based on the locally produced products. 
2. The conference noted the steps taken to establish the Union of 
Chambers of Commerce. Industry and Agriculture in the AGS, and invited 
these Chambers to hold their second general meeting to discuss and 
approve the articles of association of the union to enable it to begin 
its activities. 
3. The conference invited the countries to exchange information on 
their trade systems for study and evaluation. It urged the exchange of 
visits among responsible people in preparation to submit a general 
study to the conference at future sessions. 
4. Concerning the proposed collective agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation among AGS. the conference welcomed Saudi Arabian readiness 
to study a draft of a proposed agreement, this draft to be studied by 
the participating States through an expert committee established for 
this purpose. 
(b) Supplies Field. 
The conference decided to establish a committee composed of the 
responsible people in charge of supplies in the participating countries 
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to study: the import prices of basic food products, mainly rice and wheat; 
exploring the possibility of pooling the countries' needs for importing 
basic foodstuffs; for supplying these latter on favourable terms on the 
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basis Of joint shipments; and studying the possibility of formulating a 
general policy for the supplying of strategic stocks of basic foodstuffs 
for all countries of the Sub-region. 
{c) International Relations Field. 
The conference recommended the continuous coordination of the AGS 
attitude to international organisations and blocs, and coordinating 
attitudes towards international companies through the exchange of 
information about them. 
(d) Organisational Field. 
The conference decided to leave the follow-up process to the countries 
themselves, through a liaison officer to be appointed for this process. 
5.4.2 Industrial Cooperation 
A conference of AGS Ministers of Industry which was held in Doha/ 
Qatar on 25-26 February 1976 expressed its realization of the unity of 
regional interests among the Arab Gulf States. and the vital role for 
industry to be played in their economic development, in addition to the 
importance of indu ;.strial cooperation among the Arab Gulf States as a 
basic step on their road to achieve economic integration. 
The conference agreed to establish an independent Sub-regional 
organisation called "The Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultancy" 
to be located in Doha and serving the six AGS countries as well ffiiraq. 
The main duties for the organisation are to: 
1. Collect and publish data and information on industrial proj~cts and 
industrial development policies. 
2. Submit proposals for the establishment of joint industrial projects. 
3. Recommend ways and means to coordinate industrial development projects. 
4. Coordinate and develop technical and economic cooperation between 
existing and future industries. 
5. Provide technical assistance relating to the preparation and 
evaluation of industrial projects. 
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Gulf Industrial Consultancy Organization (GOIC): 
The structure of the newly established and approved organization is 
illustrated in the chart overleaf. 
Three projects that which some of the AGS agreed to participate in 
when proved to be feasible are(25): 
~ Bitumen (Saudi Arabia~ Oman~ Kuwait) 
- Electric lamps (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) 
- Sheet glass (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) 
Kuwait~ Bahrain and Saudi Arabia s:i.gned on 29 May 1980 an agreement 
establishing a Gulf Company for Petrochemicals, with a capital of BD 60 
million. The petrochemical complex will begin with producing methanol and 
ammonia with plant capacity of one thousand metric tons a day for each 
commodity. The shares will be distributed equally between the Kuwaiti Company 
for Petrochemical Industries~ Bahrain Oil Company and the Saudi Company for 
Basic Industries. Investments in the complex are expected to reach 3 400 
million and production is expected to begin in Bahrain in 1983.(26) 
A list of studies being carried out by the GOIC is shown in 
Appendix 2 in order to illustrate its activities. 
The Approach to Sectoral Industrial Cooperation: 
The organisation in achieving its main objective follows two main 
directions in its studies: first, studying and reviewing the countries' 
industrial development plans~ identifying competing as well as non-competing 
integrating activities. Second, studying strategies and sub-sectoral plans 
of each industry, and identifying investment opportunities for joint 
industrial projects. 
The organisation has centred its interest in the current stage on the 
three following industrial sectors: 
(a) Chemical and petrochemical projects 
(b) Mineral and engineering industrial .projec-t;s (e.g. iron, steel and 
aluminium) 
(c) Building materials. 
Gulf Organisation for ~ndustrial Consultancy Organisational Chart (24) 
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General studies of these sectors are followed by feasibility studies 
for joint industrial projects on the light of concluded priorities, 
and the submission of proposals for the establishment of feasible 
joint projects. 
GOICAchievements: 
The still youthful organization has reached various stages at the 
preparatory leVel for the implementation of joint industrial projects. 
The project most near finalisation is Aluminium Extr•1sion Plant 
in Bahrain, in which Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq agreed to 
participate. The secretariat prepared constitution documents and the 
Council of the Organization established the preparatory committee for 
the setting-up of the project at its seventh meeting 20-25 May 1980 at 
Doha. 
Coordination between the Existing Projects: 
The organization studies special sectors of existing industries 
aiming at realizing coordination between these activities, relating mainly 
to the following:(27) 
~ Marketing 
- Production 
- Maintenance 
- Laboratories and Research Centres 
- Specifications and quality control 
- Exchange of information and expertise 
-Management, organizational, accountancy and financial systems 
- Training 
Industrial Cooperation, An Analysis: 
Industrial cooperation at Sub-regional level took its first serious 
step after the conference of Ministers of Industry in the AGS ended its 
meeting in Qatar in 1976, when the Gulf Organization for lndustrial 
Consultancy was established, and then began to study and propose various 
actions to be taken for industrial cooperation and coordination between 
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the AGS. 
In the author's view, the organization's approach seems to be 
sound as it combines both the scientific method of exploring industrial 
cooperation possibilities, and the formulation of practical proposals 
for joint projects. It takes into account, when submitting its 
proposalsp various factual aspects of political, social, as well as 
economic development in the area.(28) We note that the organization 
gave special attention at the current stage of exploring cooperation 
opportunities to three industrial sectors: chemicals and petrochemicals, 
minerals and engineering, and building materials. This selection is 
based on the current facts of industrial development in the Gulf Area. 
The Organization's success in practice will depend largely on the 
real will of the participating countries for industrial cooperation 
as well as on available cooperation opportunities. 
The question which remains to be answered, is to what extent the 
Organization's activities can affect basic structural changes of 
industrial development of the AGS, taking into account the actual 
opportunities and possibilities now remaining for cooperation. Taking 
into considere.tion the various fears expressed earlier in Chapters 2 and 
4, and the fact that national actions have pre-empted many of the options 
hypothetically available the room for manoeuvre has Qecome somewhat 
limited. Two particular sets of factors already affecting possible 
joint venture linkages are worth noting here. 
First, Kuwait is the most active country in establishing joint 
pojects, for example, with Bahrain for petrochemicals (15% participation), 
with Oman and Ras El-Khaimah for cement 40% and 75% respectively. 
Secondly, Saudi cooperation with Bahrain is particularly marked 
with the Saudi stake made in Alba (20% participation) instead of 
proceeding with its own project for aluminium, is notable as also a 20% 
stake in cement. It is also worth mentioning the joint project for 
constructing a bridge-causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia which 
is expected to cost axut ;~ 1 billion with full Saudi financi~g. This 
link will contribute to strengthen economic as well as security 
cooperation prospects. Construction period will take five years and is 
expected to shorten the distance between the two countries to some 
20 minutes by road.(29) The full socio-political implications cannot 
be discussed here but are bound to have wide repercussions in the Gulf. 
5.4.3 Agriculture and Fisheries Cooperation 
The Conference of Ministers of Agriculture(30): 
Following a Saudi initiative relating to cooperation between 
Ministries of Agriculture in the Gulf and Arabian peninsula, the firr~t 
conference of Ministers of Agriculture was held in Riyadh from 1 to 3 
February 1976. This conference laid the basis for a periodic annual 
meeting. We refer below to the main trends observable in these 
Ministerial meetings. 
The emphasis in all conferences 0 was on ways and means to improve 
agricultural production through horizontal as well as vertical expansion 
and productivity increase, to bring the Sub-region towards self-
sufficiency in food. Periodic conferences, activities can be classified 
in relation to this objective, as follows: 
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(a) General agricultural activities including plant production (research 
and joint productive projects) 
(b) Water resources development 
(c) Livestock development 
(d) Fisheries development. 
5.4.3.1 General Agricultural Cooperation: 
The following are the decisions and recommendations taken at the 
various annual Ministerial meetings: 
1. Research and Information Base. 
(a)· ln. order to fulfill the ubovc~-mcnl'.ionod object:i.ves on rr!glon:d 
bases 0 due consideration was given to establish regional research 
centres 9 to cooperate and coordinate research activities and where 
possible avoid duplication of work. 
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(b) Encouragement of applied scientific research in order to solve 
the problems confronting agriculture and water, as scientific research 
was considered to be the corner-stone for the development of both. 
Exchange of information and available research results in each country. 
Coordination in the planning of research and scientific experiments 
in the member countries. Follow-up of scientific and research studies 
related to the increase of rainfall by cloud seeding. 
2. The transfer of the existing Central Agricultural Research Centre 
in Riyadh Arabia into a Sub-regional Agricultural Research Centre. 
3. Jojnt Projects. 
Fertilizers: As agricultural inputs and especially fertilizers 
were considered to be the main basis for the development of this sector, 
the conferences promoted the adoption of the idea for the construction 
of one or more t·actories for the production of both compound and 
phosphate fertilizers. 
The member countries were requested to submit their annual fertilizer 
requirements together with their expected needs for the coming five 
years to the General Secretariat. Member countries. should also 
provide the General Secretariat with information of the possibility of 
the availability of the raw materials required for the establishment 
and operation of such factories. The conference called on the General 
Secretariat to follow up this recommendation and to submit reports to 
the following meetings showing the possibility of identifying the 
location of these factores with economic feasibility studies. 
Joint production of cereals and fodder: The fourth Conference 
meeting which was held in Kuwait on 13-15 March 1979 requested the 
General Secretariat to call for a technical meeting for experts from 
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member countries in order to prepare a general outline and view on 
joint productive projects to be executed in the Sub-region, especially 
in the following fields: 
(a) Production, storage and marketing of cereals (wheat, barley, 
sorghum). 
(b) Production, storage and marketing of fodder. 
(c) Utilization of plant and animal waste for fodder industries. 
The general secretariat· should contact specialized international, 
regional and Arab organizations or consultancy companies to conduct 
studies and prepare reports. As the Arab Orga~ization for Agricultural 
Development is currently carrying out a study on food security in the 
Arab countries, the General Secretariat should give top priority to 
Arab consultancy companies and organization in proposed studies in order 
to avoid duplication. This is in line with recommendations taken by 
the meeting of the AOAD at Rabat, which concentrated on regional studies 
and gave them ~op priority. 
The fourth Conference meeting urged each country to prepare 
immediate programmes for increasing the production of cereals and fodder 
according to their capacities and potentialities. The General 
Secretariat to participate with each country in studying and coordinating 
these programmes in order to achieve the objectives of the agricultural 
cooperation. Member countries shall endeavour to approve clearly 
studied policies for the storage of an adequate reserve of cereals and 
fodders within the framework of food security of the whole region as 
well as for each country. The out~ome of such policies and actions should 
be communicated to the General Secretariat. 
Training and other activities: The Conference meetings recommended 
the member countries having agricultural, veterinary or fishing training 
centres to give priority when recruiting the staff to. those with 
proficiency in the Arabic language. 
The General Secretariat was instructed to identify and unify 
laws on theprotection of natural resources including pasture, forests 
and animals in the region, and prepare necessary legislation prohibiting 
commercial tree-cutting. 
5.4.3.2 Water Resources Development Cooperation: 
The recommendations dealing with water resources development 
ranged from the fundamental, viz. conducting more studies to strengthen 
and extend information data systems to measures for standardizing 
technical specifications and the construction of factories for water 
pumps and some equipment used in desalination plants. 
In the field of water surveys and information collection system 
the Conference realizing the importance of underground water in the 
relevant countries established a technical committee. This is to study 
all aspects of underground water and surface water flows and their 
exploitation, together with plans directed to avoid the loss of runoff 
water flowing to the sea, or otherwise lost. 
Since this committee would benefit from specialized international 
organizations in this respect the member countries were asked to suggest 
Arab and international organizations or consultants deemed necessary 
to assist such recomrr.endations, to be submitted to the General 
Secretar:i.at which would pass on approved selections to the Ministerial 
Follow-up Committee. 
Joint desalination projects: The Conference called for the 
setting-up of joint committee to study cooperation in the field of 
establishing joint atomic energy desalination plants to produce water and 
electricity. These plants should be situated at justified locations in 
order to serve the joint interests of two countries or more. When 
constructing desalination plants the conference recommended that member 
countr.b~u t;hould conuider detrimental resuJtG that affect the sea 
environment from the waste of such plants. 
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Joint satellite station: The participating countries believing 
in the necessity of responding to scientific advances decided to 
transfer the Saudi Arabian satellite station into a Sub-regional project 
with the Saudi laboratory responsible for the analysis of information 
received through the station. This analysis includes the following: 
~ Geological studies 
- Water discharge studies 
Conduction of hydrological studies e.g. springs 
- Studies of the movement of locusts 
Making a statistical inventory of agricultural regions 
- Studies of the mobility of sand-dunes. 
5.4.3.3 Livestock Development Cooperation: 
Animal wealth cooperation is concentrated in two fields. First, 
the development of livestock production on a Sub-regional basis 
including natural grazing areas and fodder production, through detailed 
surveys and feasibility studies. Secondly, the conservation of animal 
wealth, mainly through unified quarantine and research work. 
To develop livestock in the region a committee was formed to carry 
out a survey of the potentials of the member countries in livestock 
production to study current projects, plans, constraints and the needs 
to solve such problems. 
As the availability of information on natural grazing areas is 
of special importance its protection and development is of urgent 
necessity for all member countries. In order to prepare the systems 
and regulations related to the protection and development of natural 
grazing areas it became imperative to complete the information and data 
related to these areas. The conference, therefore, called upon the 
General Secretariat to take the following measures: 
1. Collection of available information in the member countries and 
the identification and mapping of grazing zones in the member countries. 
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2. Contacting both international and regional organizations to 
complete all available information in the member countries. 
3. The composition of a technical committee from member countries 
and of specialized organizations for the collections, classification 
and coordination of information, together with identifying the areas of 
information deficiency. 
4. Having collected all information and data, the technical committee 
shall identify all pastoral problems in all grazing zones and drawing 
up of a map for the improvement, development and administration of 
these pastures. The technical committee shall monitor a unified 
pastoral policy and coordinate the mobility of herds between neighbouring 
countries. 
The conservation of livestock wealth, on an integrated quarantine 
system consisting of standardized procedures to combat both animal and 
plant diseases was adopted, and a unified law was proposed. 
A central veterinary laboratory with artificial insemination 
facilities was proposed to be established in Saudi Arabia, this to 
cooperate with all the member countries and coordinate its activities 
with the Animal Production Centre at Bagdad. The Research Centre at 
Al-Hofuf for animal and fodder production was r~commended to be given 
a status of a Sub-regional centre with which all member countde:; would 
cooperate and coordinate their activities. 
For establishing joint ventures to develop animal wealth, necessary 
information would be collected and reviewed by the technical committee 
which would finalize measures for further implementation. 
To promote knowledg~ special seminars, symposiums and training 
programmes will be arranged in member countries. 
5.4.3.4 Fisheries Cooperation: 
The Conference of Ministers reviewed reports provided by the member 
countries, detailed discussions were carried out and the following 
measures were proposed(31): 
1. Close cooperation and coordination of current activities to 
develop fish resources and implementation of all necessary measures 
to improve fisheries development among member countries. 
2. Marine Laws: The formation of a 'Legal technical committee' 
·to prepare a draft of marine laws. The General Secretariat, would 
approach all countries concerned who have already prepared relevant 
draft laws and circulate these to the countries who are still in 
preparatory stages. It will also invite internati~ experts to help in 
preparing joint marine legislation to be implemented by the participating 
countries. The 'Arab Union of Fish Producers' has a considerable 
collection of marine legislations from different countries: the 
conference posed that the general secretariat should cooperate with the 
Arab Union and all the AGS countries were urged to join the Union. 
3. Statistics and Information Base: An integrated statistical 
system was considered as a priority for planning fisheries projects 
particularly in harvesting and marketing; the following recommendations 
were made to: 
- Establish statistical units in respective countries to assess the 
magnitude of fisheries wealth. 
- Ask the Gulf Regional Fisheries Project director to send fisheries 
statisticians to make regular field visits to the member countries 
and analyse the existing situation and report to the General Secretariat. 
- Form a technical committee to study the reports submitted by fishery 
statisticians and similar reports prepared by the member countries in 
their statistical unitsD and to classifyD analyseD compile and finally 
dispense these to member countries with proposed recommendations. 
- Necessary measures to protect the marine environment from pollution 
were considered and it was recommended to establish a Sub-regional 
marine research centre, in UAE. 
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4. Joint Venture Projects: 
- It was recommended that all the member countries should work out a 
joint venture programme to develop their fisheries wealth, the General 
Secretariat to prepare a work programme in this respect. 
- The establishment of joint commercial projects in a number of cases 
always pose risks particularly in the absence of adequate information 
on the fish landings and storage facilities, therefore the General 
Secretariat should: persuade the member countries to recognize the 
importance of evaluating carefully the feasibility of new projects 
before their implementation; and not to establish any commercial 
(individual or joint venture) project unless accurate and adequate 
information are available together with any bottlenecks which could 
hamper the success of the project. 
5. Training Programme: It was realized that a training programme in 
all technical fields in fisheries development is of considerable 
importance, and the citizens of the member countries be provided 
opportunities in this respect; the General Secretariat was to urge 
the Kuwait Sub-regional Training Centre to prepare a training programme 
particularly in planning, fisheries statistics, administration and in 
the operation of cold storage. 
6. FAO/UNDP Gulf regional survey and development project (also see 
section 5.4.3.6): The members expressed concern over the delays in. 
the completion and implementation of the project and the General 
Secretariat conveyed this feeling to the FAO/UNDP authorities. It was 
recommended that the General Secretariat should request the project 
authorities to prepare and submit a report for fish storage and 
preservation. 
5.4.3.5 Machinery for Agricultural Cooperation: 
The Ministers' Conference Machinery is composed of the following: 
1. The Annual Conference of Ministers of Agriculture: 
Six conferences have been held since the first conference in 
February 1976 as follows: 
- First conference in Riyadh/Saudi Arabia from 1-3 February 1979. 
- Second conference in UAE, Dubai from 19-21 February 1977. 
- Third conference in Qatar on 6-8 March 1978. 
- Fourth conference in Kuwait on 13-15 March 1979. 
Fifth conference in Oman in March 1980. 
Sixth conference in Bahrain in 1981. 
2. A follow-up Ministerial Committee including the Minister of 
Agriculture and Water resources of Saudi Arabia, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries wealth in the UAE and the Minister of Public 
Works responsible for Agriculture in Kuwait. 
The functions of this committee shall be as follows: 
- Follow-up and execution of the conference recommendations. 
- Selection of three persons constituting the general secretariat of 
the conference. Member countries shall be informed accordingly. 
- Preparation of rules and regulations of the General Secretariat of 
the conference. 
- Setting out of priorities for the execution and recommendations. 
3. The Secretariat General is composed of three main members from 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE, having a liaison officer from each 
participating country who is appointed by his country to represent in 
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the preparation for Conferences and to follow-up his country implementation 
of the Conferences' resolution. The headquarters for the general 
secretariat is in Riyadh. 
4. Technical Committees were established by the Conferences in the 
light of subjects to be studied. Four main committees were established 
to study and analyse activities relating to Agriculture, Fisheries, Water, 
Livestock with ad-hoc sub-committees established to cover special 
subjects within the main four fields. Generally speaking, these 
committees are in charge of studying common problems, prepare solutions, 
exploring cooperation opportunities and technical follow-up of 
Conference recommendations. 
The Saudi Government bears all necessary expenses of the General 
Secretariat and that of the technical committee meetings in its 
headquarters. 
5.4.3.6 Sub-regional Cooperation with U.N. on Fisheries: 
This topic is considered in some detail for three main reasons. 
First, the Survey and Development Project required joint action by the 
Gulf countries even before the formal Ministerial Conference was estab-
lished (see 5.4.3). Secondly, it provided an important catalyst for 
later discussions over cooperation. Lastly, as noted in Chapter 3, it 
concerns a sector in which cooperation appears most 'natural'. 
Two vital projects were established within the Gulf Sub-region in 
the field of fisheries development and were set up within a special 
institutional framework, earlier than and different from that of the Arab 
Ministers of Agriculture Conferences. The two project agreements 
following preparatory discussion between all Gulf States including Iraq 
and non-Arab Moslem Iran, were signed between these countries and FAO, 
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by which the latter was appointed as executive agency for the two fisheries 
projects, first a Regional Fishery Survey and Development project, 
second, a Sub-regional Fisheries Training Centre. 
Here we will examine the achievements of both projects. 
The Regional Fishery Survey and Development Project(32): 
The Gulf has abundant fish resources which could be economically 
beneficial to the countries in the Sub-region but decisions about 
investment in fisheries and the management of resources have so far 
lacked a basis of reliable information on the size of the stocks and their 
likely sustainable yield. Thus with assistance of UNDP and FAO 
coordination, the Arab Gulf States including Iraq in addition to Iran 
came into agreement to execute a project to study and survey the 
amount of fisheries wealth, its geographical nature, its protection 
and its exploitation feasibility. 
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On 9 .April 1975 the eight countries signed the agreement with FAO 
and UNDP. The main objectives of the project was stated as follows(33): 
To develop all sectors of the fishery industries of the 
participating countries to a level of efficiency which will allow them 
effectively and rationally to exploit and utilize the demersal and 
pelagic resources of the Gulf and adjacent waters. 
1. To achieve this purpose, the project is to conduct a survey of 
the fish resources in the project area, to identify the major pelagic 
and demersal fish resources, to determine the abundance of the stocks, 
their distribution and seasonal variation, and to estimate their 
potential annual yield. 
2. To give early assistance to the participating Governments on 
measures required for the management of the shrimp resources in the 
project area which, in some cases, have reached the level of optimum 
exploitation. 
3. In conjunction with the pelagic and demersal surveys, to carry out 
experimental and test fishing to identify the most suitable types of 
fish-finding and fish-catching equipment, and to estimate the probable 
initial catch rates (e.g. as tons/vessel/day) with such equipment. 
4. To advise, on the basis of the resource surveys and stock 
assessment studies, on the rational development of the fisheries of the 
area, so as to ensure that the capacity of the fleets and scale of 
industry development remains in balance with the resources and the 
dangers of over-exploitation are avoided. 
5. Within the period of the project and taking into account the 
assessment of survey, exploratory and other fishing data, to prepare 
development plans for all fishery industries sectors. 
Project Achievements: Resource Surveys; The two major 
programmes of the project were demersal trawl and pelagic surveys, and 
it was expected that they should be enough to fully evaluate the 
distribution, migration, density and abundance of resources. For the 
surveys the Gulf was divided into three main regions: Western Gulf Region 
which extends from the northern end of the Gulf to Qatar, Eastern Gulf 
Region from Qatar to the straits of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman Region 
from the Iran-Pakistan border to Ras Al-Hadd. The current catch from 
the marine fisheries of the project area was found below its 
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apparent potential (see Chapter 1). Apparently higher catches could be 
obtained if the resources were adequately exploited and managed. The 
development of these resources might follow two complementary approaches -
the better management of these resources which are already over-
exploited, (shrimp fisheries) and optimum use of those resources which 
are presently under-exploited, a situation existing mainly in the 
pelagic fisheries and to a more limited extent in some demersal 
fisheries. 
Fishery Industry Development Group: The second integrating 
contribution of the project related to industrial fisheries development 
which was the responsibility of a group consisting of five experts 
covering industrial fish processing, marketing, handling and preservation, 
and statistics. In summary, the group's work was as- follows: 
(a) Industry and Institutional surveys; (b) statistical surveys and 
programmes; (c) conduct of sectoral surveys to determine the present 
state and potential of development in the participating countries; 
(d) feasibility studies; (e) preparation of development plans and (f) 
techno-economic advisory services to Governments.(34) 
Project Assessment: Specifically, the project achieved the 
followJn~, in relation to national and Sub-regional development: 
(a) Assessment of biomass stocks of demersal, small and large pelagic 
resources. The project also referred to the potential commercial 
annual catch of fish and approaches to achieve that. 
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(b) Offering advice to the Governments relating to fishery development 
projects and policies, such as the Fisheries Development Company in 
Oman. 
(c) Proposing a regional Fisheries statistics system for the 
participating countries. 
However, we also must note the following deficiencies which 
appeared: 
(a) The restriction of the area of survey north and west of Ras El 
Hadd on the Gulf of Oman was mistaken since it ignored the other waters 
bordering Oman in the north Arabian sea, waters wealthy in both demersal 
as well as pelagic fish. This area is in fact the most wealthy in 
fisheries resources and consequently the whole assessment of fisheries 
resources for the participating countries was inadequate. 
(b) During the course of the project's operation not all the posts 
in the Industrial Development Group were filled, and this adversely 
affected the availability of much needed advice to participating 
Governments as well as other of the group responsibilities. 
(c) The participating countries felt that the project management did 
not, in some cases, choose experts qualified to propose r;;ound pragmatic 
development projects and policies. 
(d) FAO delayed in the appointment of project experts, and did not 
chocse the appropriate priorities in appointing others; it did not 
provide the necessary equipment for the operation of the vessels and 
experts. 
(e) Experts were recruited and arrived in the project area inter-
mittently: some posts were discontinued and others were cancelled. 
At any one time there were no more than three experts and then only for 
short periods. Consequently, the work plan of the group had to be 
adjusted as the activities progressed to suit the prevailing 
conditions.(35) 
(f) Participating Governments' responsibilities were, equally, not 
fUlfilled. Counterpart personnel from the Governments part were not, in 
most cases, available and if available they acted only as companions 
during visits of experts, thus making future contacts and follow-up 
activities not possible. Some member countries' delays in communication 
severely affected offers of group services; replies to information 
requests; timing of experts visits, etc.(36) Information which could 
not have been obtained during field visits but only from Government 
policy makers especially to prepare relevant development plans, were 
not provided by several member countries. The participating countries 
did not pay their financial contributions appropriately nor did they 
provide equipment such as survey vessels on schedule. 
(g) UNDP faced a financial crisis immediately after the signing of 
the project document and appeared not to be exerting enough effort 
in following up implementation (see section 5.4.3.~.(36) 
Altogether these problems postponed the termination date of the 
project by nine months, to December 1979, and severely limited the value 
of the results achieved. It is a necessary reminder that operations of 
this kind which are rarely completely successful even when only one 
developing country is involved become even more difficult in a multi-
n~onal situation. 
Sub-regional Fisheries Training Centre: 
Background: The annual fish production from the area covered by 
the Sub-regional Fisheries Centre is estimated to be near 150 thousand 
tons againstthe survey estimated potential of one million tons (see 
Chapters 1 and 3). It is apparent that one of the factors which limit 
the exploitation of these fishery resources is the lack of trained 
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fishery personnel. In factg most of the industrial fishing vessels 
operating in the region are manned by foreign crews.(37) 
Consequently, and based on recommendations made at the lOth and 
11th sessions of the FAO Near East Regional Conference for the creation 
of Regional Fisheries Training Projects, the AGS including Iraq and 
Iran requested the assistance of FAO in establishing one such centre 
in the Sub-region of the Gulf. The agreement establishing the Centre 
was signed in 1975, Kuwait offered to make available the appropriate 
facilities for the establishment of the proposed centre. 
The initial four-year duration of the project was to be financed 
by contributions from the participating countries amounting to a total 
of US ~ 2 0 325,700 with an additional contribution in kind made by the 
Government of Kuwait of US ~ 500,000. 
Table 5.1 
Distribution of Contributions to the Project 
Country Distribution (%) 
1. Bahrain 4.7 
2. Iran 16.7 
3. Iraq 16.7 
4. Kuwait 14.3 
5. Oman 7.0 
6. Qatar 9.6 
7. Saudi Arabia 16.7 
8. United Arab Emirates 14.7 
100 
---
Project Purpose and Objectives: The purpose of the project was 
to assist the participating countries in the rational and efficient 
development of their latent marine resources by training competent sea-
going operators and shore-based fishery personnel. 
To achieve this purpose, the project aimed at establishing (and 
operating during its initial years), a Fisheries Training Centre to 
train masters, mates and engine operators/mechanics required by the 
locally owned fleetsu as well as extension workers to improve the 
technological level of the existing artisanal fisheries. The project 
was at the same time to train national instructors and other personnel 
to assure the continued operation of the Centre after termination of 
assistance. Lastly, the project would grant fellowships to train 
administrators in various aspects of fisheries to provide this growing 
industry with appropriate local capabilities.(38) 
Project Achievements' Assessment: It was noted from the v0ry 
early meetings of the board of directors of the Centre that although 
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the Training Centre was a basic prerequisite for meeting the requirements 
of the region, and although the eight participating countries were 
apparently prepared to take a regional view, both of which to the FAO 
fully justified the project, the fact remained that there was no local 
capability to organize a Centre at a national level, nor the capacity 
to provide students in sufficient numbers and quality. The project 
in other words was based on hope and in fact was not planned well and 
proceeded without any feasibility study. 
The project began recruiting experts, assembling equipment and 
planning the curricula in September 1975. From that point onward the 
real problems emerged: 
(a) Problems related to planning: 
Many participating countries had difficulties in identifying 
students of suitable quality due to competing job opportunities, and the 
unattractiveness of the fisherman's lot. This became translated in 
a provision to accept students from either lesser endowed or non-Gulf Arab 
countries. 
The Centre's physical and teaching facilities were geared for a 
full strength of approximately 70 students per year (35 first year and 
35 second year trainees). It became apparent, however, that even 
at these low levels in the number of students, some of the participating 
countries were finding it difficult to attract sufficient numbers 
of qualified candidates for training. 
FAO evaluation mission doubted that "the flow of applications 
will continue at the present rates of national distribution to assure 
or even justify a permanent regional Centre such as the one envisaged 
in the project document".(39) See Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
Distribution of Trainees and Course 
Country Course 
Bahrain Mate 
Engine Operator 
Iran 
Iraq Mate 
Engine Operator 
Extension Worker 
Kuwait Mate 
Engine Operator 
Extension Worker 
Sultanate of Oman Engine Operator 
Extension Worker 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia Engine Operator 
United Arab Emirates Mate 
Extension Worker 
Palestine Engine Operator 
No. of Trainees 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Source: FAO. Report of the Evaluation Mission on Regional Projects 
Executed by.FAO in the Near East. Sub-regional Fisheries Training 
Centre. Kuwait, TEREM 11. GLE 1 Rome, July 1977. Appendix 2. 
(b) High financial costs per trainee: 
Even at the envisaged full capacity of the centre, costs per 
student were high comparative to other alternative'ways of training. 
This lead the FAO evaluation Mission to believe that "training in 
existing institutions within the Arab world or outside it may prove 
more economical".(40} 
(c) The unrealistic assessments by individual countries of their 
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actual needs with respect to training requirements in all segments 
of the fishery sector were reflected in the over-stringent entrance 
requirements stipulated by the project document. both in age and background. 
That limited the number of applications of potentially suitable students. 
This led the FAO Mission to recommend that:(41) 
"Greater flexibility be introduced in entrance 
requirements regarding age and background. In ·this 
respect a short period of sea-time prior to entrance, 
to ascertain availability and avoid pos.si ble attrition, 
would be appropriate." · 
However. reasonably high standards of selection should be main-
tained and, if adequate local candidates were not available, every 
effort should be made to attract students from other Arab countries or 
even to the admission of students from other developing countries, who 
would remain in the region to form part of a continuing fishing force. 
The Mission further recommended that: arrangements be completed 
to carry out short~term courses and seminars to train extension workers 
and fishermen in simple technologies. These short-term training 
activities would permit a more efficient use of the teaching staff and 
the excellent facilities particularly during the holiday period of 
students, and also increase the standards and improve the performance 
of existing fishery committees. 
(d) Language Problem: 
A serious language gap existed between some of the teaching staff 
and the students. It was mentioned in the board meetings that some of 
the trainees were unable to grasp a number of lectures which were 
taught in English. The problem was compounded by Iran's membership of 
the project. Iran envisaged providing interpreters (from Arabic into 
Persian) but at early stages interpretation was required in three 
languages. (42) 
Whilst the need arose for Arabic speaking instructors, the 
problem was to find Arab speaking technically competent teaching staff. 
(e) The lack of clarity in the definition of functions and 
responsibilities' limits of FAO, as the executive agenc~ contributed 
to a state of distrust between the participating countries, on one 
part and FAO on the other part. 
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As with the FAO/UNDP fisheries survey project, the Training Centre 
project's operation proved a salutory reminder that no development 
work is simple or easy but also, and more important,- that if the AGS 
were to successfully cooperate in development then much more careful 
and practical preparatory foundations had to be laid. To some extent, 
one result has been the greater acceptance by the GCC of the need for 
much preparatory work as shown in the organizational structure of 
its General Secretariat. 
5.4.4 Financial and Monetary Cooperation 
This section illustrates that financial and monetary cooperation 
which has been developed by AGS Sub-regional institutions, leaving 
consideration of financial and monetary cooperation within Regional 
Arab and Islamic institutions to later chapters. Here again it is not 
possible to survey in detail all sub-regional institutions which can 
only be exemplified by an examination of some of the key institutions 
in this field. The growing phenomenon of financial and monetary 
specialization within AGS is also examined. 
5.4.4.1 Financial Cooperation: 
Current financial cooperation has largely been directed through 
various types of financial assistance provided mainly from the richer 
Arab Gulf States (AGS) to the poorer countries, as well as country 
cooperation within the Arab and Islamic development funds. 
Bilateral Cooperation: 
Kuwait Gulf Aid: Kuwait, through its Gulf and South Arabian 
Authority has given funds to some of the Gulf States since the early 
1960's for the construction of hospitalsp clinics and schools, and this 
has become extended to the Yemens. This aid has taken the form of 
grants to finance human capital investment, but Kuwait has even paid 
for the operation of schools. 
It is thought that Kuwait has been using its oil revenues as a 
principal tool of its foreign policy, lacking as it does the physical 
power of, e.g. Saudi Arabia or Iraq. Kuwait sees as one of the major 
objectives of its foreign policy the neutralization of potential 
opposition through a systematic foreign assistance programme. Despite 
this view, the author believes that Kuwait's sense of regional and 
international responsibility has been a stronger element in motivation. 
Saudi-Omani Relations: Relatio~s between Oman and Saudi Arabia, 
which has been very strained since 1955p thawed in December 1971 when 
King Faysal invited the new §ultan Qaboos to visit Riyadh. In May 
1975p the Saudis, as a sign of goodwill offered to assist and ease 
Oman's financial crisis. It is probable that the geopolitical dangers 
perceived in the Dhofar War encouraged this change in attitude, which 
has been strengthened by more recent concern over the Straits of 
Hormuz and the Horn of Africa. The amount of Saudi aid had been reported 
to be at least 100 million U.S. dollars. 
5.4.4.2 Monetary Cooperation: 
Monetary cooperation has centred on joint banking institutions on 
bilateral and sub-regional bases, in addition to Sub-regional activities 
based on monetary authorities cooperation. Whilst bilateral cooperation 
has witnessed the creation of many joint banks and investment institutionsp 
the following section concentrates on Sub-regional based institutions 
and activities. 
Monetary 1\uthori.ties Cooperatjon: 
~:ince April 1978 when the first meeting of the exec uti. ves of the 
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monetary authorities of the Gulf countriesp including Iraqp was held 
in Abu Dhabi, they have continued to hold such meetings. General 
exchanges of view have concentrated on the following subjects: 
1. Common economic and financial problems of the Gulf countries as 
well as means of cooperation between these States. 
2. The question of the best currency denomination to be used in 
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foreign contracts made by the public sector. This matter was viewed 
in the light of profit margins that foreign contractors keep as a 
hedge against the fluctuation of foreign currencies in relation to the 
local currency, a factor which has tended to inflate the overall cost 
of contracts. The other issues connected to this topic relate to the 
monetaryp fiscal and exchange rate policy implications arising from 
the currency in which foreign contracts are denominated.(43) 
3. The formulation of a new definiti0n of foreign reserves that 
would give a true picture of the situation of Middle Eastern oil 
exporting countries. The IMF regards the role of foreign reserves as 
meeting the needs of the balance of payments. Gulf countries argue that 
this definition does not apply to themp given the special features of 
their economies. 
For the capital surplus Gulf countriesp foreign reserves are 
another source of investment. Moreoverp foreign reserves are also held 
for budgetary purposes. The committee came to the following breakdown 
of f9reign reserves. The first typep which is set aside for balance 
of payment purposep includes the value of total imports for one year plus 
a given proportion of recurrent expenditure of Government budgets and 
a given proportion of its capital expenditure. This satisfies the 
proposed definition for IMF purposes. The second type entails deferred 
expenditure which would decline as the absorptive capacity of the 
national economies increases. The third type takes into account assets 
earmarked for foreign investment as a subs·titute for or complementary 
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income to oil.(44) 
4. Issuance of common Gulf financial bulletin. The Gulf countries 
decided to issue a bi-annual bulletin to be published by the Central 
Bank of Kuwait, this to contain the most important statistical tables of each 
of the seven countries, in addition to new regulations and rules on 
monetary, financial and trade matters. It would contain studies, which 
could serve as a pool of an information on Gulf economics. 
Meetings also discussed such matters as the exchange of human 
skills between the Central Banks and Monetary Agencies of the Gulf 
countries as well as arrangements for courses and seminars. 
Gulf International Bank (GIB): 
Established in November 1975, this Bank commenced its operations in 
1976. The issued capital was put at BD 24m (i 60.8 mn), the 
authorised capital fixed at BD 100 million. 
Its activities include the provision of banking services and 
facilities to finance investments abroad by the private sector in the 
bank's member countries. It also operates as an international merchant 
bank with the objective of financing Gulf trade. 
Shareholders are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman 
and Iraq.(45) The following indicators illustrate the rapid 
development which has been achieved in Bank activities. 
Table 5.3 
GIB Development Indicators (in ~ thousand) 
Net Income 
Gross Revenue 
Interest Expense 
Other Expenses 
Shareholders' Equity 
Total Assets 
Loans 
Deposits 
For year ended 
31.12.80 
12,405 
295,140 
269,692 
13,043 
125,127 
b893,257 
1,130,401 
2,639,735 
Source: Euromoney, May 1981, London. 
For year ended 
31.12.79 
6,601 
115,668 
100,606 
8,461 
119,534 
1,444,947 
542,373 
1,245,585 
For year ended 
31.12. 78 
3.621 
50,290 
41,052 
5,617 
79,831 
769,186 
325,557 
680,245 
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5.4.4.3 Financial and Monetary Specialization: 
In broad terms, some financial experts find it reasonable to 
categorize Kuwait as an investment centre and Bahrain as a money market 
centre. 
Bahrain: is a money market centre with a wide range of banks 
represented in it, with properly equipped dealer rooms where money ru1d 
short term securities can be traded, denominated in a variety of major 
international and regional currencies. It is essentially a wholesale 
market to serve banks and other financial institutions rather than 
private individuals or even Governments. 
Bahrain with over 100 banks and financial institutions represented 
on the island, and an officially decreed status as an offshore-centre, 
seems well placed to play a money market role. Bahrain will probably 
be chosen the site for the proposed training centre for Middle East 
bankers, which is already needed despite the high quality training 
offered to Arab nationals at Citibank's Athens centre.(46) 
Bahrain's Advantages as a Money Market Centre: 
1. Bahrain's time zone position allows it to open for currency dealing 
after Singapor{f;_, the nearest money market to the east, cloE.es, and 
befc.re the European money markets open. Since the era of floating 
currencies began in the early 1970's, Bahrain helped in completing the 
circle of money centres that runs fromLondonto New York, San Francisco, 
Tokyo, Singapore and finally via Bahrain round to Europe, in addition 
to opening on Saturday and Sunday.(47) 
2. Bahrain is also fortunate in being in the same time zone as Saudi 
Arabia, as much of its financial business originates there. Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi, its main potential rivals, are one hour ahead of Riyadh's 
time, a distinct disadvantage. 
3. Bahrain is a much better base for foreign exchange business than 
Beirut ever was even in its heyday, qs there is q complete absence of 
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exchange control 0 not only on the island, but in all the adjacent oil 
exporting States of the Gulf 0 Hence trrulsactions can be conducted with 
speed and efficiency. 
It is worth noting that Bahrain has become the location of 
several Regional banking institutions. One of the greatest banking 
coups for Bahrain was to be chosen as the headquarters for the massively 
funded Arab Banking Corporation, (ABC) which was established in 1980 
with an authorized capital of $ 1 billion of which $ 375 was paid up 
immediately. This inter-Governmental joint venture, o·1med by Kuwait, 
the UAE, and Libya had plans to have 150 staff in Bahrain by early 
1982. (48) 
Kuwait: has the pre-requisitefor an investment centre, a 
developed bond market where shares are traded, as well as ancillary 
institutions. 
From modest beginnings in the early 1970's when the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry assisted the formation of a small stock market on 
which a few local stocks were floated, Kuwait has now emerged as the 
leading stock exchange centre for the entire Middle East. This is 
perhaps not surprising in view of the large number of wealthy middle-
class families and the high level of financial awareness already achieved. 
Even before the Kuwaiti market was formed many Kuwaitis invested in 
the London market and gained much valuable experience.(49) 
By 1980 Kuwait's stock market had become the eighth largest in 
the world in turnover terms with some 18 0 000 people owning shares. The 
total market capitalization of companies traded on the stock exchange 
was 4.5 billion dinars, and the daily turnover frequently approached 
50 million dinars. This extremely high daily turnover in relation to 
the size of companies quoted reflects the buoyancy of trading activity 
and the keen interest in buying and selling.(50) 
Chapter 14 on Money and Investment Cooperation within a trilateral 
approach contains further case study analysis. 
5.4.5 Cooperation on Environment Pollution Issues 
One of the most attractive activities that began to receive 
Sub-regional and Regional interest during the 1970's is the problem 
of environmental pollutionp arising from the development of coastal 
areas in the countries surrounding the Arab Gulfp tn1ilinly associated with 
the huge petroleum and gas-based industrial projects. 
The United Nations, through an environment programme (UNEP) made 
a general evaluation of development projects and activities relating 
the coastal areas of all eight countries surrounding the Gulf in 1976 
and studying their effects on pollution. In the light of the U.N.· 
mission proposalsp expert groups held many meetings in Kuwait in 
preparation for a conference held in Kuwait on 15-24 April 1978. This 
conference represented the first institutional and legal steps reflecting 
the countries' interest in cooperation to face the problems. In addition 
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to the six AGS countries considered here Iraq and Iran also participated.(51) 
In response to resolutions of UNESCO in the early 1970's there 
has been established a comprehensive system-wide programme under UNEP 
coordination to foster a cooperative approach to the opportunities and 
problems presented by the exploitation of marine and coastal resources 
and the use of coastal areas.(52) This system-wide programme was given 
impetus and support because the countries bordering the Arabian Gulf 
had expressed deep concern for common action to protect the marine 
environment from oil spills and other forms of pollution.(53) 
Here we examine the basic environmental effects of on-going 
development of coastal areas on pollution and environment, and the action 
which was taken in Kuwait by the participating countries. 
5.4.5.1 Development Activities - Physical Setting: 
The geographical extent of the designated regionp comprises not 
only the Arab Gulf but the entire coastline and nearshore of Oman in the 
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Gulf of Oman. The area west of the Straits of Hormuz however, is the 
most sensitive to pollution and subject to the most intense development, 
and is the focus of the U.N. programme.(54) 
This region is witnessing the world's most rapid industrial 
development (U.N. expert team report 1967). Four of the countries 
concerned have an almost complete coastal orientation - Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, UAE- and while the other two,Saudi Arabia, Oman- have major 
development centres elsewhere, they too are heavily committed to major 
coastal development. 
"These countries in the short period from 5-20 years, 
are in the midst of coastal industrialization and 
urbanization comparable to that which required more than 
a century in Europe and North America."(55) 
Investments on the Arabian coast from Ras-al-Khaimah to the Shatt-
al-Arab, including Abu Dhabi and Bahrain Island, may reach US ~ 40 
million per km, while, on the Iranian coast, US ~ 20 million per km 
was projected.(56) Extensive coastal development activities, including 
dredging of shipping lanes, harbours, harbour construction, heavy 
industries and commercial areas on coastal landfill, are underway. 
Vigorous programmes of industrial diversification in most countries 
are the fastest and most concentrated in the world involving such 
potentially heavy-polluting industries such as fertilizers, cement, 
steel products, plastic and various industrial chemicals.(57) 
The physical reason for industrial concentration here are stronger 
than almost anywhere else: the large-scale agglomeration of petroleum 
and other large fuel processing and consuming industries is needed at 
the source of the petroleum; deep water harbours and channels are 
possible at only a few favourable locations; the large-scale need for 
water desalination and electrification plants at certain points along 
the coast; the concentration of housing and public facilities in the 
Sllme ureau; the absence of any widespread agricultural h.inLerland or 
other population-supporting resources. 
These factors combine to produce extreme pressure on limited 
resources and severe pollution vulnerability for marine and coastal 
environment. What worsens the situation is the shallow and relatively 
slowly circulating sea, which together with prevalent air temperature 
inversions, constitute a relatively poor pollution absorbing or 
diluting environment.(58) 
Oil spill risk is particularly high. According to calculations 
made by Hayes and~lndlach in 1977 and presented at the Kuwait 
conference, the greatest volume of oil spilled into the Gulf (86% of 
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the total) is the direct result of tanker transport. Offshore production 
and natural seeps make up the majority of the remaining losses, while 
the discharge of oil by coastal oil refineries and through waste water 
is estimated to be less than 0.1% of the total. 
Taking a 5% annual increase in oil production over the next ten 
years, Hayes and Grundlach calculated that the annual spillage rate 
could rise to nearly 3 million tons of oil, depending upon a variety 
of disposal processes and oceanographic and meteorological conditions. 
Although as much as one-third of the oil will evaporate and some will 
sink, most will float on the surface for many days. Waves may have 
some effect on the dispersal of the oil but high seas are uncommon in the 
Gulf. Weather da.ta shows a dominance of north-west winds in all but the 
eastern most sections which would tend to push any oil spilled in a 
general south easterly direction, i.e. along the long axis of the Gulf 
and towards UAE shores.(S9) 
5.4.5.2 Pollution and Fisheries: 
Fishing activities have always been important in the region, as 
noted earlier. Although there has been a slow down of shrimping 
activity in the Gulf, following the over exploitation by commercial 
companies in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, there remains an 
interest in developing new methods of shrimps exploitation. In 
addition, if we add Oman with its abundant resources (Chapter 1) to 
the Gulf proper, then the significance of oil pollution becomes obvious. 
Neuman summarized the issue as follows: 
"The conclusion is clear that oil spills have an 
enormous potential for causing extensive damage to 
extremely vulnerable and valuable coastal and marine 
environments from Kuwait to the UAE."(60) 
Administration and Legislation Base: 
Of the eight countries concerned, Iran and Kuwait have independent 
environmental departments empowered to handle all different aspects of 
environmental problems. Yet, environmental coordination between the 
various Governmental branches is less than fully successful, and overall 
environmental management remains, in many cases, ineffective. 
In the other countries, environmental responsibilities may be 
ineffectively divided among many agencies, or are not assigned at all. 
The UN mission noted that: 
"Most mar:i.ne phenomena are essentially regional. If 
cooperation between various national organizations and 
neighbouring countries be brought about through regional 
activities, the complex problems of marine environmental 
management could be brought under control."(61) 
In several countries little or no national legislation exists for 
the control of the environment, either coastal or marine. Where the 
control exists, it is often an ad hoc response of doubtful continuity. 
Some pertinent articles may be found in fisheries laws and in 
legislation controlling the activities of certain industries. Oil 
pollution laws have been formulated in a few countries, however, their 
enforcement is weak in terms of marine scientific data and regional 
monitoring mechanisms. 
The coastal ~reas within the project region are in a rapid stage 
of development with major changes in land use and sea use occurring. 
Disposal of waste from many sources has often ignored ecological 
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conditions, and now the serious nature of the pollution is beginning to 
be recognized. 
"Too little is known about the basic ecological and 
physical characteristics oftfegion and too 
little attention is being given to the prevention of 
ecological damage. If this continues, many plant and 
animal communities will be negatively affected."(62) 
The Information Base: 
Information pertaining to physical and biological sciences varies 
greatly from one country to another. The six States can be divided 
into the following two groups: 
- States with ~eparate environmental agencies (Kuwait and United Arab 
Emirates), whe~e some environmental data have been systematically 
collected. 
- States which divide environmental responsibility among various 
ministries and agencies (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) where 
data collected are usually patchy, dispersed, and/or inaccessible. 
In no country is the knowledge of coastal and 111arine environment 
sufficient for the development of effective coastal planning and 
management programmes. The serious lack of environmental information is 
not due to any lack of interest, but rather to the lack of adequate 
research facilities, particularly the serious shortage of scientists 
and trained technicians. Few of the countries have marine science 
programmes. marine scientists or marine ecologists. 
There is a need for more specific quantitative data in order to 
demonstrate the effects of marine and coastal pollution. although there 
is already enough subjective evidence of pollution in the vicinity of 
centres of high population density and industry. Bearing in mind that 
a polluted area may be improved but never completely returned to its 
natural state. existing relatively undisturbed areas should be identified 
at pnce and carefully monitored. This means the protection of marine 
ecoayutemu nlong some population-accussibJe stretches of the coast. 
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These would be of great importance, providing not only healthy resort 
areas demanded by modern societies, but would also serve as baseline 
areas for research, monitoring and early warning of marine environmental 
problems. 
5.4.5.3 Kuwait Action Plan: 
The countries of the region genera~ly recognize the development 
of their coastal areas must be accompanied by efforts to protect coastal 
and marine environments. The principal concern is undoubtedly the 
threat of massive oil spills and this was addressed as a priority item 
in the Kuwait Action Plan developed in close consultation between 
the U.N. and the eight countries over a period of more than three 
years. (63) 
The first component of the Kuwait Action Plan was an assessment 
of the current state of the environment including socio-economic 
development related to environmental quality. The second component 
aimed at developing guide-lines for the management of those activities 
which have an impact on environment quality and the use of renewable 
marine resources on a sustainable basis. 
The component which provided the legal basis for cooperative 
efforts to protect and develop the region included the Kuwait Regional 
Convention for Cooperation in the Protection of the Marine Environment 
from Pollution 8 and the associated Protocol concerning Regional 
Cooperation in Combating Pollution by oir and other Harmful Substances 
in Cases of Emergencyv which provided for the establishment of the 
Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre.(64) 
The Kuwait Convention(65) contains thirty articles covering 
general obligations to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the 
marine environment, resulting from land-based and sea-based sources; 
cooperation in dealing with pollution emergencies; liability and 
compensation; and the establishment of a Regional Organization for the 
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protection of the marine environment to be located in Kuwait. This 
Organization consists of a Council which should convene annually, a 
secretariat to service the Organization and a Judicial Commission for the 
settlement of disputes. 
The protocol calls on the participating countries to cooperate 
in taking necessary and effective measures to protect the-coastline--
from the threat and effects of pollution due to oil or other harmful 
substances resulting from marine emergencies in the Sea Area which 
includes ports, harbours, bays and lagoons. It also provides for the 
establishment of the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre which will have 
primarily a coordinating role in exchange of information, training 
programmes and monitoring and which will also assist in the preparation 
of laws and regulations and the design of marine emergency contingency 
plans. 
Each Contracting State agrees to require all appropriate officials 
to report the existence of any marine emergency to the national 
authorities who will, in turn, inform the Emergency Mutual Aid Centre, 
all other Contracting States and the flag or state of any foreign ship 
involved in the marine emergency concerned. The parties to the 
protocol further agreed to assist one another in responding to 
emergencies. 
5.5 Current Development Cooperation - Analysis and Conclusions 
It is important to note at the beginning that despite the fact 
+lte . 
thatijoint de~elopment cooperation movement within the Arab Gulf circle 
actually began in the early seventies on~bilateral as well as on 
multilateral basis, there is very little factual basis on which an adequate 
analysis can be carried out with respect to the efficiency of existing 
cooperation. However, there can be identified some general trends 
which highlight, to some extent, the nature of the movement towards 
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cooperation. 
The current movement towards development cooperation among the 
Arab Gulf States can be described as designed with ambitious and 
attractive objectives of a type that characterized most Third World 
movements towards economic cooperation and integration in the period 
after these countries - including the Arab cou.ntl'ies - won their 
independence. However, very modest achievements have been realized. 
The generally unrealistic approach is reflected particularly in 
the many bilatermiagreements, letters of intent and statements of 
cooperation which prevailed among the Gulf States. Most of these 
agreements had very modest achievements, largely because of the nature 
of the most common stated objectives, e.g. 
- free movement of capital and labour, 
customs abolition, 
equal treatment of citizens, 
joint projects. 
We may note that these are mostly derived from concepts associated 
with the ideal of a Sub-regional Common Market. The same ambitious 
tendency towards creating a Gulf Common Market, based on joint projects, 
monetary unification, free movement for factors of production, etc. 
dominated the multinational agreement as we see in the statement of 
the first conference of Trade Ministers in 1976. Similarly, the first 
conference of Ministers of Agriculture had on its agenaa equally amoitious 
objectives, including the production of equipment used in the atomic-
energy based desalination plants, and joint ventures in atomic based 
desalination plants. 
The setting up of conference-type institutions, organizations and 
committee::; for cooperation is another noticeable trend in the cooperation 
movement of the 1970's, but very little action was taken to establish 
continuity, operational and follow-up capability. Similarly the 
identification of precise patterns towards which the community should 
be moving, was never effectively carried out. The special importance 
of designing and creating the right machinery for cooperation geared 
toward practical activities relevant to planned specific objectives, 
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was never appreciated. Some proposals for economic cooperation 
agreements were turned down because the proposals did not offer balanced 
benefits.(66) It is also notable that not only were the proposed free 
trade arrangements inconsequential in view of the limited range of 
domestic products which can be exchanged among the States, the joint 
committees concerned have not affected Government strategies. 
Of the results which appeared from the conferences of Ministers 
(Industry, Trade, Agriculture and Planning) that started in 1976, the 
Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy, and the GCC can be 
considered to be the only genuine advances towards effective development 
cooperation. 
Sectoral Achievements: 
Agriculture: 
The basic achievements in agricultural regional cooperation 
included agreements to establish joint research and training centres, 
desalination and power plants, and a joint satellite station for resource 
survey. Although the fourth Ministers' conference began to give 
special attention to joint productive projects beginning with cereal 
production and animal fooder, no fundamental studies were made for possible 
joint productive projects and priorities. 
Fisheries: 
The Ministers' conference succeeded in establishing a regional 
research centre in Dubai and in promoting a Regional Survey and 
Development project for building up a statistical system for the AGS. 
This project, for all its defects provided useful information on 
fisheries and marine resources in addition to submitting proposals for 
fisheries development, on a national as well as a regional basis. 
The Sub-regional Fisheries Training Centre, set up in 
cooperation with FA0(67) although providing a potentially useful 
institution for training staff needed for fisheries development in 
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the AGS, proved, in the short term at least to offer not a good prospect 
for cooperation with FAu. 
Industry: 
The creation of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy 
seems to provide the right institutional body for Industrial cooperation. 
Its seeds of success appeared with the signing of agreements establishing 
many joint industrial projects. However, the following fact needs 
emphasising. 
As each one of the AGS gained its full independence, it went its 
own way to develop its economy through building up economic infra-
structure and planning development and industrial projects without 
giving any attention to neighbouring countries' plans. The consequent 
parallel directions of industrial development which prevailed raises 
some doubt about the extent of the industrial activities that remain open 
for cooperation. However, the AGS seem to be convinced now of the 
feasibility of cooperation in and the coordination of new projects, 
whilst, at the same time, in relation to plants already built or to 
which the AGS are committed, planning collaboration in: 
- coordinating production policies and raw materials supply, 
- coordinating training and research activities, 
- coordinating market activities. 
Planning: 
Cooperation between Planning Ministries 8 which began in 1979, is 
on a very modest basis, leaving it open to each country voluntarily to 
inform any or all other AGS of any possibilities of cooperation in 
national development projects. 
Monetary Cooperation: 
In the light of the failure of previous attempts to coordinate 
exchange rate system$~ particularly between Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, 
in addition to Saudi experience with freeing the use of its national 
currency within the Gulf area, both in the late 1960's, the 
executives of Central Banks and Monetary Agencies began periodic meetings 
in 1978 for discussing and consulting over common monetary problems 
and policies. Proposals have been repeated from time to time inviting 
AGS to establish a Gulf Monetary Union, a Gulf Common Currency or 
Gulf Monetary Area. 
Pollution and Environmental Protection: 
This field of cooperation seems to be of urgent importance, given 
the existing and growing dangers of environmental damage resulting from 
development activities. It has proved also, the vital importance of 
U.N. inputs into the cooperation process. 
Throughout the period and behind the activities surveyed up to 
this point~ one problem in the way of cooperation has become apparent 
to close observers. The small size of AGS populations, coupled with 
the variation in oil wealth within them makes it possible for almost 
every citizen of each State to have a personal stake in the prevailing 
situation. Thus everybody becomes more interested in maintaining the 
benefits and opportunities within each State, and opposed to any real 
economic or political integration with other neighbours, for fear of 
losing some perceived advantage. 
"This opposition is common to virtually every citizen in 
the AGS, from the members of the ruling families down 
to the merchants and most of the ordinary citizens though 
of course, it differs in strength according to the 
interest of each particular group."(68) 
This force running counter to integration and raising suspicions 
evnn of I'IH>per::1Liun r;armot be menuured or quantifir.:d and i:; ru~vr:r 
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publicly stated. One form which it takes is that of the border disputes 
which remain a positive hindrance to some development of cooperation 
between Arab Gulf States. Despite the announcement from time to time, 
for examplep of successful talks to end disputes between Qatar and 
Bahrain over the Howar Island and the border delineation between Oman 
and UAEP the border disputes remain a problem to development, directly 
as with resource exploitation or communications, indirectly through 
reinforcing jealousies over sovereignty. 
All that can be said here is that to participants who are not 
directly partisanp the strength of separatist feeling appears remarkably 
strong even though almost invariably either expressed obliquely or 
off the record. 
Summary: 
There are clearly some signs of growing Sub-regional cooperation 
in various development activities. However, the ship of cooperation 
is still sailing in rough seas, subject to storms that could weaken its 
chances for a successful voyage. Above all what is needed is the right 
approach to jointly agreed destinations, i.e. objectives. But before 
considering these we should stand back to examine and evaluate the 
need for a continuing cooperative voyage and attempt to estimate how 
long it will take. In particular, it becomes necessary to widen the 
scale of this survey and place the movements already discussed in a 
broader context, first that of the Arab Regional scene. As we shall 
seep many of the constraints and opportunities for cooperation within 
the AGS circle become significantly changed when we enlarge the setting 
for development. 
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CHAPTER 6 - AGS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITHIN THE REGIONAL CIRCLE 
6.1 Introduction 
AGS have been playing an active role and constitute an integrative 
part in the recent development cooperation movement within the Arab 
Region. Their contributions have ranged from particular sectoral 
development activities in the fields of financial, banking and oil 
and gas related activities, to comprehensive political, economic and 
social activities, mainly under the aegis of the Arab League. 
The result is that any examination of the strategy for and approach 
to development cooperation between the AGS necessitates also identifying 
the current situation with respect to cooperation within the larger 
regional circle. We therefore have to examine the relationship between 
the AGS and Arab regional cooperation in terms of cooperative machinery 
and related joint projects and activities, in addition to making a 
general assessment of the effectiveness of this machinery and of 
achievements and identifying the lessons to be derived from recent 
experience. To ignore such inter-related Sub-regional and Regional 
cooperative activities when studying AGS development cooperation can be 
most misleading. 
Cooperation within the Arab Region has appeared in many forms but 
the most important have centred around;recent OAPEC joint development 
projects; financial cooperation through joint development funds and 
banks; institutional forms reflected in the Arab Economic Unity Council 
and the related proposed Arab Common Market decision; and other regional 
sectoral development institutions and organisations under the auspices 
of the Arab league - such as the Arab Organisation for Agricultural 
Development, Arab Industrial Development Centre, etc. 
In this chapter most concentration will be directed to the most 
successful forms of cooperation in which AGS haa~played an important role 
and made basic contributions. These are OAPEC joint projects and 
financial cooperation within joint development funds and banks. 
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However, some examination and evaluation of the Arab Economic Unity 
Agreement and the related Arab Common Market will also be made in order 
to illustrate broader aspects of economic cooperation. 
The term Region, while used here to mean, basically the Arab 
countries and members of the Arab league, occasionally has to be extended 
for purposes of analysis to include other parts of the Islamic world. 
6.2 fartial Development Cooperation 
6.2.1 OAPEC Joint Projects 
OAPEC includes all the Arab Gulf States (excluding Oman) as well as 
Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Syria, all countries in which petroleum 
constitutes an important source of national income. Established on 
9 January 1968, OAPEC initiated the first institutionalized Arab Cooper-
ation in petroleum affairs. 
Arab equity joint ventures present on the whole a recent phenomenon. 
Despite repeated discussions among Arab economists and politicians 
since the early fifties on the relevance and importance of establishing 
such ventures for the strengthening of Arab economic integration, little 
was done before 1973.(1) 
The tendency towards investing surplus Arab funds outside the Arab 
region began to be reversed in the nineteen seventies especially after 
the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the growth of some aspects of 
political solidarity and the great increase in oil prices which followed. 
The volume of net assets accumulating in the Arab oil-exporting countries 
increased to an extent where a new complementarity of interests emerged 
between these ~ountries and the other Arab countries perceived to have 
large absorptive capacities for profitable investment. It also became 
politically inevitable that the former countries should invest an increased 
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portion of their assets in other "sister" Arab countries. 
The sector first to benefit from this new trend was the financial 
sector. The second sector where immediate Arab joint action was 
possible was the petroleum industry.(2) 
The utilization of the common resources and capabilities of OAPEC 
member States in the establishment of joint ventures is one significant 
means to achieve the main objectives of the organization as set out in 
its Agreement. During the decade of the '70s OAPEC. sponsored four joint 
ventures in the Arab petroleum industry. These projects have started 
bearing fruit in the development of the member States resources and in 
supporting joint Arab action; a fifth project was established in 1981 
and others are in the study or research phase (see below). 
The future of the Organization and the joint venture Companies 
have been reviewed in the light of OAPEC's objectives, revealing many 
opportunities for coordination between the Organization's activities and 
regional projects, including information exchange, joint efforts in 
solving the problems encountered by the oil industry and training 
activities in the member States.(3) 
We examine below the four currently operating OAPEC joint projects, 
the first of which was established before the Arab-Israeli War of 
October 1973. 
6.2.1.1 Arab Maritime Petroleum Company (AMPTC): 
Established on 6 January 1973; headquarters in Kuwait; activities 
include marine oil and hydrocarbon transport. Participating countries 
include, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Algere, Iraq, 
Libya, Egypt. 
Subsequent to two increases in AMPTC's subscribed capital in 
1976 and 1977, both the subscribed and authorized capital were fixed at 
3500 million, at the end of 1980; paid up capital was i459.4 million. 
The Arab oil fleet as a whole now totals approximately 11 million 
dwt 1 compared with a world total tonnage of 312 million dwt. Even at 
full operational capacity, the Arab fleet can handle no more than 8% of 
Arab oil exports, which recently averaged 17 million b/d, despite the 
large relative increase in Arab tonnage between mid-1976 and mid-
1977. (4) 
AMPTC operates a fleet of 7 tankers totalling L 7 million dwt. 
It has ordered two LPG carriers of 75,000 cu.m. each from the French 
yard Chantiers de !'Atlantique, and is also considering buying 2 
crude oil carriers of 200,000 to 300,000 dwt and 2 refined products 
carriers of 30,000 to 35,000 dwt.(5) 
AMPTC continues to send trainees to Arab and foreign maritime 
academies. Also a computer 
to meet various AMPTC needs. 
was installed and operational in 1978 
The Company is discussing with the member States the possibility 
of future development and expansion of its fleet to include other 
petroleum and hydrocarbon carriers~ and has been studying a five-year 
(1978-82) investment plan. 
6.2.1.2 Arab Ship-Building and Repair Yard Company (ASRY): 
The decision was taken by OAPEC to establish the Arab ship-
building and Repair Yard (ASRY) in June 1973. The shareholders are 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait from AGS and Iraq, Egypt, 
Libya. The main activities of the company include ship-building 
providing dry docking and repair services Tori crude carriers of up to 
375,000 dwt with the possibility of future expansion to service crude 
carriers of up to 500,000 dwt. 
On 15 December 1977 1 the ~200 million dry dock of the Arab ship-
building and Repair Yard Company (ASRY) was inaugurated by the Amir of 
Bahrain, i.n a curemony co-sponsored by ttw Government of Bahrain and 
OAPEC. The ASHY dry dock, dimensions 375 m x 57 m and which was 
successfully completed on schedule, represents an important link in the 
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integrated oii industry, as well as an instance of actual entry into 
downstream operation. 
ASRY has established a wide network of marketing agents and is 
investigating the economic feasibility of a number of projects required 
for the integration of the dry dock's tanker and maintenance and repair 
services. Most important is the incorporation of a subsidiary company-
to handle the repair and maintenance of tanker propellers (ASHYPHOPEL) 
and another company to handle we_lding works (ASRYWELD). 
Ship-building is highly labour intensive and the project could 
provide employment to 2500-3000 workers. The bulk of managerial and 
skilled personnel will initially be foreign 0 but ASHY approved a i10 
million training programme to train and Arabize top and middle-level 
management over the next ten years and opened its new training centre, 
at the dry dock site. The centre which can train up to 450 skilled 
workers at a time, comprises classrooms, an English language laboratory 
and modern equipped workshops. In 1977, 250 trainees enrolled in the 
centre's new training programme, consisting of 46 courses. 
The ASHY General Assembly decided at an extraordinary meeting 
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held in Bahrain on 23 July 1977 to raise the company's subscribed capital 
to i340 million.(6) 
ASHY's contribution as a source of technology, training and skill 
is incalculable, and is likely to grow.{7) Moreover; ASHY reached 94% 
of actual operating ca. pacity during its first year of operations. 
The company's board chairman, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman bin Mohammed Al 
Khalifa who made this statement in the OAPEC Bulletin(8) added that new 
docks do not usually operate at such high capacity. ASHY's success, he 
stated was due to its accomplished record of repair work the high technical 
expertise and international reputation of Lisnave, the consultant 
company, the company's operating manager and the aggressive salesmanship 
of ASHY's marketing arm, ASHYMAH. 
On the question of profit making in the light of then current 
market conditions, Sheikh Khalifa significantly pointed out that a 
resolution approved by the OAPEC Ministerial Council in June 1973 under-
lined that the dry dock project had an Arab national ethos and OAPEC 
member States were mindful that the project would not bring in a large 
return in the commercial sense. Although investment alternatives which 
could guarantee a higher return were available. OAPEC States opted 
for the dry dock project, on the basis that it is a national necessity 
with their plans for establishing downstream industries. 
In the same keynote statement Shaikh Khalifa referred to the 
ambitious training programme started by ASRY in 1975 for Arabizing 90% 
of the staff by 1987, and costing the company about ~2 million a year. 
ASHY's manpower, in 1978 numbered 1100-1200, of whom 43% were Arab 
nationals; Arab nationals accounted for 25% of the technical staff. 
It will clearly be several years before one can say categorically 
whether the experiment is profitable. In the meantime ASRY has 
provided severe competition, particularly during the recession, for the 
neighbouring and rival independent Dubai dry dock completed in 1980. 
The company's authorized and subscribed capital of ~340 million 
was fully paid up in late 1980. 
6.2.1.3 Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (APICORP): 
Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation: Issues and Loans, APICORP 
was established in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. on 23 Nove-mber--1975 with a· 
subscribed capital of SR 1,200 million (approximately ~340 million). 
Following its establishment, APICORP took preliminary steps to 
define its financial policies, set up an organization chart, create the 
technical and administrative staff organization, initiate local regional 
and international liaison with financj al i nnti tu tlons, define and assesf.: 
investment opportunities, and utilize such opportunities within its 
developing capabilities. 
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APICORP objectives aim at financing petroleum projects and 
industries as well as other activities affiliated to, ancilliary with, 
or integrated with such projects and industries. Priority will be 
given to joint projects within the member States, then to the other 
Arab States, in order to enhance their capabilities toward benefitting 
from their petroleum resources and investing their earnings to- support 
their economic and financial potentials. 
APICORP has participated in the following bond issues and loans: 
- SR 7 million contribution to SR 100 million issue for the Samir 
refinery in Morocco. 
- SR 16 million contribution to SR 150 million issue for the Compagnie 
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation (CNAN). 
- US ~20 million contribution to ~100 million loan to CNAN. The loan 
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will be used to advance the initial payments against the purchase of three 
gas carriers of 125,000 cu. m. each. 
- US ~16 million contribution to US ~350 million loan to Qatar General 
Petroleum Organization for its LNG project. 
- US ~7 million contribution to US ~100 million loan to Jordan Petroleum 
Refinery Company to finance the third expansion project. 
- US ~15 million contribution to US ~100 million to Sonatrach to help 
finance the additional cost 0f the Arzew LNG plant. APICORP is presently 
considering possible financing or participation in a number of Arab 
petroleum and petrochemical projects.(9) 
The company also participated in financing the Arab Drilling Company, 
which is one of the Arab joint ventures of the Arab Petroleum Services 
Company (see below). Arab joint ventures being implemented or planned 
are in the fields of chemical detergents, drilling rigs, lube oils, 
synthetic rubber, and carbon black. Other ventures still in the 
planning stage are for synthetic fibres, insecticide&, and petroleum 
coke. The aim of these ventures is to provide regularly and at reasonable 
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prices the major intermediate chemicals required by Arab industry. 
Surplus production would be exported to neighbouring and other 
countries.{10) 
The corporation 1 s overall revenues in 1979 we.re SR 119 million, 
which was 32.2% more than in 1978. With operational costs and overhead 
deducted, the corporation realized ahet prOfit in 1979 of SR 95.3 
million, a 52% gain over 1978.(11) 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, participate in 
this company in addition to other Arab countries. 
6.2.1.4 Arab Petroleum Services Company {APSC): 
The OAPEC Ministerial Council held a meeting in Tripoli, Socialist 
Peopie•s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 8 January 1977 in its capacity as 
APSC's Constituent General Assembly, and announced the final incorporation 
of the company and the composition of its Board of Directors. APSC is 
domiciled in Tripoli and h~s an authorized capital. of LD 100 million 
and a s~bscribed capital of LD 15 million. 
During the first year efforts were mainly devoted to discussing 
and following up the company's activities, statutes .and organization. 
In setting priorities for APSC's investment activities, APSC has shown 
the utmost concern for drilling operations. 
The APSC Board and General Assembly held two meetings for this 
purpose on 16 and 18 October 1977 respectively, during which the 
incorpcration of the company's first subsidiary, the Arab Drilling Company, 
was discussed and approved. This company's activities are to centre 
on drilling oil gas and wells and associated services. It will be 
domiciled in Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and will be initially 
capitalized at LD 10 million. 
APSC is a holding company and as such can set up subsidiaries 
specialized in petroleum services particularly for drilling and well-
t~st~ng, core anal~sis 1 computer appli~~tion iQ petroleum operat~ons 
studies on reservoir engineering and petroleum geology, offshore and 
onshore petroleum facilities and structureD topographical surveys, 
various geophysical activities, and supply of materials and equipment 
required for petroleum services.(12) 
The countries which participate in the company include Saudi 
Arabiap Kuwaitp Qatar, Bahrain and Iraq, Algere, Libya, Egypt, Syria. 
6.2.1.5 OAPEC 5-Year Plan: 
Heralding a new stage for joint Arab effort in the. oil sector, 
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the Organization has laid down a working plan which spells out guide-
lines for its main course of activities over the period 1978 to 1983.(D) 
The plan envisages: 
1. The establishment of joint production projects such as lubricating 
oils, carbon black, detergents and synthetic rubber, all of which require 
both economics of scale and an integrated Arab market. 
2. The achievement of full cooperation between and coordination of 
national projects through the exchange of information and documentation, 
the organization of specialized seminars, the utilization of common 
expertise for solving problems in the oil industryp as well as the 
intensification of cooperation in training and manpower development. 
3. The establishment of joint activities for the benefit of the member 
countries in the fields of information, international relations, energy 
research, optimal utilization of hydrocarbotlt;, and exploration studies. 
OAPEC has been studying constructing a dry dock for ship repair and 
maintenance iri one of the member States situated on the Mediterranean 
coastline. Algeria is decided to be the project's location. Solid 
grounds are laid in the plan for ensuring the success of joint activities 
in refining and petrochemical industries. 
In taking this step, OAPEC proceeded from its awareness of the 
need for enhancing the abilit~ of joint Arab offprt to reaLize t;h(; 
common 1lilfiS of 01ernber countr~f:l!=l~ g 4l!:lq c4"le 11t ~ crit~cu~ ~l•mct~rC! 
in the development of the Arab oil industry, at which the producing 
countries, through their acquisition of oil companies assets, have to 
themselves shoulder most of the burden for the development of their 
natural resources in an industry that is highly capital intensive and 
subject to never~ceasing technological change. 
"Tlie- gra:vi ty -6f the shortage of- techrifcai expertise 
hence emerges in full force ••• The urgent need for 
corrunon and integrated effort among the member countries 
is all the more emphasiized by the industrialized 
countries monopoly of technology and know how and their 
power of imposing prejudicial terms on any country 
applying to them singly in this regard. i• (13b) 
Another important element in formulating the working plan lies 
in the dependence of the choice of investments largely on the avail-
ability of markets, especially in downstream industries, warranting 
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more cooperation _and integration among projects in the member countries. 
Finally, the nature of international relations at the present 
time calls for collective and concerted effort by the producers for 
facing the challenges in a world of political and economic groupings. 
6.2.1.6 Arab Petroleum Training Institute: 
The OAPEC Council of Ministers decided at its 19th meeting to 
establish an Arab Petroleum Training Institute in Baghdad. 
The institute's goal is to qualify training instructors, managers 
and engineers, as well as technicians who will produce and develop 
audiovisual and other teaching aids, in line with the standard and 
quality of the technology possessed by the member States for the 
development of their oil sectors. This should enable the institute's 
graduates to convey high standards and up-to-date technology to their 
fellow instructors in national institutes and centres. 
Among the other main functions of Lhc institute will be monitor~~9 
variables and their impact on the economics of industrial operations 
well as on job descriptions at various skilled and administrative levels 
~ 
in all petroleum activities, and to define and conti~ue~develop training 
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syllabuses and methodology.(14) 
6.2.1.7 Arab Company for Engineering Investments and Designs: 
The agreement establishing OAPEC's fifth joint project "The Arab 
Company for Engineering Investments and Designs" was signed in Abudhai 
on 22 March 1981 and work is now progressing in setting up the operation. 
This company represents the first Arab project aimed at providing 
engineering and consulting services relating to refineries, petro-
chemical projects and oil pipelines. 
Subscribed capital is US ~20 million distributed among the nine 
member countries equally, except for Algeria with 5 percent contri~ution 
and Syria with 4 percent.(15) 
6.2.1.8 OAPEC Projects' Evaluation: 
The most spectacular inter-Arab enterprises have been promoted 
by the Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Thus the 
Arab Maritime Company for Petroleum Transportation has, since the 
beginning of 1973 been prepared to undertake all types of maritime transport 
of hydrocarbons and all activities that help facilitate operations such 
as purchase and sale of real estate, commercial and-financial deals 
and transactions. The Arab Ship-building and Repair Company commenced 
activity by constructing in Bahrain, the largest dry dock in the Gulf 
area to service tankers and ships. The Arab Oil Services Company 
provides Arab States with oil exploration and other services previously 
handled by foreign companies. The Arab Petroleum Investment Company 
invests oil revenues in oil refineries, petrochemical complexes and 
other basic industries. 
These sectoral forms of economic cooperation seem to offer better 
prospects than have past efforts, because a new and more realistic 
investment climate is being crcated.(16) Although some of OAPEC 
projects are suffering from the operating losses in their early years 
of production, the OAPEC Board of Directors and policy makers in its 
--~. 
member countries consider these projects more as long term investments 
of economic importance rather than commercial projects being looked at 
from the classical approach of market forces which, in essence takes 
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the profitability criterion and the reasonable return on capital invested 
as the only justification for such investments.(l7) 
Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport co:s (AMPTC) for example 
operating losses were estimated to be i4.4 million in 1977. As for the 
tanker market the company was expected to achieve losses in 1979 of 
between US iB and 13 million (30-35%) because of recent changes in the 
mapket.(18) Nevertheless, OAPEC countries still aim at a greater share 
of the future world tanker fleet. 
Similarly, the Chairman of the Board of Directors for Asry stated 
that the countries which established Asry knew from the beginning that 
it was rather an Arab national economic enterprise than a commercial 
one, and they preferred it to many other profitable projects.(l9) 
This deliberately accepted preparedness to accept, at least at the 
beginning , financial loss-making by joint projects is of course consistent 
with an 'infant industry' philosophy. Whether the full implications of 
this course are understood by OAPEC members is another matter and some 
aspects of this are discussed in later chapters. It is also not wholly 
clear how far member States are prepared to limit their individual 
activities in the common interest. 
It is also noticeable in this respect that the establishment of 
the dry dock in Bahrain by OAPEC did not prevent Dubai from building its 
own(20) and it is not at all clear how far the various individual 
petrochemical projects being planned, for instance by Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and Abu Dhabi, fit into a general OAPEC strategy. 
OAPEC nevertheless has played a very vital role in initiating joint 
development projects by its members (among which the AGS have a 
comparatively large power leverage in petroleum related projects), 
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consequently contributing to the diversification of their economic base 
in compliance with OAEC's first objective which is as follows: 
"To carry out common projects that would achieve a 
diversified economic investment for the members. 
This, in turn would lessen their dependency on 
petroleum as a sole source of income and, consequently, 
would slow down the consumption of their petroleum 
and prolong the period of its investment for future 
generation."(2J) 
OAPEC projects also have the advantage of opening the road for 
the establishment of many other less directly oil related industries 
and services in the area. ASRY will participate, for example, with the 
other Gulf States in producing the structures needed for the causeway 
connecting Bahrain with Saudi Arabia.(22) 
In illustrating OAPEC achievements by 1978, Sayegh stated: 
"In the brief period since the October war, OAPEC has 
~ under new leadership - chiselled a new role for 
itself. This role is characterized by the initiation 
·of studies concerned with the development of national 
and joint regional projects related to hydrocarbons, 
to manpower in the oil industry, and to other areas 
of interest; the strengthening of its professional 
staff in order to be better enabled to prepare studies 
of greater sophistication; the organising of training 
seminars for oil officials in member countries; 
participation in and initiation of international meetings 
centring around the areas of its broad interest; active 
interest in the Arab-European dialogue for economic 
and technological cooperation; and initiative in the 
establishment of joint projects in the oil sector."(23) 
adding: 
"Nevertheless,_ OAPEC 's present areas of activity are 
probably not less important basically than being-able-
to be partly to the more glamorous political and 
strategic decisions of the Industry. And certainly, even 
within the present constraints, OAPEC is fulfilling a 
significant function in the drive for development, in 
the oil sector and the region as a whole."(24) 
With the establishment of its Judicial Board in 1980 OAPEC will 
have formed all thci Organs provided for in its establishing agreement. 
Thus OAPEC seems to have been well established and could prove itself 
through various competing developments which prevailed within its 
!Tl~fflbers •· 
"Many observers expected the conditions prevailing in 
1980 ~ most prominantly the Iraq-Iran war and· political 
disagreements between some member countries .- would 
disrupt the Organization's activities at least temp-
orarily. The cooperation and response of the mE!mber 
countries, however, plus the desire of the General 
Secretariat to go ahead with its work helped overcome 
these difficulties• As a consequence, OAPEC's achieve-
ments in 1980 rivalled those of previous years."(25) 
6.2.2 Financial Coo__peration 
6.2.2.1 Development Funds: 
The AGS Sub-region has been the scene of the establishment of many 
development funds, mobilizing financial resources derived from oil 
exports. Some of these funds were established within an Arab or Islamic 
framework, whilst others were established as national funds directed 
to finance development in both Arab and other developing countries. 
Our main interest, in this section, will be directed to regional 
funds and their regional activities. 
The first development fund in the Arab world was established in 
December 1961 as an autonomous agency of the Government of Kuwait. A 
decade later, Abu Dhabi established a similar, though smaller fund. 
At the same time members of the League of Arab States established the 
Arab fund for Economic and Social Development (AFEASD) as the first 
regional development fund. 
The year 1974 witnessed the establishment of three more development 
funds; two in Saudi Arabia and one in Sudan. In addition to establishing 
its own fund, ·the Saudi Development fund, Saudi Arabia hosted, a.I}d 
pledged the largest share in, the Islamic Development Bank in which 34 
Moslem countries are presently members. 
A third type of development fund, the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa (ABEDA) was established by the League of Arab 
States and provides financial assistance exclusively to non-Arab African 
countries.(26) Operating in January 1975 with initial capitalization 
of about ~ 230 mn, this was raised to ~ 630 mn. in 1976 and another i 115 
mn. was authoriseq in 1977. 
2.60 
261 
6.2.2.2 Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFEASD): 
The commencement of operations by the Arab Fund in 1972 and the 
subsequent increase in its authorized capital by 134% to $1.4 billion 
enlarged the financial resources that Arab countries, including the 
AGS, could utilize to step up their economic and social development. 
As the first regional Arab development fund, it underscored the---
awareness of member countries of the advantages of mutual cooperation 
and their willingness to promote such cooperation. 
The Arab Fund has been established with the ·main policy rationale 
of promoting regional cooperation by "creating a motive force that 
will assist the Arab world in achieving the basic tasks needed for 
economic and social development". Thus the Arab Fund is by mandate 
the designated development financial intermediary for future regional 
policies and for financing regional projects. In the Articles of 
Agreement this mandate has been defined broadly as to give priority 
to vital and inter-Arab projects.(27) 
AGS participation percentage is over 57% of the Fund Subscribed 
capital, their shares (in percentage) being as follows: 
Kuwait 30.0, 
Qatar 1.0, 
S. Arabia 18.8, UAE 5.0, Oman 2.04, 
Bahrain 0.5, Total: 57.34 
Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Algera have the largest comparative share 
among'the other Arab countries: 
KD million 
Egypt 10.0 
Libya 12.0 
Iraq 7.5 
Algeria 4.0 
33.5 
There are certain features of all Arab and Islamic development 
funds which clearly distingulsh them from other channels of traditional 
international aBsistance both from the West and from the East; these 
include ~ow interest, minimal ~har~es, substantial grant element and no 
leveraging but only some control designed to successfully implement 
the projects financed. Generally speaking, loans are long-term with 
maturities typically ranging from 15 to 30 years with a 3-5 years grace 
period and carrying interest of between 1 and 4%.(28) 
Regional Operation: 
The Arab Fund operations have consisted mainly in country 
project lending for three reasons:(29) 
1. The need for this conventional style of national project 
assistance still exists in the majority of Arab countries. 
2. National projects are relatively easier to appraise and to 
finance than regional schemes. 
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3. The Arab Fund's basic operational objective in its starting period 
was more performance oriented than regionally oriented. 
In order to fulfil its regional mandate, the Arab Fund has sponsored 
two different programmes which may become the cornerstones of and pilot 
cases for coherent investment policies in the Arab region. 
The first is a cooperative effort with UNDP, the "Programme for 
Identifying and Preparing Inter-country Investment Projects and Related 
Feasibility Studies" in the Arab world. The programme is designed to 
lead ultimately to specific investment decisions primarily of regional 
projects. In this context the Arab Fund will assume the following 
responsibilities: 
1. To provide assistance to Governments in the selection, preparation 
and submission of project documents to the Arab ~und and to other 
regional and international sources of finance. 
2. To grant direct financial assistance to such projects through loans 
from its own capital or from other resources placed under its administration. 
3. To arrange for the participation of other public or private 
financial organisations in those projects, through the establishment of 
consortia and other financial arrangements as required by the nature of 
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the project and the concerned Governments' interests. 
It is also planned to convene co-ordination meetings of interested 
development finance institutions from within and outside the region 
to study the possibility of cooperating in the financing of inter-
country and also national projects 'generated by the programme. 
Institutions which will be encouraged on a priority basis to affiliate 
themselves to the programme include the Kuwait fund, the Abu Dhabi fund, 
the Saudi Fund for Development, the Iraqi Fund for External Development, 
the ~slamic Development Bank and possibly the World Bank. 
The work plan of the programme envisages, among other activities: 
1. The preparation of a basic manual for the identification and 
evaluation of inter-country investment projects. This includes the 
establishment of a methodology for defining inter-country projects and 
the incorporation of the criteria of multinationality and its 
corresponding variables in the traditional parameters of project 
analysis. 
2. The identification of projects with a regional investment 
potential at various stages of preparation and to compile project 
information sheets; primary emphasis will be placed on projects in those 
sectors which have not yet been studied within a regional context. 
3. A study of legal, financial and administrative issues relating to 
the establishment of inter-country joint ventures. The objective is to 
identify institutional problems relating to the setting up of regional 
projects and to make recommendations for policy changes; another purpose 
is to establish model agreements to facilitate the establishment and 
management of such regional ventures. 
For those activities the Arab Fund is utilising the services of 
UNCTAD, in cooperation with UNDP. 
The following project studies were selected for study in September 
1971 and are listed as indicators of the field of AFEASD operationsand 
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their relevance to AGS interests outlined in Chapters 9 and 12. 
AFEASD/UNDP Joint Programme:(29) 
(a) Project Studies in Progress: 
- Inter-Arab/Telecommunication Links I 
- Inter-Arab/Telecommunication Links II 
Inter~Arab/Pah Arab Shipping Company (PASCO) 
- Inter-Arab/Equipment Study for the Arab Maritime Transport Academy (AMTA) 
- Inter-Arab/Management Information system for the Arab Maritime Transport 
Academy 
- Inter-Arab/Passenger Airlines Reservation System (APARS) 
- Inter-Arab/Survey of Natural Resources 
- Inter-Arab/Preliminary Study of the Status and Prospects ot· Agricultural 
Machinery and Equipment in the Arab countries 
- Egypt and Sudan/Transportation Link 
- Yemen (NY-PDRU/Determination of Requirements for a Natural Resources 
Survey 
(b) Project Studies under Consideration: 
- Inter-Arab/Educational Television Programmes for children 
Inter-Arab/Educational Television Programmes on Children Practices in 
the Arab World 
- Inter-Arab/Quality of Educational ChEdren 's Programme 
- Inter-Arab/Sub-regional Comprehensive Transportation System for Western 
Asia 
The second project with regional overtones initiated by the Arab 
fund is the "Basic Programme for Development of the Agricultural Sector 
in the Democratic Republic of Sudan, 1978-1985-2000". The main purpose 
of the basic programme is to pool and apply the necessary financial 
resources, primari~.y from Arab countries, but also from others, to 
exploit the rich agricultural potential of Sudan for the benefit of the 
whole Arab region. In this regional programme trilaterial cooperative 
arrangements could become a prominent feature, because the interests of 
a~l three circles. Sub-regional, Regional and International are 
affected; 
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1. The Arab Fund is initiating with the Basic Sudan Programme a 
comprehensive development effort which belongs to high priority areas 
of its mandates; to promote regional projects and. to assist the 
poorest Arab countries. Since the agricultural programme is conceived 
to cover food requirements of the whole Arab region, it is definitely 
a project with a regional impact and character. Furthermore, the Sudan 
is not only one of the poorest countries in the Arab region but also 
in the world. 
2. The Sudan, in its continuous effort to attract finance for the 
development of its large untapped national resources, is eager to 
cooperate with the Arab fund to organise the various external sources 
of capital, and to combine these with local efforts in a comprehensive 
plan and in an institutional framework which could ensure the 
implementaiton. 
3. The Arab capital-providing countries are motivated both by the 
desire to ensure their food imports from an Arab source and to find 
rewarding investment outlets. A special feature of this programme is 
the 'dualistic' approach of commercial investment and development 
finance with the aim of achieving a balance between these two activities. 
4. Private extra-regional sources from industrialised countries may 
be attracted to this type of programme; official development assistance 
may co-finance infrastructure. With this flow of funds, technology and 
plant will be required in large volumes and for.a long time. 
This programme is found to be in line with AGS motivation for 
cooperation within regional circle as analysed in more detail in Chapter 9 
· and also utilised as an applied case-study of a trilateral approach to 
AGS cooperation, in Chapter 13. 
In cooperation with the Industrial Development Centre for Arab 
States (IDCAS), the Arab Fund has initiated a survey of the Arab 
countries' requirements of agricultural equipment and machinery and the 
prep~ratio~ of ~ plan for their produGtion. The f4~d w~l1 P4pport ~he 
international centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA}.(30) 
The Fund and the AGS: 
While AGS are main contributers to fund capital (more than 57 
percent) however, and as expected, these countries have received only 
a meagre proportion of the fund financing activities. For example, 
AGS (mainly Bahrain and Oman) received only 3.7 percent of the fund 
financing activities up to 31 December 1978 (KD 11 million out of KD 
295.3 million). The first loan was provided to Oman in 1976 for a Gas 
Utilization project, KD 6 million out of total project costs of KD 27.27 
million. The second loan was directed to a Bahrain power project, 
KD 5 million out of total project costs of KD 60.1 miUion. 
The Arab Fund and Kuwait: 
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It is worth noting, for its implications for Sub-regional/Regional 
involvement that the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 
was active in the initiation of both the Arab Fund (AFAESD) and the 
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation.(31) 
6.2.2.3 Arab Monetary Fund (AMF): 
The promotion of Arab regional economic cooperation was given much 
needed impetus by the establishment of the AMF in 1975. Headquartered 
in Abu Dhabi and capitalized a't SDR 750 million, of which 25% has been 
paid up, the AMF provides short- and medium-term loans at concessionary 
interest rates to help its 21 member countries in financing their overall 
balance of payments management in facilitating steady economic growth, 
and endeavours to promote closer economic cooperation, within the Arab 
region. 
The AMF balance of payments support is conditional and depends upon 
the establishment of a requirement of need based generally on the 
overall deficit in balances of payments, members' foreign reserves and 
their economic and financial situation. 
In applying its conditions the AMF gives due consideration to factors 
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that effect development in the real sectors of borrowing members• 
economies. Member countries will also be encouraged to adopt and 
implement appr0priate balance of payments adjustment measures in 
accordance with stabilization programmes agreed upon.· In this respect 
the AMF has a similar approach to that of the International Monetary 
Fund. 
------
Over a relatively short period of time the M4F made substantial 
progress in establishing an operational organization and made two loans 
amounting to $25 million.{32) 
6.2.2.4 Other Regional Financial Institutions: 
The Arab Investment Company, located in Riyadh, was established 
);, 
,,, ~con 15 July ;1.974 by 15 countries with AGS participa~ion of $% of 
capital;.its activit:j_es include mainly country development projects, 
evaluated on sound economic and commercial basis.(33) 
Another regional institution with less AGS participation is the 
Arab Establishment for the Guarantee of Investment, established in 1979 
and located in Kuwait. This insures the Arab investor against non-
commercial risks. The Arab Investment Bank established in 1975 at Cairo 
has a capital of $100 million. Of the AGS, only the UAE, Oman and Qatar 
participate as shareholders (38% of capital). Other Arab shareholders 
include Egypt and Libya. 
The AGS participate in the Arab Bank for Economic Development in 
Africa, established in November 1973 by 18 Arab countries with 45% 
participation for AGS. Its activities are directed-to the-deVelopment 
of Non-Arab African countries. 
6.2.2.5 Islamic Development Bank (ISDB): 
ISDB is an international financial institution established in 
pursuance of the declaration of intent issued by a conference of Finance 
Mi~isters of Muslim Countries held at Jeddah in December 1973. The 
i~augural meetiqg of the Board of Governors took place in Riyadh in 
July 1975 but the bank commenced its operations in 1977. The shareholders 
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are 41 Moslem countries including the Arab States, and the AGS share 
is 58 percent of its authorized capitalp some i2.4 billion: 
S.R. million 
s. Arabia 200 
UAE 110 
Kuwait 100 
Qatar 25 
Bahrain 5 
Oman 5 
Total 445 
The distinctive feature of the Islamic Development Bank is that 
it operates in accordance with Islamic law. In particularp it does not 
charge interest but it finances itself by the proceeds of investment 
generated income. (34) 
The Islamic Development Bank is alone among project-oriented 
development funds in providing loans tied to financing imports of 
essential goods or raw materials. Its other activities that help 
generate income include leasing and equity participation in projects or 
enterprises with high financial yield. The Bank reserves the option of 
recycling its resources through sale of its equity share to third parties. 
Regional or complementary projects among Muslim countries tend to 
have high priority although national projects are also financed. 
Examples of the Bank's national-based activities (not all of which are 
directly income generating),- especially within AGS Sub~region, include: 
Omang which received in 1979, to finance a vocational training centre, 
a loan of US ~6.20 millionp (total costs of the projects) for training 
employed primary school leaversp unemployed adults and employed workers. 
The anticipated annual intake capacity of the centre is 140 trainees 
for a 3-year full-time course and 280 trainees for evening part-time 
course. 
UAEP on a profit sharing basis ISDB participated with the Dubai Islamic 
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Bank in financing Badr Housing Complex with the sum of US ~5.13 million 
out of the total costs of US ~18.12 in February 1978. The housing 
complex aims at accommodating 3480 families of the middle income 
groups to overcome the shortage of middle class residential accommodation.(35) 
Bahrain, equity participation in the Bahrain Islamic Bank's capital 
stock will provide it with an opportunity for sharing experience in 
banking operation and management based on Islamic principles. 
Multinational Projects: 
In line with the objectives set out in its Articles of Agreement 
according priority to projects which promote economic cooperation among 
member countries, the ISDB convened a meeting in Jeddah beuween 18 and 
2rl~February 1978, in connection with the Trans-Saharan Road project. 
The meeting was attended by representatives of the following countries 
and institutions: 
Algeria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria; The Secratariate of the Trans-Saharan 
Committee 
African Development Fund; AFEASD; ABEDA 
-- Opec special Fund; Saudi Development Fund 
- UNDP 
The Bank agreed to participate in a joint appraisal mission in 
November 1978 for the Appraisal of the Mapti-Gaeo road which is an 
important component of the Trans-Saharian road project.(36) The Bank 
is also making its efforts to develop areas surrounding the Senegal 
River. (37) 
Within its regional activities the Bank is planning to set up 23 
Islamic banks in Moslem countries during the coming five years. Besides 
banks, thirty insurance institutions are to be established along with 
18 investment companies. 
The ISDB attempts to incorporate Moslem law in banking practices, 
and it is for this reason that it gives interest free loans. To 
\ 
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encourage this the bank has founded a college to teach the fundamentals 
of Islamic law regarding business practices and banking in particular. 
The bank has also outlined a comprehensive and far-ranging economic 
development plan for its member countries. This includes an agriculture 
development programme, trade and indudstry development as well as the 
setting up of trruisport ru1d communications facilities, hospitals and 
educational and technical training institutions.(38) 
6.3 AGS Cooperation within the Region. The Comprehensive Approach 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Following examination of these AGS cooperation activities based 
on sectoral and partial development-oriented process, as reflected in 
OAPEC joint activities and joint financial institutions within the 
regional context, we now proceed to examine the more holistic approach 
to Arab Economic Uni~. This generai picture illustrates the main 
features and fulfilments of this recent and current movement, assessed 
in conceptual and practical terms. 
Attempts at pan-Arab economic cooperation have taken many forms 
and have spread over several sectors. These include trade, payments, 
manpower and capital mobility across national frontiers, cooperation of 
and coordination in undertakings in the fields of industry, mining, 
land transport, shipping and aviation, administrative development, standards 
and measurements. It is not possible here to survey all forms of such 
cooperation. but a selective view of attempts at Arab economic cooperation 
-
reveals the breadth of the area and fields in which the AGS participate. 
Sub-regional cooperation between the AGS cannot ignore the realities 
created by their being part of regional comprehensive cooperative 
movements, however valid or invalid these approaches or the extent of 
success achieved from. 
The full breadth and ambition of these attempts can best be seen 
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in the wide coverage of the Agreement of Arab Economic Unityconcluded 
under the auspices of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU). 
This Agreement in effect stipulates for the unification or else 
standardisation of all aspects of Arab economic life. Taxation systems, 
monetary and fiscal systems and laws, business laws, foreign exchange 
regulations, inheritance, equal rights to undertake business and to 
own property, and all other institutional regulators of economic 
activity are to be co-ordinated and standardised, to present a unified 
front towards the outside world, and to permit complete mobility and 
interaction within the _Agreement area. Coordination of the strategies 
and policies of agricultural, industrial and commercial development 
was also to be undertaken and free movement of factors of production. 
In trying to reflect their realization for the dictates of 
realism, the founders chose to begin their long march towards unity by 
taking the initial step of an Arab Common Market (ACM). Thirteen 
countries ratified the CAEU agreement. Up to 1981 before the 
suspension of Egypt's membership, these included Jordan, Syria, Iraq, 
Libya, Sudan,Somalia, Muritanya, N. Yemen, Palistine, Egypt, Kuwait 
and UAE. Six Arab countries ratified the ACM decision which was taken 
on 13 August 1964 by CAEU up to 1981. These countries included Jordan, 
Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Muritanya. However, four countries are 
fully pledged members of the ACM, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. 
First, we examine the achievements of ACM then turn to assess the 
CAEU approach and achievements. 
6.3.2 ACM Achievements 
CAEU took the decision on 13 August 1964 to establish the Arab 
Common Market, within a trade oriented approach aiming at approaching Arab 
Economic Unity through several stages, beginning with a free trade area, 
Customs Union, and Common Market, ending with Economic Unity. 
Since January 1971 all tariffs have been abolished on trade 
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between the four countries of ACMD but qualitative restrictions such 
as quotas remained together with the non-convertibility of currenciesD 
while foreign exchange rationing has been as tight as before the 
agreement. These continuing restrictions without doubt contributed to 
the low level of intra-ACM trade in relation to the total trade prevailing 
between 1965 and 1975 as seen in Table 6.1 
The CAEU seemed to be attracted by the EEC approach but without 
a thorough and deep study of the existing economic as well as political 
differences among Arab countries. ACM began its activities when trade 
between its four members constituted only 2.7 percent of their total 
foreign trade (Table 6.1) whilst the EEC corresponding percentage was 
30 percent. The trade approach to Arab economic cooperation and 
integration was therefore adopted by countries which were characterized by 
~comparative small importance of their inter-trade in comparison to 
their international trade. Their inter-regional exports constituted 
only 2.5 percent of their world trade in 1965 and only 2.9 percent for 
imports. Their exports were restricted to one or two raw materials and 
were directed mainly to other international markets~ The non-oil exporting 
member countries in particular had a pressing need for foreign exchange 
to finance their import requirements. At the· same time the political 
instability that prevailed in the region and in the member countries 
during the nineteen sixtiesD seventies (and which show little sign of 
abating}D contributed directly and profoundly to the weak results achieved 
by the ACM. 
Political differences between members in particular seem to have 
resulted from different attitudes towards the palestinian prob_lem. The 
most striking of this were the closing of the border between Syria and 
Jordan (ACM members) in 1971 and the suspension of Egypt's membership 
in ACAEU~ ACM ~d other Arab league bodies following the Camp-Dav~d 
accords,and its signing a peace a~reement with +srael in 1979. 
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AlJ. these factors contributed to the very weak achievements of 
ACM as reflected in Table .G.1. The proportional importance of trade 
between member countries in fact fell. Total inter-exports as a 
percentage to total world exports of members decreased from 2.5 percent 
in 1965 to 1..6 percent in 1975, and imports decreasedfrom 2.3 in 1965 
to 1.7 in 1975. The total intra-trade percentage within ACM decreased 
from 2.7 percent in 1965 to 1.6 percent in 1975: at the same time 
ACM countries trade with the Arab countries decreased in percentage 
importance from 9.1 percent to 6.5 during the same period {as computed 
from Table 6.1). 
ACM, despite the number of decisions nominally taken and 
organisational and procedural steps made is: "still a very lame institution 
of limited coverage".{39). Of the seven member countries, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Iraq, North Yemen, Moritanya and Sudan, three did not abide 
by its decisions and monetary administrative restrictions as well as 
political differences between the member countries destroyed ACM 
effectiveness. 
There are no signs of success to ACM approach, as just referred to 
and as expressed by Soliman Damir when he said: 
"Generalized trade liberalization (as exemplified in 
the Arab Common Market) is not the appropriate strategy 
for Arab regional development. There are too many 
uncertainties about the benefits of such a scheme to 
make it workable in the Arab region. For example, the 
more ambitious aims of the Arab Common Market, _such_as 
the free movement of labour and capital, require an 
agreement on a wide spectrum of political and economic 
matters •. Such an agreement may be difficult to achieve 
instantaneously."(39) 
6.3.3 CAEU and Comprehensive Planning Approach 
The limitations of the EEC type trade approach being demonstrated 
by the ACM, the CAEU launched a new approach derived mainly from COMECON 
experience. · 
It is important to note at this stage that the COMECON system 
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used as a comprehensive planning approach for cooperation has been 
developed through many and lengthy stages; beginning with bilateral 
trade agreementsp multilateral trade agreement, leading up to 
coordinating foreign trade plans but leaving each country to organise 
its own national plan. COMECON lastly approached a stage of coordinated 
investment plans, intendedp theoretically at least, to affect growth 
rates in favour of least developed among the group.(40) It must also 
be noted COMECON has also been dominated by one super-power member, 
whose role in maintaining political and ideological as well as economic 
cohesion was an integral element in the organisation. 
In adopting the COMECON type of comprehensive planning approach 
CAEU assumed that:(41) 
"International experience shows that cooperation in 
planning which begins with coordinating country plans 
is the principal style for creating economic development 
among developing nations." 
Consequently, CAEU issued Decision No. 700 of·4 June 1975 to the 
effect that: ( 42) 
"The General Secretariat of the CAEU shall make a· 
developed and gradual programme in collaboration with 
planning l.nsti tutions of member countries in orde~.~ to 
overcome difficulties and obstacles that accompany 
experiments. This procedure aims at coordinating Arab 
development plans to create technical conditions that 
help in achieving a fairly good standard of coordination 
among these institutions on the regional level as from 
1981. 11 
.The General Secretariat produced this programme which was approved 
by the CAEU in Decision· No. 723 dated 4 December 1975. The programme 
includes, inter·alia, regional, sub-regional and country studies, and a 
follow-up of country plans that came to an end in 1975. The CAEU began 
to discuss 1976-80 plans, evaluate growth effected in the first half 
of 1970's, scrutinize the proposed joint ventures, coordinate planning 
ways and means, construct models for Arab economies and make long-range 
forecasting. 
The last mentioned resolution stipulated that the programme 
should be achieved at the end of 1980 so that coordination would 
flower in 1981. The period 1975-80 was to be devoted to the 
preparation and classification of statistics concerning industry in 
view to discover the elements of integration therein.(43) 
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The CAE.:U aimed at achieving the following objectives in its Five-
Year Plan (1976-1980): 
1. Lay·-out of ar. Arab plan commencing in 1981. 
2. Shifting from Free Trade Area to Customs Union stage. 
3. Abolishing handicaps hindering the movement of capital and technical 
labour. 
CAEU proposed other changes in the machinery for the Arab economic 
integration: 
1. Transferring the CAEU into a Council for Arab Economic Integration 
including all Arab States. 
2. Transferring the Arab Fund for Economic and Social development into 
a Bank for Arab economic integration. 
3. Utilising the AMF (Arab Monetary Fund)as the monetary and commercial 
hand for Arab economic inegration. 
Despite, or possib+y even because of, CAEU's comprehensive approach 
its effectiveness has been lowp as illustrated below: 
1. The trade approach adopted by the Council proved a complete failure 
for some fundamental reasons. Trade between the Arab countries is a 
very small proportion of the total trade. Intra-regional trade among 
them was estimated at about 7 percent of their total trade in 1970 as 
compared with 50 percent in Western Europe and 30 percent in the European 
Economic Community. It is only in the case of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 
whore the uhare in each other'n trado ir-; :;ignificant. Furthc~rmore, the 
ratio of foreign trade to gross national product is very high in most 
Arab countries (see Table 10.2). Imports in all of them are quite high 
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in proportion :to gross national p~oduct whilst only a small fraction 
of those imports comes from the Arab world. 
It seems, therefore, that according to orthqdox theory the case 
for discriminating in favour of the outside world would be much stronger 
than that for discriminating in favour of the Arab countries. The 
Elxports of most of them also form a high proportion of gross national 
product. Hence abolition of duties and other restrictions on existing 
intra~regional trade could hardly have a marked effect on the level 
of economic welfare of the Arab countries. The benefits of customs unions 
will, according to this theory, be greater for industrialized countries 
than for less industrialized countries but will increase for the latter 
as they succeed in developing (see Chapter 11). 
2. That success which has been achieved by CAEU has been centred 
around the initiation of joint projects such as the Arab Mining Company, 
the Arab Company for the Development of Animal Resources, the Arab 
Pharmaceutical Industry Company, Arab Company for Industrial Investment, 
in all of which the AGS have participated. However, although progress 
with these has varied, in no case have the projects reached the stage 
at which evaluation is currently possible; they remain unproven in 
effectiveness. 
3. Another weakness of the CAEU appears from a consideration of Maghreb-
Mashreq relationships (see also Chapter 10, section 10.5). 
,· 
Maghreb countries come under the umbrella of the Arab League and 
have joined several League institutions, including the Organisation of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development. However, they are not members of the ACM, a 
position which reflects the fact that trade between Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries is virtually non-existent. 
Maghr~b countries e~ly attempted to concentrate on their own 
Sub-regional cooperative structure ~d formed a number of relevant 
institutions. The body at the head of this structure is the Maghreb 
Permanent Consultative Committee (MPCC), formed in 1964 by the Ministers 
of national economy of the Maghreb countries, in order to achieve 
economic cooperation and coordination. This separatist development 
was not accidental, as, in explaining the weak economic exchange 
2718 
relations between the Mashreq and the Maghreb, Burhan Dajani emphasised:{44) 
(a) Economic cooperation within the framework of the League was started 
before the Maghreb countries obtained independence and became League 
members. 
(b) Mashreq countries developed inter-relationships during this period 
from which Maghreb countries were barred by the French and Italian 
colonial Governments. 
(c) The Fren~h in particular had long tied their Maghreb colonies' 
economies firmly to their own, and these links continued under 
independence. 
(d) The Arab countries, like other developing countries, tend to have 
more intensive economic relationships with the advanced industrial 
countries than among themselves. 
(e) Transport and communication linkages, especially by sea, between 
Mashreq and Maghreb were and remain under-developed. 
4. The Comprehensive Planning Approach: A considerable number of 
desk studies, based on a COMECCN type comprehensive planning approach, have 
been prepared, but no signs of any coordination between Arab national 
plans are apparent and the comprehensive plan studies themselves are not 
clear. (45) 
This approach can be expected to fail completely as it is totally 
premature at the current stage of Arab development and does not consider 
the prevailing realities, whether political, social or ideological, 
already illustrated in this thesis. Fundamentally, it has been a blind 
adoption by the CAEU of the socialist approach, modelled on tne Communist 
Bloc's COMECONP without realizing the drastic differences between 
this bloc and the Arab world, between their development priorities, 
constraints and objectives, as well as the ideological differences. 
279 
Arab subjective conditions necessary for approaching economic cooperation 
and integration have not been considered. 
5. AGS and the CAEU: Kuwait and UAE are nominal members of the CAEU, 
but none of the AGS have approved the ACM arrangements. The state of 
suspicion prevailing in the Arab world, which is particularly clear 
in the way these countries with rich oil resources suspect that any 
form of close cooperation would in effect lead to, if not aim at, 
depriving them of their wealth, this strengthened by the feeling of these 
•haves' towards the superiority of many of the 'have-nots' in manpower 
skills, these together largely explain AGS' negative attitude towards 
any restrictive integrative form of cooperation within the region. 
Consequently AGS have not partic~ted actively .in the Agreement on Arab 
Economic Uni -cy. ( 46) 
6. The current state of the CAEU: The CAEU now seems to be approaching 
break-up. Its last meeting.which should have been held in Amman in 
June1982 failed to begin due to Syrian-Iraqi political tension over the 
Gulf War andmany officials. within the Arab Economic Cooperation circles 
look despairingly forward to the CAEU's unavoidable fate. 
6.3.4 Arab Economic Cooperation - An Over View 
Cooperation, as we have seen, has been approached via multiple 
avenues. Although this may seem to be sensible and appropriate, the 
distribution of emphasis among these avenues has been largely accidental 
and haphazard instead of being deliberate in the light of a prioristic 
perceptlon.(47) When cooperative actions are examined, particularly 
within the CAEU it appears that they were not ba:;ed on any deep 
apprcc::i.ation of the real factr1 prevaiJi.ne in t.he /\rab world, in a way 
leading to a pragmatic avenue for development cooperation. 
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Most Arab economic cooperation activities have in fact been 
achieved without the involvement of the CAEU agreement and related 
ACM arrangements. For example, whilst the ACM lays great emphasis on 
the protocols necessary for free mobility of factors of production as 
well as commodities, such movements have in fact been proceeding without 
any formality. For lnstimce- there-lias been large-scale labour migration 
from countries such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan to the rapidly expanding 
oil economies as Kuwait, S. Arabia and UAE (see Chapter 9), and 
substantial capital movements have already been sponsored, as noted 
earlier, by both multi-national bodies such as the AFEASD and· national 
institutions as the Kuwaiti FAED. 
In other words, at a pragmatic level some of the key real 
activities associated with a Common Market have been taking place naturally 
without requiring the grandiose central planning intervention by a 
pan-Arab organisation. Where particular interests have appeared worth 
serving then mutually benefitting cooperation has taken place within 
different country groups. 
Failure on a pan-Arab scale are largely due to political disharmony. 
This presents a serious problem because it is based on long historic 
traditions, and the art of living together peacefully takes a long time 
to acquire. In a group of countries where nationalist policies, as 
well as a state of continual tension among ruling bodies prevails, it is 
-
difficult, realistically, to imagine an integrative comprehensive 
planning process to have the seeds of successful integration. 
This unavoidable political state of affairs which characterizes the 
Arab world of today, is reinforced by the state of instability which 
exists to varying different degrees within the Arab countries. Sayegh 
has expressed the position thus:(48) 
"Syria, Iraq, Sudan and to a lesser extent Jordan and 
Morocco, have suffered most from instability in the 
post-war or post-independence period ••• ln Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, 
Libya and all Arab Gulf States to varying degrees, there 
is .very little free political expression and less free 
opposition."· 
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This state of affairs does not create the healthy atmosphere necessary 
for securing at-the highest decision making level the needed political 
will towards an integratory movement as this element is a key pre-
requisite, not only for integration but also for less-modest 
cooperation. Integration in this part of the world has tended to be 
"largely symbolic". There have been countless meetings and conferences, 
innumerable initiating of treaties, literally hundreds of pronouncefuents 
of good intentions and aspirations as well as many other expressions of 
fidelity to the principles of Arab economic unity. But all this activity 
has not resulted in the creation of positive contributions to the 
development of the region. The explanation of this lack of success 
would seem to lie, among other things, in the nature of the approach, 
as well as in history and politics.(49) 
Among the newly independent Arab countries the desire for mutual 
cooperation is not deep and their foreign diplomacy is motivated more by 
political as well as ideological ambition than by long-term interests:(50} 
"Why do the Arabs quarrel so much? Right now Syria is 
supporting non-Arab Iran in its war with Arab Iraq; Syria 
and Jordan are growling at each other; Saudi Arabia and 
Libya do not even talk. Libya's expansionist aims in north-
central Africa include doing its best to subvert Arab 
Tunisia. Algeria and Morocco are at war in the ex-Spanish 
western Sahara via Algeria's proxy Polisario guerrilas. 
North and South Yemen hover on the brink of war whenever 
they are not meeting to discuss their complete and 
immediate unity." 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The emergence of the rapidly growing petroleum sector in ~he AGS 
and related financial surpluses have been shown to have given development 
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cooperation within the Regional eire!~ a big push as it has contributed 
to create a solid and favourable institutional framework for 
cooperation. OAPEC related joint development projects and joint 
financial projects(particularly Arab development funds), seem to 
constitute the two basic elements of this framework. 
OAPEC, established in 1968 (after the Six-Day War with Israel 
in June 1967), began to play its vital role in establishing joint 
development projects after the 1973 surge in oil prices and related 
income. 
Within the OAPEC framework, in which AGS play a dominant role, 
important joint ventures hav~ been established, including industrialp 
services, financial and petroleum related projects. OAPEC's relative 
success has supported the notion that Regional cooperation processes 
could succeed in a non-confined geographical area. OAPEC projects can 
be considered as the most spectacular inter-Arab enterprises, whilst 
at the same time contributing to the achievements of the diversification 
strategy adopted by AGS. 
Arab and Islamic Development Funds, with the leading role in 
their creation taken by AGS in general and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
in particularp have been creating a motive force that assists the 
Arab and Islamic world in achieving the basic tasks needed for economic 
and social development, mainly through regional projects. 
AFEASD and ISDB has sponsored different regional programmes which 
may become cornerstones and pilot cases for investment cooperation within 
the region, complementing as they do the OAPEC role which has been 
centred on petroleum-related development activities. This regional and 
multi-national direction is exemplified by the AFEASD 'Programme for 
Identifying and Preparing Inter-country Investment Projects and Related 
Feasibil:i·ty Studies 1 , the ISDB 1 Trans-Saharan Road 1 and the development 
of areas surrounding the Senegal River, the efforts of establishing bankin~ 
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investment and insurance institutions based on Islamic law practices 
in addition to the far-ranging development plan being drawn up for 
the Bank's member countries. 
The AGS policy of expanding their financial activities is 
particularly appropriate in both Sub-regional and Regional contexts. 
Finance and banking activities form a capital-intensive industry 
requiring little outside labour and invclving minimal strain on the 
resource base ~ it is thus well suited to the Gulf. Moreover, 
financial policies could. in part 2 be geared towards developing Arab 
economies on a complementary and coordinative basis. which could provide 
the wider context within which Gulf economic self-sufficiencv can be 
envisaged.(51) 
Examining recent Arab Economic Cooperation Movement in general. 
and CAEU and ACM in particular showed drastic limiting factors facing 
their opportunities to success. These factors have been reflected 
in~misleading approach as well as economic, social and political 
reasons. In general. it has been doubtful whether one all-embracing 
strategy can be formulated for 21 Arab countries. differing in ba:.:;lr: 
factor endowments (as reflected in their producti're structure and natural 
resources), in size and quality of population, as well as in ideology and 
in political, social and economic regimes. and their respective targets.(52) 
Consequently much less has been achieved than aimed at or undertaken 
in agreements and arrangements under Arab League auspices. Political 
as well as socio-psychological impediments must be added to economic and 
misconceptions in leading to this end. 
The few bright instances of success so far. as in the OAPEC example, 
have been characterized by partial rather than a comprehensive 
trade-oriented approach in addition to the large mea;;;ure of 
autonomy possessed by the institutions concerned. Their freedom from the 
cumbersome bureaucracy which distinguishes the Secretariat of the Arab 
League is backed up by: 
"The high quality of leadership enjoyed by these 
institutions, which combines motivation and drive, 
modern mindedness, innate capability and a broad 
Arab nationalist horizon."(53) 
For successful Arab economic development cooperation, which clearly 
could be beneficial in depth and potential, there seem to be two 
contemporary requirements. First an approach based on programmes which 
are partial rather than comprehensive in their realisation of common 
interest, as illustrated by OAPEC's signs of success as well as the 
development of single-sector potential, e.g. the Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Investment and Development with its basic Sudanese programme. 
Case study examples of this type of approach are examined further in 
Chapter 13. 
The second requirement is the emergence of a strong and 
sincere political will to cooperate. 
This latter factor, as with the former, clearly cannot merely 
be examined in a falsely-isolated Arab region, any more than the AGS 
can be studied with validity purely on Sub-regional terms. In Chapter 
7, therefore, we have to expand the scale still further by turning to 
the International Circle. 
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of any other Arab capital-surplus country. 
(47) Sayigh, Y.A. Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 710. 
(48) Say:igh, Y.A. Op. cit., Vol. ·2, pp. 97-98. 
(49) Sayigh, Y.A. Op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 707-709. 
(50) The Economist, 24-30 January 1981. London. 
(51) Niblock, T. Dilemmas of Non-oil Economic DeveloEment in the 
Arab Gulf (London: Arab Research Centre - Arab Paper No. 1, 1980) t 
p. 18. 
(52) Hershlag, Z.Y. 'Industrialzation in Arab Countries: Patterns, 
Options and Strategies', In, Arab Industrialization and Economic 
Integration, edited by Roberto Aliboni (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 
p. 53. 
(53) Sayigh, Y.A. Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 710 
CHAPTER 7 - AGS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS' STRUCTURE AND 
SUB-REGIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIPS 
7.1 Introduction 
Earlier analysis of the ec0nomic structure of and development 
trends in the AGS has showed the vital importance of AGS' ~xternal 
relationships. This chapter explores the structure of AGS' sub-
regional, regional and international economic relations, beginning by 
reviewing and analysing AGS international, sub-regional and regional 
trade relations, and trade and payment systems. The chapter then 
proceeds to analyse the international economic situation of the AGS as 
reflected in their balance of payments accounts in order to illustrate 
structural characteristics such as dependency, income flow, financial 
surpluses and external investment. 
7.2 AGS International Economic Rela1.iun's Structure 
7.2.1 Foreign Trade 
1· Trade Composition: 
Exports - AGS exports are heavily dominated by the oil and gas 
and related industries; the exports of oil, gas and related industries 
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constituted round 97.3% Df AGS combined total exports in 1980 distributed 
between member countries as shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 
AGS Oil Exports Comparative Importance (1980) 
·(in $U.S. millions and percent) 
Country Oil Exports % Total Exports % 
( 1) (2) 
Kuwait 17,924.9 11.8 19,961.4 .12.8 
Qatar 5,387.2 3.6 5 ,671. 8 3.7 
Oman 3,280.5 2.2 3,294.1 2.1 
s. Arabia 102,371.7 67.5 102,470.9 65.8 
UAE 19,454.3 12.8 20,737.9 13.3 
Bahrain 3 ,201. 2 2.1 3,607.1 2.3 
Total 151,619.8 100 155,743.2 100 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1981. 
(1): (2) 
89.8 
95.0 
99.6 
99.9 
93.8 
88.7 
97.3 
Transferred from Country Currencies into g U.S. by the author. 
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The few non-oil exports are composed mainly of agricultural and 
food items (dried limes, dates, flour) and a limited range of 
industrial products (aluminium, petrochemical fertilizers, building 
materials). 
Re-exports directed mainly to neighbouring countries, especially 
in the Indian ocean region include construction and mining machinery 
and transport equipment. These manufactured goods of foreign origin 
are of significance in the non-oil export trade of AGS. 
Imports - Due to the limited agricultural and industrial base 
of AGS economies, these countries are highly dependent on imports to 
satisfy rising local demand for consumer goods as well as intermediate 
and capital goods. Following sharp increases in petroleum prices and 
the resulting expansion in public and private sector income and 
expenditures during the last decade, AGS import demand has surged. 
In Kuwait, over the years ended 1977 import payments (F.O.B.) 
rose nearly five-fold. In terms of relative shares consumer goods 
imports have continued to dominate the import basket, accounting in 1976 
for 41 percent of total imports (c.i.f.) compared to 37 percent and 22 
percent, respectively, for intermediate and capital goods.(l) 
UAE total imports' value increased also more than five times 
between 1973 and 1977. While part of' this growth was associated with 
relatively large increases in import unit values, particularly in 
1974 and 1975 most of it was attributable to the expansion of import 
volume. (2) 
The economic effects of rapidly rising and large-scale imports are 
important but this phenomenon also reflects social,psychological as well 
as economic factors which have geared an almost self-generating increase 
of imports. 
The progressive increase of AGS imports and the forces behind it 
impede economic development through the following effects: 
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I (a) i'They reduce the incentives to industrialize or the building up of 
import substitution projects. 
(b) The process tends to direct oil derived revenue to current 
expenditure to an unbalanced extent compared with investment expenditures. 
(c) They create continuous pressures and drains on AGS reserves and 
economic assets, periodically giving rise to cash=flow problems even 
in these wealthy countries. 
Since the domestic consumption pattern established is one of social 
preference in favour of foreign products, domestic products' consumption 
can only be built up by some long-term programme of preference.(3) 
The significance of imports in total expenditure emphasises the 
general dominance of the external sector in the economies of the AGS. 
Imports as a percentage ·of aggregate demand in the individual countries, 
as shown in Table 7.2 are extremely high (see also note in Table 7.2 
referring to Bahrain). 
2. Trade Balance: 
It is noted that all the AGS have achieved trade surplus since the 
discovery and export of oil, except Bah~ain which registered a deficit 
in 1977. Saudi Arabia is the largest foreign trader among AGS, 
contributing 66 percent of AGS exports and 54 percent of their imports. 
in 1977, followed by UAE, then Kuwait (Table 7.3). 
3. Foreign trade and Dependence of AGS Economies: 
Table 7.2 illustrates the-high degree ·of AGS economies dependence 
on internati<mal economic relations as reflected by the following 
indicators: 
- The high foreign trade (imports and exports) proportion of GNP. This 
percent ranges from 383.3 percent in Bahrain to 91.4 percent in Saudi 
Arabia. 
- A very high ratio of value of exports to GNP, which ranges from 73 
percent in Saudi Arabia to 183 percent in Bahrain. 
Table 7.2 
AGS: Trade as a Percentage of GNP in 1975 
GNP Imports. Imports Exports Exports Imports** Foreign Foreign 
(billions of US $) value percent value percent as a percentage trade trade: 
billions of GNP billions of GNP of aggregate demand us ~ GNP 
us ~ us ~ billions % 
UAE 7.8 2.6 33 6 .. 8 87 72 9.4 120.5 
Bahrain* 0.6 1.2 200 1.1 183 171 2.3 383.3 
Qatar 2.0 0.41 20 1.8 90 67 2.2 110.5 
Kuwait 11.2 2.4 21 9.2 82 55 11.6 103.6 
Saudi Arabia 38.3 7.2 19 27.8 73 41 35.0 91.4 
* The reason for imports being greater than exports is due to large re-exports. This factor also makes it meaningless 
to calculate some ratios which are therefore indicated. 
** Aggregate demand is GNP minus foreign trade surplus (deficit) calculated· as follows:· Imports GNP-(Exports-Imports) 
Source: EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the Yemens. Annual Supplement 1980, p. 263. 
i:'V 
(0 
.... 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain 
UAE 
Qatar 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Table 7.3 
AGS Foreign Trade: Country Percentage Importance (1977) 
(~ million and percent) 
Total Exports % Total Imports % 
43,464.9 66.0 14,657.3 54.0 
399.2 0.6 1,126.9 4.2 
9,525.5 14.4 4,652.4 17.1 
1,898.5 3.0 1,231.0 4.5 
8,970.3 13.6 4,591.9 17.0 
1,583.9 2.4 874.1 3.2 
65,842.3 100 . 27,133 • .6 100 
Trade Balance 
28,807.6 
-727.7 
4,873.1 
667.5 
4,378.4 
709.8 
+38,708.7 
Source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Featur~s of Economic Structure and Joint Work 
Prospe~ts for Arab Peninsula, March 1981, Table no. 2, p. 11, (Arabic). 
·~ 
~ 
~ 
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- Imports as a percentage of aggregate demand ranged from 41 percent in 
S. Arabia to 171 percent in Bahrain. 
7.2.2 AGS Balance of Payments - Main Features 
AGS Balance of Payments data base, vital as a basic tool in 
analysing this group's international economic relations, is generally 
deficient, qualitatively and quantitatively, and in the case of some 
countries is extremely poor. 
In the UAE, for example~ there have not been published any complete 
official balance of payments statements. The balance of payments 
estimates which have to be used are those prepared by the IMF and 
based on incomplete data of varying degrees of reliability. Most of 
the data in the services and private transfers account are based on 
very rough estimates and some of the other data are also subject to 
possibly large margins of error. No attempt has been made to estimate 
private capital flows separately but the errors and omissions entry 
is believed to reflect mainly such flows.(4) 
Other examples of the deficiency of data include the Government 
reserve assets of Kuwait as they include an unknown proportion of medium 
and long-term portfolio and equity investments. Private sector 
investment income, remittances and capital are still inadequately known.(5) 
The same situation tend, in broad terms, to be prevajling in 
other AGS. The data for some i terns such as oil sector tram:actiom: 
are considered quite reliaole, but even estimates for 6ther items, 
such as the large volume of unrecorded imports, non-oil income, other 
services, and workers remittances, (inward in the case of Oman and 
outward elsewhere), are subjec.t to considerable margins of error. 
However, data on AGS balance of payments are believed to be 
at least-broadly representative of actual trends. 
The structure of AGS balance of payments reflects the typical 
characteristics of an oil economy, i.e., a dominance of the oil sector 
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in financial activities and a limited home production base. The net 
surplus of the oil sector accrues almost entirely to the public sector 
in the form of Government oil revenues and is injected into the 
domestic income stream through Governments' domestic expenditures. 
AGS current account has consistently been in surplus in recent 
years, except for Bahrain and Oman, as oil export earnings have been 
considerably in excess of current payments by the public and private 
sectors. Despite a high level of official foreign aid disbursements 
and a large outflow of private capital, the overall balance of payments 
has also been in surplus in recent years. The size of the current 
account surplus increased substantially particularly following the 
sharp rise in oil prices in the latter part of 1973 and the beginning 
of 1974(6), and later in 1979. 
The large current account surpluses of recent years have been 
accompanied by substantial foreign aid disbursements and net outflows 
of capital by both the public and private sectors with the result that 
the overall balance of payments surplus in the UAE, for example, amounted 
to less than 40 percent of the combined current account surplus in the 
1974-77 period {Dh 68.2 billion or~ 17.3 million).(7) 
In Oman the balance of payment has been characterized by a large, 
although varying trade surplus, but also by large remittances of profits 
and expatriate workers savings, which have tended to put the current 
account into deficit. Official capital inflows and net oil-related 
capital movements have fluctuated considerably, but have generally offset 
current account developments, while there have been persistently large 
net unrecorded payments, attributable mainly to private capital outflows. 
The overall balance (as measured by changes in the banking system's net 
foreign assets) was persistently in deficit until 1977. 
In Bahrain's open economy with imports and exports both 
substantially exceeding GDP the balance of payments was,characterized 
by a fairly large trade deficitp attributable.to a heavy imbalance 
in non=oil trade, by a gradually rising current account deficit 
except for the year 1980. (Appendix Table 1.) The structure of the 
external accounts changed substantially in 1979, with the current 
account improving. As net oil exports rose due to price increases, 
and other exports also turned upp non-oil imports grew only slightly 
and the trade deficit narrowed. 
Services and Private Transfers: 
The AGS services' and private transfers' account has been 
characterized in. recent years by deficit, except for Kuwaiti and 
Bahraini services' accounts (i.e. excluding private transfers). 
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In Kuwait, the services account has been marked by growing 
surpluses attributable for the most part to sharply rising income from 
official and private investments abroad. Although official and private 
net transfers abroad have been substantial, the current account surpluses 
have remained large. 
In response, the authorities have pursued policj.es affecting thf~ 
capital account that have contributed to the international adjustment 
process. In particular foreign loans and investments by the Governmen~ 
and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED)p as well as 
by the private sector, have been sizeable. Despite these capital 
outflows large overall external surpluses have been realized in recent 
years, leading to a substantial increase in net foreign assets of the 
Government and the Central Bank.(B) (Appendix Table 2.) 
Bahrain's identifiable service transactions (Appendix Table 3) 
consist mainly of airline and port earning and corresponding payments 
(recorded under Transportation), expenditures l.Jy travell (~r~;, investment 
income P diplomati <.; outlays p and the local ~~xpend i l.ureF; of l:h1~ utTshore 
Banking Units (OBU). Total service receipts tripled between 1975 and 
· 1979p with all components growing rapidly, particularly OBU outlays. 
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It is estimatedp largely on the basis of nine-month bank data that 
earnings continued to. rise sharply in 1980. Investment income, 
reflecting the growth of official reserves and high interest rates 
abroadp was the chief gainer. Total service paymentsp which are 
considerably smaller than earningsp have not grown quite as rapid1y.(9) 
The above indicators reflect the importance of the services' 
sector in both Kuwait and Bahrain. 
Non-Oil Current Account: 
While AGS' general current accounts tended to result in 
surpluses during recent years (1973-80). the non-oil current accounts 
have been witnessing continuing growing def.ici ts as reflectE:d :i.n th<·! 
Appendix Table 4 on Saudi Arabia. This reflects the fact that all 
positive surpluses achieved in AGS current accounts are due, mainly. 
to oil sector accounts. 
Another important point emerging from Appendix Table 4 relates 
to the growing importance of investment incomep a subject examined further 
below. 
Overall Balance of Payment Account: 
The AGS overall balance of payment account has tended towards 
surplus in most years between 1972-80. This is particularly true of 
four Statesp Saudi Arabiap Kuwait. UAE and Qatar. 
The overall balance of payments surpluses of these countries have 
been associated with a growth in their foreign financial assets and 
investment activities abroad. as discussed further in Chapter 14. 
This achievement of overall balance of payments surplus has been 
part of the related effects of a net surplus of the oil sector which 
accrues almost entirely to the public sector in the form of Government 
oil revenues and is injected into the domestic income stream through 
Government domestic expenditures. Part of the surplus goes to foreign 
reserves accounts through the realized overall balance of payments 
surplus. the other part is recirculated into the world financial 
markets through investment. 
7.2.3 Trade and Payments System 
The trade and payments system of the AGS tends to be liberal 
and characterized by the following:(lO) 
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. 1. Import licensing is not required in some countries. e.g. S. Arabia, 
and even when required is given easily. usually for one year for 
specified i teins. 
2. Most imports are free of duty (mainly food items, raw materials 
and some equipment). and many others subject to very low duty- 2% to 
3%. For example. in Saudi Arabia. 15 percent of all customs items are 
duty freep 48 percent are subject to 3 percent levy whilst only 1 percent 
of customs subjected to protective duty of 20 percent. 
3. Impor~s of few items are. however. either completely prohibited. 
mainly for security and health purposes or subject to higher levies 
reaching 15%. as for alcoholic drinks in Qatar. 
4. Selected protected items are subject to imports duty round 20 
percent as in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
5. Payments for and proceeds from invisibles are not restricted 
except that payments must not be made to or received from Israel,Rhodesia, 
or South Africa. Travellers may freely import and export AGS banknotes 
and coins. 
No exchange control requirements are imposed on capital receipts 
or payments by residents or non-residents, but payments must not be made 
to or received from Israel, Rhodesia or South Africa. 
6. Exch~nge systems are also liberal, the exchange rate system is 
pegged to SDR in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Bahrain, the Omani Riyal 
is pegged to ~ US and the Kuwaiti Dinar is pegged to a special inter-
national currencies basket. 
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7.2.4 Financial Impact of Investment Income 
An analysis of balance of payments accounts and national budget 
illustrates a growing importance of investment income as an item 
effecting the'total sources of services' exports in balances of pay-
ment as well as the non~oil income in budgets. 
!n Kuwait investment income is proportional~ly greatest and 
constituted 299 percent of non-oil export's income in 1978 and 25 percent 
of the value of total exports (Table 7.4). This reflects the 
importance of such services activities in diversifying the sources of 
non-oil income. 
At the same time the investment income contribution to national 
budgetary income increased from 12.8 percent in 1973 to 16.4 percent 
in 1978. Its value proportional to non-oil budgetary income increased 
from 463 percent in 1973 to 757 percent in 1978, non-oil income 
contribution to total income decreasing slightly from 2.8 percent to 
2.16 percent (Table 7.5). 
The growing investment income, as for example, in Kuwait, and 
mainly from foreign sources, must be set in the context of national 
accounts structures characterized by a high savings ratio, in Kuwait 
averaging about 77 percent of GNP over the four years ended 1975/76 
(Appendix Table 5). Domestic utilization of these savings, i.e. the 
level of domestic capital formation, is lGw due to the inadequacy of 
profitable domestic investment opportunities and the attraction of 
higher yielding foreign assets. Over the 1972/73-1975/76 period only 
about 11 percent of total savings was invested domestically.(11) 
In Saudi Arabia investment income represented 3,666 percent of non-
oil exports in 1975 and 8% of total exports (Table 7.6). The 
importance of investment income in the Saudi budget grew in relation to 
total revenuo~• frorn ·;,' porcont to 8 perc1·:n l; be:: tween 1970 and 197~:> and 
from 19% of non-oil reve11ues in 1970 to 87 percent in 1975, whilst the 
Table 7.4 
Non-oil Exports and Investment Income: Percentage Importance 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait 
1975 1980 1976 1978 1978 
US :t mn. BD mn. QR mn. OR mn. US :t mn. 
1. Exports 26,568 1,445.0 8,730.0 552 •. 0 10,233 
2. Non-oil exports 0,060 210.0 287.0 30.2 845 
3. Oil, gas & related 
exports · 26,508 1,235.0 8,443.0 521.8 9,388 
4. Investment Income 2,200 181.1* 529~0 2.4** 2,529 
Ratio of 2:3 0.226% 17.004% 3.339% 5.787% 9.000% 
Ratio of 4:2 3666% 86% 184% 8% 299% 
Ratio of 4:1 8% 12% 6% 0.4% 25% 
* Service receipts. largely investment income. 
** Official Investment Income. 
Source: IMF Consul tat ions \ITi th AGS countries. 
UAE 
1978 
bn. dirhams 
38.4 
4.3 
34.1 
4.5 
12.609% 
104% 
12% 
"" CD CD 
Table 7.5 
Kuwait Investment Income and Bud~et Revenues 
(in millions of Kuwait dinars) 
1973/74 1975/76 1976/77 1978/79 
1. Investment Income 89.0 262.5 329.4 440.0 
2. Oil Revenues 584.0 2,234.6 2,598.2 2,186.7 
3. Other Revenues 19 • .2 37.4 58.9 58.1 
4. Total 694.1 2,550.2 2,992.1 2,687.7 
1:2 15.24% 11.74% 12.68% 20.12% 
1:3 463.5% 701.87% 559.25% 757.31% 
1:4 12.82% 10.29% 11.00% 16.37% 
3:4 2.8% 1.46% 1.97% 2.16% 
Source: IMF, Kuwait- Recent Economic Developments, SM/79/57, March~. 1979. 
w 
0 
0 
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non-oil revenue contribution to total revenues decreased from 14 percent 
to 9 percent (Table 7.6). 
In UAE, investment income constituted 104 percent of non-oil 
exports in 1975 and 12 percent of total exports (Table 7.7). 
In relation to Government revenues, investment income increased from 30 
million dirhams in 1972 to 1300 million dirhams in 1977, corresponding 
to a growing contribution from 1 percent of total revenue of 1972 to 
4% in 1977 and .from 19 percent of non-oil revenues in 1972 to 73 percent 
in 1977 (Table 7.7). 
In Qatar, investment income corresponded to 184 percent of non-
oil exports in 1976 and 6 percent of total exports (Table 7.4). 
In Bahrain, investment income corresponded to 86 percent of non-
oil exports in 1980 and 12 percent of total exports (Table 7.4). 
In Oman a less important role has been played by investment income 
as it constituted only 8 percent of non-oil exports and 0.4 percent of 
total exports in 1978 (Table 7.4). 
The Circulation of Financial Surpluses: 
AGS surpluses in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar have been 
committed on a continuous basis to grants and investments in Arab and 
other developing countries as well as to investments in the capital 
markets of the developed countries. Whilst to a considerable extent 
this has been conventional overseas aid, there is also a strong investment 
element: 
"It was hoped that income from such investments would 
in the long run provide Kuwait and AGS with adequate 
Government revenue to offset the possible loss of 
revenue when oi 1 resources are depleted."( 12) . 
More analysis ofthis issue will be done in Chapter 14. 
7.3 National and AGS Trade Patterns within the Sub-region 
In this section, the main characteristics of inter-AGS trade are 
identified, and the relative importance established of intra-Sub-regional, 
1. Investment income 
2. Oil Revenues 
3. Other Revenues 
4. Total Revenues 
Ratio 1:2 
Ratio 1:3 
Ratio 1:4 
Ratio 3:4 
Table 7.6 
Economic Impact of Return ort Government Investment: Saudi Arabia 
1970/71 
.6,827 
1,127 
7,954 
14.17% 
1971/72 
253 
9,795 
1,321 
11,119 
2.57% 
19.07% 
2.26% 
11..88%. 
1972/73 
440 
13,455 
1,870 
15,325 
3.27% 
23.52% 
2.87% 
12.20% .. 
1973/74 
857 
39,267 
2,438 
41,705 
2.18% 
35.15% 
2.05% 
0.59% 
1974/75 
4,207 
94' 190 
5,913 
10,103 
4.46% 
71.14% 
4.20% 
5.90% 
Source : IMF, Saudi Arabia - An Economic and Financial Survey, SM/76/57, March 26, 1976. 
Table 7.7 
UAE: Investment Income artd Budget Income 
(in million of dirhams) 
1972 1974 1975 
Estim. 
1975/76 
7' 771 
86.920 
8,877 
95,847 
8.94% 
87.54% 
8.11% 
9.26% 
1977 I 
! 
r-----------------------------------------------~ I 1. E~ternal Investment Income 
2. Oil Revenues 
3. Other Revenues 
4. Total Revenues 
Ratio 1:2 
Ratio 1:3 
Ratio 1:4 
Ratio 3:4 
30 
2, 645. 
154 
2,829 
1.13% 
19.48% 
1.06% 
5.44% 
400 
20,132 
772 
21,304 
1.98% 
51.81% 
1.88% 
3.62% 
600 
21,961 
1, 204 
23,765 
2.73% 
49.83% 
2.52% 
5.06% 
Source: IMF, UAE - Recent Economic Developments, SM/79/16, Jan. 12, 1979. 
1,300 
30,481 
1,744 
33,555 
4.26% 
73.28% 
3.87% 
5.28% 
(,.1 
0 
N 
AGS-Regional and AGS-International trade~ 
7.3.1 National Trade with the Sub-Region 
Kuwait's Trade with AGS: 
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Kuwait's trade with AGS occupies a very modest place in its total 
foreign trade. Its exports to AGS cons·ti tuted only 6. 6 percent of its 
total exports in 1977, however this made Kuwait proportionately the 
second largest indiv.idual AGS exporter to the AGS Sub-region, Bahrain 
being the first. Kuwait's imports from other AGS represented only 0.4 
percent of its overall imports in 1977. 
Saudi Arabia received 75.3 percent of Kuwait's exports to AGS 
in 1977p whilst the UAE received 15.1 percent (Table 7.8). Kuwait 
imported 57 percent of its AGS imports from Saudi Arabia in 1977 and 
23.4 percent from Bahrain (Table 7.9). 
Kuwait's trade balance was in surplus with all other AGS and 
achieved the largest single AGS surplus in inter-Gulf trade in 1977 
(Table 7.10). 77.2% of Kuwait's non-oil exports go to AGS, 73.6% of 
which were re~exported products.(13) 
UAE Trade with AGS: 
UAE seems to rely almost completely on non-Arab countries for its 
export markets.· For example its exports to other AGS in 1977 constituted 
only 0.35% of the total with 0.05% to other Arab countries (Table 7.11). 
UAE imports from AGS represented 5.3 percent of its total imports in 
1977 (Table 7.12). 
Most of UAE exports to AGS are directed to Oman and Saudi Arabia 
which received 38.9 and 33.9 percent of UAE exports in 1977 respectivelyp 
followed by Qatar with 17 percent and Kuwait with 3.5 percent. 55.6 percent 
of UAE imports from the AGS came from Saudi Arabia in 1977, followed by 
Kuwait's 33.7 percent (Table 7.9). 
UAE trade with AGS achieved overall surplus in 1977, due mainly 
to its trade surplus with Oman and Qatar, although a deficit was realized 
in UAE's trade with the other AGS. 
Table 7.8 
National Inter-AGS Exports in 1977 as % of Total Inter-AGS Exports 
Exports 
to Saudi" Bahrain UAE Qatar Kuwait Oman 
Exports Arabia 
from 
1. Saudi Arabia 
-
96.6 0.6 0.3 0.8 1.7 
2 .• Bahrain 84.6 - 6.0 3.8 5,. 5 0.1 
3. UAE 33.9 6.6 
-
17.1 3.5 38.9 
4. Qatar 65.0 17.9 16.4 
-
0.7 
-
5. Kuwait 75.3 2.7 15.1 6.2 
-
0.7 
6. Oman .···. 5.0 
-
95.0 
- -· -
7. Total 35.5 45.9 5.4 4.8 1.5 6.9 
Source: Derived from Appendix Table 6 •. 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
% 
45.6 
11.1 
15.2 
0.6 
27.3 
0.2 
100 
t.J 
0 
~ 
I 
~ . m 
1. Saudi Arabia 
% 
2. Bahrain 
% 
3. UAE 
% 
4. Qatar 
% 
5. Kuwait 
% 
. 6. Oman 
% 
Total 
% 
Table 7.9 
Inter-Arab Gulf Trade Imports 1977 
(in US-~ millions and percent) 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain UAE 
-
216.0 108.0 
22 11 
8.5 
-
21.8 
21.3 54.5 
134.5 23.5 -
55.6 9.7 
5.11 9.1 56.4 
5.3 9.4 58.3 
4.4 1.8 1.1 
57 23.4 14.3 
-
23.1 128.2 
14.9 82.9 
152.5 273.5 315.5 
10.0 17.9 20.6 
Source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Op. cit., p. 16. 
Transferred from SR into US ~ by the author 
Percentages calculated by the author 
Qatar Kuwait 
9.1 652.4 
0.9 66 
2.6 6.0 
6.5 15 
2.3 81.4 
1.0 33.7 
-
26.1 
27 
0.1 -
1.3 
-
3.23 
2.2 
14.1 769.1 
0.9 50.3 
Oman 
3.0 
0.1 
1.1 
2.7 
-
-
0.3 
4 
-
4.4 
0.3 
Total 
988.5 
100 
40.0 
100 
241.7 
100 
96.7 
100 
7.7 
100 
154.5 
100 
1,529.1 
100 
w 
0 
tn 
Country 
1. Saudi Arabia 
2. Bahrain 
3. UAE 
4. Qatar 
5. Kuwait 
6. Oman 
Total 
Table 7.10 
Trade Balance between AGS 
(US ~ million) 
1977 
Imports from AGS Exports to AGS 
988.6 990.1120968 
40.0 240.874884 
241.7 315.775908 
96.7 14.0155704 
7.7 592.6259808 
154.5 4.1706252 
1529.1 2157.5750652 
Source: Ibid. Table 7, p. 17. In Saudi Rials. 
.Trade Balance 
Deficit Surplus 
-
1.5 
- 200.9 
-
74.04 
82.73 
-
-
584.8 
150.4 
-
233.17 861.2 
Transferred into US Dollar based on official rates for exports and 
imports, published in U.N., International Foreign Trade Statistics. 
c.v 
0 
~ 
UAE exports to AGS are composed mainly of re-exports. 
Qatar's Trade with AGS: · 
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Qatar imported from AGS 7.8 percent of its total imports in 1977p 
whilst exporting to them only 0.7 percent of its total exports. Qatari 
exports went mainly to Saudi Arabia which received 65% of its total 
exports to AGS in 1977; Bahrain took 17.9% and the UAE 16.4%. Qatar 
imports from AGS came mainly from the UAE and Kuwait which, respectively, 
contributed 58.3 and 27 percent. 
Qatar had trade qeficits with UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait but was in 
surplus with Saudi Arabia in 1977. 
Bahrain's Trade with AGS: 0 
Bahrain is notable as having the highest inter-AGS exports in 
relation to total international exports. Bahrain's exports to AGS 
corresponded to 60.4 percent of its total world exports in 1977. Bahraini 
exports went mostly to Saudi Arabia, 84.6% in 1977, followed by UAE, 
Kuwait and Qatar respectively (Table 7.8). 
On the other hand, Bahraini imports from AGS constituted in 1977 
only 3.6 percent of its total imports (Table 7.12) of Bahrain's imports 
from AGS in 1977, 54.5% came from the UAE, 21.3% from Saudi Arabia and 
15% from Kuwait (Table 7.9). 
Bahrain's overall trade with AGS achieved in 1977 a surplus of over 
US ~ 200 million, but registered deficits with UAE and Oman. 
Aside from aluminium exportsp mainly to Japanp sales to neighbouring 
Gulf countries are mainly accounted for by non-oil exports, and, abGve 
all, re-exports. 
Oman Trade with AGS: 
Omani foreign trade with AGS constitutes a small percent of its 
total international foreign trade. 90% of its exports went.to developed 
market economies in 1977, with 9.4 percent directed to developing countries 
(Appendix Table 7). Neverthelessp 93% of its non-oil exports was 
directed to AGS in 1977 (Appendix Table 8). Omani exports to AGS 
are composed mainly of asbestos pipes, dried limes arid dates, flour 
and fish. 
Oman is the smallest contributer to total inter~Gulf exports, 
with only 0.2 percent in 1977. 
Oman exports were mainly directed in 1977 to the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia with 95 and 5 percent respectively. 
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Most of Omani AGS imports came from UAE, followed by Bahrain and 
Kuwait with 82.9, 14.9, 2.2 percent in 1977 respectively (Table 7.9). 
Oman registered a deficit overall in its 1977 trade with other 
AGS (Table 7.10). 
Saudi Arabia Trade with AGS: 
Saudi Arabia trade with AGS occupies a limited role in its inter-
national trade; its exports to AGS constituted only 2.3% of its total 
exports in 1977 (Table 7.11) whilst its imports represented 6.8% 
(Table 7.12) . 
99.6% of Saudi exports to AGS in 1977 went to Bahrain, and were 
composed of petroleum. 
Saudi Arabia imported from Kuwait 66 percent of its imports from 
AGS in·1977, 22 percent from Bahrain and 11 percent from UAE. 
Saudi Arabia registered a very small surplus in its trade with 
AGS in 1977, corresponding to some US i 1.5 million (Ta!Jle 7~10). 
7.3.2 Inter-Gulf Trade 
The existing volume of intra-Sub-regional trade is clearly very 
limited. The total inter-country imports of AGS constituted only 6 
percent of total imports, with an additional 5 percent from other Arab 
countries (Table 7.12). 
Oman is the largest AGS intra-regional importer taking 17.7 
percent of its total imports from AGS. Qatar follows with 7.9 percent 
Country AGS 
1. Saudi Arabia 990.1 
2. Bahrain 240.86 
3. UAE 315.7 
4. Qatar 14.0 
5. Kuwait 592.5 
6. Oman 4.2 
Total 2157.3 
Source: Ibid. Table 3. p. 13. 
Table 7.11 
Inter-Gulf Exports. Regional and International 1977 
(in ~ mn and percent) 
% .Other Arab Countries % Other Countries 
2.3 697.2 1.6 41777.7 
60.4 10.5 2.6 147.8 
0.35 4.4 0.05 9205.3 
0.74 1.1 0.06 1883.4 
6.6 669.1 7.5 7708.6 
0.3 
-
0.0 1571.2 
2.9 1382.3 2.1 62294 
Computed in ~ US by the author 
% Total 
96.1 43464.7 
37.0 399.2 
99.60 9525.5 
99.20 1898.5 
85.9 8970.3 
99.7 1575.4 
95.0 65842.2 
% 
100 
.100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
(..J 
10 
<tO 
.and Saudi Arabia with 6.8 percent (Table 7.12). 
Total inter-country exports constituted only 2.9 percent of their 
total exports in 1977, with a further 2.1 percent to other Arab countries 
(Table 7.11). 
Bahrain, the largest intra-Regional exporter, sent 60.4 of its 
exports (including re-exports) to the Sub-region (Table 7.11). Other· 
AGS Sub-regional exporters were, in comparison, insignificant: 
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Kuwait 6.6%, Saudi Arabia 2.3%, Qatar 0.7%, UAE and Oman 0.3% (Table 7.11). 
Though the data on the detailed composition of intra-Gulf regional 
trade is scanty, it is clear that most of it consists of re-exports 
including construction and mining machinery, transport equipment 
(particularly from UAE with Dubai contributing 94% of UAE re-exports), 
automobiles and consumer durables. 
Domestically originating non-oil exports include the following 
items: dried limes, asbestos pipes, dates, flour and fish from Oman; 
aluminium ingots and shrimps from Bahrain; fertilizers, agricultural 
inputs and handicrafts from Saudi Arabia; fertilizers, building materials 
and prefabricated houses fro.m Kuwait; and fertilizers and steel from Qatar. 
The AGS int~a-Sub-regional trade balance indicates that Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE achieved surpluses while Oman and Qatar met 
deficits in 1977. Kuwait achieved the largest surplus, with US ~ 584.8 
million. Though Kuwait is the major AGS exporter to the Sub-region, 
this is almost all of re-exports. 
7.4 Summary and.Concluding Remarks 
The preceding analysis of the structure of and recent developments 
in AGS foreign trade and balance of payments has shown a high degree 
of AGS dependency on international economic relationships both in trade 
and investment. The structure of Sub-regional trade relations has proved 
to be comparatively very weak and the same has to be said of AGS-Arab 
Country 
1. Saudi Arabia 
Table 7.12 
Inter-Gulf Imports 2 Regional and International Imports 1977 
(in million US ~ and percent) 
AGS % Other Arab % Other Countries Countries 
988.7 6.8 1114.2 7.6 12554.5 
0~ 
85.6 
2. Bahrain 40.0 3.6 4.9 0.4 1082.0 98.5 
3. UAE 241.7 5.3 56.2 1.1 4354.4 93.6 
4. Qatar 96.7 7.9 27.7 2.2 1106.6 89.9 
5. Kuwait 7.8 0.4 98.0 1.9 4486.1 97.7 
6. Oman 154.6 17.7 2.3 0.3 717.2 82.0 
Total 1529 •, 5 6.0 1303.3 5.0 2430.9 89.0 
. Source: Ibid. Table 4 • 
Computed in US S by the author 
Total 
14657.3 
1126.9 
4652.4 
1231.0 
4591.9 
874.1 
27133.6 
% 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
w 
1-' 
1-' 
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trade relations. 
The balance of payments accounts are a very clear mirror reflecting 
the nature of oil-based economies, with a very weak non-oil base as 
illustrated in the non=oil balance of payments accounts. 
AGS trade and payment system is shown to be, in broad terms, 
liberal with few restr·ictions, both reflecting and reinforcing the 
strength of wide-ranging international rather than Sub-regional or 
Regional linkages. 
·Inter-Sub-regional trade is very limited; total inter-Sub-regional 
trade constituted only 3,9 percent of AGS total foreign trade in 1977 
.(Table 7.13) with 6 percent for imports and 2.9 for exports. Saudi 
Arabia has the highest value and proportion of Sub-regional trade, 53.7% 
in 1977, and at the same time 62.5% of total AGS world trade (Table 7.14). 
When reviewing Inter-Sub-regional trade developments one can perceive 
large variations over time, indicative of rather unstable trade 
relationships. For example, Bahrain imports percentages from Saudi 
Arabia change from 0.8% in 1970 to 63.4% in 1974, _then dropped again to 
0.9% in 1978, this the effect in the main of great variation in petroleum 
imports (Appendix Table 9 ) • However, we also note that Bahraini 
exports to Saudi Arabia grew from 32.1 of total exports in 1970 to 
51.1% in 1977, then dropped to 21.6 in 1978 (Appendix Table 9 ), a lack 
of stability resulting from the high proportion of re-exports in Bahrain's 
export trade and the volatility of Saudi demand for the-associated 
goods. 
Similarly, Kuwaiti exports to Saudi decreased from 18.9% in 1978 
to 4.4% in 1977 (Appendix Table 10), a variation caused by the same 
factors as affected Bahrain.(see 14 and 15) 
AGS trade within the Arab Re~ion is also proportionately small. 
Total AGS trade with the rest of the Region in 1977 constituted only 
3 percent of their total international trade (Table 7.13) with 5 percent 
Country 
1. Saudi Arabia 
2. Bahrain 
3. UAE 
4. Qatar 
5. Kuwait 
6. Oman 
Total 
L 
Table 7.13 
Inter-Gulf Trade, Sub-regional, Regional and International (1977) 
(in millions $ US and percent) 
AGS % Other Arab % Other Countries % Countries 
1978.8 3.4 1811.4 3.1 54332.2 93.5 
280.86 18.4 15.4 1.0 1229.8 80.6 
557.4 3.9 60.6 0.5 13559.8 95.6 
110.7 3.5 28.8 1.0 2990.0 95.5 
600.3 4.4 767.1 5.7 12194.7 89.9 
158.8 6.5 2.3 0.1 2288.4 93.4 
3686~86 3.9 2685.6 3.0 86594.9 93.1 
:Source: Table 7.11 and 7.1~ 
Total 
58122.0 
1526.1 
14177.9 
3129.5 
13562.2 
2449.5 
92975.7 
% 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
VJ 
1-' 
w. 
Table 7.14 
? 
AGS Sub-regional and International Trade 
(in ~ US millions and percentage importance) 
(1977) 
Country AGS % Total World 
Saudi Arabia 1978.8 53.7 58122.0 
Bahrain 280.9 7.6 1526.1 
UAE 557.4 15.1 14177.9 
Qatar 110.7 3.0 3129.5 
Kuwait 600.3 16.3 13562.2 
Oman 158.8 4.3 2449.5 
Total 3686.9 100 92975.7 
Source: Derived from Tables 7.11 and 7.12 
% 
62.5 
1.6 
15.3 
3.4 
14.6 
2.6 
100 
w 
I-' 
.1-b-l 
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for imports and 2.1 percent for expqrts. This situation of very weak 
inter-Arab trade relations is further examined in Chapter\0. 
As regards the international circle linkage~ of the AGSp the 
structure of foreign trade clearly reflects the current structure of 
their economies and their individually perceived development needs. 
The fact·e>rs- and -fo:Pces which strengthen current trends and limit the 
expansion of intra-Sub-regional and Regional trade can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. The availability of foreign exchange through high and continuously 
rising oil revenuesp the limited agricultural and industrial base of AGS 
economies and thus the high average and marginal propensity to importp 
the vigorous efforts at economic diversificationp social development 
and industrializationp all these factors can be expe'2ted to continue 
to encourage the growth of AGS imports from developed countries rather 
than through intra-regional trade. (Appendix Table 11.) 
2. The AGS attempts to reorientat~ their economies towards petro-
chemical industries and other heavy industries are particularly directed 
more to world markets than to Sub-regional or Regional ones. This 
apparent path to the diversification of their economies and reducing 
dependence on oil imports is in fact leading to continuing heavy reliance 
of the AGS on international markets. There is little indication that 
the decrease in mutual economic dependence is about to be reversed; on 
the contrary current development p"lans show a marked- similarity to each 
other in terms of priorities for productive investment with each State 
investing in petrochemicals, fertilisers, etc. (16) 
The comparison may be unfair at this stage, but the extent of the 
undertaking which lies ahead for the Arab Gulf countries in creating an 
integrated economic unit can be assessed here with reference to the 
experience of the European Economic Community - where the member States 
accounted for about 35 percent of each other's trade before the Community's 
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inception, rising to about 50 percent within five years of the E.E.C.'s 
inception.(l6) This is a rough measure of the degree of difference 
as indicated by trades between the real economic diversity of Western 
Europe and the lack of diversity between the AGS today and for years 
to come.(17) 
3. The transit and re-export trade between AGS is expected to c.lirninish 
as each country develops its ports and transport networks to handle and 
distribute more and more of its imports and exports. 
However, against these trends and influences, the current 
industrialization cooperatien movement leading to the establishment of 
joint industrial ventures directed to the Gulf as well as to international 
markets is of some significance. Already, some industrial products are 
directed mainly to Gulf markets, for example from the Qatari integrated 
steel complex. Opened in April 1978, with a total production reaching 
440,320 tons of steel bars in 1980, exported mostly to Saudi Arabia, 
UAE and Kuwait,(18) this indicates some movement to increase the role of 
inter-Gulf trade. This movement, so far, has been slow and quantitatively 
less significant than increasing dependence on trade outside both Sub-
regional and Regional. 
''The many agreements on economic co-operation and 
co-ordination among the Arab Gulf States, therefore 
have not succeeded in creating a greater measure of 
mutual economic dependence but have, rather, been 
accompanied by decreasing mutual economic dependence."(19) 
Compared with the industrial sector; the services sector seems to 
have special importance in the future o.f diversification of income sources, 
mainly in the field of investment activities which have begun to play a 
clear role in Government external income. Cooperation between the AGS 
by pooling their financial surpluses and reserves, or part of them, with 
the strategic objective of economic diversification through financial 
and other 1-;erv ices appears both feasible and viable. More detailed 
study of this subject is made in Chapter 14. 
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As a final note in this chapter it is worth emphasising the 
importance of improving the balance of payments' accounts of AGS, 
which best could be done in cooperation with IMF. Existing glaring 
deficiencies in the information at present available to decision-makers 
can lead to inefficient analysis and proposed policies. 
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CHAPTER 8 ~ MOTIVATION FOR DEVEL0PMENT COOPERATION - THE GENERAL SETTING 
8.1 Introduction 
McClelland and Hagen, in their in-depth search to find a basic 
force behind development, came up with one answer: motivation through 
the'need-for-achievement'.(l) 
In this context Part 3 is devoted to an examination of the 
motivation for cooperation between AGS through the need for achievement 
of a joint development strategy in order to serve common objectives. 
Chapter 8 explores first in a general context the basis for cooperation 
motivation. Development determinants are used as the main tools of 
analysis, with some reference to quantitative results of cooperation 
among developing countries. However, the quantitative gains would not 
receive the basic attention when analysing the whole subject by this 
author, as non-measurable and qualitative changes are of special relevance 
to the achievement of development objectives, especially for AGS, where 
a high rate of aggregate as well as per capita growth of GDP was 
achieved during the Seventies (see Part 1 and Chapter 9). 
This part of the research is considered as the backbone for the 
whole coming analysis of~pragmatic approach for the development cooperation 
of AGS (the Sub~regional circle) and for the case studies on cooperation 
within the regional circle, mainly on Agriculture , as well as case 
- -- - -
studies relating to cooperation on 'investment' within the three circles, 
including the international circle. 'Cooperation' as a term will be 
used to mean joint'action in the Sub-regional group, within the Arab 
region, or internatiarli cooperation relations, that joint action which 
can be described to be development-oriented and motivated by development 
considerations and joint objectives. 
Thus analysis will be conducted in the light of joint development 
objectives, that can be served either on Sub-regional, Regional or 
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International levels. Concentration will be directed mainly to those 
AGS interests which create a motivation for cooperation within the 
three circlesp Sub-regionalp Regional and International. These 
objectives for AGS will be supposed to be 'the achievement of equitable 
and secured real growth within the framework of Arab Socio-cultural 
and ideological construction'. 
The term 'cooperation' within the three circles will have the 
following components: 
1. Sub-regional cooperation (include AGS). 
2. Regional cooperation (includes mainly the Arab worldp but the 
Islamic and Developing world will be referred to from time to time within 
the regional frameworkp however within narrower space). 
3. International cooperation (includes the developed world, mainly 
in the West and Japan, in addition to United Nations). 
Although reference to the term 'Cooperation' in this chapter will 
have the above-mentioned meaningp which is wide enough to include various 
forms of partnership from adjustmentp harmonisationp coordinationp 
association to finally integration; however, chapter 11 will go further 
towards discussing which form of cooperation is suitable to AGS within 
the main objective geared towards a sound pragmatic approach for 
development cooperation. 
8.2 AGS DeveloEment Determinants and the Need for Cooperation 
8.2.1 Cooperation Movement Atmosphere as a motive for Cooperation 
Free trade areas, common markets, economic unions, and other types 
of economic cooperation schemes (see Chapter 11) aroused hope that they 
would result in rapid economic progress in the countries involved. 
Despite difficulties encountered and the failure of many schemes to live 
up to these early expectations, cooperation, or regionalism remained a 
goal for many developing countries. More recently the formation of the 
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Caribbean Community and Common Market in 1973, and of the Economic 
Community of West African States in 1975, in addition to the most 
recent relevance to our subject is the establishment of the Arab Gulf 
Cooperation Council {GCC) in 1981, (Chapter 5), the formation of all 
these more recent schemes reflect the dramatic resurgence of interest 
in cooperation arrangements. 
Various forms of cooperation are seen as ways of stimulating 
economic growth and development. As a United Nations report has 
recently stated:(2) 
"Deep and prolonged recession and severe inflationary 
pressures in the developed market-economy countries, the 
increase in oil prices, fluctuations in other commodity 
prices and the.consequent financial and balance-of-payments 
problems, brought about dramatic changes in the world 
economy. All this gave rise to a greater awareness of the 
potentialities of collective self-reliance." 
"A desire to safeguard past advances and to assure future 
progress in the face of a very uncertain world economic 
situation is one very important stimulus to the movement 
for greater cooperation among developing countries." 
The present state and prospects for economic cooperation 
experiments in the three under-developed continents strongly supports 
the p~oposition that such schemes offer one of the very few ways 
available to the 'Third World' to break the present vicious circle of 
social backwardness, economic stagnation, and parochial nationalism.(3) 
"Self Reliance and 'Unity' have been the principal 
rallying cries of the Third World in international 
bodies in recent years. The obvious policy corollary 
of these sentim'ents is regional integratiori,"-which has 
enjoyed renewed enthusiasm among statesmen, bureaucrats, 
and academics alike."(4) 
8.2.2 The AGS Development Movement and the Need for Cooperation 
1. Cooperation as a Path for Development: 
Conceptual Background - The benefits of economic cooperation cannot 
be ful.l,y apprc~ciaLc,d without. the: •mdt·,r'::t~:tnding of' .it.:.: T'<!l.(;VancP. Lo thr: 
dynamics of development. Although preuenL com:ideraUon if-i reJated 
mainly to economies of scale, the issue is more far-reaching. The impact 
of cooperation on economies is intricately related to countries' 
capacities for sustained development. 
The development impulse that would result from the impact of Sub-
regional cooperation on the AGS economy is, moreover, not limited to 
inter-industrial relations in the strict sense. It operates at the 
foundation of the economy in virtually every sector. Thus structural 
changes in production ought to be paralleled by corresponding changes 
in trade, transport and other related activities. The lessening of 
dependence on primary production would have its counterpart in the re~ 
orientation of trade towards closer relationships within the sub-
region and a diminished importance of traditional overseas markets: it 
would likewise call for a restructuring of the transport network which 
would facilitate intra-sub-regional exhcnages as well as improve the 
location of economic activities. 
A U.N. agency stated it thus: 
"The sum total of these structural changes not only 
reveals what development is all about but also supplies 
the motive power for development. Thus, the growth-
generating influences of Sub-regional cooperation 
should not be viewed simply as providing economic 
activities which would otherwise not occur, but also 
as providing a framework more conducive to rapid 
development and less prone to structural imbalances. 
These imbalances are typical of traditional economies 
which lack harmonious development of the productive 
sectors and are burdened with bottle-necks."(5) 
2. AGS Development; Constraints, Prospects and Cooperation: 
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The need for development strategy for non-oi-l era is one important 
element. Both optimistic and pessimistic projections which are made of 
the AGS economies leave absolutely no doubt of the impending end of 
the petroleum era. As shown in Chapter 1, the life of petroleum for the 
Sub-region will last some 56 years, ranging from 168 years for Kuwait to 
58 years for UAE, 46 years for S. Arabia, while only 12 years in Bahrain 
and for 22 years in Oman and Qatar, on the basis of 1981 production 
level and proven reserves (Table 1.7). 
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During this period the AGS, if they are to establish reasonably 
prosperous futures for themselves will have to maintain extremely high 
levels of investment in the productive services sectors, whilst at the 
same time sustaining large expenditures on training and education; 
all this in addition to financing consumption expectations for goods 
and services. 
Given the limitations of their resource bases, Governments have 
come to see diversification largely in terms of investment in: 
(a) Capital intensive industries. 
(b) Supporting industries. 
(c) Infrastructures. 
(d) Other income generating services (transport, banking, trade, banking, 
hotels etc.). 
We turn, now, to examine how development determinants play a 
motivating force for cooperation, with some reference to sectoral needs, 
and how cooperation could help in tackling structural constraints facing 
development. 
Structural Constraints and Cooperation: 
Preceding analyses leads us to conclude that as the process of 
economic development of AGS has started to move, there have been identified 
the sectoral structural constraints which need to be tackled to enable 
these countries to approach comprehensive and profound development. 
In their drive towards diversification of economic base in preparation 
for the non-oil era, AGS have found themselves in a critical situation 
particularly in relation to the following development determinants: 
(a) As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, agriculture, which is the normal 
backbone of economies the world over, is a very small sector in the AGS. 
Its development potentials and prospects are limited. The pockets of 
agriculture in Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE do not even feed the populations, 
let alone produce raw materials or surplus capital (see Chapter 9 for 
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detailed analysis). 
(b) Weak structural changes despite high GNP growth rates: Whilst 
a rise in real income per person in the population is often presumed 
to indica.te a rise in per capita productivity, fundamental to real 
development achievements. the same indicator can not be applied to the 
AGS. Despite reaching a stage of growing real_ i_ncome per capita, as 
will be illustrated in Chapter 13, the AGS cannot attribute this to 
higher per capita productivity, but rather only to transferring the 
form of natural oil and gas assets into a money asset. 
Consequently, the logical process, assumed in economic literature, 
of raising productivity through improved efficiency· or technical 
progress in the use of economic resources already in hand and from the 
growing stock of real capital is a missing element in AGS development. 
It is the making good of this missing element that is necessary to lead 
to a healthy and meaningful association between growing per capita 
income and economic advancement in the Sub-region. This in turn 
requires structural change of a kind, which as will be seen. is best 
achieved through cooperative action. 
(c) The achievement of real growth of national income in the AGS in 
the foreseeable and more distant future has therefore to be based on, 
among other things, on four foundations. (6) 
(i) Obtaining the optimum rate and terms for converting oil and gas 
resources to a flow of financial and other real assets at home and/or 
abroad. 
(ii) Obtaining the optimum rate of saving out of current income and of 
reinvestment of earnings. 
(iii) Obtaining the optimum sectoral and geographical allocation of 
investment which contributes best Lo growth of the national economics 
and prevents the erosion of international investments by inflation and/or 
foreign exchange rates. This question is further discussed in Chapter 14. 
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(iv) The building up of human capital for the nation. 
These four foundations seem to create a strong motive for 
Sub-regional, Regional and International cooperation, i.e. what is here 
termed the 'trilateral approach'. This approach.is examined in the 
following chapters, to assess to how this approach could contribute 
to the achievement of optimum development process. 
8.2.3 Low Abso~ptive Capacity as a MotivaD~~for Cooperation 
The recent increases in oil revenues accruing to the major Arab 
oil producers has created a novel and hitherto scarcely known phenomenon: 
economic development which could proceed with a virtually unlimited 
supply of capital. However, the very large financial resources of the 
Arab Gulf States have not been absorbed domestically for a variety of 
reasons largely related to a highly skewed resource base (large limited 
to oil and gas), and sheer smallness of population and physical size. 
All of these elements together have severely limited the domestic 
'Absorptive Capacity' in ways which have proved to be serious constraints 
on the development of AGS. 
The relevance of this low 'absorptive capacity' as a motive for 
cooperation needs examination in the light of the conceptual meaning of 
the term and its determination of the growth of the economies of AGS 
so far, and of the dynamic effects on absorptive capacity of working 
within larger cooperating areas. 
Absorptive Capacity - The Conceptual Framework: 
"Absorptive capacity may then be defined as that amount 
of investment or that rate of gross domestic investment 
expressed as a proportion of GNP that can be made at an 
acceptable rate of return, with the supply of cooperant 
factors considered as given."(7) 
To economists, traditionally, the contraints on absorptive 
capacity fall into four broad categories: (a) those related to the size 
of the demand and the markets; (b) impediments due to inadequate infra-
'•. 
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structure and shortage of complementary inputs; (c) planning and 
implementation inadequacies; and (d) political, institutional and 
socio-cultural restrictions. For our purposes, the bottle-necks in 
domestic investment resulting from the very limited AGS natural and 
human resource base are also regarded as fundamentally important, hence 
the survey made in Chapter 1 and later references. They form the 
background to the sections that follow. 
This basic concept of absorptive capacity was first developed as 
an analytical tool appropriate to a generality of poor less developed 
countries with assumed potentials. Applied to 'mini-economies', such 
as those of the AGS the concept still remains of some value, 
especially in .the context of scale. Any enlargement of the scale of 
consideration to include Sub-regional or Regional groups of economies 
raises other possibilities which, conceptually, can be regarded as one 
of the rew~rds of cooperation, collaboration and integration. This is 
the concept that the absorptive capacity given regional cooperation among 
the various States of the Sub-region is greater than the sum total of 
the domestic absorptive capacities of the individual States taken 
separ~tely and in the absence of regional cooperation.(B) The 
validity of this claim, in broad terms, will be examined later while 
examining motives for cooperation within the three circles and the related 
applied case studies in Chapter 14. 
One important aspect of the limi t.s on-absorptive capacity in 
individual AGS has been the direction of a large part of their monetary 
investment to the global scene, outside the Sub-region and Region. 
Cooperation within the Sub-region and/or Region can create the 
opportunjties to rechannel at least a part of these investments. The 
creation within the Sub-region and Region of such wider opportunities 
also impl:i.es the cre;;ttion of wider markets which are well known to 
affect po:,;i ti vclv the absorptive capac.i ty of an economy and to i ncrem;c 
the quantitative, as well as qualitative potentials for development 
achievements. A bigger market could afford ampler opportunities for 
diversification and specialization with regard not only to industry, 
but also to agrarian and financial sectors. as well as enabling the 
creation of reciprocal trade which could enable each country to get 
some of the commodities it requires for its growth purposes at a high 
rate of productivity.(9) 
Absorptive capacity is a very important determinant of AGS 
development. It has an effect on oil production policies, which take 
into consideration the absor~tive capacity of their economies, 
Nationally, Subregionally, Regionally and Internationally. In affecting 
oil production policies, absorptive capacity affects, thereafter the 
extent of revenues achieved and surpluses derived from the total 
expenditure process, thus widening the circle of movement with which 
AGS can achieve optimum investment within all the above-mentioned 
circles. Ultimately, absorptive capacity, in the broader sense, seems 
very strongly to determine the extent and limits of economic 
diversification in the long-term strategy for the post-oil era 
Nationally, Sub-regionally, Regionally and Internationally. 
In the AGS the oil revenue revolution which commenced in 1973 
illustrates vividly the limits of absorptive capacities within national 
economic borders. and which resulted in the search for wider areas for 
investment of f1nancial surpluses. 
In Saudi Arabia, for example, oil production rose by about 12 per-
cent from 1973 to 1974, wh~le revenues went up 420 percent. The country 
was unable to absorb half this revenue. Bv mid-1975 international 
currency reserves had accumulated to over i 20 billion~ 31 times the 
1970 level~(lO) 
In Qatar, throughout the 1970's, budgeted allocations consistently 
exceeded developmental expenditures. The recent increased commitment 
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to development is adequately reflected in expenditure data. However. 
the capacity to implement development programmes has not kept pace 
either with existing programmes or with increased revenues of the 
Government.(ll) The same situation prevailed in the Sub-region as 
a whole as noted in Chapter 4. 
AGS national economies are not expected to grow enough during 
the 1980's to absorb its oil revenues domestically. In the UAE, for 
example, 1977 forecasts showed the UAE's annual Government spending 
at about ~ 6 billion in 1980 and ~ 7 billion in 1985, while the oil 
revenues were projected to be about~ 8 billion during both years.(12) 
The same estimates projected that imports would increase from about 
:ill 1 billion in 1975 to Z 2.1 billion in 1980 and ~ 3.2 billion in 1985. 
Given the projected oil revenues the UAE was inevitably heading towards 
large annual surpluses in its balance of trade and cumulative financial 
surpluses. (13) 
The strength of the constraint in finding domestic investment 
outlets is emphasised further if we expand the si.mple phrase 'shortage 
of complementary inputs' to cover the question of the very severely 
limited domestic physical resource base, as surveyed in Chapter 1. 
At the same time there is an urge to find remunerative outlets for th~ 
surpluses. All of this reinforces the positive relationship between 
absorptive capacity an,d the possibilities offered by cooperation. The 
realisation of low national absorptive capacity is becoming a vital 
motive to AGS cooperation within the Three Circles. 
8.2.4 Development StrategY Variables and Cooperation 
The qutline of a development strateey for Kuwait drawn up by 
Biblawi and Shafey(l4) seems to applv, with some modification, to the 
/\GS co.l.locLiveJy and Lhc modified ouLlim: pr<:sented in Tabl.u 8.1 i.u uut;d 
as the basis for further discussion. It refers to the main objectiver; 
of AGS development in its Sub-regional, Regional and International 
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context, resources, constraints and side effects. 
Table 8.1 
AGS Development Strategy Variables within Sub-regional, Regio~al.an~ 
International Contexts 
Objectives 
Domestic Resources 
Constraints 
Side Effects 
Secured and equitable growth of real national 
income, within the framework of socio-cultural and 
ideological structures uf AGS societies, extending 
into the post-oil era. 
1. Natural Resources: 
Mineral (Petroleum, Gas) 
Agriculture (Planting, livestock, fisheries) 
Geographical location 
2. Human Resources 
3. Fixed Capital Assets: 
Infrastructure 
Productive capacity 
Claims on foreign assets 
4. Liquid Capital Resources 
1. National: 
Conservation of oil and gas 
Market size and absorptive capacity for 
national investment 
Population size and composition 
Paucity of managerial, professional and 
labour skills 
Paucity of raw materials 
2. Sub-regional: 
Gulf Security - Identity 
3. Regional: 
Arab Regional Needs 
4. International: 
Energy need of the outside world 
Stabilization of international financial 
systems 
International "political absorptive capacity" 
of.investment 
5 •. Other: 
Various types of risks and uncertainties 
1. Strains on domestic and social fabric 
2. World inflation, terms of trade and domestic 
inflation 
3. Attitudes towards work in rentier sociP.ties 
The assessment of development resources and potentia1s, the 
evaluation of current conditions, the prospects for growth Rnd the 
obstacles to development as illustrated all over Part l~four chanters 
lead to the following conclusions in relation to cooperation: 
- The narrow 'window' (to borrow a space-age term) for the achievement 
of development objectives on national bases, given a natural resource 
endowments, rich in oil and gas, but very poor in other natural as 
well as human resources. ln addition, a large humber of powerful con-
straints relating to market size, population numbers and composition, 
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am paucity of managerial. entrepreneurial and professional _labour forces. 
- A less narrow window for the achievement of development objectives 
within the Sub-region, if resources are pooled and constraints of markets 
and managerial capacity are lessened. 
-A still wider and more vital opportunity window for development 
within the Arab Regional framework~ with larger resources and potential-
ities, particularly for agriculture (see Chapters 9 and 13). as well as 
reducing the depth of constraints relating to markets, population and 
managerial capacity and absorptive capacity for investment. 
Even more promising development achievements seem to be available 
within the International circle given the above-mentioned determinants •. 
This circle is examined in Chapters 10 and 14. 
8.2.5 Economies of Scale and Cooperation 
Economi~s of scale are by no means limited to manufacturing 
industries; they extend to every branch of activity. Thus, in a 
relatively small economy it is uneconomic to construct a large hydro-
electric plant because there are not enough users to absorb the power 
generated; i~ is not economic to engage in every aspect of agricultural 
research because there are not enough research workers to go round; 
it is uneconomic to train skilled workers of every kin('!. because the 
numbers required of workers possessing a particular skill (for example 
system analysis) may be very small; it is uneconomic to provide every 
type of specialized medical facility (for example, for the treatment of 
cancer) if the incidence of the disease among a small population is low. 
Examples of the wastefulness of attempting to ignore such diseconomies 
of scale abound in the Gulf area and some have already been noted e.g. 
the Sub-regional fisheries training centre at Kuwait (Chapter 5). 
We will, however, commence with a consideration of some examples 
of manufacturing industries as industrial development has been the 
main motivating force behind most of the recent cooperation schemes. 
8.2.6 Industrialization and Cooperation 
The AGS have been establishing many industries, either of the 
import substitution type, or export oriented as analysed in Chapters 
2 and 4. There are two important considerations to be taken here. 
First, manufacturing industry is everywhere still in the infant stage 
of its development despite the large capital inputs. This is reflected 
in various indicators to the manufacturing industry contribution to the 
national economy, as for example, that of Kuwait'· the Gulf State in which 
industrialization has the longest history. 
In terms of the degree of induitrialization (defined as the 
percentage ratio of value-added in manufacturing to value-added in 
commodity sectors other than construction, commerce, transportation, 
and Government services), Kuwait's score of 6% in the early seventies 
was essentially 'pre-industrial'. Kuwait in the mid-seventies was still 
in the same stage - still short of its planned 8% target, and still 
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way behind the 20% threshold of the stage of industrializing countries.(15) 
Kuwait's petrochemicals occupied central importance, contributing 
70% of value-added in manufacturing in the mid-seventies. Other 
branches were food and beverages 5%, wood products 4%, non-ferrous 
mineral products 5%, fabrjcated metal 6% and other industries 10%. 
Manufactured products accounted for over 70% of Kuwait's imports, and 
only around 8% of its (mainly Arab~re~ion-oriented) total exports. 
Inter-ind~stry transactions and linkages are relatively limited. The 
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manufacturing sector accounted for little more than 5% of total 
employment in the mid-seventies- over 90% of which were non-Kuwaitis.(l6) 
Secondlyp industrialization is not merely the setting up of 
industrial plants. The industrial plants must be capable over time of 
recpvering their costs of capital expenditurep plus a yield (in terms 
of commercial profits and/or other social benefit::l), otherwise instead 
of generating wealth they bleed the economy in a way which can in the 
long run desti.v the whole complexes being installed.(l7) The question 
of matching marketsp either Sub-regional, Regional or International 
of sizes appropriate to the capacities installed, in addition to the 
efficient use of science and technology to assure continuous advances 
in the industrial movement are of direct relevance to this issue. 
The growing appreciation of the extent and kind of problems 
impeding industrial development in the AGS contributes to the creation 
of an atmosphere favouring development cooperation. The main impediments 
which were analysed in some detail in Chapters 2 and 4 includes the 
paucity of raw materials, other than petroleum and natural gas, the 
relative lack of industrial skills and/or appetite for industrial 
employment among Kuwaitis and other AGS citizens; the relative narrow-
ness of the national domestic markets in view of the small populations; 
and shortages of industrial know-how and skills in the identification, 
design and approaisal of projects. 
In studying the future of Kuwaiti industry, its development, and 
the justification for support and connection with the Arab Common Market 
(ACM) the relevant Committee in 1979 concluded that: 
"Two facts are controlling the course of industrial 
development in Kuwait that urge the need to 
institutional reform efforts, these are: 
First, the technological, marketing and administrative 
know-how in the requisite quantities are available only 
from abroad. Second, there is the dilemma of an active 
Government role in a private enterprise environment. 
There is thus a need for greater classification of the 
respective role of the public, private and mixed 
sectors."(l8) 
11 ln the absence of these two types of institutional 
reforms industrialization efforts in Kuwait-would 
falter on account of insufficient or contradictory 
signals. 11 ( 18) 
The first needed institutional reform necessitates cooperation to 
meet marketing, building the administrative know-how and technological 
advancement. The author of this thesis thinks that the same situation 
is applicable within the Sub-region with different degrees ann 
priorities. 
Industrialization in Kuwait has really two facets: domestic 
facet concerned with industry within the national economy and the second 
facet is an external one in the form of joint ventures within the Sub-
region or in the Arab Region in general, and the less developed world 
at large, in addition to some joint projects within the international 
circle. 
The external facet expands the domestic absorptive capacity 
insofar as it opens up a broad secure linkage possibility for home-
based Kuwaiti industry. This can take the form of backward linkage; 
e.g. agricultural and other raw materials. It can also take the form 
of forward linkages, e.g. subsequent stages in processing (for 
petrochemicals, steel etc.) and in assembly (possibly in some branches 
of engineering and in prefabricated construction projects abroad 
supplied by Kuwaiti Cement projects etc.).(19) 
It must be emphasized that· coop_eration is essential, not only as 
a means for securing access to the wider regional market for the 
growing petrochemical industries, but also as a vehicle for coordination 
and harmonization of the oil producer's plans for the development of 
petrochemicals and other energy and capital-intensive industries, 
thus preventing duplication, waste, and harmful competition. 
The general argument shows that an increase in the aggregate 
volume of production of anything will generally increase the size, and 
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therefore the internal economies possessed by such a representative 
firm; that it will always increase the external economies to which the 
firm has access; and thus will enable it to manufacture at a less 
proportionate cost of labour and sacrifice than before.(20) 
Important economies of scale in production costs seem to prevail, 
not only in the more capital-intensive producer goods industries, 
such as chemicals and steel, but also in consumer-oriented industries 
such as textiles. Studies have shown, as illustrated in Tables 8.2 
and 8.3, that economies in unit production costs vary from a maximum 
of about 56 percent for ethylene and isopropyl-alcohol, to a minimum 
of 20 percent for the spinning of coarse cloth in textiles. The 
highest economies are in a group of chemical products: ethylene, 
isopropyl-alcohol, PVC, carbon black, amonium nitrate and butane, all 
with economies greater than 40 percent. Cement and steel have 
economies of 46 percent and 40 percent respectively.(21) 
If economies of scale in manufacturing are as widespread as seems 
to be the case then it could be expected that plants based on similar 
technologies for a given industry will tend to be of similar size in 
different countries.(22) It follows that if technical factors influence 
the size of typical or average plant, then the size of the market will 
influence the number of plants. As the developing markets tend to be 
small, this situation has important implications in relation to their 
industrial development. Consequently, given the existence of economies 
of scale, countries with large markets will be in an advantageous 
position in these lines of production requiring a minimum size of plant 
which is well above the market size of small countries. 
Dynamic changes in scale economies arise as a result of past 
experience. Increasing the efficiency of both labour and management 
through s:;ai ned experience gained over ti.me i.s well known, and forms thf~ 
basis for infant industries' justifiable requirement of tariff 
335 
Table 8.2 
Economies of Scale in Productlon Cost in Selected Manufacturins Industries !Pre-investment 
or Bngineerln~ Data2 
Maximum 
Product, capacity Unit Variation in capacity and production decrl!aSe in Scale 
and cost cost production factor(s, 
coste (%) 
Alumina 
Capacity Thoueando of tone per year 60 100 165 330 
Cost per ton 1965 US dollars 82.30 73.45 67.45 59.00 28 0.804 
1\cetylene (from 
natural sae) 
· Capacity Thousands of tons per year 13.6 27.2 45 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 465 376 320 31 0.688 
Ammonium nitrate 
Capacity Thousands of tons per year so 100 150 300 
Coat per ton 1957 US dollars 190.4 145.1 125.6 101.5 46 0.649 
Beer slaee 
bottles 
Capacity Number of mauldin~ machines 1 2 6 12 
Cost per ton 1957 US dollars 8.51 7.25 6.13 5.69 33 0.695 
Butadiene 
Capacity Thousands of tons per year 10 20 40 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 600 450 337.5 44 0.585 
Carbon Black 
Cape.c1 ty Thousands of tone per year 10 25 50 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 300 208 160 47 0.610 
Cement 
Capacity Thousands of tone per year 100 450 900 1,800 
Cost per ton 1959 us dollars 26 19.8 16.4 13,9 46 0.517 
Ethylene (from 
gasoline) 
Capacity Thousands of tons per year 10 20 60 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 570 413 250 56 0.540 
Isopropyl-Alcohol 
Capacity Thousands of tone per year 6 12 30 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 242 167 ,107 56 0.493 
Polyethylene 
(high pressure) 
Capacity Thousands of tons pel;" year 8.13 12 24 
1960 US dollars 492 417 383 22 0.770 
Polyvinyl chlorit:le 
(P.v.c.) 
Capacity Thousands of tone per year 6 20 40 
Cost per ton 1960 US dollars 285 170 129 55 0.529 
Steel (rolled 
products) 
Capacity Th~sanda of tons per year 50 100 200 300 
Coat per ton 1966 US dollars 162.6 130 103.3 97 40 0. 711 
Styrene 
Capacity Thousands of tone per year 10 25 70 
Coat per t.on 1960 US dollars 280 224 177 37 0.764 
Cotton textiles 
(Coarse cloth, 
spinning) 
2,000/90 6,000/270 10,000/450 18,500/630 Capacity Number o~ spindles/loom 
Cost par·unit Index 100 83 81 80 20 0.891 
Cotton Textiles 
(Fine cloth, 
spinning) 
2,000/43 10,000/214 18,500/396 Capacity Number of spindles/looms 6,000/130 
Cost per unit Index 100 69 64 60 40 0.759 
e: T~etal, s. 'Economics of Scale and Size of Plant•. In, The Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. xiii, No .. 1 
and 2, 1975, Table no. 1, p. 98. 
!able 8.3 
Relationship between Production Cost and Scale of Output in Selected Industries 
Item Unit Production capacity and cost 
Steel 
Capacity Thousands of tons per year 50 250 500 
Cost per ton 1948 dollars 209.4 158.8 137.5 
Cement 
Capacity Thousands of tons per year 100 450 900 
Cost per ton 1959 dollars 26.0 19.8 16.4 
Ammonium nitrate 
Capacity Short tons per day 50 100 150 
Cost per ton 1957 dollars 190.4 145.1 125.6 
Beer bottles 
Capacity Number of moulding machines 1 2 6 
Cost per gross 1957 dollars 8.51 7.25 6.13 
Glass containers 
-..~·(' Capacity Number of moulding machines 1 2 6 
... ~ ... 
.. ,·_ Cost per gross 1957 dollars 8.66 7.77 6.78 }· ··~\ 
Radial ball-bearings 
Capacity Production index (1961=1) 1 2 3 
Cost per thousand 1961 dollars 220.6 185.5 174.4 
Tar 
Capacity Tons per day 100 200 300 
Cos·t per ton 1961 dollar8 29.0 26.5 25.4 
1,000 
127.2 
1,800 
13.9 
300 
101.5 
12 
5.69 
12 
6.33 
400 
24.6 
Continued ••• 
w 
w 
O'l 
Table 8.3 (continued) 
Item Unit Production capacity and cost 
Benzol 
Capacity Tons per day 50 100 200 300 
Cost per ton 1961 dollars 80.7 74.9 71.6 '70.2 
Aluminium plate 
Capacity Tons per year 200 1,200 3,000 5,000 
Cost per ton 1960 dollars 772.5 759.7 751.0 735.4 
Source: Industrialization and Productivity Bulletin, No.8 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.B.6), p. 55. 
w 
w 
'I 
protection during early periods of growth. From the point of view of 
dynamic scale economies (the learning by doing type) the country with 
the largest accumulated experience in production will be the most 
efficient, and thus enjoy superior technology. 
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From all the above-mentioned illustrations we see that developing 
countries apparently have good reason to pool their markets to face 
the challenge of economies of scale in industrial production and of 
size-biassed technical change (see Chapter 9, section 9.4). 
The alternative is of course for individual countries to expand 
their markets through exports, and some small economies such as 
Hong Kong or Taiwan have been successful in this. However, given the 
other factors affecting the nature of industrialisation in the AGS, in 
particular the balance of domestic inputs available, the commodities 
which AGS industries have for export are mainly not consumer goods but 
semi-processed or processed materials destined for other industries 
e.g. basic chemicals rather than finished pharmaceuticals. There then 
appears a need for integrated and specialised marketing organisation to 
deal with specialised market outlets more limited in number and often 
more demanding than the mass-markets for consumer goods. If therefore 
all the AGS which individually export-orientate their manufacturing 
industries in order to find wider markets were to act collectively 
through coooperation, their chances of success could be increased.(23) 
Such a move is also relevant to the AGS desire to build up those 
many industries, such as iron and steel, certain basic chemicals and 
engineering industries (e.g. automobiles), known to require high minimum 
scales of production for efficient operation, because they are strategically 
necessary to future industrial development. It is these industrialising 
industries which are generally regarded as vital to provide the economy 
with the necessary dynanism through their high growth potentials as the 
economy grows, and through the stimulating impact on the rest of the 
339 
economy through linkage effects. 
In addition to export orientation import substitution is also 
seen as a method of deepening internal demand structures by providing 
employment to local labour and investment opportunities to local 
entrepreneurs. Howeverp AGS economies are individually so small that 
the narrowness of the market prevents the establishment of large-
scale plants and inhibits the possibility of effective competition 
with imports. The institution of cooperation systems with larger 
domestic markets is seen by many economists as making the strategy of 
import substitution industrialization a viable solution to the 
pressures for change. 
8.2.7 Technology as a Motive for Cooperation 
Many recent theories including those associ~ted with the growth 
pole concept have led to the argument that since there is often a 
direct relationship between the size of a firm and its outlay on 
research and development that inducing the growth of industrial 
organisations improves their capability for R. & D. and therefore for 
technological progress. The full use of the benefits of economies of 
scale could accelerate technological advance and thus lead to higher 
rates of economic growth. In the Gulf area such a development is 
urgently needed. 
Regional and international cooperation would seem to benefit the 
development and transfer of technological know-how in the-petrochemical 
industry and other activitiesp raising the question of the feasibility 
of pooling research and technology transfers. This issue is examined 
further and more appropriately within the context of the International 
circle in Chapter 10 because in petrochemicals and associated fields 
in particular it has to be recognised that operating on anything less 
than a world-scale of technology and expertise is invalid today. The 
technological interdependence of even the USA, Western Europe and the 
USSR, as has appeared over the building of Russian gas pipe-lines, is 
evidemteof this. 
8.3 Political and Security Considerations Motivation for Developm~nt 
Cooperation 
AGS, which is living, figuratively, both \'lith a dream and a 
nightmare. The dream is of emergence as a huge political pmAfer backed 
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by the comparatively huge and growing petroleum reserves and production 
capacities that seem to affect the whole international economic order 
and development and stability, this a translation of the fact that they 
are important owners of the best ever known strategic product in recent 
history, with Saudi Arabia being the largest oil exporter in the world 
(17.6% of world oil production and 25% of oil reserves as reflected 
in Table 1.7, Chapter 1). The dream also relates to the growing 
financial force of the AGS, reflected in their huge investments and 
financial placements as well as their ranking among the leaders in 
assistance to the Third World, with Saudi Arabia as the world's second 
largest aid donor after U.S.(24) 
The nightmare seems to be planted in AGS minds by a consciousness of 
their own weaknesses. Their individually small populations together 
did not exceed 11.7 million in 1978 (less than Iraqopopulation of 12 
million) a fact which has led Saudi Arabia to refuse to disclose 
population census results and discouraged Oman and Qatar from having 
censuses. The realisation of the depletion of oil resources, the muscle 
behind all development achievement, the dangerous weakness in their own 
military and security capacities, is accompanied by fear of growing 
competing interests of the sup~rpowers illustrated by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. 
All these nightmare weaknesses led Ghassan Salameh to describe, rightly, 
Saudi Arabia 'as a giantwith feet of clay'.(25) 
In such a state of affairs, cooperation among these six countries 
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with ~enerally homogeneous econo~ic as well as political systems, is 
seen as a means by which they hope to lessen gradually the strength 
of the nightmare. There is also a growing faith in the effects of 
cooperating in directing their oil-based development and the derived 
investment activities in secure real growth, which considers both 
the needs of their own,regional and werld economy at the same time. 
8.4 Benefits of Cooperation - Some Quantitative Illustrations 
These attitudes to and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation 
have also been strengthened by regional cooperation efforts elsewhere 
in the world. 
Despite the fact that not all the ramifications of economic 
cooperation lend themselves to quantitative appraisal, and many 
difficulties face attempts to project macro-economic variables derived 
from cooperation effects on development, there do now exist some 
quantitative indications of the expected cooperation effects on 
development. 
One relevant study was made by an East African team of experts 
who, in 1971, compared two sets of macro-economic projections for that 
Sub~region which inGluded eight countries. (26) Pro.iections were made 
for two situations, first that in which there is cooperation and another 
where there is none. 
13. 
The analysis was described as being: 
"Of a preliminary nature and is based on a number of 
simplifying assumptions. The calculations depend 
crucially on the allocation of the multinational 
industries among the countries of the Sub-region."(27) 
The following projections are derived from Appendix Tables 12 and 
1. !i!!l economic .cooperation, the projected output of secondary sector 
(industry) by 1980 would increase by 34 percent over the expected level 
without cooperation for the eight African countries, distributed as 
follows: 
Ethiopia 17%, Kenya 45%. Madagascar 22%, Malawi 118%, 
Somalia 70%, Uganda 36%, Tanzania 64%, Zambia 30% 
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2. Per capita GDP would rise with cooperation in 1980 by 27% more 
than without cooperation by 1980: 
Ethiopia 10.4%, Kenya 8.3%, MadagaRr.ar 1.3.3%, Malawi 63.9%, 
Somalia 40.3%, Uganda 21.8%, Tanzania 37.0%, Zambia 49.3% 
3. The projected per capita GDP growth rate would increase in the case 
of cooperation over the period 1970-1980 reaching 4.4 percent in 
comparison with 1.9 percent in the case of nil cooperation. This would 
give an increase in the growth rate of per capita GDP of 131.5 percent 
given cooperation.(28) (Appendix Table 14.) 
The U.N. team obtained the same results from their projections of 
sectoral growth, marginal propensity to save and investment growth 
rates. In all analyses the probability of Sub-regional cooperation 
yielding significantly better returns than the. nil-cooperation case 
was very strong (see Appendix Tables 15 and 16}. 
From this summary of the quantifiable projected results of East 
African Sub-regional economic cooperation some particular points 
emerge. 
First, the qualitative and/or less directly measurable effects 
expected from cooperation were not projected in the East African case 
but for the purposes of-this study of the AGS they are regarded as vital, 
as noted in Chapters 4 and 5 (see also Chapter 12.) 
Secondly, although the approach adopted in the East African case 
may be applicable in general terms to the AGS Sub-region, we have to 
extend consideration to the wider Arab region in order to find real 
relevance. This is because of the enormous differences between the 
East African and the AGS Sub-regions in scale and quality of resource 
base, economic structure. population. income levels and development 
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priorities. For example, the proposed East African programme included 
many engineering industries such as vehicle, trailer and tractor 
manufacturing which in the Arab world could be appropriate or justified 
only on an Arab market basis as will be highlighted in Chapter 9. 
Thirdly, we have to accept the fact that it is not possible to 
prove by the quantitative measuring of East African development 
achievements during the 1970's whether the U.N. projections of the 
results of cooperation were actually valid. Political instability, 
particularly in Uganda, had wide-ranging repercussions on all the 
countries in East Africa. What can be claimed, however, that the 
adverse effect of n£n-coope~ation appeared clearly enough. It might 
also be held that if the programme for cooperation had included more 
foundation building of a qualitative kind and been less concentrated 
on the mechanics of production the ties between the East African 
countries might have grown more strongly, if slowly, and the adverse 
effects of local instabilities might have been lessened. 
8.5 §ummarl and Conclusions 
The preceding analysis of determinants, constraints and 
opportunities can be summarised and concluded as follows. 
1. Whilst capital availability is the main positive determinant in 
AGS, their development processes are negatively affected by many other 
determinants which do not appear as critical in most other developin~ 
countries. The weakness of the resource base absolutely as well as in 
relation to demand, the extremely limited agricultural potential and 
the smallness of markets, all appear here as in earlier discussions 
as critical constraints. 
However, the gr0wing, if incomplete, appreciation of these 
const·raints on AGS economies, particularly as they affect Sub-regional 
absorptive capacity and related potentialities for economic diversification 
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is tending to stimulate a movement towards wider circles of cooperation. 
2. Economic considerations particularly relevant to industrialization 
and problems of economies of scale can be proved through empirical 
evidence to be of critical significance to the industrialization 
process. At the same time analysis of AGS industrial structure has 
shown the Vital need for technological and management build-up. This 
latter appears clearly achievable only through wider circles than that 
of the AGS. Problems of economies of scale are by no means limited 
to manufacturing industry and are of special relevance to infra-
structural projects (e.g. research and training). This supports the 
conclusions reached at the end of Part One of the need to direct 
special attention to AGS infrastructural and qualitative development 
activities but now to extend this to indicate the need here also for 
a wider than Sub-regional scale through a cooperative approach. 
All economic considerations tend to confirm the rationality of 
the motivation to pool AGS development efforts within cooperative 
frameworks aiming at achieving optimum benefits from the three circles, 
Sub-regional. Regional and International. 
3. The psychological effect on the AGS of a fear of socio-political 
weakness underlying financial strength, the concept of being 'the giant 
with legs of clay' given the current political and security serious 
dangers affecting the Middle East. tend to support strongly economic 
influences which favour a growing motivation to cooperation within a 
broader context than merely the Gulf Sub-region. 
This particular theme is examined with some further detail in 
Chapters 9 and 10. 
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CHAPTER 9 - MOTIVATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 
9.1 Introduction 
In the light of the preceding chapter's conclusions which point 
to the AGS' need for wider circles of cooperation, this chapter 
explores the supportive factors which jointly contribute to create 
motivation for AGS-Arab development cooperation within the Regional 
circle. 
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The concept of motivation is explored here primarily with respect 
to development determinants that are available within the Regional circle 
rather than the Sub-regional circle. Consequently 9 by motivation here 
is not meant a clear conscious desire expressed by the AGS for a 
regionally cooperating approach to developmentp but rather as expressed 
by the availability or use of the development determinants from the 
Region. AGS' real realization of the benefits which could follow from 
regionally more rational utilization of development determinants, 
whether of resources, capitalp labour or markets will be examined in broad 
terms, in the whole of the coming chapters. Our main immediate 
interest is directed to examine whether and how potential motivation 
for cooperation is provided. 
The central question is whether and how the main determinants of · 
economic development are better satisfied within the Regional rather 
than only the Sub-regional circle. 
Illustrations are drawn from selective secteral analyses, 
particularly of manpower, industry and of agriculture. 
9.2 Development Determinants and Cooperation 
Four determinants are highly relevant to the process of develop-
ment activities as supportive or environmental.(!) First, the presence 
of some resource base of commercial value which promises reasonable 
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returns to entre~reneurial effort. Secondo a social and economic 
infrastructure above a certain minimum level which permits certain 
basic functions to be performed (in transport and communication, 
public utilities 0 urban facilities, housing, irrigation, health and 
education). Third, capital availability. Fourth, manpower with some 
skills. Although some substitution can be made among these determinants, 
all have to be present in quantities and with quality that do not 
inhibit activities. 
It is very clear from the previous descriptive and analytical 
review in relation to the availability and existence of the above-
mentioned determinants, that within the Arab region the resource base 
and manpower mainly exist in the non-oil producing countries 0 whilst 
capital is there in abundance in the oil-producing AGS. The infra-
structure base in spite of large expenditures on physical infrastructure 
remains weak in other respects everywhere. 
The Arab countries present a wide and diversified spectrum, 
geographically and economically, as well as ih political, institutional 
and social aspects. 
The analysis of the characteristics of the Arab economy, as will 
be illustrated in this chapter and Chapter 13 tend to assure near self-
sufficiency in the major factors of production (capital, labour and 
natural resources). This indicates that the Arab countries are in 
possession of the elementary essentials for growth and development 
provided that the aforementioned factors are redistributed to guarantee 
the best utilization possible within the framework of cooperation. 
"The Arab World can become a weight, an economic power, 
not only via its financial surplus and monetary accounts, 
but also by means of its actual resources and the rapid 
growth of its economic sectors."(2) 
9.2.1 The Resource Base 
UNDP rightly evaluated the situation in saying: 
"From a regional perspective, one ~an perceive the 
Arab World today with a highly skewed distribution 
of differing and complementary resources -
skilled and unskilled human resources, rich and 
poor in capital, and abundance and absence of 
natural resources - with its major natural resource 
being rapidly depleted, its capital subject to 
erosion; and with the necessity of a dramatic economic 
transformation within a generation."(3) 
The resource and performance base of any economy is clearly of 
great significance for its growth. However, as earlier analysis has 
shown, nowhere in the six AGS are the natural resources of enough 
significance to form a solid base for development. 
Achieving optimal·exploitation of natural resources within a 
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cooperative approach including processing, industrialization, marketing 
and distribution as well as the determination of volume produced and 
price demanded, depends to a certain extent on the performance base 
of the economy. This relates to the efficiency of manpower and 
institutions, their capabilities to solve problems and the level of 
per capita income, and the proportion of it used for investment purposes 
as well as the determination of the political management of the 
economy. 
Resources by themselves are very weak in their relation to 
development prospects. Sayegh has noted to Lebanon's growth achievements 
and notable returns from its modest resources before 1975. In 
contrast, Iraq and Sudan with well-endowed resource bases produced 
returns far from commensurate with their resource, because of 
unsatisfactory performance and the poor political management of the 
economy. In Sudan, 
"the idleness of resources is attributable to 
inadequate infrastructure, insufficient investment 
capital, shortage of skilled manpower, plus weak 
motivation, low level of versatility between crops 
requiring different techniques, frequent change of 
Government."(4) 
Consequently, even a widened resource base, which can be con-
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sidered as a motivation 'for regional cooperationp cannot play its 
dynamic role in regional development unless it ha.s been supported by the 
other determinants which collectively give 'the performance base'. 
In Sayegh's words:(5) 
"The resources available constitute opportunities 
for development 0 which meet with serious constraints 
on the one side. The outcome determines how-
effective resources are as a 'factor in economic 
development as well as a factor in development 
cooperation." 
9.2.2 Flow of Capital 
Will an abundant supply of capital become a positive determinant 
o'f development? Empirical evidence suggests that where capital resources 
have become abundant, economic development has been promoted inasmuch 
as the capital constraint has been relaxed. But if capital sufficiency 
is a necessary condition for accelerated investment and the achievement 
of economic development, it is not a sufficient condition.(6) 
It also has to be supplemented by other major supporters like Government, 
manpower, seriousness of purpose 0 technological change and so on. 
The AGS possess this basic determinant of capital availability 
whilst most of the other Arab countries, comparatively speaking, do< 
not have it. This raises the question of regional cooperation. At 
present, .owing to the limited inter-regional flow of capital (that is 
from the surplus oil producing countries to. the capital thirsty countries 
and to joint Arab projects and programmes) (7) the region viewed as a unit 
is still short of investment capital. 
"Capital can be a determinant of economic development, 
but for the region it is still a potential determinant, 
one which has not yet been allowed full scope to 
operate. Nor have the supportive requirements, 
political, psychological, institutional and economic 
been sufficienty developed."(8) · 
Development Choices and Cooperation Possibilities: 
It has been suggested that three types of choice of development 
strategy are open to developing countries, (9) i.e.: 
(a) An industrial as oppesed to an agricultural thrust. 
(b) Capital intensive as well as labour intensive policies. 
(c) Import substitution in addition to or instead of export-
orientated activities. 
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What is relevant here is the way in which cooperation on an Arab 
Regional scale would increase the range of these .choices open to the 
AGS as well as to other Arab countries. Thus: 
(a) Development ·could be based on the factors of a more varied 
production endowment allowing benefit to flow from comparative advantage 
in its dynamic sense. 
(b) Industrial development could fellow or be parallel to agricultural 
development, once the Regional circle replaces the Sub-regional circle. 
(c) Both import substitution and export oriented directions have 
advantages that could be achieved more efficiently through the Arab 
circle. 
None of these can be viewed in isolati~n, as we see if we consider 
for example the dangers of export oriented industrial complexes in the 
AGS. Two major dangers may emerge in this respect. One, that the 
multinationals will leave to the LDC's, as they have done in the past, 
only simple technology processes with low value-added characteristics 
whilst shifting more complex and sophisticated processes to other areas, 
chiefly their own metropolitan regions. Second, closely linked to the 
first,. an advanced export-oriented industrial sector may become again 
as it has done in the past - a non-integrated enclave, with little 
impact on the LDC's own production structure. 
The Arab Industrial Development Conference recommended in its 
third meeting the adoption of an industrial strategy concentrating on 
industries which affect the economic structure of the Arab countries 
and lessening their dependence on external factors, by adopting 
industrial production based on regional raw materials, like agricultural 
and mineral materials and applying the principle of physical inter-
connection between the agricultural and industrial sectors with an 
integral role being played by petroleum in this process, leading to 
the produc~ion of industries that serve the agricultural sector e.g. 
fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery and equipment.(lO) 
This would become a·natural extension of the recommendations of the 
Gulf Industrial Consultancy (see Chapters 5 and 12). 
Moreover, in view of the poor competitiveness of Arab industrial 
products on Western markets, recent Arab analysts support export 
concentration on African and Asian markets, in addition to import-
substitution. According to these the0ries, export industries require 
an adequate division of labour, redistribution of markets, unification 
of market conditions and prices, coordination and association of 
partners. All these are more difficult to· achieve satisfactorily 
in relation to markets in the industrialised countries than in others. 
Consequently, both strategies are recommended but successively -
353 
import substitution first (in the short and medium term and then export 
industries in the long run).(ll) 
This sophisticated strategy however, is only appropriate to a 
situation in which both production factors and domestic market base 
are extensive and diverse. In the Arab region this necessitates 
cooperation, in which the AGS would have the opportunity of more 
efficiently using its abundant capital determinant within the wider 
circle such a circle creating more opportunities for a strategy of 
diversification. 
9.3 Manpower (see also Chapter 4, section 4.3.6.3) 
The population growth common to nearly all the Arab countries 
increases the potential of their respective labour forces. If the 
present situation is projected into the future it is clear that a far 
from negligible supply of labour will be available in the coming 
decades.(12} 
Wage differentials between the Arab countries largely explain 
the fascination of emigration.(13) Two fundamental factors- the 
existence in some countries of surplus labour and the oil boom have led 
to the emergence on the Arab labour market ofp firstp host countriesp 
that is nearly all the major oil producers plus Lebanon andp secondly 
labour suppliers which includes the others and again Lebanon.(14) 
Table 9.1 calculated by Farrag gives the first more or less 
complete picture of inter-Arab migration in the early 1970 1 s.(15) 
Around the years 1972-73 there were at least 900p000 foreign 
workers in the Arab World, of whom 650p000 or 72.2% originated in other 
Arab countries. In other words roughly 72 percent· of foreign workers 
in the Arab World were Arabs P whereas orily 28 percent were non-Arabs: 
Pakistanis, Indians, Turks or European technical personnel. There 
can be no doubting the vitality of the Arab labour market.(16) 
The AGS ~hare was nearly 78 percent of inter-Arab immigrationp 
Saudi Arabia alone received nearly 50 percent (Table 9.1). 
The countries which provided the largest number of emigrants 
are Egyptp Syria and Palestine, each of which supplied between 90,000 
and 100,000 workers to neighbouring countries. Each in other words 
supplied about 14 percent of total inter-Arab migration. Other studies 
cited later confirm this basic pattern. 
9.3.1 AGS: Arab Joint Economic Interests. 
"The migrants' role is not just to participate in a 
process which is already under way but to help set the 
process in motion and to give it new drive. The 
motivation, the social position and the psychological 
attitude of the inter-Arab migrant differs significantly 
from that of the em'igrant from Europe."(17) 
These significant cultural elements which are common to the 
Arab world as a whole make it relatively easy for Arab migrants to fit 
into and participate in the development activities of their host 
904ntries. ' r': 
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.!!lli 9.1 
Inter-Arab Mi~ation 
Year Yemen Egypt Syria Palestine Lebanon Jordan Oman Other Total Other Uncertain Total: % Arab Arab Countries 
Countries Countries 
Saudi 200,000 to 
Arabia 1970 250,000 n.a. 40,000 50,000 30,000 ? ? ? (345,000) ? 65,,000 (410.000) 45.9 
Kuwait 1970 6,898 17.714 12,659 8,419 41,299 10~299 24.467 121,755 53.925 ... 175.680 19.6 
Libya 1973 
-
60.752 6.162 4.324 8,324 4.324 
-
24.215 108,101 20.300 
-
128.401 14.4 
Lebanon 1970 ? 4,500 33.800 8.100 
-
? ? ? 46,400 ? 21,600 68,000 7.6 
UAE 1968 ? 11,100 
-
6,640 ? 6,640 6,640 4.430 35,450 8,819 ? 44,269 4.9 
Qatar 1970 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (24,000) 16,090 ? (40,090) 4.6 
Bahrain 1971 2,000 ? ? 2,000 ? 2,000 5,600 4,000 15,600 6,000 751 22,351 2.5 
Oman 1973 ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? ?' (2,000). 3,000 ? 5,000 0.5 
Total (233,898) 94,066 92,621 71,064 46.743 54,263 22.539 57,112 (698,.306) 108,134 87,351 (893,791) 100.0 
Note: AGS share of total Arab Countries Inter-Arab Migration was 543,805 out .of 698,306 which correspond to 77.9 percent. 
Source: Boudiba, Abdel Wahab, 'Arab Migration'.• In Arab Industrialization and Economic Integration. edited by Roberto, Aliboni 
(London: Croom Helm~ ·1979) • Table no. 3.24. IJ• 170. 
w 
U1 
U1 
Inter-Arab immigrants come from a wide range of social groups. 
In certain cases it can be shown that the majority consist of 
technicians and management staff. This reduces the difficulties 
involved in the integration of the migrant with the. local population, 
whatever the social status of the former.(l8) 
Table 9.2 
Level of Education of Arab Workers in ~atar and the UAE 
Qatar UAE 
Nationals Non-Nationals Nationals Non-Nationals 
Illiterate 15.7 84.3 49 51 
Prim.ary 24.3 75.7 34 66 
Secondary and 13.7 86.3 7 93 technical 25.7 74.3 
Higher education 5.9 94.1 7 93 
Total 16.9 83.1 43 57 
Source: Boudiba, A. Op. cit., p. 178. 
Table 9.3 
Arab Workers in Bahrain (by level of qualification) 
Level of qualification Nationals Non-nationals 
Unskilled 
Skilled and Semi-skilled 
Liberal professions 
Technicians 
· Management and supervisory staff 
Total 
Source: Boudiba, A., p. 179. 
57.6 
61.5 
80.2 
64.5 
40.0 
43.0 
42.4 
38.5 
19.8 
35.5 
60.0 
57.0 
Emigration of this kind is no longer a short term economic 
phenomenon but rather a structural one that must be treated at a 
regional level.(19) 
9.3.1.1 Arab Labour Force - Economic Importance for AGS: 
From the following indicators foreign workers in general and Arab 
workers in particular seem to be of structural long-term importance to 
the development of AGS. 
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1. (a) 78% of total inter=Arab migration (including non-Arab nationals) 
is absorbed in AGS, distributed as follows: (Table 9.1) 
Saudi Arabia 45.9%, Kuwait 19.6%, UAE 4.9%, Qatar 4.6%, Bahrain 2.5%, 
while only 0.5 percent for Oman. 
(b) Total AGS share in the inter-Arab migration was 543,805 {77.9%) 
distributed among AGS only as follows: (derived from Table 9.1) 
Saudi Arabia 63.4%, Kuwait 22.4%, UAE 6.5%, Qatar 4.4%, Bahrain 2.9%, 
while Oman only 0.4 percent. (Above item (b) excludes non-Arab 
nationals.) 
2. The importance of migrant workers in the functioning of AGS was 
examined in Chapter 1 qn the light of Table 1.15 which showed that 
the total active non-natiorulis percent in the Sub-region was 51.9% in 
1975 with 84.8 percent for UAE, 81 percent for Qatar, 69.4 percent for 
KuwaitD 43 percent and 39.6 percent for Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
respectively. 
Immigration contribution seemed to increase in some of the AGS. 
In Abu Dhabi, for example, which had in 1968 a population of 46,000 
of whom 26,000 or 56.5 percent were immigrants. Howeve~, immigrants' 
share increased in 1975 to two thirds.(20) (Also Table 9.4.} 
3. The sectoral distribution of non-nationals is as follows: 
In Kuwait, S. Arabia and Qatar agriculture has been almost entirely 
abandoned to non-nationals. Building work has been left to foreigners 
who make up 60 percent of the sectoral labour -force in-Kuwait, 48 percent 
in Saudi Arabia, 45.8 percent in Bahrain, 96 percent in Abu Dhabi and 
82 percent in Qatar.(21) 
Manufacturing industry has similarly been abandoned to foreigners 
who make up 81 percent of the sectoral labour force in Kuwait, 55 
percent in Saudi Arabia, 67.1 percent in Bahrain (Table 9.4). What 
is more, the importance of this foreign labour force is not expected 
to decrease as the labour force is projected to continue maintaining 
recent growth rates.(22) (Also Table 9.5.) 
Table 9.4 
Distribution of Foreigners and Nationals by Economic Activity (% of total economically active _population) 
Agriculture Extractive Manufacturing Building Electricity Commerce Transport Service and 
and fishing industries industry and gas Others 
Kuwait 
Nationals 19.7 23.3 19.0 6.5 29.4 22.1 19.4 35.6 
Arab non-nationals 52.2 5?.1 57.1 53.7 59.3 54.4 49.3 47.4 
:Foreigners 28.1 19.6 23.9 39.8 11.3 23.5 31.3 17.0 
Saudi Arabia 
Nationals 4 50 55 52 80 59 49 39 
·Foreigners 96 50 55 48 20 41 51 61 
Bahrain 
Nationals "16.0 73.7 32.9 54.2 86.8 63.0 65.4 60.6 
Foreigners 24.0 26.3 67.1 45.8 13.2 37.0 34.6 39.4 
Abu Dhabi 
:Nationals 63 19.5 4 - 9 28 16.2 
.Foreigners 37 80.5 96 
-
91 72 83.8 
UAE 
Nationals 93 34 18 - 43 47 36.2 
Foreigners 7 66 82 - 57 53 63.8 
Qatar 
Nationals 5 
-
13 
- -
19 34 14 
Foreigners 95 - 87 - - 81 66 86 
Source: Boudiba, A.W., Table 3.25, p. 172. 
Total 
25.4 
51.7 
22.9 
50 
50 
62.9 
37.1 
17 
83 
43 
57 
17 
83 
w 
CJ1 
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Table 9.5 
Arab Economically Active Populations 1970;...85 
Country Labour force ('000) Annual growth rate 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
Algeria 3,369 3,894 4,545 5,362 2.94 3.14 3.36 
Egypt 9,174 10,357 11,741 13,426 2.46 2.54 2.72 
Iraq 2,395 2,770 3,224 3,784 2.95 3.08 3.25 
Jordan 564 641 737 857 2.59 2.83 3.06 
Kuwait 282 431 637 911 8.85 8.13 7.42 
Lebanon and Gaza 864 986 1,112 1,264 2.68 2.43 2.60 
Libya 488 550 625 721 2.42 2.~.9 2.90 
Morocco 4,161 4,782 5,543 6,526 2.82 3.00 3.29 
Oman, bahrain, Qatar and United Arab 
Emirates 290 331 381 441 2.68 2.85 2.97 
Saudi Arabia 2,109 2,355 2,649 3,025 2.23 2.38 2.69 
Sudan 5,065 5,830 6,760 7,938 2.85 3.00 3.26 
Syria 1,574 1,817 2,109 2,466 2.91 3.63 3.18 
Tunisia 1,273 1,457 1,685 1,964 2.74 2.95 3.11 
N. Yemen 1,689 1,911 2,178 2,512 2.50 2.65 2.89 
PDRY 347 388 436 498 2.26 2~36 2.69 
Total 33,644 38,500 44,362 51,695 
Source: ILO, Labour Force ProJections, Parts I and II, Asia and Africa, Geneva, 1975. 
w 
c.n 
co 
9.3.1.2 AGS-Arab Joint Gains from Labour Exchange: 
(a) "It seems clear that the annual rate of population 
growth in the whole region will remain at a high 
level: more than 3 percent. This will lead to an 
increase in the economically active population. 
Thus even a rapid rate of growth in GDP (7-8 percent) 
will lead to a per capita increase of only 4-5 percent. 
An analysis of the economically active population 
shows unemployment of 4.0 million in_ 1980 and 4.6 
million in 1990. Between 1973 and 1990 the rate 
of unemployment in the Middle East should fall from 
4.2 percent to 3.3 percent. In the Maghreb, on the 
other hand, unemployment will probably remain 
stationary at around 7.6 percent; conditions will 
in other words continue to be very favourable for 
emigration."(23) 
(b) Labour force-- supply and demand equilibrium: 
The Arab Region thus possesses a large labour force reserve which 
is in excess supply for some countries, as reflected in the following 
indicators:(24) 
1. Disguised unemployment in non-petroleum producing countries can 
be considerablep e.g. in Egyptian agriculture existing as a permanent 
phenomenon constituting 45 percent of the male labour force (e~g. 1.518 
million unemployed). 
2. The existence of disguised unemployment in the Government service 
sector, mainly in Egypt, Syria and to a less extent, in Iraq. 
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3. In Tunisia and Algeria unemployment is maintained in the secondary 
sector as labourers migrating from rural to urban areas accept low wages 
to wait for better opportunities in the modern economic sector. 
4. Unemployment in Morocco is estimated at 11 percent of the total 
labour force, that is equal to 550,000 unemployed at the end of 1977; 
some estimates are as high as 1.2 million. 
5. There are approximately one million Arab labourers in Europe, 
80 percent of them are in France. With growing unemployment problems in 
Western Europe, they are expected to go back to their countries. 
These recent trends illustrate the importance of achieving 
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equilibrium between supply and demand within a cooperative Arab 
arrangements for the countries' joint interests, and in the light of 
their real development needs. 
If AGS choose to maintain high growth rates they cannot escape 
from importing labour in very large quantities. 
For example, economic studies and forecasts indicated that Qatar's 
economic growth is very sensitive to the rate of import of foreign 
workers. 
"In the high estimate, with open immigration, GDP 
grows rapidly until 1978, then levels off at about 
~ 3.5 billion •.• in the best run the higher 
immigration permits higher GDP when the oil industry 
begins to decline slowly after 1978."(25) 
This relationship between imported labour and GDP seems to be applicable 
to the whole Sub-region, and provides a motive for regional cooperation 
to ensure the availability of needed labour for AGS development 
projects and activities. It seems logical that this sensitive factor 
of production should be regarded as an essential part of a regional 
cooperation framework. 
Despite the. necessity for importing labour, the question of 
viability of continuing the import of labour has, however, led some 
analysts, mainly when taking into consideration the negative social as 
well as political effe~ts of such large importations of labour, to 
raise the point that 
"social costs of foreign labour, if added to their 
wages might, in some cases, exceed their contribution 
to GDP and therefore nullify the objectives of 
diversification."(26) 
Given the fact that the migrant Arab labour force is now and will 
continue to be structurally vital to AGS development the relevance of 
both the negative and positive effects of inter-Arab labour emigration, 
to the question of cooperation becomes clear. 
For the Arab labour exporting countries, positive effects have 
resulted from exporting labour through the reverse flow of financial 
remittances. In Jordan, for example, these grew from JD 34 million 
($ 98.3 mn. in 1974 to JD 800 mn. {$ 2312 .mn. ) in 1980, (27), this 
in addition to a contribution to solve the problem of domestic 
unemployment. 
However, this movement-has also resulted in some adverse socio-
economic effects as it contributed to create market bottlenecks in the 
labour exporting countries, particularly in relation to trained and 
highly qualified labour force. Their own development programmes have 
been affected, the whole productive capacity has been subject to 
negative effects. Selective labour shortages for example, in Jordan 
j.$ 
and Tunisia, have caused inflationary pressures. _Itt now seriously 
felt that the emigrant labour force has affected negatively the socio-
economic advancement of the labour exporting countries as it resulted 
in the departure of the most efficient section of the labour force, 
i.e. a kind of brain-drain. 
This situation creates a motive for these countries to re-
evaluate the whole labour force export movement thus creating potential 
dangers for AGS. 
At the same time the AGS have been moving more and more to import 
and use highly progressive technology for their development projects, 
technology a~·used in communications, for example, which is not within 
the capacity of the current Arab labour :force. Unless special training 
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and education schemes are adopted within joint cooperation understandings, 
Arab countries might face yet other dislocations.(28) 
Consequently, whether the AGS decide to continue their import 
of an Arab labour force, or opt to export their capital for investment 
where labour is available, the motivation for cooperation, on a more 
solid basis, than the hitherto ad hoc basis, seems to be strong. 
Such cooperation could protect both sides from existing and potential 
dangers. 
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The Arab labour conference decided, in its eighth session in 
Baghdad in March 1980 to establish an "Arab Institution for Employment" 
to coordinate labour exchange between Arab countries in the light 
of supply-demand situation and development plans.(29) Such a step 
seems to be in harmony with the above conclusion. 
9.4 Motivation for Regional Cooperati0n - Industrial Sector 
Empirical Examination: 
AGS inudstrial development has been facing many structural 
constraints which endanger its strategy of economic diversification, as 
examined in Part One, the economies of scale, marketing and technology 
have been found of direct relevance to AGS' chances of industrial 
success. Such constraints can only be avoided within wider circles 
than the Sub-regional circlep as indicated in Chapter 8 (Section 8.2.5 
and 8.2 .6). 
Wider markets in particular constitute a vital factor in AGS and 
Arab industrial development, thus creating an incentive for regional 
cooperation. 
In illustrating the benefits of wider Arab markets to Arab 
industrialization, the empirical analysis by Metwally "The Case for 
Arab Economic Integration"(30) must be considered. fvletwally took Egypt 
as the largest individual Arab market and examined the technical 
considerations of industrial production capacity. He compared the 
existing capacities of many industries in the U.K. with the available 
capacity of the Egyptian market and applied the results to Arab 
industrial production situation. 
In examining technical considerations of industrializations, 
Metwally came to the following conclusions:(31) 
1. The scale of efficiently producing manufacturing products is not 
very much smaller in less industrialized countries than it is in 
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industrialized countries whose markets are much wider, for the same 
products, than the markets of the develop.ing euuntr)P.s. 
2. Technical factors determining the size of plant in manufacturing 
industries tend to play 0 more or less, the same role in determining 
the scale of operations in industrialized and less-industrialized 
countries. However, there are some factors that necessitate some 
difference in the designed capacities and optimum size for industries 
of less-industrialized countries. This is due to indivisibili.ties 
and discontinuities in the production process. 
3. For very many manufacturing industries in the U.K. the medium 
size of plant, as measured by employment, is similar to that in other 
countries (see Appendix Table 17). Some factors tend to make the size 
of some industrial plants greater (e.g. sugar, textiles, paper, matches, 
petroleum 0 cement and fertilizers) in the less industrialized countries 
than in the U.K. 
The above mentioned illustrations suggest that to industrialize 
on an efficient scale, an Arab country must possess a present market 
wide enough to justify the establishment of at least one plant of a 
size that is typical in industrialized countries.(32) 
In comparing the present size of the Egyptian domestic market 
for a fairly large number of manufactures (measured by apparent 
consumption, i.e. domestic production + imports - exports over the 
period 1970-1973) and the typical size of plant in -U.K.;rresuits 
contained in Appendix Table 18 showed that: 
"l'he market is too small to justify the establishment 
of even one plant of economic size in most categories 
of manufactures. Only in food and clothing does the 
Egyptian market appear to be large enough to justify 
the establishment of plants of a size that is typical 
in U.K."(33) 
As was mentioned before, the Egyptian domestic market, with a 
populat]on .of 39.855 million in 1978, the largest population among the 
Arab countries with 26 percent of the Arab world population, about 
3.6 times the population of the AGS Sub-region and near the population 
size of the whole Maghreb sub-region (Table 9.6) measured by whatever 
criterion is, probably, much larger than the domestic market for any 
other Arab State.(34) 
The problem of domestic market limitation in other Arab countries 
is an even more serious constraint on their industrialization. 
Metwally concluded that:(35) 
"The number of manufacturing industries that .can be 
economically established (even if only one plant 
is established in any industry) within the present 
market limitation in any Arab Country is too small 
to provide employment opportunities for a large 
number of the unemployed and underemployed labour 
force." 
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Applying empirical analysis to the collective Arab market Metwally 
obtained the results shown in Appendix Table 19, in the light of 
comparison between the typical size of U.K. plant and the present size 
of Arab markets and estimated the number of viable plants possible 
within the present Arab market. 
In comparing the number of feasible industrial plants in the 
Egyptian market and Arab market as shown in Appendix Table 18 and 
Appendix Table 19, the evidence shows that whilst in the largest number 
of cases no viable plant is possible based on the Egyptian market, 
taking the Arab market as a whole many plants operating at optimum 
scale became feasible. 
"Thus for Arab countries the argument for an aggregation 
of markets to provide an outlet for the products of 
· eve·n one efficient modern manufacturing plant is 
extremely powerful."(36) 
Despite the absence of detailed information on.the effective 
size of the AGS sub-regional market, without doubt one can conclude 
that the industries which were not viable within the total Arab domestic 
market are certainly not going to be feasible for the Sub-region 
unless exports are implicitly or explicitly assumed. These include 
primary aluminium, ball and roller bearings, electric motors, electric 
transformers, typewriters, electric domestic washing machines, electric 
domestic vacuum cleaners, electric domestic refrigerators, agricultural 
tractors of all types, manufacturing and passenger cars. 
Also, when only one or two plants are possible within the Arab 
market, it seems safe to assume the doubtful feasibility of plants 
for the AGS Sub-region, these include - pig iron, steel ships and 
strips, copper, agricultural tractors (40 to 50 H.P. - assembly only 
and passenger cars- assembly only). 
The above mentioned ex~~ination has been directed until now on 
a static basis, however, industrial cooperation should be based, as 
mentioned before on.dynamic and long-term period effects, e.g. on 
expectations regarding further market opportunities rather than on 
existing conditions. The Arab domestic market may widen sufficiently 
in the near future to justify economic production of those articles 
that cannot be produced efficiently at the present. 
11A still unpublished investi~ation of some 30 industrial 
sectors has shown that only 12-15.qualify for advantages 
resulting from economies of scale, while the remainder 
can reach optimal efficiency in smaller units. The 
total annual savings through eventual aggregation and 
integration are estimated at no more than 50 miliion-
70 million dollars. Most of them are ~n chemicals, 
iron and steel, Gement and car assembling. However, 
the order of magnitude will change radically under 
dynamic assumptions of a rapidly developing industry, 
modelled on modern technology and designed for both 
domestic import-substitutes and export-oriented products. 
This will require concentration of certain industries and 
even their relocation, according to the comparative 
advantage of the partners in the integrated area."(37) 
A study of the expected size of Arab markets showed that in 1990 
the size of market for which the present market is too small to justify 
economic production for such commodities as passenger cars, washing 
machines, domestic refrigerators, typewriters, ball and roller bearings 
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and aluminium will become large enough to justify the establishment 
of plants of economic size.(38) 
Consequently it is of vital importance to pool the Arab markets 
as this will lead to the enlargement of industrial opportunities, as 
well as an increase in the efficiency of existing industries and hence 
initiate a higher continuing groWth of productivity. 
The implementation of such projects would need Arab capital and 
international technology, in addition to the other factors determining 
industrial development. 
We can conclude that, first, the Sub-region market of the AGS 
seems to be too small by itself to sustain significant industrialization. 
Second, despite the huge factories and industrial complexes now on the 
ground and planned in some parts of the Sub-region mainly as export-
oriented national ventures or within a policy of 'build and wait' based 
on the assumption of future justification of at present non=justified 
projects by an expected rise in the level of income as development 
proceeds, the possibility of securing successful industrialization 
through exportation is doubtful. 
The building of plants and factories does not in itself mean an 
industrialisation process with all that implies in terms of 
organisation, skills, attitudes etc. Without the structural change, 
social, economic and technological, implied by true industrialisation, 
the viability of export dependent manufacturing plants in the AGS is 
at great risk in a world characterized by rapid technological change 
and current'recession. 
This analysis has illustrated how Arab domestic markets seem to 
be too small to justify, at this stage, the establishment of some 
industries, a fact reflected in the export-oriented strategy adopted 
by the AGS and many other Arab countries. This same analysis shows the 
-
need for even wider cooperation to include the international circle 
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a need which is supported also by AGS and Arab requirements for external 
science and technology. This last question will be e~mined further 
in Chapter 10. 
9.5 Motivation for Regional Cooperation; The Agricultural Sector 
9.5.1 Introduction 
The serious development constraints which face the agricultural 
sector in the AGS and which are particularly associated with its very 
weak resource base were noted in Part One. Already in Chapter 8 
the general basis for the extension of AGS' cooperation to wider 
circles was established. Here we turn to examine how such AGS cooperation 
within a regional circle could assist in tackling structural constraints 
in agricultural development. The potential contribution of the 
agricultural sector to AGS development given Regional cooperation is 
also examined. In this way can be demonstrated the linkages between 
general and sectoral aspects of development cooperation and the strength 
of the underlying motivation for such development. 
In its drive to achieve economic development, the Arab region, 
whilst achieving some success with industrialization has in general 
failed in the agricultural sector. This has been reflected in the growing 
'food gap' in the Arab worldp despite the very large potentialities 
for agricultural produc~ion in generalp and food production, in 
particular. This question is examined further here in this chapter 
and in Chapter 13. The AGS Sub-region has witnessed an even greater 
and growing dependence of agricultural and food requirements on imports. 
Whilst the crude facts of what has become known as the food 
security issue have increasingly become realised, little attention 
has been given to the role of agriculture iri integrated development 
policies. 
A pre-occupation with industrialisation as an integrating 
influence has obscured the significance of the agricultural sector 
and led to the neglect of the contribution which agriculture could 
make to cooperative endeavours and vice versa. 
Taking into consideration all these points it has been thought 
justifiable to explore in more detail agriculture in general and 
food production as an example of AGS cooperation within the Regional 
circle. 
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The discussion begins with reference to the problematic prospects 
for agricultural development in the AGS. The problem is then analysed 
· within its regional context, identifying potentialities to solve it, 
ending with recommendations relating to coopeation in achieving Arab 
agricultural development and achieving food security. 
It is important to mention at this stage that the following 
analysis does not intend to examine, in detail, various aspects of 
agricultural development within its regional context. It aims, rather 
to illustrate the factual position which constitutes the basis for 
considering agricultural development in general and food security 
in particular, one of top priority within the Regional circle of 
cooperation rather than the Sub-regional one. This regional stress 
does not conflict with the continuous and various efforts being 
followed within the Sub-region towards cooperation on various aspects 
relating to their agricultural development as examined in Chapter 5. 
It is the intention of the current analysis to show how food security 
for the AGS cannot fundamentally be achieved solely within the Sub-
region circle, at the same time examining to what extent Regional 
cooperation as a basic determinant of Arab agricultural development 
can lead to profound changes in the current weak direction of 
agricultural development within the whole process of Arab economic 
development. 
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The Misleading Conceptual Base: 
There is a widespread misleading belief in less developed 
countries that poverty is associated with agriculture; thus the drive 
towards development should ignore the agricultural sector and 
concentration should be towards industrialization. However, it is very 
important to note that 
"some of the regions with the highest average 
incomesp such as Nevada in the United Statesp 
Australiap Denmark and Argentinap are also pre-
ponderously agricultural."(39) 
It is not the conviction of national leaders in the under-
developed economies that a special effort should .be directed towards 
agriculture in order to raise the standard of living and quality of 
life for the masses who depend on agricultural activities. There are 
many examples of such leadersp motivated by national pridep self 
sufficiency or purely non-economic motivationsp take a contemptuous 
attitude towards agriculture and f'armingp in favour of gigantic 
industrial or public utility projects. Such irrational attitudesp 
have to be reckoned with as part of the general setting of the problem 
of economic development.(40) What continues to be needed is a reverse 
drivep objectively based on the material aspects and quality of the 
lives of rural populationsp at the same time appreciating lessons to 
be learnt from the agricultural revolutions in Europe and Japanp which 
preceded the industrial revolution and Wt:l'ea basic prerequisite towards 
its achievements. 
It is against this background that there emerges the question 
why countries that possess natural advantages in agricultural resources 
do not expand and improve these outputs.(41) 
Observers often see enormous buildingsp shining new factoriesp 
colossal airports and impressive Rport8 ~tadiums alongside poor peasant3 
and miserably equipped urban dwellers pitifully in need of the basic 
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amenities of life, immense personal riches alongside the abyss of rural 
poverty. 
"In brief, this contrast is the outcome of 
satisfaction with mechanistic, statistical development 
which neglects and remains silent about the real 
human beings in the urban slums and destitute country-
side."(42) 
Whilst this picture refers mainly to countries with large rural 
populations, such as Iraq and Syria, it is also relevant in some of 
the AGS, notably Oman and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. This 
is a situation which, as we shall see, could be improved by a change 
in attitudes to the rural sector, a change which could happen more 
readily if the economic opportunities presented by Regional cooperation 
were seized. 
9.5.2 AGS and the Arab Region: Mutual Interests and Agricultural 
Cooperation 
Both the AGS and other countries in the Regional circle have 
much potentially to gain from regional agricultural cooperation, 
partly because their specific sectoral structures complement each other, 
partly because agricultural development through cooperation could bring 
valuable benefits in other socio-economic sectors. For the AGS 
way 
regional cooperation seems to offer the onlytround Sub-regional constraints 
particularly as regards food supply security. 
The situation in Saudi Arabia which has the highest agriculture 
potential among AGS, is summarised below to illust~at~ th~ posit~on 
with regard to agriculture development achievements in the AGS. 
9.5.2.1 Saudi ·Arabia - Agricultural Self Sufficiency: 
Despite all efforts taken, including technological innovations, 
during the nineteen sixties, agriculture witnessed a very low growth 
rate of two percent a year, and by 1970 it contributed only six percent 
of GNP. Its share fell because of the rapid growth of oil and 
industry. 
While agriculture was treated with some enthusiasm in the first 
Saudi Five Year Development Plan (1970-1975) in an effort followed 
by the Saudi authorities to remedy this state of affairs, 
"Today agriculture is far from being foremost on 
Saudi Planner's minds."(43) 
The SecQnd Saudi Five Year Plan (1976-1980) ru~oc~ted_ to it only 1 
percent of the resources at its disposal. 
"The Kingdom thus has to import seventy-five to 
eighty percent of its food. Saudi planners speak of 
self-sufficiency in food production by the year 2000, 
but this assumption is barely credible."(44) 
Food indeed comprises more than thirty percent of the overall 
import bill. (45) 
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The Saudi ·Third Development Plan (1980-1985) reviewed agriculture 
sector situation in relation to its development, food demand trends 
and constraints. In relation to the sector main developments the plan 
stated that: (46) 
"Despite the discovery and development of oil, and 
subsequently, rapid development in other sectors, 
agriculture has remained the primary occupation of 
the Kingdom's population. In 1394/95 (1974/75) it 
is estimated that about 695,000 persons, or 40% 
of the civil labour force, was engaged in agriculture. 
By 1399/1400 (1979/80) although agricultural 
employment declined sharply by about 96,000 persons, 
the sector still remained the largest employer, with 
about a quarter of the Kingdom's labour force." 
Food Demand: 
The demand for food has increased rapidly in response to both 
population growth and rising incomes. Projections of the Kingdom's 
food demand based on population growth, disposable income and elasticity 
of demand suggest a relative change in the per capita consumption as 
follows: (47) 
1. Continued rapid increase in the consumption of eggs, poultry, 
fresh vegetables and fruit. 
2. Modest growth in the consumption of fresh meat, fresh fish, 
f·C'ui t drinks, milk, pulses and tinned fish. 
3. Decreases in demand for rice, flour, melons and dates. 
Agricultural Constraints: 
"The continued exodus of labour has made the labour 
input expensive and in short supply."(48) 
This has particularly affected the traditional sector, where, for 
example, dates in some areas are only partially harvested. The small 
size of most farming·units has impeded the replacement of labour by 
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mechanisation. Other constraints in the Second Development Plan Period 
(1975-1980) included the lack of infrastructure, in particular roads 
and well-drilling. Wasteful use of water in traditional irrigation 
practices has led to early salination of the best oases' croplands. 
"The existing subsidy system, although increasing 
some farmers' incomes, did not always result in 
the desired production or improvement effect. In 
particular, the various livestock subsidies do not 
seem to have increased the domestic supply of meat, 
the date subsidy and guaranteed wheat price have been 
paid regardless of product quality."(49) 
The above mentioned developments reflect a continued impeding 
of agricultural efforts by basic constraints despite the large financial 
allocations and subsidy policies adopted as shown in Chapters 1 and 3. 
At the same time the problem of labour raises again the familiar 
question of regional cooperation as examined in the preceding section. 
9.5.2.2 AGS Interests and Regional Cooperation in Agriculture: 
The prospects for substantial improvement in AGS food production 
cannot be viewed in the light of this and all preceding examinations as 
bright. 
It is reasonable to assume that the food deficits which are faced 
by every nation in the Middle East, will continue to mount during the 
1980's. Individual countries may achieve an increased degree of self 
sufficiency in some crops in some years, particularly if greater public 
investment is channelled to their agricultural sectors.(50) 
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The AGSt to varying degreest have the capacity to set aside 
a large portion of their national wealth for agricultural activitiest 
and to afford the prevailing international prices of food commodities, 
farm machinery and other modern farm inputs, and subsidising food for 
their citizens. Howevert investment in agriculture which faces drastic 
limiting factors whtin the AGS circlet is offered much larger 
opportunities in the Arab regiont which has a driving motivation, and 
in turn provides a motivating force for cooperation within the Regional 
circle. This could lessen the perceived problem of high dependence 
on imports of food by a food deficit area with a high level of consumer 
income. Food security is perceived to be less problematic if it is 
associated with interdependence within an Arab context. The case for 
wider ranging productive investment also then becomes stronger. 
This is of crucial importance as the large extent of reliance 
on food imports leave the region's policy makers uneasy. Neither foreign 
food tradet nor agricultural development assistance are viewed as 
reliable and too often they are perceived to carry explicit economic 
and implicit political pre-conditions.(51) 
AGS interests in regional efforts towards agricultural development 
seem to be based on the following needs: 
1. Ensuring a secure source for food and other agricultural products 
and minimizing dependence on non-Arab foreign sources for supply. 
2. Creating a diverse production base that exports to agricultural 
countries many commodities used in agricultural production, such as 
fertilizerst chemical insecticides, agricultural equipment and machinery, 
materials and equipment needed for the infrastructure of agricultural 
production and marketing of agricultural products. By virtue of their 
cheap energy sources the Arab oil countries are expected to be in a 
position to set up many such industries on sound economic bases, 
3. Expanding the range of opportunities for joint investment with 
reasonable returns in agriculture and agro-industries, transportation 
and marketing. 
4. In addition to the previously stated benefits, financial 
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investment in the Arab countries brings about mutual security. On the 
one hand, it contributes to minimizing the differences in income and 
standards of living between these countries, thereby preventing 
instability and susceptibility to fluctuations and crises caused by 
.these differences in the region. On the other hand, it averts the dangers 
to which these funds are exposed if they continue to flow to or are 
kept in large quantities in the Western industrialized countries. In 
other words, the capacity in these latter countries to absorb Arab 
funds is not unlimited, and it is most probable that if they rise above 
certain amounts, their real return will fall to very low levels, 
whether because of fluctuations on the world market, inflation, 
involvement in unreliable side investments, or for all these reasons·. 
We must also note that the agricultural sector is a pivot for 
economic and social development in the Arab agricultural countries 
without exeeption.(52) 
9.5.2.3 AGS-Arab Cooperation in Agriculture: 
Food Security as a Motivation for Cooperation: 
In the following section we will explore the general situation 
relating to the food gap as well as related food security problem 
in AGS and the whole Arab region. 
Food Gap - World Vision: 
It is understood from available indicators that the food gap is 
characterizing the world economy in general and that of developing 
countries in particular. 
Growth rates of food production in relation to population in the 
periods 1952-62 and 1962-72 are reflected in the following Table 9.7. 
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Table 9.6 
Sub~re~ionalism in the Arab Re~ion 
(Population, GNP & GNP per capita) 
Population GNP GNP - Per capita 
mid 1978 ~ U,S: rnn. ~ u.s. 
1. AGS {GCC) 
s. Arabia 8;229 54,200 6,590 
Kuwait 1,215 19,410 15.970 
Oman 839 2,340 2,790 
UAE 811 12,130 15,020 
Bahrain 368 1,500 4,060 
Qatar 220 3,310 15,050 
Total 11,682 92,940 7,956 
Percent to Arab 7.6% L12.2% 550% 
2. ACM 
Iraq 1?.,~.1.2 22,540 1,850 
Syria 8,102 '1,820 960 
Jordan 2,984 2,370 1,100 
Egypt 39.855 16,890 420 
Total 63,153 49,620 785 
Percent to Arab 41.2% 22.5% 
3. Maghreb 
Morocco 18,914 12,890 680 
Algeria 17,635 25,730 1,450 
Tunisia 6,075 6,010 990 
Total 42,624 44,630 1,047 
Percent to Arab 27.8% 20.3% 
4. Other Countries 
Lebanon 3,012 n.a. noao 
N. Yemen 5,648 2,301 410 
PDRY 1,750 780 450 
Sudan 17,376 5,900 340 
Sumalia 3,743 3,853 n.a. 
Libya 2,748 18,820 7,210 
Muritanya 1,544 420 270 
Total 35,821 33,074* 
Percent to Arab 23.4% 
Total Arab 153,280 220,264 * 1,437 
Egypt : Arab World 26% 
* Without Lebanon 
Source: IBRD, World Bank Atlas. 
Table 9.7 
Food Production and Population Growth 
Advanced countries 
Developing countries 
World Total 
Advanced countries 
Deve!oping countries 
World Total 
World 
Population 
1952-1962 
1.3 
2.4 
2.0 
1962-1972 
1.0 
2.4 
1.9 
Percentage Annual Growth Rates 
Total 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
Food Production 
Per capita 
1.8 
0.7 
1.1 
1.7 
0.3 
0.8 
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Source: CAEU & FAO, Economic Integration and Trade .!!:xpansion among 
Arab States with Special Reference to the Agricultural Sector, 
Seminar on Agricultural Aspects of Economic Integration, 
1977 D P• 79 o 
If the population growth rate remains stable in developing countries 
then the per capita food share will continue to decline year after 
year, having dropped from 0.7% in one decade to 0.3% in 1962-72 due to 
the fact that population growth has far surpassed food production 
ratios. 
The picture seems worse if we consider the gap between the food 
needs of these countries and their available food production which had 
been estimated by many at 85 million tons shortfall at least by 1985.(53) 
AGS Self-Sufficiency (S-S) in Food Production: 
This is far weaker than that of the Arab region as a whole as 
reflected in the following indicators: 
While self-sufficiency average percentage for cereals was 18 
percent for AGS during the period 1974-78 it was 64.2 percent for the 
Arab region (Table 9.8). 
For vegetables it was 86 percent in AGS comparing to 101 percent 
for Arab region. For fruits it was 63.6 percent in AGS while it was 
111 percent in the Arab region. ln sugar it was zero in AG::> while it 
Wheat Barley Rice 
AGS 14.4 17.7 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0 
Kuwait 0 0 0 
Oman 5.5 0 
Qatar 0 0 0 
S. Arabia 20.8 28.5 0 
UAE 0 0 0 
Total Arab 45.6 90.8 78.9 
Table 9.8 
AGS and Arab Self-Sufficiency in Food Production (%) 
(1974-1978) 
Maize Other* Total Vegetables Sugar Fruits Eggs 
Grain 
2.9 88.9 18 86 0 63.6 38.0 
0 _o 61.4 0 71.7 39.0 
0 0 38.2 0 1.3 18.1 
0 0 100 0 97.0 41.1 
90.8 0 0 0 
3.5 93.9 93.9 0 67.7 62 
0 64.7 0 25.2 11 
76.2 100.6 64.2 101.1 34.5 111 84.1 
* Mostly Tobacco and Maize 
** Mostly broad beans, chick peas, lentiles, peas and beans 
*** Olive Oil only 
Legumes** Fish Meat Vegetable 
& Pulses Oils*** 
0 94.4 41.3 0 
0 68.8 25.6 0 
0 60 40.1 0 
0 1CO 49.5 
0 1GO 40.6 
24 63.5 46.0 0 
0 100 23.5 0 
95.4 497.7 86.8 130.6 
Source: AEUC & FAO, Food Dilemma and Food Security in the Arab World, Part III on Fodd Consumption, Amman, March 1980, 
Many tables, (Arabic). 
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was 34.5 percent in the Arab world. In meat it was 41.3 percent 
in AGS compared to 86.8 for the Arab region. In oil seeds it was zero 
for AGS compared to 130.6 percent for the Arab region. 
It is important to note that the move towards self-sufficiency 
has also been slowing down in the region during the period between 
1970-1074 and 1974-1978. (54) 
For the grains (S-S) decreased from 77.1 percent to 64.2 percent. 
Egyptp Morocco, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and Jordan are the biggest 
producers, whilst the following countries achieved the highest degree 
of self-sufficiency (S-S) during·the period 1970-1974; Iraq 94.1%, 
Algeria 92.0%p Morocco 82.6%p N. Yemen 85.8%, Syria 79.8%, Egypt 
78.4%. (54) 
For fruit (S-S) decreased from 130.7 percent to 111 percent. The 
countries responsible for most of the surpluses are Somalia, Algeria, 
Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania. 
For vegetables the S-S proportion decreased from 104 percent 
to 101.1 percent, with Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Egypt and Iraq achieving 
the highest S-S percentage. 
For sugar S-S decreased from 42.8 percent to 34.5 percent. 
Egypt, Sudan and Somalia are in comparatively better situations. 
For meat, the degree of S-S decreased from 94.3 percent to 86.8 
percent, with Somalia, Tunisia, Muritanya, N. Yemen, PDHY, achieving 
surpluses. Saudi Arabian S=S in meat decreased in the same period 
from 69.3 percent to 46 percent. 
The above trend reflects a continuing weakening situation in 
relation to self-sufficiency in food in the region, the degree of 
self-sufficiency and its decrease differing from one country to another. 
This situation raises two ~ain possibilities for cooperation 
within the region. First, through trade in food products the Arab 
region as a whole achieved surpluses during the 1970's in many food 
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i terns. (mainly veg~tables, fruit and oil seeds) • Second, through joint 
_action. Regional self-sufficiency in food would seem to be achievable 
in the light of existing situation and available potentialities 
relating to resource base. 
Per capita food consumption is higher in the AGS than in the 
whole Arab region group. This applies to all items except for grains 
and fish as reflected in Table 9. 9. As an example, per capita 
consumption of eggs in AGS was nearly four times that of Arab world, 
nearly three times for milk, meat, fruits and vegetables. 
However, whilst the AGS total area corresponds to 18.1 percent 
of the total area of the Arab world the AGS agricultural area correspond 
to only 2.4 percent of the total agricultural area of the Arab region 
(Table 1.2). 
The AGS comparative deficit in trade balance of food commodities 
was especially high for some items during the period (1974-1978) such 
as milk, meat and eggs (Table 9.10). 
9.5.2.4 The Arab Food Gap Situation and Development: 
The whole Arab region i.s witnessing a serious food gap problem 
as reflected in the following indicators. 
A growing trade deficit of food commodities during the period 
from 1960-1964 to 1974-1978 (Appendix Table 20) shows that the 
deficit index for most commodities ranged from 187.3 percent for sugar 
to 2175.9 percent for rice. 
Agricultural production rates in the Arab world over recent years, • 
showed fluctuating rates around 2.5% annually, and these rates scarcely 
kept pace with the high population increase; moreover, the per capita 
demand for many foodstuffs has increased as a result of higher. income 
levels. Table 9.11 reflects this trend over the last ten years.(55) 
For some sources estimate the average annual increase of foop 
production in the Arab world .to be round 2 percent, while the def111:!-f1d 
AGS 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
s. Arabia 
UAE 
Total Arab 
Table 9 •. 9 
Per Capita Annual Consumption (1974-1978) 
Kg/person 
Grains Vegetables Fruits Fish 
199.9 20.7 87.6 6.3 
151.5 38.4 144.3 6.7 
179.2 16.3 66.5 7.4 
116.9 7.5 91.2 
349.5 33.7 6.5 
146.5 9.6 63.1 4.7 
255.5 18.7 72.8 
231.2 7.6 42.2 7.5 
Meat Milk 
& Prod. 
47.9 341.2 
42.1 223.1 
59.5 216.6 
16.6 188.3 
93.2 1045.7 
22.9 98.6 
53.0 274.8 
16.6 117.3 
Source: AEUC, Food Dilemma and Food Security in the Arab World. Food Consumption 
(Part III) Amman, March 1980, from Many Tables (Arabic) 
Eggs 
9.5 
11.8 
11.1 
1.3 
15.6 
3.0 
14.4 
2.4 
UJ 
00 
r-' 
AGS 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Sub Total (1) 
Total Arab(2) 
1:2 
Table 9.10 
Balance of Trade Commodities (AGS & Arab Region) 
1974-1978 
Quantity in Tonp Average ~>nual 
Grains Sugar Milk Meat 
-46p222 -7,096.8 ~2.2 -501.6 
-197,456 -69 p 739.4 -44.6 -5p741.6 
-89,812 -11,356.6 -276 
-34,076 ~.465.6 
-840p182 -124,865.4 -10,189.4 -5,635 
-145,646 -23 p 753.6 -1,208 -1,845.8 
-1,353,394 -243,277.4 -llp504.2 -14,000 
-13p000,259 -2,416,645 -32p441 ~1,012.2 
10.4% 10.1% 35.5% 22.9% 
Source: Ibid., Part III. 
Eggs 
-l0p298.8 
-660 
-1,564 
-8,908.8 
-8,217.4 
-29p649 
-55,466 
53.5% 
VJ 
00 
!:\) 
Tabie 9. ll 
Percentage of Average Annual Growth 
(1970's) 
Country Population Food Prod. 
Saudi Arabia 2.4 2.9 
Iraq 3.3 2.8 
Egypt 2.3 3.4 
Syria 3.0 1.8 
Morocco 3.0 2.8 
Lebanon 2.8 5.0 
(Production and Food) 
Demand for 
Food 
5.0 
5.2 
3.8 
4.6 
3.3 
3.1 
Difference 
Production {+) 
and Demand {-) 
-2.1 
-2.4 
-0.4 
-2.5 
-0.7 
+1.9 
Source: Ali, K.T. 'Food Security and the Joint Arab Effort', Sources 
and Problems of Arab Development, Kuwait: OAPEC, 1980, p. 72. 
for food increases annually by 5 percent.(56) 
Table 9.12 shows that the Arab world in the mid-1970's imported 
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the equivalent of 37% of its total cereal production, 175% of its total 
sugar production, 18% of its total oil seeds production and 15% of 
its total meat and egg production. 
l'he general trend during the 1970's of food production in relation 
to existing and predicted consumption within th eregion can be further 
illustrated thus: 
1. Whereas the overall ratio of the value of agricultural exports 
to imports exceeded 99 percent in 1970, tnis value began to fall rapidly 
until it reached a low of only 36% in 1975. Table 9. 1;~ illustrates 
this trend. 
2. While the trade balance of agricultural commodities was in 
favour of seven countries at the beginning of the decade, particularly 
for Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Egypt and Mauritania, by 1975 this balance 
showed a deficit in 18 Arab countries, with the exception of Sudan 
and Somalia. 
3. In the ECWA countries as a whole there was a rising growth rate 
Table 9.12 
Production, Imports and Exports of the Arab World for Major Agricultural Productions in 1976 
Commodity 
A Food Productions 
I Cereals (1) 
II Sugar 
III Oil seeds (3) 
IV Fruits and Veg. 
V Meat and Eggs 
Dairy Produce 
Total for A: 
(4) 
B Other Agricultural 
Productions 
VI Crude Cotton 
Wool 
Jute 
VII Tea 
Coffee 
Tobacco 
Total for B: 
Overall Total: 
Production 
(millions of tons) 
29.90 
1.20 
4.00 
27.00 
2.00 
7.50 
minimal (2) 
0.06 
Imports: 
Quantity 
(millions of tons) 
11.20 
2.10 
0.70 
1.00 
0.30 
0.40 
0.06 
0.02 
0.04 
0.14 
0.10 
0.06 
Imports: 
Value 
(millions of $) 
1.900 
1,200 
420 
206 
400 
515 
4,641 
60 
45 
15 
204 
165 
287 
776 
5,417 
% 
41.0 
25.8 
9.1 
4.4 
8.6 
11.1 
100 
Exports: 
Quantity 
(millions of tons) 
0.50 
minimal (2) 
0.40 
2.20 
0.10 
0.43 
minimal 
minimal (2) 
0.01 
Exports: 
Value 
(millions of ~) 
216 
28 
266 
777 
92 
1,379 
766 
8 
8 
16 
898 
2,176 
continued 
VJ 
00 
~ 
(Table 9.12 continued) 
(1) Mainly wheat, rice, corn, barley and legumes 
(2) Minimal on this table = less than 10 thousand tons 
(3) Also includes extracted vegetable oils 
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(4) Exports comprise 500 thousand tons of wine valued at 120 million 
dollars. 
Source: Ali,Khalid. T. 'Food Security and the Joint Arab Effort', 
In, Oil and Arab Cooperation, OAPEC, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1978, pp. 
17-49, (Arabic). 
Table 9.13 
Growth of Agricultural Imports and Exports in the Arab World for the 
Years 1970-75 
(In billions of US dollars) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Value of Agr. Exports 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.5 
Value of Agr. Imports 1.7 2.1 2.4. 3.3 6.2 6.9 
Diff. between value of 
exports(+) and imports(-) -0.4 -0.5 -0.9 -3.4 -4.4 
Percentage value of 
exports and imports 100 81 79 73 45 36 
Source: AEUC & FAO, Op. cit., p. 59. 
for per capita consumption, and a decreasing rate of self-sufficiency. 
Whilst average self-sufficiency for wheat was 57 percent during the 
period 1970-1977 it was 0nly 39 percent in 1977. The same trend has 
occurred in all food items, with the exception of legumes and eggs as 
shown in Appendix Table 21. 
The contribution of agriculture to Arab GDP decreased from 18 
percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1975. This percentage is much less 
than the average percentage prevailing in the middle income group of 
countries, 15%, while the extraction industries' (depleting resources) 
contribution to Arab GDP increased from 25% to 46 percent. 
The Arab region can be divided into-three group of countries 
in terms of agricultural potential: 
1. Group One: Oil exporting countries with poor agricultural 
resources (all AGS and Libya). 
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2. Group Two: Countries with relatively large agricultural reosurces 
(Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria).-
3. Group Three: Non-oil countries with relatively limited 
agricultural resources or poor exploitation prospects (Mauritania, 
Somalia, South Yemen, North Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan). 
The first group is characterized by heavy dependence on imports 
for the supply of agricultural productsv and thus has had a continuous. 
negative trade balance. The value of such imports reached ~ 1600 
million in 1975, constituting 35% of the total trade deficit of the Arab 
countries, while the population of this group of countries was only 9% 
of the total population of the Arab world. The per capita net value· 
of imports of these products reached around ~ 120 in 1975.(57) 
The second group has the highest proportion of agricultural 
potential in the Arab region with agricultural resources comprising 
(in cultivable land and supply of water) 90% of total Arab 
agricultural resources. Despite this the group's trade balance in 
agricultural commodities reversed from surpluses ranging from US ~ 200 
to $ 600 million during the late 1960's and early 1970's to a defiCit 
of about US $ 2,400 million in 1975, more than half the total deficit 
for these commodities in the Arab world. The average per capita net 
imports of countries in this group was 21 US dollars. 
The third group countries, either have limited agricultural 
resources, or agriculture potentialities which have limited prospects 
of exploitation. Excluding Somalia, which in the mid-1970's had a 
surplus agricultural trade balance, the countries of this group trade 
balance deficit rose from $ 300 million in 1970 to $ 470 million, 
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representing 10% of the net value of agricultural imports of the Arab 
world. 
A serious growing gap is predicted for all food items in the 
Arab region because the needed increase of existing average production 
to close the expected gap between production and consumption in 1985 
would be 121.5 percent ofwheat production average in 1976 and 327 percent 
for sugarg 144 percent for meatg 144 percent for milk and 180 percent 
for vegetable oil (Table 9.14). · 
These indications of trends in productionp consumptionp trade 
and self-sufficiency all point to a critical situation in relation to 
food situation in the Arab region. It is even more critical in the AGS. 
Sub-region. 
Persistent regression in the agricultural sector in most Arab 
countries, whether in the form of unexploited resources or low 
productivity levels, constitutes a great challenge to the possibility 
of absorbing·the financiai resources available in the region, trans-
forming them into material assets through investment in productivity 
projects, and preventing them from being eroded and wasted in the form 
of rapidly diminishing capital or unreliable investments in foreign 
countries. 
"It mayp therefore, be said that the development of 
agricultural resources in the Arab countries during 
this period of history, is one of the best fields for 
Arab cooperation in joint creative efforts motivated 
by joint and mutual interests between the countries 
with financial resources and those with agricultural 
resources. 11 (58) 
Achieving Arab food security necessitates the emphasis to be 
directed to bridging the food gap by increasing production of strategic 
food commodities forming this gapp particularly wheatp sugar, animal 
products and vegetable oils. This increased production and productivity 
should ideally also meet the costs of other agricultural imports 
including production requirements (e.g. fertilizers, insecticidesp 
Table 9.14 
Food Production and Demand and Gap in 1985 'for the Major Food Products (million tons) 
Average Net Average Average Forecasts o'f Gap between Increase in Production 
Commodity Production Imports 1973-76 Aggregate Demand 1985 Current Production in % by 1985 to close 
(current gap) Demand and Demand in 1985 the gap 
Wheat 9.3 8.2 17.5 2.6 11.3 121.5 
Sugar 1.1 2.2 3.3 3.7 3.6 327 
Meat 1.8 0.2 2.0 4.4 2.6 144 
Milk 7.0 3.0 10.0 13.0 6.0 185 
Oil Seeds 4.0 (0.1) 3.9 
Veg. oils 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.1 180 
Source: Ali, K.T. Op. cit., Table 5, p. 73. 
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tools 0 agricultural machinery etc. The relationship between the 
development of Regional agricultural production and the Regional 
production of these required inputs and its relevance to non-
agricultural .sectors of cooperation is clear. 
9.5.2.5 .Political Aspects of the Food Security QUestion: 
IViany pragmatic indicators show the political importance of food 
problems as motivating AGS-Regional cooperation. Broadly these can 
be grouped as follows: 
1. Food shortages and higher prices have led to popular demonstrations 
and political unrest.in many parts of the Middle East. 
2. The danger of cuts in the flow of food exports·by the USA and the 
use of such trade as a political weapon. 
3. Dangers of food boycotts. 
Some examples serve to illustrate those perceived. 
"It is an overstatement to conclude that as.long as 
city people have food in their stomachs, political 
leaders need not fear popular uprisings; but it is 
apparent that, in the absence of food security, no 
regime in the Middle East can have afirm grip onpower."(59) 
Both the rich and the poor nations of the region have a .common: 
over-riding concern that food prices paid by their citizens be kept 
from soaring and that food stocks <;lre adequate. In both types of 
nations, any acute shortages of food are likely to increase national 
··.,. 
tensions by underscoring the economic advantages in the access of food 
of particular social groups. The economically weak and strong alike 
moreover face the possibility that during the 1980's and 1990's global 
food exporting countries will be increasingly unable, perhaps unwilling 
to cover the.region's food deficits at any price.(60) 
The u.s. to name one country has never shied away from exploiting 
agricultural exports to nudge consumer_and recipient nations to modify 
international or domestic policies, although rare,l.y is this done so 
--.~~ 
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following Afghanistan's invasion.(61) 
Boycotts are better designed to bring about mass discontent 
through spot shortages and the creation of higher prices that erode 
confidence in ruling authorities and lay fertile ground for opposition 
elements.(62) Such boycotts were periodically enforced by Syria on 
the Syrian-,Jordanian border during 1981 and 1982. 
The withdrawal of food exports and concessionary financing might, 
nonetheless, be used in the. hope of destabilizing a regime and indicates 
the often limited range of credible alternatives available in 
particular to the USA in trying to influence policies in the Midd.Le F.ast.(63) 
Recent moves by the USA to apply sanctions even to its Western European 
allies in the industrial trade sector only make Arab countries more 
dubious about American dependability. 
Food is considered as an inescapable issue in the larger cities 
of the Middle East where consumption patterns sP.rve as a measure of 
economic status. A high proportion of urban family incomes goes toward 
purchasing food; the regular enjoyment of meat, rice, fruit and other 
staple food is one conspicuous mark of well being. Food consumption 
is closely tied to a sense of overall security. 
The near disappearance of onions and potatoes both conspicuous 
in the Persian diet, is considered to have sparked street riots 
in Teheran during the winter of 1976. The rise in the price of sugar 
of 33 percent in Sudan, together with food, fuel and transport prices 
brought mobs into the street of Khartoum and other cities. In 1977, 
following IMF advice to reduce the budget deficit running at ~ 3.2 
billion, Sadat cut or eliminated subsidies by about ~ 700 million 
annually on a wide range of basic consumer items (rice, sugar, bread 
and bottled cooking gas). There followed violent street demonstrations, 
strongly anti-regime in tone, criticising Sadat for causing deterioration 
in e~6nomic, condi t i onG. .Tne measures proposed had to be withdrawn. { 64) 
These and most other examples tend to reflect the dangerous 
food supply problem in the non-oil exporting Arab group. Such signs 
have rarely appeared in the AGS Sub-region which has been able to 
guarantee continuing supplies of food commodities at relatively low 
prices through being able to pay for heavy import bills and consumer 
subsidies. However, such potential dangers could arise, in the view 
of the author of this thesis, in the case of conflicts between this 
group and those countries which constitute the main source of their 
imports. What is as important as the likelihood of this eventuality 
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is the fear felt by Governments in the Sub-region that it could happen. 
Consequently, political considerations tend to strengthen economic 
ones in motivating the AGS to search for a regional solution to food 
dilemma. 
We turn now, to examine how the regional agricultural resource 
base could be used to transform motivation into practice. 
9.5.3 Gulf-Arab Cooperation in Agriculture-Resource Base Potentials 
In the following section, we will summarily examine the extent 
and diversity of water resources (surface, underground and rainfall), 
land resources as well as animal wealth (including fisheries) of the 
Arab world and the potentials of agricultural expansion available through 
such resources. The question of agricultural cooperation from an 
integrated outlook dealing with its constraints and a proposed approach 
will be discussed in Chapter 13. 
9.5.3.1 Resource Base - Water and Land Resources: 
Water Resources: 
Arab countries at present exploit around 55-65% of their surface 
and underground water resources, and even this volume is not utilized 
in a sound scientific manner or with adequate efficiency. 
Current irrigation water use averages 115-12.5 billion cu. metres 
per year ~ostly dr~wn from rivers (105-115). This ut~lizat~on of water 
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d~es not exceed 50% of the total annual potential supply of river 
waterp some 195· billion cu. m. and expected to increase to 213 billion 
on completion of the upper Nile schemes which.will cut losses from 
evaporation and wastage in the flood areas and marches of Sudan. 
The volume of ground water annually utilized for irrigation is 
about 8-12 billion cu. m. with an additional 3-5 billion cu. m. of wadi 
water; these together may be more than doubled by the year 2000. Arab 
plans envisage additional utilization of 50-100 billion cu. m. flood 
water annually. This quantity could allow expansion of the irrigated 
area by 6 million hectares.(65) 
On the basis of perennial or supplementary irrigation from 
underground sources we can expect the area·irrigated·by ground water 
wiil extend by the year 2000 (according to recent available data) 
from 0.7-0.8 million hectares (1975)to 1.0-1.2 million hectares 
1985 and to 1. 7-2.3 by the year 2000 ~n the. basis of perennial irrigation~ 
If all unexploited underground water was used solely for supplementary 
irrigationp it would be possible to expand almost threefold the irrig-
ation areap i.e. to around 4.5 milli~n hectares.(66) 
The Arab world will depend for the future horizontal and vertical 
expansion of its irrigated agricultural areas mainly on the savings 
(approx. 45 billion cu. m. a year) realisable from rationalising and 
. of 
modernizationlirrigation systems and methods of exploitation of 
unutilized water resources (50-60 billion c_u. m. of _su!'face and wadi 
:< 
water and 10-15 billion cu. m. of ground water) in order to get 10 
million hectares under intensive agriculture.(67) 
Rain-fed Area and Potentials: The rain-fed area in the Arab 
world is between 39 million and 44 million hectares. The lands suitable 
for rain-fed cultivation in Sudan alone are at least 30 million hectares 
and some sources estimate them at 70 million he~t~~~ or m~re. rh~ 
~~dan i~:; one of the three countries on which other Arab c:;ountr~el? !¥\d 
·. ·-:·t 
.. :: \-
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the rest of the world rely fer solving future food problems 
particularly in grain. The average annual expansion in rain~fed areas 
in the Arab countries will be approximately 1% during the period 
1975-85, with half the expected development will be in the Sudan alone 
and 35% in the Arab Maghreb. 
It is worth noting that the Arab fund has its target of 8.5 
million hectares rain-fed by the year 2000 (of which 2.1 million by 
1985), under mechanisation for growing cereals (sorghum and corn) 
oil seeds (peanutsD sesame and sunflower) and various fooder crops.(68) 
Land Resources: 
Land under cultivation (rain-fed and irrigated) in the Arab 
countries is estimated at about 49~52 million hectares. Land available, 
but not exploited for agriculture certainly amounts to nearly SO 
million hectares while some sources suggest a figure of 120 million 
hectares. However, even the lower figure includes lands (not less than 
25%) of low or marginal quality or which have no access to water supply. 
More detailed survey information is needed for each country. 
Water from any source remains the decisive factor for any 
expansion. During the period 1975-85 the additionalareas added to 
production are expected to be 6-8 million hectares at an average annual 
rate of 1.3%; ·the major development will be in Sudan (40%) Morocco (28%) 
and Iraq (16%). But this 6-8 million· hectares still make up only 8% 
of the expansion potential in the Arab region.(69) 
In illustrating the great potentials for food production in Sudan 
and Iraq it is worthy reviewing Table 9.1S which reflects the 
significance of potential expansion in Sudan and Iraq. The long term 
potentials of Iraq for wheat production are almost double the current 
wheat production in the Arab world as a wholeD and Sudan's potential 
for crop production of oil seeds is equivalent to three times the 
current Ar~b production. FurtherJ;'ore D Sudan 1 s potentiall:l for su~ar 
394 
production could entirely bridge the gap between current production 
and projected demand in 1985.(70) 
Table 9.15 
Comparison of Present Production with Long-term Procluction Capacity for 
Main Crops in Sudan and Iraq 
Present Long-term Production Long-term Production 
Crop Production* Capacity as per Present rate (million tons) (million tons) 
Sudan 
Oats 1.7 22 13 
Other grains 0.2 5 25 
Oil seeds 0.8 12 15 
Sugar cane 0.1 2.7 27 
Cotton 0.6 3.1 5 
Meat 0.4 3.5 9 
Iraq 
Wheat 0.8 16.0 20 
Barley 0.8 2.7 3 
Oats 6.0 
Total Grains 2.0 25 12 
* Represents production of 1972-73 for Sudan and average production at end 
of the 1960's for Iraq. 
Source: Ali 0 K.T. Op. cit. 0 p. 83. 
The relative costs of cultivating new areas of land in Sudan are 
lower than in most other Arab countries. The potential returns on such 
development are high in the majority __ of cases even though investment 
includes improving and adding constructing infrastructures and the 
provision of supporting services.(71) Sudan great potentials for food 
the 
production has motivated the establishment of~Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Investment and Development with a promising programme which 
is used as a case study for Regional cooperation in Chapter 13. 
9.5.3.2 Summary - Water and Land Resources and Potential for 
Development:(72) 
:I 
From this data water and land resources and agriculture development 
potential seem to be considerable in the Arab region in aggregate. 
However, it is concentrated in 'few of the countries as indicated 
in the following notes: 
1. Current irrigation water exploitation ranges from 115-125 billion 
cubic metres annually taken from: 
105-115 cu. m. billion from rivers (87.1%-90,5%) 
8- 12 cu. m. billion from underground 
3- 5 cu. m. billion from wadis 
2. It is possible to increase the supply of irrigation water by 50-100 
cu. m. billion annually, to increase the irrigated area by 6 million 
hectares. 
3. Arab countries, at present, exploit around 55-65% of their surface 
and underground water resources as the average drainage of surface water 
(rivers and wadis) is around 195 billion cu. m., while the current use 
of water is inefficient and can be used for more expansion. 
4. The rain-fed area is estimated at 39 to 44 million hectares with 
the largest share being for Sudan with 30 million hectares. 
5. While the total Arab area under cultivation ranges from 49-52 
million hectares, 80 million hectares are available for cultivation. 
6. Available water resources are expected to increase the agricultural 
areas within the range of 6.8 million hectares during the period 
1975-1985 at an annual average rate of 1.3%. The major development will 
be in Sudan (40%) Morocco (28%) and Iraq (16%). The 6.8 million_ 
hectares forms only 8% of the expansion potential in the Arab Region. 
However, when utilizing total available surface water (using 200 
from the 227 billion cu. m. for irrigation and the remainder for 
other uses), an increase of the agricultural area could be brought about 
to 16.9 million hectares (equivalent to 60% increase). In controlling 
the use of irrigation waters by using 7,500 cubic metres instead of 
12,000 cubic per crop hectare, an increase in the annual cropped area 
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could be achieved around 160% {from 10.5 to 26.7 million crop he~tares). 
7. The CAEU/FAO 1977 Symposium concluded that the countries with 
the greatest proportion of irrigated land, and the greatest potentials 
for and an increase in production are. in order of their future 
potentials: Egypt, Iraq. Sudan. Syria and Morocco. These five countries 
possess around 90% of currently available irrigation water and irrigated 
areas. 
Some estimates suggest that Iraq could increase its irrigated 
cropareas by 5.7 million hectares. i.e. by 360%. The increase 
corresponds to 35% of the total p.:>tentials for increasing cultivated 
areas in the region. This could be achieved in Iraq through better 
exploitation and control as well as redirecting the waters of the Tigris. 
the Euphrates and their tributaries. 
8. Sudan, with 50% of possible agricultural rain-fed area expansion 
in the Arab world. deserves special attention in the realm of Arab 
agricultural and food production. In addition the lowest relative 
costs of cultivating new areas of land with high returns exist in 
the Sudan~ even though this needs large infrastructural and supporting 
services investments. 
9. More than half the agricultural land i~ concentrated in four 
Arab countries: Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Syria. which together with Iraq 
represents 68% of all cultivated areas. 
10. The area of the land effectively irrigated {without fallowing) 
i3 expected to rise from 9 million hectares to 11.5 million hectares 
over the coming decade at an annual rate of expansion in the irrigated 
lands of 2.5%. The major part of this expansion {74%) could be in 
·Iraq, Sudan, Egypt and Syria and 17% in Arab Mahgreb countries.{73) 
11. By developing available but hitherto unexploited resources 
{horizontal expansion) both the Arab and foreign exports are in 
agreement over the possibility of more than doubling or trebling Arab 
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agricultural production by the turn of the present century, once the 
inherent obstacles within the structures, systems and organizations 
have been removed and positive steps taken for the modernization and 
intensification of agriculture.(74) 
All above indicators show the great potential for agricultural 
expansion within the Region and the fact that the location of such 
potential is beyond the AGS Sub-region boundaries. 
9.5.3.3 Fisheries Resources and Potentials: 
The following Table 9.16 summarizes the situation in relation 
to production and potential of fisheries in the Arab world: 
Table 9.16 
Area Production 1974 Potentials (000 tons) · (OOO.tons) 
Atlantic 292 1000 
Mediterranean 115 200 
Red Sea 50 100 
Indian Ocean 240 1000 
Arab Gulf 78 1000. 
Total 774 3300 
Source: CAEU, & FAO Seminar, Op. cit., Opportunities for Agricultural. 
Integration as related to comparative advantage and production 
specialization, p. 76. 
From the above table it is seen that the annual fish production 
in 1974 of 775 thousand tons represented 23% of the 3.3 million tons 
as a potential annual catch in the Arab world. 
It reflects also the importance of the Indian Ocean, Arab Gulf, 
as well as the Atlantic area. It is proposed to concentrate development 
activities in the medium-term on the Indian Ocean and Arab Gulf Area 
and Atlantic which is wealthier than the rest of the areas with further 
study and surveys to be conducted on the less wealthy Mediterranean 
and Red Sea areas. 
The following indicators and notes are of special relevance to 
fisheries devel0pment within the regional context. 
1. The backwardness of Arab fisheries in general is due to the 
inefficiency of investment aimed at this type of economic activity 
together with an inefficient fishing fleet and lack. of expertise, 
training and fishing methods. This situation was illustrated for the 
AGS in.Chapters 3 and 5. 
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2. All factors point to the under-exploitation of Arab fish resources, 
calling for effective solutions to the problems caused by the shortage 
of animal protein. 
3. Marine resources in the Arab world are one of the major fields 
of development, of no lass imp(!)rtance than oil if preperly exploited 
renewed and replenished, while oil depletes and eventually dries up. 
The economic importance of the Arab fish wealth lies primarily 
in that it could significantly improve the nutrition and protein 
levels of the population, as well as their income levels and employment 
opportunities. Investment returns are proportionately large due to 
low production costs, being mainly the fish harvesting operation. 
4. 119,000 tons (1.2%) only are produced from fresh waters out of 
the total Arab production of fish in 1974. Arab production was 1.2% 
of world production of 70 million tons. 
5. Morocco is the major producer with 288,000 tons in 1974 (32%} 
followed by South Yemen 134,000 (15%) Oman with :noo,ooo (11%) and 
Egypt 96,000 (10%}. 
6. The Arab region as a whole is self-sufficient in fish with 97.7 
percent for the Region and 94.4 percent for the Sub-region (Table 9.2}. 
58% of"fish produced in 1974 was consumed locally, 26% exported outside 
the Arab world. Thus fish products are important when added to the 
total consumption which comes to 669,000 tons or 75% of the general 
Arab production of 1974. 
7. In 1974 with an Arab.population of 141 million, per capita 
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consumption was 4.6 kg while the world average is 18 kg. Only four 
Arab countries surpassed this - Muritania, S. Yemen, Oman and UAE. 
8. Sweet water fish production is restricted to six countries led 
by Egypt with 68,000 tons in 1974, about 58% of Arab production, 
Sudan 22,000 ( 18%) , Iraq 13,000 12%, Muri tania 1:3,000 ( 11%) , 
Syria and Morocco 1% each. 
9. The fish potential of the Arab world may exceed 3 million tons 
annually. It is possible to reach 2 million tons annually, of which 58% 
(or 11.2 million tons) would be for human consumption raising Arab per 
capita consumption to 6.5 kg by 1983. 
10. 1985 Estimates: With a population of 185 million, consumption is 
estimated at 1, 017, 500 tons giving a per capita consumption of 5.5 kg, 50% 
of 2 million tons production for local demand, 26% for export and 16% 
for industrial uses. 
11. The sources of anticipated 2 million tonsproduction may be 
distributed over the Arab producing areas as follows: 
Atlantic Ocean area 
-Mediterranean 
The Red Sea 
The Indian Ocean 
The Arab Gulf 
260,000 tons 
300,000 
120,000 
620,000 
200,000 
The Mediterranean and Red Sea area areas IJ!ill have a deficit of 
120,000 tons which could be met byimports from neighbouring countries. 
To summarise the fisheries situation - the available and potential 
catch of fish from the Arab Region is considered to be abundm1t, 
allowing the needs to be met while leaving a good range for export. 
Despite the wealthy potential, the current stage is characterized 
by under exploitation and low per capita consumption, reflecting a 
comparative weak protein nutritional situation in comparison to inter-
national standards. 
The situation calls for cooperation to develop the fisheries 
sector, concentrating mainly on the Indian Ocean, Arab Gulf and Atlantic 
areas. 
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9.5.3.4 Potential For Developing Animal Production: 
In order to provide integration of agriculture and livestock 
production this should be developed in those countries having some 
comparative advantage. Some important relative advantage in resources 
are natural pastures and carrying pasture land for growing green 
foragep feed grains, oil, seed cake, by-products for feeding animals, 
together with a capability for intensive livestock farming. 
There are a number of Arab countriesp such as Sudan, Somalia, 
Iraq, Syria and Morocco which have potentials for increasing livestock 
production through expanding irrigated areas as well as using rain-:-fed 
fallow lands.(75) 
Specialization coupled with intensive feeding could increase the 
rate of production considerably and effectively by 60% in mutton and 
68% in woolp the two major products of sheepp in addition to improving 
births by 40% and milk yield by 33%. 
9.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The preceding analysis supports the proposition that the resource 
base in general, and the labour force situation and the size of markets 
in particular, provide strong motives for the AGS to extend cooperation to 
the Regional context and as illustrated by industrial and agricultural 
sectors needs. 
Examining the agricultural sector in general, and food production, 
in particularp it was clear that the AGS had a very weak agricultural 
base which has been reflected in very weak production achievements 
despite the notable subsidy programmes, except for fisheries in which 
·the Sub-region has an advantage. With such a situation prevailing it 
leaves these countries subject to food security problems in the long run, 
despite financial resources which enable Governments to provide their 
citizens with subsidized food: the current high standard of income and 
j .. , 
consumption is disguising the potential problem. The agricultural sector 
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pre>blem in general and the food po.tential problem in particular, 
strengthens the AGS need to diversify their income sources through the 
productive investment of their surpluses ~1d in the wealthy agricultural 
potentials available within the Region. Consequently, in considering 
the whole agricultural spectrum in the Arab Region and possible agro-
industrial integration of the AGS Sub-region ~~d the whole Arab region 
one should look at agriculture as providing a strong motivation for 
cooperation, supported by economic as well as political considerations. 
In earlier chapters the efforts of the AGS to lessen their 
dependence on oil export revenue and economic domination by the 
oil-based sector as a whole have been outlined. The results to date 
have not been encouraging. Future developments, in particular, continue 
to rely heavily on foreign workers' availability, the very limited 
potential of new resources, the better exploitation of known resources 
and an investment of their financial surpluses. All these factors are 
associated with strong constraints within the Sub-region. However, 
the Arab Region has far fewer structural constraints and far greater 
potentials in terms of physical and human resources and investment 
possibilities. 
All the evidence shows that, although some limitations would remain 
(which require an involvement in the International circle as considered 
in Chapter 10), the benefits which would come from Regional cooperation 
are very promising. In particular, the long-term objectives of the AGS 
in achieving profound development changes, changes of structure not 
merely the facade, seem to require Regional as well as Sub-regional 
cooperation. This ultimately provides the basic motivation for such 
a move. 
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·Notes and References 
(1) Sayigh, Y.A. The Determinants of Arab Economic Development, 
(London: Cromm Helm, 1978), Vol. 2, p. 151. 
402 
(2) CAEU & FAO ·•Ecoroomic Integration Organs in the Arab Countries and 
the Role of CAEU' Seminar on Agricultural Aspects of Economic 
Integration, 2-7 April, 1977, Cairo-Egypt, p. 74. 
(3) Demir, S. Arab Development Funds in the Middle East. (U.S.: 
UNITAR, Pergman Press, 1979), p. 68. 
(4) Sayigh, Y.A. Op. cit., p. 47. 
(5) Ibid., p. 48. 
(6) Ibid., p. 58. 
(7) Ibid. , p. 59. 
(8) Ibid., p. 59. 
(9) Hershlag, Z.Y. 'Industrialization in Arab Countries: Patterns, 
Options and Strategies', In, Arab Industrialization and Economic 
Integration, edi t.ed by Roberto Aliboni, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 
·P. 21. 
(10) IDCAS, Memo on Arab Industrial Development Strategy, First Arab 
Ministers of Industry Conference, Algeria, 29-31 May 1975. 
Document No. WS1/102, pp. 5-6, (Arabic). 
(11) Hershlag, Z.Y. Op. cit., p. 57. 
(12) Boudiba, A.W. 'Arab Migration', In, Ar~b Industrialization and 
Economic Integration, edited by .Roberto Aliboni (London: Croom Helm, 
1979) , p 0 158 0 
(13) Ibid., p. 168. 
(14) Ibid., pp. 168-169. 
(15) Farrag, M.A.M. Migration between Arab Countries in Manpower and 
Employment in Arab Countries, (Gen-eva: ILO, 1976). 
(16) Boudiba, A.W. Op. cit., p. 169. 
(17) Ibid., p. 177. 
(18) Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
(19) Ibid., p. 186. 
(20) Ibid. , p. 171. 
(21) Ibid. 
403 
(22) ~- p p. 173. 
(23) ~-· p. 160. 
{24) Arab Planning Institute and ILO, Seminar on: Population, Employment 
and Migration in the Arab Gulf States, Kuwait 16-18 December 1978, 
pp. 223-225. 
(25) Abed Fathi, F., Keynon, G. & others, The Opec Market to 1985 
{Canada: Lexington Books, 1977), p·. 235. 
(26) Hablutzel, R. 'Issues in Economic Diversification for the 
Oil-Rich Countries', In, Finance and Development, June 1981, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 12. 
(27) Meed, 4 June 1982, p. 18. 
(28) Ferjani, N. 'Human Exchange between Arab Countries', In, Al-
Mustaqbal El-Arabi (Arab Future), No. 39, May 1982, pp. 40-41 
(Ara'!::lic). 
(29) Ibid., p. 43. 
(30) Metwally, M.M. 'The Case for Arab Economic Integration', 
In, L'Egypte Contemporaine, No. 376, April 1979. 
(31) Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
(32) Ibid., p. 123. 
(33) Ibid., p. 130. 
(34) 
..!lli· t p. 123. 
(35) Ibid., p. 128. 
(36) Ibid., p. 130. 
{37) Hershlag, Z.Y. Op. cit., p. 80. 
(38) 
.!E.i2· t pp. 221-223. 
(39) Buchanan and Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development, (U.S.: 
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 237. 
(40) Ibid., p. 259. 
(41) Ibid., p. 263. 
(42) Sayigh, Y.A. Op. cit., p. 11. 
(43) Salameh, G. 'Saudi Arabia: Development and Dependence', In, 
The Jerusalem Quarterly No. 20, ~ummer 1~81, Jerusalem, p. 117. 
(44) Ibid., p. 117. 
404 
(45) Ibid. 
(46) s. Arabiap Ministry of Planning, Third DeveloEment Plan (198-1985)p 
p. 137. 
(47) Ibid., p. 141. 
(48) 
.!£!s!·' p. 149 • 
(49) Ibid., p. 149. 
(50) Weinbum, M.G. 'Food and Political Stability in the Middle East', 
In, Studies in ComEarative International·DeveloEment, Vol. XV, 
No. 2, Spring 1980, U.S., p. 23. 
(51) Sayegh, Y.A. Op. cit., p. 51. 
(52) Ali, K.T. 'Food Security and the Joint Arab Effort', Sources and 
Problems of Arab Development, (Kuwait: OAPEC, 1980), p. 85. 
(53) CAEU & FAO, 'Economic Integration and Trade Expansion among Arab 
States with special Reference to the Agricultural Sector', Seminar 
on Agricultural AsEects of Economic Integration, Cairo, 1977, p. 79. 
(54) Ibid. See also: CAEU, 'Food Dilemma and Food Security in the Arab 
World', Food Consumption, Part III, Amman, March 1980, (Arabic). 
(55) Ali, K.T. Op. cit., p. 72. 
(56) CAEU, Food Dilemma and Food Security in the Arah World, Part I, 
Amman, March 1980, (Arabic). 
(57) Ali, K.T. Op. cit., p. 60. 
(58) Ibid., p. 84. 
(59) Weinbum, M.G. Op. cit., p. 25. 
(60) Fathi, F.A. and others Op. cit., p. 24. 
(61) Weinbum, M.G. Op. cit., p. 24. 
(62) Ibid., p. 24. 
(63) Ibid., p. 24. 
(64) Ibid., p. 8. 
(65) CAEU & FAO Seminar Op. cit., 'Opportunities for Agriculture 
Integration as Related to Comparative Advantage and Production 
Specialization', p. 4. 
(66) Ibid., p. 6. 
(67) .!E.!2·, p. 9. 
(68) Ibid. 
(69) Ibid., pp. 10-11. Gulf War effects are excluded here. 
(70) Ali, K.T. Op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
(71) Fathi, F.A. and others Op. cit., p. 11. 
(72) Added to the information material from: Ali, K.T. Op. cit., pp. 
77-81. 
(73) CAEU & FAO Seminar, Op. cit., p. 8. 
(74) Ibid. D p. 1. 
(75) CAEU & FAO Seminar, Op. cit., p. 58. 
405 
CHAPTER 10 - MOTIVATION FOR COOPERATION WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCLE 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 8 the questicn of cooperation fer developrr:ent was 
first raised in terms of cooperation not only within the AGS Seb-region 
but also within two larger 'circles', the Arab Region and the 
Ir.ternatior.al. In Chapter 9 the opportunities for and benefits of such 
cooperation within the Regional circle were discussed ·as well as the 
limiation. In this chapter we explore the need for and the feasibility 
of adopting a development cooperation strategy between the AGS, both 
directly with the non-Arab world and indirectly through trilateral 
arrangements. Such a strategy deliberately involving the International 
circle must be based on a recognition of those basic development inputs 
and opportunities that are only available, or more efficiently 
available within this largest of the three circles. 
Analysis is based both on conceptual and empirical evidence, thus 
it starts by examining current misleading concepts of dependency. The 
facts of international interdependence appear fror.1 an identification 
of these development factors obtainable within the third circle and the 
motivation for cooperation at this level emergesfrom considerations of 
labour, industrialisation, trade and finance, agriculture, and science 
and technology. 
An assessment of AGS recent development and its objectives, as 
well as the facts of Regional and Internatior.al economic relations, 
highlight the following key issues: 
1. A high degree of dependency on interr.ational economic relations 
as reflected by the following indicators: 
- AGS' non-Arab foreign trade constituted 93.5% of their total foreign 
trade in 1977. 
- Sub-regional -crade constituted only 3.4%. 
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- AGS-Arab trade corresponded to only 3.1 percent (see Chapter 6, Table 
6.13). 
2. AGS development is facing serious formidable constraints relating 
mainly to markets, labour force, managerial capacity and weak resource 
base. The preceding chapters showed the potential viability of AGS 
cooperation -within a Regional context, in -the light of oppor-tunities 
available to tackle such constraints. 
3. The regional circle also has its own constraints and limitations 
and this motivates the search, generated by development needs, for wider 
economic circles. Thus the international circle emerged with its potential 
contributions through development factors (markets, technical labour 
and mana.gement science and technology and wider resource base) of 
direct relevant to the cooperative movement. 
As misleading concepts are prevailing in some parts of development 
literature circles with respect to the term 'dependency' we begin this 
chapter with its discussion. 
10.2 Misleading Concept of D~pendencx 
Economic literature discussing Arab international economic 
relationships has many misleading ideas relating to the application of 
the term 'dc~endency' ~o these relationships, for example, Douidar's 
description of the present situation as leading to the capitalist world's 
absorption of Arab economies' wealth.(l) 
This not untypical evaluation is based-on one type of interpret-
ation of some particular phenomena, viz. the continually growing Arab 
imports from the 'West' and the increasing importance to Arab economies 
of trade; the growth of joint ventures involving the participation of 
trans-national companies and banking institutions; Arab investment in 
the 'West' in ways which are thought to lead to the depreciation in 
value ~f such investments. 
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These ideas in the view of the writer of this thesis, tenri to 
reflect a preceding ideological judgement that ignore the structural 
facts of international economic inter-relationships and mutual interests. 
They also ignore the positive development inputs of such foreign 
participation activities for example, relating to management, 
technology and marketing. Consequently, such discu!5sion looks to the 
question from only one angle of vision. 
Whilst it is necessary to explore the statistical and quantitative 
aspects of the trade and financial relationships which are used to 
justify such value judgements, emphasis in this chapter will be 
mainly <iirected to the qualitative effects of questionl3of- efficiency 
in the management of such relations to serve the countries' development. 
obJectives. 
Some particular points serve to highlight various aspects of the 
concept of dependency in relation to Arab international economic 
relations. 
1. The growing trend towards greater international economic involve-
ment does not necessarily mean increasing dependency. Reducing dependency 
should not be reached through reducing the size of exports and imports, 
but rather should be achieved through better balanced trade conditions 
and when directing these to meet the development objectives of 
achieving self sustaining growth. It is impossible both to develop 
and to confine the circle of cooperation to the Arab region which is 
characterized by a similarity of products, the inabiU.ty to consume 
petroleum and related activities' products and an inability to supply 
internally many of the requirements for developments, as noted below. 
2. It has to be remembered that the recent great increase in trade 
and other international economic activity by the AGS resulted from 
their own independent decisions to,increase oil prices from 1973 onward 
which in turn generated financial surpluses that enabled AGS to 
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expand their international economic relations. 
3. In the current stage of development either within the Sub-region 
or Arab region, it is legitimate to believe that: 
"Any feasible course of economic development aiming 
at modernization and major increases in real national 
product and income would have the same effect of 
increasing reliance upon the foreign sector. 11 (2) 
4. Equally, in a development process which relies on huge imports 
for investments ~md consumption purposes. 
"Any djsruption of the flow of imports, whether as a 
result of political or of economic factors, would 
be in turn disruptive to the economy." (2) 
Consequently, their exist no signs of reducing the need to Arab-
International economic cooperation in the eighties and the decade which 
follows. ( 3) 
These points show the necessity of analysing the Arab-Internationai 
economic relations from a wide angle of vision which takes into 
consideration mutual interests and the benefits of cooperation, as will 
be illustrated and analysed in various sections of this chapter. 
The two-way nature of the flow of benefits implied by 'mutual interest' 
and 'cooperation' has, of course to be remembered continually. 
We proceed, now, to examine the importance of development factors 
and determinants that are available to the AGS only through the Inter-
national circle, special reference first being given to the questicn of 
foreign labour, this follo ... red by a sectoral_survey_. 
10.3 Foreign Labour and Cooperation within the International Circle 
In Part One were illustrated clearly the structural constraints 
imposed by the ei:?:e and quality of the domestic labour force and 
managerial capacity which face AGS development. The facts relating to 
the contribution of Arab labour into AGS development process, its economic 
lmpor·tance and mutual. Sub-regional· ~rad Regional inter~sts, and the w~~, 
in which these create motivation for cooperation within a regional 
context were examined in Chapter 9. 
Despite this need for cooperation within the region the AGS 
have shown in their current development policies, illustrated in Part 
One, clear signs of trying to reverE:e the earlier trend of vast in-
migration of expatriate workers, for understandable cul turel and soci2.l 
reasons. Consequently, these countries have on the one hand triE:d 
to become more selective in labour importation and or; the other moved 
towards an alternative option, reversing the procedure of bringing ".:he 
labour to where the capital is located ?.n.d embarking on much greater 
direct productive investment and cc..pi tal placements where 1 abour is 
located within the wider regicnal and international circles. 
As many economic activities within the regional circle face 
problems of inf:rastructural and institutional weakness and the lack of 
needed skills, thus these investments have already found outl~ts within 
the international circle (considered further in Chapter 14). 
At the same ti.me, attempts are being made by AGS tc; substi tut.e 
less dependenee on foreign workers and managerial capacities by raising 
domestic labour forces' productivity, BS illustrated in ·che Saudi Third 
Development Plan, 1980-1985, (see Chapter 2 of Part One). Specjal 
attention i.s therefore being paid to the training, education and build-
up of local technical labour and man8.gerial capacities, particularly 
important given present deficiencies. 
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Despite the large reserve of labour force in the Arab Region, as 
shown in Chapter 9, however when considered on the light of qualitative 
considerations of supply and demand (size, quality, incentives to work, 
health, experience, etc.) it is thought that a state of general deficit 
prevails in the region and necessitates AGS' orientation towards the 
international circle to meet important parts of their qualitative needs. 
At the same time a state of 'brain drain' exists in some pC~.rts of the 
Region and this is not expected to decrease signifjcantly in the fore-
seeable future. 
10.4 Industrialization as a Motivation for International Cooperation 
Despite the developing world's concentration on industrialization, 
available indicators showed very modest results in the seventies. 
~fuile developing countries decided at the Lima Conference {March 
1975) to raise their. share in world industrial production to 2!:· percent 
by the year 2000, their·actual share in the 'seventies was only 6.9% 
in comparison to 6.2% in the early 'fifties. Wlth the Arab Region's 
share less than 0.5% of world industrial productiori{4) the ex.perienee 
gained by the whole developing. world, (including the Ara:, countl~ies) 
in terms of currently achieved proportional industrial production seem 
to be very modest. Consequently, it i.s very di fficui t to expect any 
profound structural changes in the industrialization process in the 
Arab countries either within AGS Sub-region or the region without 
cooperation with the most industrialized world. 
'i'he very elear backwardness of Arab industry is reflected in the 
following indicators: 
1. The proportion of per capita industrial production to per capita 
GNP is 3.3% in Kuw~it and 17.6% in Egypt. The last percentage whilst 
being the highest in the Arab Region is far below the percentage in 
Latin ~America, Europe and U.S.A. Pe~ capita industrial consumption 
in the Arab countries does not exceed $ 52 U.S. compared to $ 223 in 
Latin America a~d $ 279 in the world.(5) 
2. The manufacturing industry's structure in the. Arab world is weaker 
than any part of the world as reflected in the following Ta.ble 10.1. 
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3. The statisticaJ evjdence {Table 10.2) as well as other economic 
observations on the structure of Arab et:onomy indicate that none of the 
Arab countries has reached Rostow's stage of "take off into self-sustained 
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Table 10.1 
World Manufacturing Industry Structure 
Industrial Structure (in percentage) 
World 
Non-durable 
consumer 
products 
Intermediate 
products 
Capital a.nd 
durable consumer 
and mineral 
products .. 
World 34 29 37 
Capitalistic countries 35 29 36 
Socialist countries 32 29 39 
Latin America 52 33 15 
Arab Countries 58.5 26.7 14.8 
Source: IDCAS Memo On: Arab Industrial Development Strate&L 
First Arab Ministers of Industry Conference, Algeria, 29-31 
Mey, 1975. Document no. WSl/102, p. 13 (Arabic). 
economic growth", althocgh some of the Arab countries, (e.g. Lebanon, 
Egypt and Iraq)(6) are moving faster towards the achievement of the stage 
of self-sustained growth. 
None of the Arab countries can really be considered as industrialized. 
(7) and Table 10.2. 
(a) The r.et value of manufacturing production per head in none of 
them is more than ~ 100 per year. 
(b) The proportion of active population engaged in manufaotu~ing 
industry in every one of them is less than 16 percent. 
(c) The exports of finished manufactures of most of them is almost 
negligible. 
But although they cannot be considered industrialized, they differ 
significantly in their degree of industrialisation. Egypt has already 
established a wide variety of industries and is regarded in ·~he Middle 
East as the factory of the Arab World. In contrast, Libya imports over 
80 percent of its requirements of manufactures. 
Table 10.2 also reveals that the Arab countries are foreign trade 
oriented: 
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{i) the proportion of exports to national income in these countries 
is not less than 15 percent, and in some of them it is· as high as 
80 percent; 
{ii) most of them earn foreign exchange from the exportation of one 
or two staple products; 
(iii) in some of them custom duties on articles imported amount to 
over 50 percent of total Government revenue. 
Arab Industry Structure and Development: 
Industrialization has made considerable progress in the Ar.ab 
world, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Syria and Iraq with 
signs of emerging industrialization in Saudi Arabia. 
However, nothing like an 'industrial revolution' has occurred. 
In describing the current industrial developmc.nt stage in the 
Arab world, Sayegh rightly expressed the situation in the following 
words: {8) 
"What is taking place in the Arab world is, with hardly 
any exception, a mere transplanting of factories and 
industrial technology from developed to developing 
countries. The theoretical and applied research that 
goes with industrial innovation is still lru·gely 
missing; factory orgrutisation, institutionalised 
industrial relations and labour discipline are still 
in their first stages; industrial entrepreneurship, 
with all that goes with it in terms of innovation and 
adaptation, and adoption of the forms of organisation and 
the patterns of division of authority appr.:>priate to 
industry, is still at its early stages of evolution; 
and finally, only a beginning has been made ill the 
mrumfacture of producers' P,oods - lhe machines that make 
the manufactured products.- It is painful, with respE:ct 
to the last point, that a region that now claims some of 
the most modern and technologically advanced refineries 
and petrochemical factories cannot itself design and 
make a machine that can produce needles." 
We apply the World Dank indicator on the degree rJf country 
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industrialization{9). Sudan, Iraq, Libya and all AGS are considered non-
industrial countries, while Jordan, Syria, Morocco, e.nd Tunisia are 
in the state of industrializing. Only two countries are considered to 
be semi-ini.lustrializ.ed (F.gypt and Lebanon}, while none of the Arab 
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countries are considered to be industrialized.(lO) 
The current industrialization programme in theAGSp with Saudi 
Arabia as the largest among them, is expected to take many years to 
compJete, especially if we regard this programme as including a later 
stage less dependent on foreign manpower, technology and managerial 
expertise. One has- "!:;o observe that any disruption of the flow from 
.outside the Sub-region P and even the regior:, of goods and personnel o 
would jeopard:.se the whole industrialization programme. 
For example, non-oil mineral exploitation of potentials in the 
Sub-region, mainly in Saudi Arabia 0 and to a less extent in the UAE 
and Oman is ex~ected to be a contributary part of the diversification 
of foreign exchange earnings (see Chapter 1). Not only survey and · 
explorat:lon but the later stages of extraction and processing activities 
could not be achieved without international cooperation to fill'the gap 
of needed elements in the wholt- pr<?cess. 
The Omani example in the development of cooperation of' industry 
in the country through international cooperation is applicable here. 
Surveys were carried out by a joint Canadian and American group 
(Prospection-Marshall) and studies based on the exploratory activities 
proved the feasibility of extracting and smelting operations of copper. 
It was possible to establish a joint venture through the Oman Mining 
Company with Oman having 75% of the shares but virtually all the skill. 
as well as equip~~nt still has to be imported. Even broadening the 
range of extractive industries requires at least joint venture 
projects involving the international circle and what becomes important 
is identifying priorities and negotiating the best terms. 
Investment plans for export-oriented industries in AGS often 
include joint investment with large international companies which, it 
is believedo will secure acces~ to foreign mar~~ts ~s we~l ~~ Pf9Yt~e 
technical know-how and manag~rial c~p~cit¥, Jqtnt prq~ect~ w~th 
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international companies have been committed to establish industries 
directed also to domestic and the regional Middle East·ern market. 
Examples inciude the proposed Saudi Arabian car assembly-plant in 
collaboration with General Motors Corporation and Nissan Motor Company 
of Japan. 
The establishment of the Qatar Fert-ilizer Company (QAFCO) 
illustrates the ongoing cooperation between Gulf States and international 
companies, based on joint interests. A feasibility study on the 
establishment of a nitrogenous fertilizer plant in Qatar was submitted 
to the-Government by the appointed British Industrial Consultant 
'Gibb-Ewbank' in April 1968. 
QAFCO as a shareholding company was established in 1969 with the 
participation of Norsk Hydro of Norway (20%) 0 Davy Power Gas Corp. 
British (7%), Hambros Bank, British (10%), while the State of Qatar 
shares are 63%. 
Davy Power Gas and Costain Process Engineering and Construction 
of the U.K. were the main contractors and Chiyoda Chemical Engineering 
and Construction of Japan as the main engineers, Hambros Bank remained 
as the financial organiser for the projectp while Norsk Hydro's 
Nitrogen Division in Oslo acted as QAFCO's sales department and carried 
out independent decisions on markets, prices and quantities. QAFCO 
produced 507,709 metr~c tons of Ammonia and 640,678 metric tons of Urea 
in 1980, very largely for Middle Eastern and Asian markets. At every 
level and at every stage there was and is international involvement.(11) 
One U.S. official has said that several U.S. companies were planning 
to produce everything from cars to fertilizers in the Arab countries.(12) 
Both at a conceptual and at a factual plane, everything relevant 
to AGS' industrial development supports the need for cooperation within 
an international context. This judgement in favour of cooperation 
seems far more valid the misleading thoughts me~t~qn~d in the f~rs~ 
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section of this chapter. Hershlag provides further historical support 
in his statement: 
"A close examination of past industrial history and 
performance shows that even during the 'indigenous' 
industrial revolutions in England, Germany, France and 
the U.S.A., imported technology, skills and capital 
significantly contributed to domestic industrialization. 
Political 9 fiscal and other measures were employed~to 
accelerate and protect the process of industrialization."(l3) 
The last sentence is also important in its emphasis on the 
e~ficient management of the international flows involved. 
10.5 Trade and Investment 
AGS and Arab Foreign Trade Relations: 
The emergence of AGS as oil and gas export~ng countries has 
created a state of joint interest and high inter-related dependency 
between the Sub-region and the International economy. The world 
economy in general developed countries depend largely on these two 
strategic commodities, with Arab oil reserves constituting 53.3 percent 
of world reserves at the end of 1978 and 43 percent of world production 
(excluding the Eastern bloc) in 1979. Oil and gas are essential for 
the international economy. 
The international economy has been subject to the effects of 
oil and gas availability and prices. Saudi Arabia occupies a pivotal 
position on future energy cost and availability as proved by events 
since 1973. Saudi Arabia has proved tq be able, through its gigantic 
oil reserves,' production capacity and large foreign exchange reserves, 
to affect oil prices and availability without slowing its own economic 
growth. This situation has in particular strengthened the interest 
of the major world economic power, the U.S.A. in Saudi Arabian economic 
policies. (14) 
The aboye facts create very clear need for all world economic 
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policies rather than relying on 'laisser faire'. 
liJhile the AGSg in particular 0 and the Region, in general 
experienced a very low level of inter-Sub-regional. and inter-regional 
trade during the 'seventies, they witnessed a comparatively large 
and growing trade with the third International circle; at the same 
time their foreign trade sector significantly increased its contrib-ution 
to their GNP. All these developments are reflected in the following 
trends:(15) 
The foreign trade ratio GOP is not only relatively high in the 
Arab worldg and even higher in the oil producing countries but has 
increased during the period 1970-1979. Whilst the foreign trade 
proportion of GOP was 73 percent in 1970 for the oil groupg increasing 
to 88 percent in 1979, it was 43 percent in 1970 for non-oil countries, 
increased in 1979 reaching 55 percent (Table 10.3). 
Table 10.3 
Share of Exports, Imports and ·Trade Percentage to GOP in Oil and Non-Oil 
Arab Groups 
1970 
1974 
1979 
Exports 
% 
47 
73 
57 
* Exports + Imports 
1970-1979 
Oil group 
Imports 
% 
26 
25 
31 
Trade* 
% 
73 
98 
88 
Non-oil group 
Exports Imports Trade* 
% % % 
19 
29 
21 
24 
38 
34 
43 
67 
55 
Source: Sadiq, A.T. 'Monetary, Financial Policies and Arab Development 
in the· 'Eighties', The Arab Planning Institute Seminar 1979/80 
on Arab Development Horizons in the 'Eighties 0 Kuwait, Jan. 
1981g Table No. 6. 
While exports of AGS witnessed real decrease in growth rate, the 
rate of growth of imports during the period 1970-1977 was high, e.g. 
in Saudi Arabia while the average growth rate of exports was -8 percent 
in 1970-1977, the average growth rate of imports wa~ 38.5 percent. ~r 
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Kuwait, while the average growth rate for exports was -10.9 percent, 
the average annual growth rate for imports was 20.3 percent.(16) 
The Arab foreign trade relationship has beengrowing as 
reflected in increasing foreign trade share in GOP from 59 percent in 
1970 to 80 percent in 1979. From 34 percent to 48 percent for exports 
and from 25.percent to 32 percent for imports.(l7) This increase 
reflects the Arab economy dependency on international economic 
relations (trade and technology and capital exchange) mainly as a 
developing economy. At the same time analyses presented in Chapter 9, 
of AGS' economic structure showed the Sub-region's structural indicators 
on AGS and the Arab Region's backwardness. 
Current facts of Arab economic cooperation ;with the EEC and the 
benefits derived from this tend to strengthen the need to seize 
' 
opportunities for further cooperation. 
"Among Arab statesp Algeria 0 Morocco, Tunisia 0 Egyptp 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have preferential trade terms 
with the EEC through cooperation agreements. Sudanp 
Somalia and Mauritania have duty free access for 99.4 
percent of their agricultural exports to the EEC through 
the 1975 Lome Convention, which ·is being renegotiated. 
Other Arab League states have asked for a regional 
cooperation agreement within the framework of the 
European-Arab Dialogue~ but the EEC has repeatedly 
~ejected this demand as most of the countries concerned 
are oil exporters. North Yemen and South Yemen are the 
notable exception,s."(l8) 
11Bahrain enjoys some benefits under the EEC Is generalised 
system of preferences, which gives reduced tariff rates on 
manufactured imports from developing countries. For 
example, a 7 percent duty is levied on Bahrain's 
aluminium exports."(19) 
The historic economic relations of Maghreb countries with Europe 
which tended to make these stronger than with their Arab economic 
relations were illustrated in Chapter 6, section 6.3.3. 
Finance and Investment: 
Chapters 5 and 6 showed clearly the e~ergence of t~e speedi~¥ ~o~!~ 
AGS financial and monetary systems. Such ~r0wt~ i§ r~flep~eg in th~ 
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emergence of Kuwait as a financial centre and Bahrain as a monetary 
centre for off-shore banking. Equallyp the financial _sector has been 
experiencing notable joint regional projects as the first signs of GCC 
showed the emergence of the Gulf Company for Investment (see Chapter 5). 
The financial situation in the AGS and its relevance to ()Ur 
topic is examined in more detail in Chapter 14. Here we are concerned 
only with the general pattern emerging from AGS' motivation to drive 
into international monetary and financial markets to find new fields 
in which to invest their surplus capital. 
In particular we should note how AGS' international financial 
investment is proving an effective way to diversify AGS sou~ces of 
income and revenue. 
Despite all the negative aspects relating to financial investments 
within the developed countries as will be examined in Chapter 14 9 
income which is being generated from such investmentsp in addition to 
the related gained expertise from dealing within international monetary 
and financial markets, is proving to be of growing importance. As 
Chapter 7 indicated Kuwait investment income has been growing in its 
proportional importance to other total non-oil income from 463 percent 
in 1973 to 757 percent in 1978. The investment income contribution 
to the total Government budget increased from 12.8 percent to 16.4 
percent during the same period 0 investment income constituted also 299 
percent of non-oil exports in 1978. The same situation prevailed in 
most AGS, especially in S. Arabia, UAE and Qatar. This situation tends 
to motivate the planning authorities in the Sub-region to compare the 
benefits derived from the domestic investments with those from a 
foreign investments.(20) 
AGSp particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have become already 
a notable holder of foreign exch?Oge res~rves 0 wit~ Saudi Arabia o~~~pying 
• - .. '. : . .> 
the sixth rank all over all countries of the world. (See Chapter 14.) 
This situation has enabled both S. Arabia and Kuwait to lend to the 
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IMF and World Bank and play a vital role within the whole international 
financial markets. 
With AGS financial assets being held throughout the world, 
they acquire a strong vested interest in internat1onal financial 
stability. 
10.6 Agriculture and Motivation for Cooperation within the Third Circle 
10.6.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 8 illustrated the AGS' need for cooperation as 
generated by agricultural sector developments factors in general and 
food security considerations in particular, Chapter 9 showed that 
cooperation within regional circle seems to be more promising than 
cooperation solely within the Sub-region, motivated mainly by the resource 
base considerations and development determinants. However, as there 
remain many deficiencies in the structure and development determinants 
of agricultural sector even within the region as illustrated later, 
it becomes necessary to study how the International circle could serve 
AGS agricultural development objectives. 
While the agricultural sector in general, and food production in 
particular can be shown to create a motivation for AGS cooperation 
within the Arab regional context, many factors re~ult_in very mode~t 
inter-Arab trade in agricultural commodities. Arab agricultural 
production backwardness and the widening of the gap between production 
and rising national income, and therefore consumption, and the similarity 
of Arab countries' raw-material based production, exporting these to 
international markets and importing both raw and processed agricultural 
and industrial goods, all these factors, in additio~ to the weakness of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, contribute to inter-regional 
exports constituting only some 5.1 percent of their total world 
exports during the period 1965-73.(21) 
The EEC has become the Arabs' major trade partner. In 1970-73, 
Arab exports to the EEC ranged from 43 to 70 percent of their total 
exports. Arab imports ranged from 44 to 48 percent of their total.(22) 
Agr'icul tural commodities play a large part in this flow. 
In illustrating the strength of Arab agricultural trade relations 
with the Third International circle it is worth note mentioning that: 
"The Maghreb States still continue their traditional 
paths regardless of the Ministers' agreements.to 
harmonise customs duties policies and give priority 
to imports originating in the Maghreb countries."(23) 
10.6.2 Agricultural Development Determinants and Gulf-Arab-International 
Cooperation 
Mosher has identified ten factors as being universal for 
agricultural development, of which, in his belief·, five are 'essentials' 
including markets, technology, local availability of input supplies, 
production incentives, and transportation. "Without any one of these 
there can be no agricultural development." In addition there are 
'accelerators' to development which are important but not indispensable 
in Mosher's opinion, including education, production,credit, group 
action by farmers, land improvement and development and national 
planning. (24) 
Although the author of this thesis agrees with Mosher on the ten 
factors of agricultural development, and in considering markets and 
technology as being indispensable determinant factors which support our 
trilateral approach to development cooperation in AGS, however we do not 
agree to his division between the two groups of determinants, as it is 
difficult to think of agricultural development without education which 
is an integral part of technology, as well as of production. 
Regional Cooperation for Agriculture and the International Input: 
Intensified direction towards joint agricult4ral developme~t 
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projects has directly and indirectly to include a wide range of 
international inputs into the Sub-regional and Regional cooperative 
activities. 
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Agricultural cooperation which depends on already existing 
infrastructure meets with many deficiencies, needing some international 
inclusion of expertise on the identification and undertaking of 
feasibility studies and design specification for the joint projects. 
In addition there is the need for importing equipment and machinery, 
technological expertise, as well as the need for international markets 
which is already consuming the larger part of Arab agricultural exports 
in comparison to the smaller percentage of intra-regional trade on 
agricultural commodities. 
In spite of major Arab efforts in agricultural development it is 
still in various stages of production underdevelopment, due particularly 
to several factors relating to agricultural inputs, improved seeds, 
fertilizers, pest control, mechanization to raise productivity and research 
and training. Even resource information is lacking and can only be 
supplied by using international expertise. Data on Arab ground and 
wadi waters are still inadequate. It is proposed that the Arab centre 
for Arid Areas in cooperation with UNESCO should undertake a comprehensive 
hydrological s.urvey. ( 25) It is also proposed that use be made of the 
techniques of areal photography and remote sensing to enable an integrated 
study of water systems and in selecting priority areas for their 
development; here again technological international dependence is clear. 
Training Input: 
The implementation of regional projects requires the training of 
specific types of technical manpower, identified as follows by the 
CAEU and FAO: (26) 
1. A sufficient number of engineers specialized in land reclamation. 
2. A group of economic experts and specialists in economic feasibility 
of projectso especially as regards agro-industrial complexes 0 the 
modern trend being in favour of this type of integrated agriculture. 
3. The necessary number of engineers qualified to cultivate newly 
reclaimed areas and select suitable crops. 
4. A sufficient number of skilled workers to be trained in modern 
agricultural methods, --mechanization, operation of farm fTiachinery and 
modern transport equipment. 
5. A high level of administrators capable of managing large scale 
farms, using an approach unaffected by traditional agriculture. 
Management and Technology: 
Effective institutions for agricultural development will require 
reinforcements 0 with both long-term staff and short-term interchanges 
from developed countries. 
111/Jhile technology often cannot be transferred from 
temporate to tropical climates 0 scientific competence 
can."(27) 
Marketing: 
This field, as with others which will be discussed, is a near~ 
perfect example of the nature of AGS economic inter-relationships in 
the Sub-region 0 and with the Arab Region and the International circle, 
i.e. the three circles identified in the Introduction as the over-
lapping circles in which cooperation for development becomes important. 
Although - even because of - the globally unique characteristics of the 
AGS collective economy, the AGS Sub-region is inextricably- tied in with 
the larger circles. 
For example 0 import restrictions imposed by the developed world 
on the flow of commodities from the developing countries are seen as a 
serious danger to the disposal of agricultural surpluses by the latter 0 
"as illustrated in the protection of temperate sugar-
beet production against cane-sugar which can be 
produced in tropical and sub-tropical countries at much 
lower costs~"(28) 
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The AGS are not at the moment directly affected by such 
restrictions although fisheries and associated activities could face 
such a danger in the future. What is important is that the potential 
for cooperation within the Region, between the AGS and other Arab · 
countries as described in Chapter 9, can only be fully realised if the 
increased agricultural production which could result found open outlets 
in the world as a whole. The linkages between Arab agricultural 
exports and non-Arab markets is already strong (see Table 10.4). As 
noted in Chapter 9, and referred to in the Sudan case-study in Chapter 
13, Regional agricultural cooperation would involve the combining of 
AGS capital, other Regional resources and International technology 
and ·expertise. The potential exists for this Regional production of 
some commodities, such as cotton, oil-seeds, fruits, vegetables, and 
sugar, beyond the demand capacity of the .AGS and the Arab Region. 
If such surpluses are prevented by trade restrictions from finding 
other markets and particularly in the more developed regions such as 
the EEC, then the basis for cooperation within the Region is weakened and 
the motivation for AGS involvement in such cooperation could be 
significantly diminished. This inevitably would mean that the chance 
of success for trilaterally based. activities would.be decreased, and 
all the evidence show that without such trilateral arrangements, the 
present fragmented situation would decrease benefits all round. It is 
in this context that the following statement is relevent: 
"The paramount threat to the green revolution is the 
availability of markets rather than production technology."(29) 
It is also true that international marketing organisation and 
experience is of special importance to soundly based agricultural 
development. The historical experience of Europe and the U.K. support 
this assertion. For example, in England the main determinants which 
provided the driving force behind eighteenth and nineteenth agricultural 
. _ ..... 
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Table 10.4 
Export of Food Stuffs from Arab Countries. Average 1971-1973, in tons 
A B 
Commodity To World To Arab World Proportion B of A 
Wheat 200,991 19,714 9.8 
Sugar 251,635 632488 25.2 
Oil seeds 333,208 44,563 13.4 
Fruit 1,598,014 394,643 24.5 
Vegetables 1,098,714 238,096 21.7 
Meat & by-Prod. 13,136 6,957 52.9 
Livestock 250,354 243,957 97.4 
Milk & Dairy Prod. 22,511 20,681 91.9 
Eggs 20,067 19,218 95.8 
Fish 34,754 1,012 2.9 
Source: CAEU & FAO, 'Economic Integration and Trade Expansion among 
. Arab States with Special Reference to the Agricultural 
Sector', Seminar on Agricultural Aspects of Economic Integration 
Organs in the Arab World and the Role of CAEU, 1977, Table 6, ·. 
p. 87 • 
revolution can be summarised thus: 
1. The rise of a very commercially oriented group of entrepreneurs. 
2. The expansion of domestic and foreign commerce with the 
entrepreneurial group exploiting the expanded market for established 
products as well as the creation of new markets for the new products. 
This process was vital because, as Ellis-arid Buchanan have 
pointed out(30) 
"the eighteenth century improvements in agriculture ••• 
are fundamental, for without them advances in industry 
could hardly have proceeded as they did." 
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The whole_ process created an environment favourable to a new class 
of energetic ·landlords who at the production end of the linkage found 
it worth investing capital and employing new technology in agriculture.(31) 
Some of this new technology was imported but even more became exported 
to other lands such as Denmark, North America etc.(32) This flow of exper-
tise is similarly vital to AGS-Arab regional agricultural development 
Technical knowledge needed for agricultural development in the 
region can of course be obtained not only from western countries of USA 
and Europe, as they may not be the sole reservoirs of technical knowledge 
as Japanese methodsu for example, have constantly improved the land 
and the forests, while supporting the highest recorded density of rural 
population with a star:tdard of living considerably superior to the rest 
of Asia. Japan would have much to offer in techniques applicable to many 
areas. (33) 
Infrastructure: 
The importance of infrastructure, including all services and 
facilities, without which all regional development efforts will be 
impeded has already been stressed in Chapter 9. It is clear that 
regional cooperation in agriculture is not expected to lessen the need 
for an ipternational coptribution of inputs to the regional develop~ent 
process tqrough its various stages. To the contrary it wi+l lea~ to 
:··:. 
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increased international inputs of an infrastructural type (management 0 
expertise, science and technology, training, importing equipment and 
marketing, etc.). ·However, this does not mean increasing vulnerability 
and dependency since this direction would be taken within a designed 
movement towards agricultural expansion and self reliance on food 
production, and agro-industrialization. 
The role of United Nations agencies which is included in our 
definition 'ofthe international·circle is very vital as already 
mentioned in many parts of this thesis, spreading to. include the Gulf 
Sub-region and many other Sub-regional and Regional groupings. 
10~7 Transfer of Technology 
It has already emerged in this.study that the transfer of technology 
is vital to AGS development. Here we are concerned with the fundamental 
meaning of technology in this context, the basis for the successful 
transfer and application of technology, and the contribution offered 
by AGS-International cooperation in this field. 
10.7.1 Science and TechnologY - Conceptual Framework 
The material wealth of a country or a group of countries depends 
on the production of goods ahd services through the coordinated use of 
the available supplies of human skills, capital, iand, and natural 
resources. Economic growth can stem from greater production through 
the use of more resources and from greater pr~~uctiv:i.ty through the more 
efficient use of resources. 
Technology contributes to both aspects, through increasing the 
utility of available resources ~.as in allowing the productive use of 
land previously considered infertile, or by discovering an economic 
use for raw material previously thought valueless and by productivity 
machines. ( 34} 
.. ' . - ' '- ... ~- . ·' ' ·-- : 
. ,.( 
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Science is 'know why' while technology is 'know how'. Science 
produces knowledge while technology helps to produce wealth. Science 
provides the pool of basic knowledge and understanding on which 
technology increasingly depends. The transfer of technology: 
"can be viewed to cover the transfer of those 
elements of technological knowledge that are 
normally required in setting up and operating new 
production or service facilities or extending 
existing ones. In its broadest sense this process 
involves (i) transfer of materials; (ii) purchase 
of machinery and equipment; (iii) transfer of 
designs, blueprints, technical literature and/or 
(iv) transfer of a technical capability permitting 
production and/or adaptation."(35) 
Science and technology could then be considered as the fuel 
needed for the engine of development in the Sub-region which does not 
suffer from a ·shortage of capital so often the key constraint on 
technological change. Thus a large part of success in the diversification 
strategy would seem to rely upon the sound application of science and 
technology in the utilisation of a skewed physical resource base and 
quantitatively limited human resources. However, as shown below, this 
is not a simple matter. 
10.7.2 Technology and Economic Development 
It is increasingly being realised that small isolated economies 
have been rendered non-viable by technical revolutions in production, 
transportation, marketing and administration. · No large project can be 
successful unless: 'it is backed by a large and complex technical base 
and served by higMly sophisticated large-scale markP.ting.(36) Individual 
countries may attempt to build up individual capabilities for research 
and technology but although some Arab Gulf countries, such as Kuwait, 
have established special centres for this purpose, it is being realised 
that this approach is very limited. The AGS are aware of the fact 
that even Sub-regional collective efforts are insufficient to build up 
the needed scientific and technological institutions and they need to 
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become part of the l~ger international scene.(37) 
Even States which are much larger than the AGS are also coming 
to recognise that in addition to the research and technology base, 
the successful application of technology to production makes vast 
demands on a great range of skills and understanding. For example, 
Iraq has found that the 'green revolution~ requirAs_far mor~ than 
the simple sowing of High Yield Varieties (HYV) of grain. Since 1965 
both imported and locally produced wheat HYV's have been used and even 
by 1972-73 35% of the cultivated area was under Mexipak.(38) However, 
as Jawad Al-Tahan has pointed out, there was no significant change in 
the yield of wheat between 1949-50 and 1975-76 and it is clear that 
"many socio-economic and institutional factors 
together with other technical factors, i.e. 
mechanization, irrigation and drainage facilities, 
certainly reduced the potential gains from the 
'Green Revolution'."(39) 
What was required but was not forthcoming was a whole range of 
effective technical and institutional back-up inputs through extension 
services, cooperatives, machinery and other supply agencies, marketing 
organisations etc. Even in a large country such as Iraq these could 
not be supplied satisfactorily from domestic resources; it seems that 
the full implications of the use even of HYV technology in agriculture 
were not realised. 
Similar situations are found in other sectors. Even before the 
peak of the Japanese impact on the world automotive industries developed 
during the 1970's 0. the overall cost for manufacturing automobile products 
in developing countries was some 80% above the world market level and a 
significant part of this difference was not due to dis-economies of 
scale but to poor technological utilisation of imported plant.(40) 
Already in 1971 it was being pointed out that the varied and large 
supportive technological demands required for the effective utilisation 
of c.:ompul.<'!rG were iru;ufficiently appreci.ated by developin~ countr:j.es. ('1~.) 
If science and technology are regarded as of vital importance to the 
AGS then it is crucial that the successful basis is established for 
their transfer and application. 
10.7.3 Basis for Viable Application of Science and Technology 
that 
"Arab countries have been securing the services of 
international firms for the execution of projects on a 
very large scale.- The cost of projects· is fairly high 
and the extent to which these projects are integrated 
in the national economies is also very limited. In 
fact most projects persist as isolated enclosures. 
The performance of many of them after completion is 
often below expectation."(42) 
This .is not an abnormal situation; Baranson has pointed out 
"newly industrializing countries on the one hand 
are not able to influence the policies and practices of 
multinational corporations in transferring technology; 
on the other, they lack the indigenous capabilities to 
design and manufacture industrial products and production 
systems."(43) 
What is the way out? 
In broad terms, it is now believed that greater benefits would 
come from developing countries' expenditures if these were directed, 
firstly, within integrative approaches which secured the development 
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of efficient and effective institutions, policies, Values and manpower 
to plan and manage these processes.(44) Secondly, these measures have 
to be taken within a more deliberately organised framework of cooperation 
between countries at different levels of development and technology.(45) 
In the following we refer to the main elements needed to provide a 
favourable platform for the process of integrating science and 
technology into the development movement. 
(a) Cultural and Social Change: 
Some writers give economic and social factor higher weight than 
the lack of scientific and technological knowledge as a limiting factor 
in the application of science and technology in developing countries. 
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Economic and social factors include education, communication, acceptability 
of new ideas, administrative effectiveness, business enterprise and 
political leadership. 
"Social and cultural traditions are often positive 
barriers to change, and economic growth will require 
extensive and intensive changes in human values and 
attitudes, as well as_ in social and politicaL structures, 
Only within the broader context of development, can 
science and .technology·make an effective contribution."(46) 
While these factors are needed to developing countries, they are 
especially relevant in the case of AGS where those socio-economic and 
political factors inhibiting the effective application of science and 
technology need to be analysed and practical means for overcoming them 
devised. 
(b) Education and Training: 
The benefits of technical change are achieved at the cost of 
heavy investments in education and training, in research and development 
(R and D) and in capital equipment embodying the results of R and D. 
Such heavy investment sometimes implies a temporary r-eduction in the · 
living standards of the people.(47) In the AGS there would appear to 
be ample scope for financial manoeuvring. 
Education and training is needed at many different levels, as the 
application of new technical knowledge to production and manufacture 
requires trained personnel at all stages of tne innovation process. 
In practice, innova tion may arise, not only from R and D, but also 
from operational improvements by managerial or production personnel.(48) 
What is required is not simply formal mass education but education 
and training linked to R and D designed to achieve the optimum 
deployment of qualified technical and managerial personnel who are, 
often, in short supply. 
Unselective and excessive expenditure on R and D can be counter-
productive,(49) whilst ~t the same time a general broad-front grow~r ~n 
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the provision of further and higher education does not necessarily create 
directly the specialist skills required for development. Every one of 
the AGS will have at least one university by 1983 but the question has 
to be asked whether each national-based institution will or can con-
tribute to the profound changes necessary for rea~ technological 
processp viz. 
- in social systems and human attitudes; 
- in knowledge and human skills; 
- in the physical elements in which technology is embodied. 
The process of planting the values of fundamental and applied 
research work within AGS institutions and education establishments 
seems to be of direct relevance to their development. 
It is relevant here to quote Sir Eric Ashby's words: 
"Higher education is unlikely to bring its full 
benefit to a country unless its content, emphasis, 
and balance between different fields of study, are 
adapted to the indigenous culture and the nation's 
economic environment."(50) 
The heavy demands made by administration on trained cadres 
in the AGS, as well as the tendency to dedicate personal efforts to 
business and wealth generating activities weaken the motives for research 
and even make contact with research virtually difficult if not impossible. 
Such a situation calls for Governments and scientific institutions to 
mobilize their·human potential in research and technology and create 
an atmosphere encouraging to cooperative work~ Sub-regionally, 
Regionally and Internationally. 
(c) Adaptation to Local Conditions: 
International transfer of technology to the Arab countries needs 
to be viewed as a catalyst for accelerated growth and indigenous 
technological development as well as an instrument for attaining the 
general-objective of reducing technological dependence. 
A reduction in external dependence appears difficult to achieve 
if not impossible over the next several decades.(51) Consequently,· 
AGS which need to rely almost entirely on imported technologies for a 
long time to come, should concentrate their efforts on adaptation of 
technology to local conditions, resources, labour skills and social 
institutions. 
"As development proceeds local resources can be 
increasingly allocated to R and D, and dependence 
on imported technology can be reduced."(52) 
It is important to note that it would be wasteful to apply 
severely limited resources to reinvesting in technologies already in 
existence and available through copying or licensing. (See 10.7.4 
Technology and Balance of Payments.) 
"The transfer of technology must be rather innovative 
than imitative process."(53) 
Experience indicated many research centres in developing·world 
were directing their activities towards developed world needs. 
It is of similar importance to stress the need to adapt 
education systems to suit local needs, particularly as experience showed 
a tendency in developing countries' universities to follow the models 
of-European universities, and out of touch with the local people and 
nat.ional needs. (54) 
"While the results of some of the developed world's 
R and D appears in less developed countries in the form 
of modern equipment and new .processes, very -little -
of it is specifically concerned with the problems of 
the developipg world."(55') 
The technologies of an advanced industrialized society have been 
developed in response to the needs and conditions of that society, 
particularly with regard to markets -normally large, and with 
comparatively high incomes - ~d to resources and their comparative 
costs - high labour costs, but an adequate supply of capital and strong 
managerial and te9hnical skill~. · 
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In the developing world, where shortage of skills and capital 
(excluding AGS for capital) plentiful unskilled labour and small 
markets, a real adaptation of imported technology to local conditions 
as it is of the same importance to know how and which kind of 
technology to be imported.(56) 
10.7.4 AGS and Cooperation on Science fuld Technology 
In general, AGS economies are dependent on imported science and 
technology which are embodied in physical capital. The reasons are 
many, but the most important can be traced to the smallness of local 
markets, which do not often justify on economic grounds the creation 
of a capital goods industry, and the absence of a scientific and 
technological infrastructure normally required for a research and 
development-intensive industry. Despite the appearance of national. 
will and the existence of abundant financial resources, which are two 
necessary conditions for the establishment of such science and 
technology-intensive industry, these are not sufficient by themselves 
to bring into being this type of industry. 
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Therefore 0 it would be fair to say that AGS are almost totally 
dependent o·nthe International circle for foreign equipment, machinery 
and other forms of physical capital. International dependence appears 
to be less in regard to skilled manpower, however, the declining degree 
of dependence ove~ the last decade has resulted from AGS' ability, 
particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to attract Arab as well as non-
Arab scientists, engineers, technicians and professionals in 
practically every. field.(57) Thus it shciuld be emphasised that lessening 
the degree of dependence on foreign human capital is one thing and 
claiming an end to the problem of a high-skilled manpower shortage is 
another. As was stated at the Kuwaiti Symposium report on Science 
and Technology for development in Kuwait: 
\ 
"What has actually happened is that the country 
has substituted foreign consultants with 'in-house' 
foreign consultantsg that is, there is still a 
substantial supply shortage of Kuwaiti scientists 
and engineers."(58) 
This problem is not projected to be solved in the foreseeable 
future. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning forecast that skJlled 
manpower requirements will be 167.5 thousand by the year 2000 while 
domestic supply is not expected to exceed 67.5 thousand.(59) 
Absorption as opposed to the importation of science and 
-.. ~. 
technology has been slow in AGS in part because of their abundant 
funds. 
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In all the AGS' private sectorsg the entrepreneurial groups which 
exist tend to launch enterprises if potential markets are seen to exist. 
Given ample funds the result is the uncoordinated piecemeal importation 
of the tools of technology rather than the slower process of building 
up the basis of technology. As has been recognised in Kuwaitg(60) 
which in this respect is typical of all the AGS, the public sector tends 
to operate in the same way. National industrial enterprises are total 
package imports based on heavily subsidised utilities and developed 
sites. Import duties are practically non-existent and always waived 
for Government projects. As a wholeg thereforeg there is no financial 
incentive to be selective about imported technology and little incentive 
to encourage cross-fertilisation. 
If one then adds the problem of the small absorptive capacities 
of the individual AGS and the consequent limitation on the benefits 
:r 
obtainable from the application of large-scale technology then the 
need for cooperation becomes very clear. 
The ~stablishment of joint centres for research and developmentD 
e.g. in agriculture, either on a sub-regional or regioqal basis are 
justified on the light of the above discussion. Such centres could 
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be based on integrated research work that includes appropriate 
fertilizer use techniquesp adequate means of pest and disease controlp 
together with necessary plantingp cultivation and animal nutritionp 
irrigation and management techniques. Economic Researches on 
productionp marketingp food security and agricultural· cooperation 
prospects would also be better carried out on a Sub-regional and 
Regional basis. Moreoverp the qualitative and quantitative up-grading 
this would bring would enable the AGS to obtain far greater benefits 
from International cooperation. 
The industrial movement is characterizedp as shown in Part Onep 
by importing most of the elements of its projects.and factoriesp at the 
same time directing the bulk of investments towards petrochemicals. 
An example of the first tendency is the recent establishment by the 
American General Motors Company of a vehicle assembly plant in 
Saudi Arabia. What is needed here is the build-up of technology rather 
than the pseudo domestic supply of market need of cars. 
The emergence of huge petrochemical industries within the Sub-
region faces, as we have noted earlier, many potential dangers. We must add 
to these dangers the continuing technological advancement in developed 
countries which is expected to result in supplying the world markets with 
a competitive petrochemical product caused by adopting new methods of 
production and leading to cheaper products than the ones which will 
-
come on stream in AGS.(61) This obviously calls for attention to be 
directed to research and technological fields.with respect to innovative 
rather than imitative AGS petrochemical industries.(62) 
Technological Balance of Payments and Cooperation: 
It is neither necessary, nor practicable to rely entirely on one's 
own research and development (Rand D). The results of scientific 
research are available internationally through publications, and the 
results of most technological research are available in the market pla~e 
in the shape of new machines or materials or through the purchase 
of patents and licences. Technical know-how is a standard commodity 
in international markets. 
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This is why despite the relatively high rate of R and D expenditure, 
in the U.K., it produces only about 10 percent of the world's 
technological discoveries, and relies heavily on bying from outside.(63) 
Japan has for many years had an adverse balance of trade in patents 
and industrial licences. 
Jones has pointed out that while developing countries received 1% 
of the world total receipts from technology in 1964 they paid 8%. 
U.S.A. received 57% while paying for 12%, U.K. received 12% while paying 
for 25%.(64) U.S. has been the only country which achieved a positive 
technological balance of payment in 1964. 
The AGS would receive greater medium and longer term advantages 
from the purchase of know-how through patents and licenses in order 
to create the foundation for home-based R and D than they get from 
merely buying the imported results of other nations'technological 
progress. This is not a simple matter. It requires a deep appreciation 
of the real implications of development and a recognition that 
cooperation of a full trilateral type is necessary. 
This section on science and technology as a motivation for 
cooperation has shown that AGS need to apply science and technology in 
order to serve their objective of diversifying of their economic base. 
Effective use of science and technology necessitate socio-economic and 
administrative measures and activities which constitute a pre-condition 
for that effective application. At the same time the nature of science 
and technology application calls for joint efforts, sub-regionally or 
regionally towardA the build up of research, training and education 
institutions. Their activities are proposed to be based on careful 
studies of the kind of problems to be tackled in appropriate sectors of 
their economies. 
As we have seen the international circle constitutes the main 
source for the transfer of technology and science. In the light of 
the examples given the question of science and technology demands 
cooperation within the international circle, such cooperation to be 
based on concrete and constructive policies. 
10. 8 Summary 
This chapter examined the need for AGS cooperation within the 
international circle on the basis of fundamental development needs 
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as well as facts characterizing AGS development. Analysing the need 
for cooperation on labour force, particularly with respect to technical 
labour, has shown that in addition to the necessity for cooperation 
within the regional circle, the third circle proves to be the main 
source for needed technical labour with its qualitative advantages. 
Cooperation in industrialization requires securing a stronger 
· foundation for AGS industrial development than the regional circle 
which has its own industrial deficiencies and backwardness can provide. 
Strengthening the research, training and technological base of AGS 
industry, which should have a priority in the current and coming stage, 
can only be supported effectively through the international circle. 
In examining the role of cooperation within the third circle in 
supporting AGS and Arab agricultural development, it was clear that 
through training·, technology, marketing cooperation could be of vi tal 
importance. The facts of AGS and Arab trade relations reflect a high 
degree of dependency on the third circle. Such dependency was explained 
and justified, and constructive dependency must be considered when 
formulating any strategy for development and development cooperation. 
AGS' dependence on the third circle as an outlet for investment of 
their financial surpluses and as a source of tr~ini~g~ mapagement apd 
technical capabilities in the rapidly growing industry of finance 
is clear and call for cooperation on constructive basis. 
440 
AGS' extensive need for the development of their science related 
activities (education, research and training) and technological 
capabilities in order to serve development in general and the 
diversification strategy in particular can only be met through the main 
international sources of science and technology. At the same time 
these activities necessitate the pooling of AGS efforts sub-regionally 
and regionally in order to make the best use of economies of scale 
and obtaining the most favourable conditions and returns from this 
trade in expertise. 
In conclusion one can safely indicate the vital importance of 
cooperation within the International circle. Cooperation within the 
Sub-regional and Regional context does not weaken the need for this 
third circle involvement. On the contrary, since the first two circles 
have their own limits and difficiencies, they tend to create the motive 
to direct the development movement of AGS into trilateral pathl€1-
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'PART FOUR 
· THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO AGS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
CHAPTER 11 - THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND TO AND THE PRACTICAL BASIS 
FOR VIABLE AGS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
11.1 Introduction 
Since the 1950s ~here has been growing discussion of the 
theoretical and conceptual principles involved in economic cooperation 
between countries. (The terms cooperation and integration are used 
interchangeably in much of the literature andp for the momentp will 
continue to be used in this way in this thesis.) Discussion has 
included debate on the value of various types or forms of cooperation 
and this section is devoted to this particular question. 
For present purposes, the main types of cooperation/integration 
arrangements can be classified as follows. Firstp trade-oriented 
comprehensive integration in which can be included the free-trade 
associations, customs unions and common marketsp as instituted in 
Europe, Latin America and the Arab League. Secondlyp there are the 
development orientedp selectively partial approaches involving 
arrangements covering particular commoditiesp projects and sectors; 
these have been applied in.some areas of the developing world. 
Section 11.2 examines the theoretical and .conceptual background 
to this typology of the formsof cooperation 
Section 11.3 analyses the practical experience derived from some 
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recent cooperation efforts, utilising the two different approaches (Trade 
- - - - -
oriented and Development oriented). Within t~~ context of relevant 
general experience of developing countries two case-studiesp of the 
East African Community (EAC) and of the Me·kong Project, are used to 
illustrate the salient differences between the two approaches. 
At the outset we should stress the fact that economic cooperation 
is still regarded as a factor to pe taken i~to account in efforts for 
socio-economic development in developing countries despite all past 
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disappointments. The need for and potential benefits of cooperation 
were amply illustrated in preceding chaptersp whilst past and recent 
disappointments relating to cooperation schemes suggest not that the 
cooperation principle should be abandoned but that greater and more 
pragmatic efforts to secure these benefits have to be adopted. 
11.2 Conceptual Background 
Developed and Developing Countries: 
The consequences of any cooperation movement depend on the 
characteristics of the adopted scheme and of its instruments directed 
to the mobilization of factors of production and trade. 
Some of the effects have been classified as static and others 
are dynamic, the former relating mainly to the re-allocation of factors 
of productionp to problems of consumption and to the terms of trade. 
The dynamic effects are related largely to the way in which cooperation 
alters the possibilities for economic growth in participating countries. (1) 
It is generally agreed that integration does n.ot have the same 
meaning for less developed countries as for advanced countriesp and 
while the attention of the latter has been until very recently focussed 
on the static effects of integration, dynamic effects are the 
significant issue in the case of less developing countries. It is 
these dynamic effects which demand our attention while designing a 
pragmatic approach for AGS cooperation scheme. 
Thus, cooperative programmes are seen here much more as an 
alternative path of economic development than as a way merely of allowing 
a better allocation of a given stock of factors of production. 
"With less developed countries, it is much more 
important to .examine the opportunities that integration 
opens for the growth of diversification of their 
economies."(2) 
Development strategies, morepver, are not only different as 
between developing countries and developed countries, but also vary 
from one developing country to another as well as from one group of 
developing countries to another. 
The long term targets of low-income and middle income developing 
countries will nearly always remain: population growth controlp 
increase in per capita income through modernization of agriculture, 
industry and service, efficient management and greater domestic and 
international equality. A relatively recent addition is quality of 
life, more relevant to the middle income group than the low, implying 
a healthier environment even at the expense of rapid technological 
and economic progress, and particularly industrialization. 
AGS' development objectives and socio-economic structure, a:~ 
noted earlier, are different; as a result the AGS have to choose a 
different avenue to their development cooperation in order to achieve 
their objectives. Even so, as Abangwa has suggested:. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
"It appears that any meaningful analysis of the · 
strategy of economic integration must possess at least 
five basic elements:" (3) 
Objectives 
Means 
Constraints 
Instruments 
Commitments 
As we examine the possible forms of cooperation, we have to bear 
in mind these basic elements. 
11.2.1 Forms of Cooperation 
In theory and practice many forms of cooperation and integration 
have been known and applied as instruments to achieve certain objectives 
through cooperative efforts, types are theoretically limitless. For our 
analysis purpose we will distinguish between two forms of approach 
with'in each of which are contained many sub-forms. 
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The first approach includes what is termed the 'trade approach, 
while the second approach includes what recently has been called the 
'development-oriented approach'. Despite the inclusion and interaction 
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of trade and development activities within both approaches, (see Chapter 11, 
section 11.2.2), some important differences are identifiable: 
1. Whilst integration movement requires, as we shall-see, holistic 
cooperative measures in the trade-oriented approach, development-oriented 
integration can be directed through selectively partial sectoral or 
project cooperation. 
2. The whole structure of the trade approach is based on trade as 
an instrument directed to achieve gains from cooperation through trade 
policy instruments, noting however the necessary distinction between 
trade-conversion and trade creation. The development approach is 
directed primarily to the structural changes necessary for the development 
of the economies of the participating countries, and looks at the trade 
instrument only as one of the contributory elements not the basic 
element in cooperation. 
3. Development oriented cooperation can be understood as involving 
partial economic integration, with a planning or programming content 
through which negotiated divisions of labour or agreed specialization 
and complementary agreements can be made. This can work in two ways. 
First, agreements on a product to be jointly produced for a unified 
market or to be produced-by orie country for a un1f:Lea market, this 
leading to liberalization of trade in these products with the possibility 
if the need arises, the imposition of a productive tariff against other 
countries. 
4. The effects of trade-oriented cooperation may be felt in the 
short run and can lend themselves to relatively clear measurement. 
Development-oriented approach effects, deliberately aimed at structural 
change, are of a long-term nature apd more difficult to me~sure witpin 
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the short and medi urn t'erm. 
11.2.2 The Trade Approach to Cooperation 
This approach is based on the classical theory of economic 
integration based on creating different trade-oriented degrees of 
cooperative instruments ranging from free trade areas to economic uions. 
In this scheme, with its theoretical justification originating in 
the work of Viner ahd the evolution of the theory thereafter, cooperating 
countries attempt only to free trade among themselves, usually in 
gradual steps. The participating countries first liberate their 
inter-regional trade from all restrictions at the stage of·· 'Free Trade 
Area' and then erect a common external tariff wall at the 'Customs 
Union' stage. Behind this wall there is an extension of the free 
movement of goods to include the free movement of factors of production, 
this moving towards the stage of 'Common Market', which also implies 
achieving the harmonization and coordination of economic and trade 
policies. The stage of economic union includes, hypothetically and 
logically, in addition to all the above-mentioned measures, the 
·.-... unification of various economic components and the creation ofa supra-• 
national regional economic machinery to cont~ol the whole participating 
economies. 
must 
The re.al issue however1not be centred on whether intra-regional 
trade is relevant but rather: 
1. How much of such trade is needed to sustain the cooperation 
process. 
2. What are the policy requirements for promoting it and how such 
policies affect the rest of the economic system and its multiple objectives~ 
3. Whether trade will be the primary force of cooperation or whether 
. ,; it would be used in specific areas as one of the instruments which 
:..-":· . : 
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regional cooperation. (4) 
This issue and related questions will be analysed in Chapter 12 
as related to the AGS situation. 
11.2.3 The Development Approach 
The 'Development Oriented Approach' to cooperation, as far as the 
writer of this thesis knows, has not been formally dealt with as such, 
either in the theory of international economic relations (within which 
economic integration studies lie) or in the theory of economic 
development. This term has been used to comprehend various cooperative 
approaches which deny the universal validity of the classic and trade 
oriented approach, and rather direct economies towards achieving specific 
development objectives through common policies in economic development, 
this based on planning or programming. 
Recent literatu~g. emphasis on the distinction between the 
static and dynamic effects of economic integration, mainly of developing 
countries, is especially relevant here. 
The traditional theory of economic integration concentrates on the 
static effects. It is suggested that this treatment is inadequate, 
especially when economic integration is viewed from the standpoint of 
LDC's, (1) analytically because. taking the primary objective of 
LDC's to be economic development which is a dynamic process, economic 
integration should be treated in terms of its dynamic rather than short-
run static effects; and (2) empirically, there are some estimates which 
show that t~e static gains or losses of economic integration as 
negligible. ( 5) 
Deficiencies found in the trade approach concept resulted in 
Dosser's reinterpretation of the old idea of trade creation and trade 
diversion as development creation and development divers~on. 
"Customs Union arrangements may lead to development 
outside the union, this is development diversion, ~f 
they are conducive to eco~omic development of the 
member States, that is development creation."{6) 
r 
... ' 
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In generalp the development-oriented selectively partial approach 
to cooperation can incluqe many sub-formsD e.g. the multi-sectoralD 
the sector by sector and the project by project type. A variety of 
combinations of elements is possibleD depending on the development 
aims of a particular group of countriesp their socio~economic structures 
and intended structural changes. What is important is the deliberate-
recognition by the cooperating countries thatD whether on the sectoral 
or project planeD some coordinated planning and management is necessary 
for the achievement not only of agreed specific objectives but for those 
mutually agreed structural development aims. 
The Sectoral Approach:· 
Sectoral cooperation allows for reasonably good insight and 
control of the distribution of benefits within ariy integration schemeD 
certainly superior to those which follow from simple trade arrangements. 
There are of course some dangers. As Willgerodt has pointed out, for 
example: 
"Disintegration of other less integrated sectors may 
result if factors of production are attracted by the 
integrated sector from other export industries."(7) 
Consequentlyp a joint planning unit is required to follow-up the process 
of cooperation in sectors subject to itp to avoid detrimental linkage 
affects on other sectors of the economy. 
As the concept of coordinated planned cooperation for development 
-
has emerged, whereas formerly projects were viewed in isolation from the 
rest of the ecoriomyp they.are now being viewed not only in relation 
to individual development plans of each country but also in relation 
to each other. Some large degree of harmonisation becomes essential. 
The-merit of this approach is that the planned future is being looked at 
soas to facilitate an agreed scheme of specialization among the 
participating countries. $econdly, it ultimately h~s to take into. 
con!;!ider!'ltion all sectors and ap P~!'lflpeq prpjects, pot werely e>ne ip!i4~t~¥ 
or one project in isolation. This approach can better satisfy the 
criteria of reciprocity and equal advantages for the participating 
countries. (8) 
The evolution of cooperative organisations involving developing 
countries, cooperation bodies has shown that greater importance in 
cooperation between States has to be attached, not to trade exchange, 
loans or warding off payments imbalances, but rather to specialization 
and cooperation in production with the goal of realizing the economic 
integration of member States through a long term, comprehensive plan 
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for joint economic activity. Coordination between'planners is therefore 
the necessary springboard for integration just as long term planning is 
a pre-requisite to a general Arab economic blueprint. This requires 
countries to undertake their own plans. A limited approach to planning 
harmonization covers common interests (export prices, joint development 
and infrastructural links etc.). 
Sub-regional or Regional joint planning coordination require strong 
political goodwill, infrastructural expansion, including highly efficient 
planning machinery at a national as well as Sub-regional and Regional 
level and a very .efficient process of exchanging of information and 
ideas relating to pQssible areas of cooperation. 
Planning coordinati,on is divided into two broad types, the first 
of a holistic nature which includes all sectors of economies; the second 
is partial economic integration which means 'negotiated' division of 
labour or agreed specialization or complementarity agreements. 
While the idea behind joint planning harmonization was created by 
the known interrelations between various development activities, as was 
noted earlier, there are many economists who are in favour of practical 
selective planning harmonization based on joint projects and activities, 
otherwise joint planning ideas will remain dreams. At the same time 
partial selective planning will have the advantage of ti!!le in comparisori 
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to the needed waiting till consistent regional plan is formulated. 
The Advantages of Joint Projects: 
The concept of joint projects has a dynamic content and viewed 
in the light of difficulties encountered in coordination of plansp 
specialization and intra-regional trade, to be the best solution for 
Arab economic cooperation. Joint projects are considered also to have 
the following advantages: (9) 
1. They avoid many of the pitfalls associated with multilateralism. 
2. They can bring about a better allocation of resources and 
reduction in costs. 
3. Are more acceptable from political point of view. 
4. Provide a better opportunity for the application of reciprocity 
and joint justice distribution of benefits and costs, as illustrated by 
the 'Mechong Projects' in Section 11.3.2. 
11.2.4 Conceptual Basis for Viable Cooperation 
A large part of the economic literature on cooperation in the 
developing world has been characterized by non-practical approaches which 
design theoretical approaches based on either schemes being followed in 
the developed world, or the assessment in isolation of the means or 
instruments used (e.g. free trade and Customs Unionp Common Marketp etc.) 
rather than on how cooperationp as a determinant factor of deve~opment 
can be a means to achieve certain economic and social objectives within 
the development process. Such approaches tend to give little attention 
to the economic and political environment within which they are 
supposed to operate. 
As Vaitsos has put it: (10) 
"As a general conclusionp we can state that a large part 
of the economic literature on integration is characterized 
by a high degree of fetishism." 
In the following, we will examiqe the basic issues ~ith respe~t 
to rea~istic concept~ of s4ccessful cooper~tion. 
Political Aspects of Development Cooperation: 
Research reinforces the experience of the writer of this thesis 
that political determinants are of great significance for development 
as well as for development cooperation. Four major elements are most 
relevant to the framework: political stability in the context of a 
political system amenable ~o and welcoming planning; development 
orientation of the political leadership; an efficient civil service 
which is not an over-burdened bureaucracy with ·fragmented loyal ties; 
and appropriate planning institutions and instruments. The political 
stability required is one which is seasoned with political 
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participation; otherwise the stability would be the product of autocratic 
rule and would defuse potential popular enthusiasm for the plan and 
cooperation for its success. 
A country can be said to be committing itself to an integration 
move if it is willing to mobilize its political, social, cultural. 
economic, technocratic and bureaucratic resources towards that goal. 
A performance gap will be caused by frequent and sharp change in 
political authority and system, and therefore in the degree of stability 
and to unpredictable changes in the planning environment. 
Confusion of terms and concepts frequently renders analysis and 
projections difficult. In discussing strategies and scenarios, it is 
important to draw clear dividing lines between extrapolated genuine 
trends and ,choices between realistic options on the orie nand, and on the 
other, strategies recommended for the achievement of desired targets 
under optimal conditions. What should be avoided is a certain tendency 
in developing countries to mix up real-life-oriented options and wishful 
scenarios, which may or may not be rooted in realistic assessments of 
prevailing conditions and available, or at least prospective, resources. 
Although the Arab world is wealthy in literature dealing with 
Arab economic integration and cooperation at several levels, however, 
the quality of research on which it is based cannot provide the 
analytical and other material which will: 
II be able tO analyse Objectively and dispaSSiOnately 
the technical case for multinational development and 
cooperation and have access to a platform and forum 
of such prominance that their wishes could be easily 
heard and assimilated within an international context." (11) 
The result, has already illustrated and examined further in this and 
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subsequent chapters has been both illusion and disillusion. It will be 
suggested below later how this can be minimised. 
The Basis for a Viable Approach: 
In carrying forward the search for a viable approach for AGS' 
development cooperation endeavours, further examination is required 
of the case for selective or partial cooperation as against the 
holistic comprehensive approach. 
It is often held today that economic cooperation should concentrate 
on sectoral activities which involve functional fulfilment of specific 
goals and tasks (as cooperation is not valued as an end in itself). 
A non-holistic approach to integration implies that any policy harmon-
---L_J 
ization undertaken needs to be selectively partial and specifically 
task directed. However, as all economic activities are inter-dependent, 
") 
on the macro-level, inconsistencies might arise. Given adequate 
coordination and timing of programmes, the costs of such inconsistencies 
could have perhaps less negative implications for regional cooperation 
than would the disintegrating forces that will be present in attempts-
towards holistic types of cooperation integration. 
In particular, cooperation needs to select and concentrate in areas 
where there are possibilities for significant expansion of the group's 
production, infrastructural and associated parameters. Major advantages 
of cooperation will stem from areas where separate market systems 
are in themselves neitner responsive nor leading to beneficial outcomes. 
The question qf equal distribution of cooperation be11ents occupies 
a key position in the arguments concerning the conceptual basis for 
the successful design of cooperation. 
"Mytelka has argued that regional integration in 
developing areas will fail unless the problem of 
unequal gains is solved. 11 ( 12) 
Despite many methods proposed to treat such problems, as noted below, 
there exist some inherent difficulties which make adequate management 
of the distribution question difficult: 
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1. The concepts of costs and benefits of regional cooperation as well 
as their evaluation are different among member countries of the cooperating 
group and will differentially change over time. 
2. Many of the benefits from integration are of a non-quantifiable 
nature, in the short or even medium term and this can give rise to 
disagreements which cannot be quantitatively resolved. 
3. The difficulty of measuring the actual distributional impact due 
to: 
(a) Limited analytical techniques. 
(b) The problem of data availability during periods of rapid change in 
very fast movements which make even their recording, let alone the 
quantifying, of their implications rather difficult. 
The tendency of integration to exaggerate economic imbalances 
within a region is well-known. Benefits arising from integration accumulate 
disproportionately in those areas that already enjoy higher levels of 
economic development - the 'back wash' effects of integration are far 
stronger than the counteracting 'spread' effects. Regional and Sub-
regional cooperation can only survive in the long run if all partners 
make net gains and these gains are perceived to be distributed relatively 
equally between the participating States. (13) 
Here we can note those compensatory mechanisms which are identified 
in the literature and followed in practice to counteract the 'natural' 
economic tendency towards increasing inequality. 
1. As industry is usually considered to be the key indicator of 
equality of regional gains, through its location multiplier effects 
on employment, improved local skills, technology, infrastructure and 
for creating centres of attraction for new investments, programmed or 
planned industrial cooperation becomes particularly necessary, through 
which a set of viable projects are distributed between participating 
countries. Industry is not the main sector of interest to our 
analysis, as many other sectors and activities seem to occupy more 
attention within AGS' cooperation movement priorities. However, these 
proposed measures for achieving equitable distribution of benefits seem 
to apply also to such other activities. 
2. Fiscal transfers to partners who fail to attract industrial 
investment, mainly through the trade-oriented and market-force based 
systems. Such transfers can be directed also to countries who lose a 
serious amount of their usual income from customs duties due to their 
application of trade instruments. 
3. The idea of a 'Fund for cooperation' or a 'Regional Development 
Bank' has been created by which the financing of projects is to be 
distributed as equally as possible between parties and with special 
attention to the least developed among developing regions or sub-
regions. to promote their development projects. 
11But the problem of backwash and the difficulty of 
ensuring thatpenefits resulting from integration are 
distributed equitably is more than simply an issue of 
debate among economists. It is a real life problem 
that has in one way or another influenced almost every 
economic integration scheme among developing countries. 
It was responsible· for the failure of earlier integrative 
endeavours in West Africa such as UDAO, and affected 
similar efforts in the East African Community as well as 
in the economic groupings in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 11 ( 14) 
It is generally agreed that distribution problems become more 
acute if certaln members of a regional grouping are more advanced than 
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others prior to the formation of the grouping. It is interesting to 
note within this context the different judgements over the main 
beneficiaries fromthe East African integration process. While some 
writers calculated that Uganda lost through integration (although 
to a smaller extent than did Tanzania) others found Uganda's net 
position was positive. (1~) 
Other important concepts relate to the fact that economic 
integration creates opportunities and problems at the same time. It 
leads to new benefits and new costs and the member countries have to 
find ways and means of distributing them. (16) 
The approach to sub-regional cooperation should avoid misleading 
and exaggerated expectation of too much gain arising from cooperation 
which is considered to be in the middle between the nationally-oriented 
and internationally-oriented (including Sub-regional and Regional) 
development. Th~s it is not a substitute to either any of the two. 
These associated problems, as seen below have led to the development 
of partial cooperation schemes which have the advantage of clearer 
distributionary effects, despite their apparently modest gains in 
comparison with those hypothetically offered by holistic integratory 
approaches. 
11.3 Practical Framework for Development Cooperation - Lessons of 
Experience 
In this section we analyse lessons of recent ana current cooperation 
movement mainly in developing countries, as they provide a practical 
and sound pragmatic background for successful cooperation approach. 
This section concentrates on experience relating to key issues on 
cooperation, including trade and development approaches, with some 
examples from Arab, ~{C and ECAFE regional experience. Some illustrations 
are also taken from the EEC as a capitalistic approach for cooperation 
as well as for some socialistic approaches in order to highlight the 
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distinctions which must be made in designing approaches for cooperation 
among different regions or sub-regions. 
11.3.1 The Trade Approach in Practice 
11.3.1.1 Arab Integration Movement Lessons: 
The analytical review of the recent Arab economic cooperation and 
integration movement, which was made in Chapter 6 shewed the complete 
failure of trade oriented approach as reflected in the ACM's declining 
fortunes. The CAEU experience has shown, also, no signs of success 
as the result of the COMECON type approach to comprehensive planning 
adopted. In broad terms, the evaluation of Arab economic cooperation 
movements is much more favourable to the partial development-oriented 
approach as was reflected in the OAPEC example. 
We can add here the supporting evidence of Metwally who, in 
analysing the effect of a common market and trade oriented approach to 
Egyptian cooperation with the Arab world concluded that with Egypt 
better established, with a wide variety of industries and the ability 
to produce most manufactured goods at lower costs, she will be the 
main winner while other parts of the Arab world would be expected to pay 
higher costs and obtain less benefits from such cooperation. (17) 
r 
This would be expected to happen partly because of the "competition 
of relatively more efficient Egyptian industries in other Arab countries". 
Egypt could also exert an unfavourable influence on economic development 
in the other countries through its impact on the financial resources 
available for the Government for development expenditure which results 
from a loss of customs revenue. Despite the joint benefits expected 
to accrue to both sides, since the higher incomes will be generated 
primarily in Egypt, the resulting balance might be a seriously adverse 
effect on Government revenue in other Arab States. (18) 
11.3.1.2 East African Community Lessons: 
The Arusha Declaration establishing the East African community 
460 
between three countries. Kenya. Uganda and Tanzania was adopted in 1967. 
The East African Development Bank was established in Kampala in the 
same year, and many sub-regional institutions were established in 
addition to those inherited from the colonial period, particularly 
as joint services. The EAC ceased operation in 1977. 
The EAC adopted trade approaches to establish common market and 
attempted to use specific instruments to secure an equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits. 
Following the treaty. self-contained services provided by the EA 
Common Services Organization were consolidated under four autonomous 
corporations as commercial institu.tions equally shared and controlled; 
the East Africa Railways Corporations (EARC), the East African Harbours 
Corp. (EAHC), the EA ports and Telecommunication Corp. (EAP & TC) and the 
EA Airways Corporation (EAAC). The continuity of the services provided 
by these corporations constituted a very important part of economic 
cooperation among the member countries. Other categories of services 
included revenue collection, various economic and research organisations, 
mainly financed from foreign aid. However, the whole system, as Table 
11.1 illustrates. started collapsing in 1971 since when the East 
African Authority ceased m~e~ing. In the f~llowing we e~amine the key 
.·· 
•• · ......... !.· -· ..._ 
issues learnt frorn.this exptbrience. 
Reasons for failure: 
1. The Customs Union theory was adopted and fail-ed: (-19) 
(a) Countries' intra-trade was very weak in comparison with their 
extra-regional trade which meant that changes had very large trade 
diversion effects, whilst the non-competitive production structure did 
not allow the appearance of trade creation effects. 
(b) The free market forces, an inherent part of the operation, tended 
to bEmefi t Kenyan industry to the detriment of the other two countries. 
(c) Agriculture was excluded from cooperation even though it was 
Table 11.1 
Regional Integration in East Africa 
A Timetable of Events since 1961 
1961 - Tanganyika became independent as Tanzania (with the addition 
of Zanzibar) 
- Talks on an East African federation started 
1963 ~ Kenya and Uganda became independent 
1967 - The treaty for East African Cooperation established the East 
African Community and the East African Common Market 
The East African Development Bank was established in Kampala 
1971 - The East African Authority ceased meeting 
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1972 - Exchange controls and import restrictions were imposed individually 
by the three countries 
1973 - The East Africans corporations started facing financial crises 
caused by restrictions imposed on inter-State transfer of funds 
.1975- A commission set up to review the Treaty adjourned a year late 
with no recommendations 
I 
1976 - EAC workers in the General Fund Services (excluding those in 
1977 
Arusha) were asked to work in their own countries 
EAAC workers from Tanzania and Uganda returned home 
- The headquarters of the HarboursD Railways and Telecommunications 
Corporations broke up 
- The East African Railways became decentralised 
Tanzania and Kenya s~t up autonomous harbour .services 
Kenya established its own railway system 
- The EA Airways Corp~ration collapsed 
- Tanzania closed its borders with Kenya thus ending the Common 
Market 
- Member countries could not agree on the General Fund Services 
budget 
Kenya announced its withdrawal and took over all EAC services 
operating in Kenya 
- The EAC ceaseq operations . 
Source: EkenD S. 'Break up of the East African Community'D Inp 
Finance and Development, Vol. 16p No. 4p Decem~er 1979p pp. 
38-39. 
fundamental to their economies and offered many opportunities for 
cooperation and development. 
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(d) The measures planned to achieve equitable distribution of benefits, 
such as intra-regional taxes and the East African Development Bank 
proved to be failures. 
2. Political and ideological differences between Tanzania, Uganda 
and Kenya became acute during the decade after the achievement of 
independence. Tribalism, which affected the cohesian of each State 
as well as the group, personality clashes between leaders, differences 
in pre-colonial and colonial cultural and economic experience, as well 
as basic geographical differences, were strengthened by suspicions 
of unequal benefitting from trade cooperation. 
3. The trade approach: During the initial years the existing trade 
patt~rns were reinforced and certain increases in trade flows took 
place, particularly in the share of intra-regional exports of man-
ufacturing products as compared to the total manufacturing exports of 
the member countries (see Table 11.2) (in Central America this 
relationship in the manufacturing sector reached above 80%). 
Yet, the member countries soon reached a plateau in their 
intra-regional export performance with limited opportunities for 
expansion. This was the result of two primary causes. First, no 
significant production and technological changes were introduced in 
the domestic capacities of the member countries. They achieved, 
primarily, some import substitution activities, which the individual 
countries could, anyway, have undertaken some years later on the basis 
of their national markets. Secondly, the new trade patterns proved 
not to be strong enough to be irreversible either for individual 
economic reasons (as intra-regional import-substitution advanced in 
each country) or as a result of political discrepancies and conflicts.(20) 
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It is true that the three countries were competitive in the 
sense that they produced the same range of primary products but they 
could hardly become complementary except in the long term because 
their economies had a low level of industrial development. The removal 
of trade barriers could not have ledp and did not lead, to substantial 
changes in patterns of production (Table 11.2 and ref. 21). 
Table 11.2 
Indicators 
Significance of intra-community Trade (1967-76) 
Exports to and Imports from EAC as a percentage of: 
Total Exports of Total Imports from 
1967 
1976 
1967 
1976 
Kenya 
30.8 
19.3 
Tanzania 
4.6 
6.3 
Uganda 
16.1 
0.5 
Kenya 
11.3 
3.2 
Tanzania 
17.0 
12.5 
Distribution of Intra-community Trade (1967-76) 
61.4 
83.1 
Exports 
9.4 
15.9 
29.2 
1.0 
31.5 
16.9 
Imports 
32.2 
42.9 
Uganda 
27.4 
44.6 
36.3 
40.2 
Source: Eken, S. 'Break up of the East African Community' Finance & 
Development, Vol. 16, No. 4p December 1979, Table 1 and 2, 
p. 48. 
4. The East African Community - A non-Developmental Approach: 
The Treaty for East African cooperation was at the time one of the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching efforts at Sub-regional integration, but 
its approach to strength and regulate industrial, commercial and other 
relations was mainly through the Customs Union policy. 
However, the EAC did not produce free movement of labour and 
capital, nor did the provisions of the Treaty extend to agricultural 
products. (22) 
5. Ideological Differences: The Arush~ Declaration in Tanzania 
was adopted in 1967 before the Treaty came into effect. In this 
statement the ruling partyp the Tanganika African National Union, set 
out its policy on socialism and self-reliance, involving a growing 
public sector under Government control. 
"The effects of the different ideological orientations 
of the partner States affected trade relations and the 
general scheme of investments and industrial policies, 
the situation in Tanzania contrasting with a clear 
emphasis in Kenya on private and largely foreign 
investment."(23) 
5. Agricultural Cooperation: Agriculture was an area where great 
potential for coordination existed: but it was excluded from the 
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common market and agricultural prices were matters of national political 
sensitivity. 
6. The Failure to Achieve Balanced Growth (EAC): The Treaty included 
the establishment of two instruments to ensure the industrial 
development. The first was a transfer tax on intra-community trade 
to protect industries in the less industrially developed members against 
those of the more developed. The second was the establishment of the 
East African Development Bank (EADB) on December 1967 in Kampala with 
equal contributions from all countries. 
Even so, the benefits of a customs union were not distributed 
evenly among them. Owing to their different levels of economic 
developmentp market mechanisms tended to increase inequalities. Kenya 
is generally thought to have benefitted more from the Unionp particularly 
from the enlarged market for its already developing manufacturing 
industriesp while Uganda and Tanzania lost revenues from foregone import 
duties since Kenyan industrial products were imported tariff free.Tney 
Paid higher prices for Kenya produced commoditiesp more than they were 
paid. 
7. Political Conflicts: The major factor contributing to the 
breakdown of the Community was the deadlock in the Community's highest 
bodyp The East African Authority. 
Although cooperation in the EAC was encouraging in the initial 
years, relations between the member countries started to deteriorate 
in the early 1970's. The community's highest body, the East African 
Authority, which consisted of the three presidents, did not meet 
after 1971 because of Tansanian President Nyerere's refusal to meet 
with Uganda's President. (24) 
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Perhaps not unsurprisingly, given the emphasis placed on newly-
won sovereignty and the sensitive nature of economic issues, African 
Governments have been unwilling to delegate authority to regional 
institutions. This reluctance is compounded by the fact that intra-
regional economic activity constitutes but a small proportion of most 
African States' total external economic transactions. Governments 
will not undertake policy harmonisation for the sake of furthering 
regional cooperation if there is a possibility that this may adversely 
affect what are perceived as more important relations with extra-
regional partners. 
In all, the EAC illustrates the weakness of the assumption in 
the trade-oriented approach that trade-liberalisation will in itself 
confer so many benefits that the other difficulties of cooperation will 
be. negated. 
11.3 .2 Development Approach 
11.3.2.1 Partial Development Cooperation - Case Study Mer-kong Project: 
As a case study in partial integration, the Me' kong Proj e·ct 
implemented in ECAFE region suggests a number of valuable conclusions. 
It is recognized that the experience in regional cooperation gained in 
developing and implementing the Me·:kong project largely influenced the 
attitude of ECAFE towards the problem of regional integration and has 
led it to adopt the partial integration approach as a more feasible 
solution than full integration. (25) 
It is clear that during almost twenty years, first of study and 
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then of progressive implementationp that the potential of this approach 
began to be realised. Unfortunately the international component 
of this project collapsed during the 1970's with the growth of political 
instability and conflict. Our interest on this project is centred 
rather on its main features and lessons as a Sub-regional and partial 
development oriented project than on its detailed development. 
Political instability, in this case exacerbated by external forcesp 
which affected the final outcome of the project is excluded from our 
examination as this factor could lead any form of cooperation into 
complete failure. 
The Mekong Project -Main Features: 
The ECAFE Bureau of Flood Control published the first preliminary 
report relating to flood control and water resources development of 
"The Mekong - An International River" in 1952. A second study, the 
"Reconnaissance Report - Lower Mekong River Basin" was prepared by 
a United States group in March 1956 under the auspices of the United 
States International Cooperation Administration. ECAFE appointed a 
group of consultants to survey the river basin and to report on its 
development possibilities. This group which published its report in 
1957 stressed the international character of the project and recommended 
the establishment of an international coordinating authority. 
In accordance with the above-mentioned group's recommendation, the 
Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin 
was created in 1957. The following yearp a high-level technical advisory 
board of engineers was appointed to assist the Mekong Committee, and 
in 1959 the Committee appointed an executive agent to act as the 
general manager of the project .. ( 26) 
As a result of extensive measurements and surveys conducted over 
the years by var;ious international working parties organised by the 
Mekong Committee, 
"the possibility of constructing thirteen major 
dams has been establishedp and the possibility 
of constructing dams on twenty tributaries was 
investigated." ( 27) 
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The Mekong Committee, howeverp gave high priority to three major projects, 
namely the Pa Mong, the Sambor and the Toule Sap projects. Two 
tributary projects were completed in 1966 and put under operation 
(Nam Pong and Nam Pung in Thailand) construction was in progress on 
three other projects up until 1970 0 (28) these projects are: Lower 
Se Done and Nam Ngum in Laosp and Lam Dom Noi in Thailand. Construction 
was scheduled to begin in 1968 on the Nam Dong project in Laos, and 
finance was secured for the Prek Thnot project in Cambodia. The 
other tributary projects were at various stages of investigation up to 
1970. 
"The activities of the Mekong Committee are 
organised under eight headings, namely basic data 
collection, basin planning, main stream projects, 
tributary projectsp navigation improvement projects, 
ancillary projects concerned mostly with economic 
and social studies and economic planning and develop-
ment problems, training projects and supply 
programmes • 11 ( 29 ) 
Twenty-three non-basin countries provided the staff, materials 
and money to help in carrying out the investigations and pre-investment 
studies; ten United Nations bodies and seven private organisations 
and business firms also provided assistance. The total amount made 
available up to 1970, ~ 156 million. (30) 
Mekong Project Lessons: 
1. Favourable Timing: Despite the non-emergency of productive 
activities in the modern sense in the case of the least developed 
countries, the Mekong Project case showed the existence of new 
development opportunities within the regional cooperation. 
"This consideration points to the urgency of the 
attempt to develop regional projects before vested 
interests grow or take deep root. Once a national 
project is underway, however unjustifiable or 
irrational it may be, it becomes extremely difficult 
to harmonize it into a regional scheme or to achieve 
any degree of regional integration." (31) 
2. Reciprocity: One of the important lessons that was learnt in 
implementing the Mekong·project is the very significant role played 
by the principle of 'reciprocity'. This priAciple proved to have 
much greater success and force.in this partial integration effort 
than in other full, comprehensive attempts at integration. 
"The priorities established by the Mekong Committee 
in deyeloping the various components of the project 
were guided by this principle (of reciprocity). 
Thus, among the mainstream projects, equally high 
priority was given, as was mentioned earlier, to 
three.projects, namely, Pa Mong, to benefit Cambodia 
and the Republic of Vietnam. Similarly, in carrying 
out the tributary projects p an ef.fort is beirig made 
not to diverge too much in the completion dates. 
Thus, two projects in Thailand and one in Laos having 
made greater progress than any in Cambodia, it was 
decided to declare 1966 Cambodia Year so as to 
accelerate the progress of the Cambodian Prek Throt 
project." ( 32) 
To add here the importanceof institutional ·arrangements as it 
contributed to no small extent in the project success. 
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3. Additionality: ECAFE experience suggests one important principle 
for the choice of joint projects to be chosen 0 the principle of 
'additionality' which has the basic idea that a regional project will. 
be acceptable to sovereign States only if it does not injure any 
national interest but rather contributes to its fulfilment. Thus 
regional projects must not replace or compete with whatever projects 
already exist on their own 0 but only to complement them. This principle 
has been adopted in the ECAFE region by the Asian Development Bank. (33) 
4. Programmed Joint Projects: As the construction phase of some of 
the projects drew nearer, the need to create a market for the water 
and electricity was felt more urgently and attention by 1967 was 
directed to the problems of economic development in the region. A lag 
in.developing a market for water and power through education of the 
farmers, modernization of the farming methods and development of an 
'• .. 
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industrial base, could create a serious problem of idle capacity in 
the projects, upsetting their profitability expectations. The need to 
integrate a regional project into the national development plans of the 
participating countries and to harmonize the plans of the countries with 
each other, at least for the more important sectors connected with 
the project, was given a high priority by the Mekong Committee.(34) 
5. Role of the U.N. in the Mekong Project: The Mekong Committee 
was primarily concerned in the early stages with gathering the 
technical and engineering data necessary for constructing the 
multiple-purpose projects. Rudimentary work on experimental farms and 
a survey of forestry resources were undertaken by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations {FAO) as early as in 
1958. A manpower survey was conducted by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) also 
undertook some health work.(35) The active participation of the 
premier international bodies was important politically as well as 
technically. 
"The belief that economic coooperation can 
transcend political animosity has received 
repeated vindication in the operation of the 
Mekong project. The project has progressed in 
spite of the cool relationship between two of the 
countries, which at times almost reached breaking 
point. Common interest in the long run, however, 
permitted progress despite these differences; 
though, here again, the availability of massive 
foreign aid was certainly a help."{36) 
We should note here that limited political disagreements 
had no serious effects as has been also the case with OAPEC (see 
Chapter 6). The Mekong experience suggests that partial 
development-oriented cooperation is less liable to negative effects 
of political conflicts than the holistic and trade-oriented 
approach. 
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6. The Piecemeal Approach: In evaluationg regional cooperation 
in ECAFE area, in various fields, noting experience elsewhere and 
differences between ECAFE region and other regions with regard 
to economic, historical and political conditions, the ECAFE 
commission abandoned efforts to form an 'overlord' regional 
organisation similar to EEC or LAFTA. Instead it had accepted the 
philosophy of a piecemeal solution to the question of cooperation and 
rather identified a number of areas of potential and suggested a 
number of projects in which a piecemeal approach to developing regional 
cooperation could be adopted.(37) 
11.3.3 A Practical Basis for Successful Cooperation 
We refer here to the basic lessons derived from the 
cooperation experience of the developing world in the light of past 
analysis, in such a way as to provide a practical framework for a 
proposed pragmatic approach for AGS cooperation. 
11.3.3.1 The Trade Approach: 
1. The laissez faire model, which is implicit in the trade 
approach, is clearly inappropriate for developing areas, and it is 
not surprising that integration schemes of this type have not 
lasted long. This is because a free trade area, or a customs union 
with ·free trade policies, is inevitably bound to lead to uneven growth 
and development-. 
"Simple market integration has in many cases 
shown itself to be a strong disintegrating 
force."(38) 
Thus the integration of markets approach has proven to be the 
approach which has contributed least to the solution of development 
problems. 
"Rather it has often contributed to an accentuation 
of under-development and dual productive and 
income structures as well as to the present dis-
illusion with integration itself." (39) 
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The limited intra-regional contacts at the beginning of cooperation 
schemes imply that effective regional cooperation based on trade blocs 
is to a large extent, because of its protectionist nature, trade 
diverting and is not necessarily trade creating. The latter 1110uld 
involve, in specific sectors, mechanisms for either de-linking with 
the industrialized countries- or for redressing their relations with 
them. 
"The types of regional transactions induced by simple 
trade liberalization mechanisms, despite initial high 
growth rates, could end up stagnating o~ even being 
reduced. This is the result of import substitution 
among the member countries." (40) 
As individual countries grow, their market size allow them to substitute 
domestic production for their imports from the rest of the group. Actual 
observations from Central American integration movement support this 
trend. By 1975 the Guatemalan GNP was equal to the total Central 
American GNP in 1955. This has enabled Guatemala to build up its own 
production and reduce imports from the rest of Central America. Whilst 
this may appear to be a development success for Guatemala, its 
partners have lost. Similar phenomena have been noted for the East 
African community. Trade flows do not create in themselves intra-
industry specialization. ( 41) 
2. Distributional Effects -General Experience (see also 11 below): 
In the Andean Pact, in the first four to five years when the enhanced 
trade relations became applicable, while the newly programmed industries 
needed time for negotiations and plant construction, 
"the resulting trade flows basically reflected and 
benefitted the already more advanced Colombian industry."(42) 
Despite the existence of many policy instruments which can be used for 
redistributional purposes, most of them, in practice, proved unable 
to prevent polarization effects created through market forces. 
All the main instruments of regional cooperation in East Africa 
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(i.e. common market policiesp common services, East African Corporations 
and the East African Development Bank) as well as distributional system 
instruments (i.e. transfer taxesp industrial licensing system, the 
financing of General Fund services, the disbursements of the East 
African Development Bank). 
"All-of these instruments were, to a large scale, 
inadequate in correcting distributional imbalances 
in East Africa." (43) 
All this evidence, with respect to the trade-oriented approachp 
strengthened by the experience of schemesp such as the ACM, support the 
contention of the non-viability of this approach for developing countries. 
3. Multi-sectoral and Project by Project Approach: It does seem 
possible to ·devise jointly accepted formulae for the allocation of 
multinational projects in various sectors based on the comparative cost 
advantage principle, as in the Mekong case. This minimizes the problem 
of sharing gains from cooperation because negotiations for the allocation 
of multinational projects among the member countries would generally 
involve a wide range of such projects. 
The relative simplicity of such arrangements is itself attractive 
and appears to work in the ECAFE region and elsewhere. It is more 
difficult to make calculations, in advance, of the gains derived from 
holistic integration. (44) 
4. Political Motivation: The driving force behind the European 
attempts at integration, as represented by the EEC and EFTA, was the 
political imperative to seek a role for Western Europe, independent of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. The birth .of the CMEA owed 
much to the cold-war tensions of the early post-war years. Likewisep 
in the Arab world, in Africa and in Latin America, the initial impetus 
for integration was provided by the drive for ideas of regional and 
continental unity, the need to consolidate newly-won independence and to 
enha~ce bargaining power. Economic considerations were, of course, always 
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presentu but it is doubtful that they played a leading role in the 
establishment of these schemes. The GCC example as was illustrated 
in Chapter 6 is relevant here. 
Lizano has touched on most of the economic and political 
obstacles that have hampered the working of integration schemes among 
developing countries.(45) There is, however, an important-source of -
difficulties that is not reflected in his discussion. Reference is made 
here to the issues that arise when countries with different economic 
systems come together in an integration scheme. Many of the regional 
groupings among developing countries incorporate members with 
significantly different economic systems. This is the case, for example, 
with the East African Community, the Permanent Consultative Committee 
of the Maghreb, and the Arab Common Market; and was the case with the 
Andean group until the overthrow of the Allende regime. The coexistence 
of ideologically diverse States within a single trading bloc raises 
issues relating to the role of foreign private investment relationships 
with third parties, and a number of other aspects of social and 
economic policies. Sovereign States can always abrogate cooperation 
instruments if they consider that the process does not fulfil their 
desires. 
5. Comprehensive and Partial Regional Planning: Although 
comprehensive planning on a regional scale has not been applied so far, 
in a number of schemes regional sectoral -planning~has taken place 
particularly i~ the services sector: transport, communication, energy 
production, etc. In isolated cases regional planning of industrial 
sub-sectors has been attempted, such as the steel industry in Latin 
America. 
"On the whole, specialization agreements have been 
more frequent and appear a more acceptable approach 
to industrial planning in an integration scheme." (46) 
6. The Industrial Approach - Indicative Planning: The LDC's rigidities 
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are much less liable to be overcome and streamlined by market forces 
alone. The control of the market mechanism, which became indispensable 
also in industrialized economies, seems to be imperative within the 
framework of, preferably indicative, planning. 
A careful and unbiased collectianaf basic and relevant data, study 
of their significance and inter-relationship, examination of the 
power and limitations of international market forces, scrutiny of the 
industrial linkage inside industry and with other sectors, and 
adaptation of technology to the prevailing domestic production factors 
(see Chapter 10), consumption patterns and feasible export prospects, all 
these belong to the fundamental requirements of reasonable industrial 
planning. The latter's efficient and flexible execution is decisively 
dependent on the quality, integrity and competence of the Government 
and its agencies, a major development issue per se in the LDCs. (47) 
Consequently, there exists room for the need for indicative planning 
to substitute the LDC's weak markets forces in relation to development. 
7. Economic Independence and Cooperation: The major lesson which 
has been emerging from developing countries experience is that cooperation 
between developing countries will be very difficult to achieve unless, 
and until, the countries have achieved a certain measure of economic 
independence, particularly for ex-colonies. 
"If such c9untries are too closely tied to the 
former metropole, the establishment of meaningful 
economic relationships with neighbouring countries 
will be slow to develop. Certainly this has been 
the case in West Africa." (48) 
8. Commitment: A strong political commitment is vital, channelled 
through avenues that can serve the purpose, such as indicative planning 
built on a solid statistical and information base, and association with 
civil service adequacy, political stability within the whole sub-region. 
A strong general commitment and policies and measures, however, 
will be inrmfficient. unless there is a large measure of motivation 
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directed towards development cooperation and unless motivation is 
supplemented by strong economic and social mobility. In addition to 
all of this the strength of the entrepreneurial spirit governed by 
the motive, real will and ability to participate in the cooperative 
process, mainly in systems working within the frame of private enterprise, 
all of these constitute pre-requisites for successfuicooperation. 
It is important to involve various social forces and forces of 
entrepreneurship, otherwise they will work to break the whole system of 
cooperation. Further, it can be maintained that cooperation needs to 
concentrate, mainly in the beginning of the process, on issues which cannot 
be dealt with by market forces, and thus call for Government intervention. 
9. The Issue of Timing: When programming economic cooperation it is 
important to take into consideration the stage of cooperation already 
reached and prospects for further advancement being affected by that 
stage. Since the validity of regional cooperation is dependent on the 
achievements of cooperation in specific development areas, the factor 
of time plays a key role in various ways. 
As regional cooperation in developing countries starts from a 
very low base of economic and non-economic inter-relations, a long 
gestation period is needed to build up such interactions; gains accruing 
from economic integration are often less obvious and longer run than 
the costs and constraints. (49) 
As this -situation might cause a state- of frustration to the 
countries involved in the cooperation process. 
"It thus becomes important to programme and select 
certain policies and projects which periodically 
will keep alive the interest and character of integration 
in anticipation of the longer-run benefits."(50) 
In the Andean Pact, when the first stage of its life was over, it 
became fundamental to inject a second impetus to integration through the 
approval of common industrial programmes. The most important adopted was 
of the automobile industry. 
Political leadership usually faces pressure from some other 
political and social groups, which for various reasons oppose 
cooperation. It is important to the cooperative leadership therefore 
to proceed with projects and policies which lead to reasonably balanced 
-
distribution of such benefits 1 remembering the explicit identification 
of the allies or pressure groups which are in favour of integration 
is a part of the strategy for successful cooperation. 
"It is important to stress that it was not that the 
selection of policy instruments led to the.poor 
performance of LAFTA. Instead powerful social 
groups, which would have been affected by integration, 
pressured their Governments to adopt measures and 
policies which were consistent with the group's 
interests." (51) 
10. The history and experience of economic integratip 1 either in the 
East or in the West proved that the most successful measures applied 
recognise the following critical points: 
(a) Staged and graduated change. It is thought that through this 
principle most differences could disappear gradually within a reasonable 
limit of time, controlled by the extent of differences between the 
economies of the participating countries. This way, also, leads to 
required changes without negative side effects or repercussions. 
(b) It is advisable to begin cooperation movement with the most 
simple subjects and interests which are of common agreement between them 
by all participating countries. The establishment of appropriate joirit 
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bodies and institutions, the coordination of measures and systems and the 
continual contacts among the executive agencies in the participating 
countries; ensuring the common interests of the subject-level participants 
is more important than setting up one central authority. 
(c) The changing nature of benefits and costs as well as the different 
evaluation criteria used over time by each partner become critical for 
the viability of a process, and the accumulation of frustrations must be 
avoided. 
(d) Significant political changesp which are endemic in many 
development processes, set certain limits on the prospects and 
evolution of regional cooperation. 
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11. The Requirements of Inter-country Distributional Considerations: 
As indicated in general terms of 2 above, a large number of the most 
serious crises in the diverse experiences of regional cooperation 
centre around the issue of inter-country distributional effects and 
it is necessary to examine how these can be minimised. 
The issue of the distribution of benefits and costs of integration 
among the member of countries remains one of the most complex and 
difficult problems of integration. In all the integration schemes there 
have been some countries that have considered that the costs that they 
have to bear are excessive in relation to the benefits that they obtain. 
This fact gives rise to permanent tensions and conflicts and to so-
called distributive crises. 
Economic integration creates opportunities and problems at the 
same time. It leads to new benefits and new costs and the member 
countries have to find ways and means to distribute them. The benefits 
and costs that accrue to a country depend on its own economic conditions 
as well as on the specific measures that the integration programme 
contemplates. The conditions comprise the amount and the degree of 
utilisation of the factors of production, the economic policy that a 
country follows in relation to matters such as monetary affairs, exchange 
rates, wage policy, foreign investment, and the type of social 
organisation that the country has. The disparities that arise from the 
specific measures of integration relate particularly to the freedom of 
trade in goods (changes in trade flows, price levels, the allocation 
of factors of production, and fiscal revenues)p mobility of factors 
(supply and demand of factors), financial arrangements, and possible 
agreements regarding the geographical distribution of industries. These 
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conditions and disparities determine the way in which the member 
countries take advantage of the new opportunities that integration offers, 
and, to a large extentp the way in which the benefits and costs of 
integration are distributed among them. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties do not stop there. The concept 
of benefits and costs of integration isp iri i~self, a very elusive one. 
A benefit for one country may be a cost for another (for example, the 
migration of labour under conditions of labour shortages as against 
a situation of unemployment). Not all of the countries participating 
in an integration programme have the same objectivesp and each one will 
judge subjectively the benefits it receives. The costs that each country 
is prepared to accept depend upon the alternatives available to it. 
These conceptual problems make it difficult to have a clear idea 
of the distribution of benefits and costs of integration and their true 
meaning. Leaving aside some methodological points, this is the main 
reason why the several attempts that have been made to measure the 
benefits and costs of integration and their distribution have been of 
little use. It also helps us to understand whyp though all integration 
schemes have recognised the necessity of securing an 'equitable' 
distribution of net benefits (benefits less costs)p very little progress 
has been achieved. 
This is why solutions to this complex problems should not be 
sought primarily for the purpose of improving the measurements of the 
total benefits and costs of integration, but rather for helping countries 
to negotiate -integration treaties that take account of the interests of 
all parties involved. The crucial need is not so much to measure the 
benefits and costs of integration and their distribution, as to adopt a 
set of measures that make each of the countries feel that it is obtaining 
net benefits. The fact that none of the integration programmes has yet 
been able to find the right solution to this problem means not that the 
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problem s, hould be abandon~d but that more thought should be given to it. (52) 
12. The Role of Hegemonic Powers: 
"It is not surprising then that Governments of 
developed countries which have had various types 
and degrees of hegemonic presence in the less 
developed parts of the globe, had a definite interest 
and played a part in shaping the processes of regional 
economic coop_eration in the Th.i,rd lllorld." (53) 
Throughout history, Governments of hegemonic powers have shown, 
in many cases, marked opposition to effective regional and economic 
cooperation among less developing areas. In other cases there have been 
multiple attempts to formally integrate less developed economies in 
customs unions, free trade zones (or other special trade arrangements) 
with certain hegemonic powers. 
"Such efforts had the dual objective of both 
increasing the dependence of the former on the 
latter as well as excluding other powers from 
interfering in established zones of influence." 
"The case of US interference in central America 
represents one of the most severe foreign influences 
in the integration processes in recent times. One 
might even question the 'external' status of the 
US in this regional system." (54) 
The USA up to 1960 opposed Latin American regional integration 
on the grounds that it was against its own economic and political 
interests. (55) However 0 in the early 1960 1 e the USA reversed its 
position on Latin American ;integration movements in general and in Central 
America in particular. This arose from the newly created economic, 
political and security interests following the Cuban revolution, the 
inclusion of development as part of the military and political issues 
of continental security. Development was needed to prevent drastic 
revolutionary changes and subversion. As a result a case was made for 
US economic interests in substituting exports to Latin America of final 
goods by American foreign direct investment and by the export of inter-
mediate and capital goods. Also foreign private investment reinforced 
by official aid, could counter the increasing interference of the newly-
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built and growing economic power of Europe and Japan into the 
Continent. 
US through its influence could shape the Central American 
Common Market through various stages of its formative period, mainly 
through its aid programme reaching 50% of the budget of virtually all 
regional organisations OT institutions in Central America, incl~ding 
Central American Development Bank. US intervened continuously against 
regional industrial planning in Central America through multiple pressure 
to nullify the scheme of 'integration industries' as included in the 
General Treaty of CACM. 
"The central American experience demonstrates how a 
hegemonic power took over an integration movement 
which was thought of and initiated by others, 
restructured its policy instruments and functioned 
to fit that powers own interests and, in so doing, 
created a non-viable process of integration. 11 (56) 
It might be suitable to refer to current experience derived from 
Israeli Occupation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with which Israel, 
as controlling power has designed a customs union that is working from 
one side only. The markets of occupied territories are open to Israeli 
industrial production, the Arab labour force has been attracted to 
Israel, while occupied territories are not allowed to market their 
products freely into the Israeli markets or to import freely from the 
outside world.(57) The captured markets of West Bank and Gaza in 1967 
became the largest market for. Israeli exports.(57) 
The hegemonic role of the USSR within COMECON is similarly 
apparent. 
13. The Role of Transnational Enterprises (TNE's) in Economic 
Integration: 
"The TNE's are not neutral vis-a-vis the process of 
economic integration among developing countries. They 
become, in fact, one of the strongest sectors in regional 
cooperation. They influence policies, participate in or 
even dominate policy implementation and can become critical 
integrating or dis-integrating forces in the pursuit 
of their corporate objectives." (58) 
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The following factors reinforce TNE's power-
Their size and worldwide expansion, their command of company-
specific strategic assets (technology, managerial skills, corporate 
planning and control) their international commercial presence 
(advertising, trademark, extensive distribution outlets) their access 
and possibility to tap resources and- ent-er markets internationally. (59) 
11.4 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has been devoted to establishing the conceptual 
as well as the practical basis for establishing a viable approach to 
AGS Cooperation. In order to achieve this objective, various forms 
and conceptions of cooperation were examined, generally classified into 
two types; that is of trade-oriented and development oriented 
approaches. 
The main findings of this part of analysis have shown the non-
viability of 'trade-oriented approach' for the Developing Countries 
Case, and support, at the same time, the greater viability of selectively 
partial-development oriented cooperation for these countries. The trade-
oriented approach can be regarded as a mistaken universal application 
of conventional wisdom relating to the success of larger units such 
as the EEC within the western capitalistic world. The basic concept 
relies on the effects of opening of markets to free trade while allegedly 
Adam Smith's invisible hand obligingly took care of the rest. This 
situation has proved to be inapplicable to the developing countries' 
case. 
Various elements were identified as necessary for successful 
cooperation. Among these, political aspects of cooperation appear as 
especially relevant. Political conditions include stability in the 
context of poliLical leadership, efficient adm:inistrat.ion and appropriate 
planning and institutional instruments. 
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The literature dealing with approaches to development cooperation 
and integration between developing countries is extremely blinkered in 
extolling for general adoption either the trade approach followed by 
EEC, or comprehensive planning approach followed by socialist countries. 
Arab literature relating both to Arab and AGS economic cooperation 
is not excluded from this criticism (see Chapter 12). 
Developing countries experience in, for example, the EAC 
examined in this chapter and the ACM & CAEU in Chapter 6, illustrate 
why the trade-oriented approach has resulted in failure. 
that 
Pragmatic evidence tends to support the conceptual conclusion 
"partial development-oriented and programmed 
cooperation with integratory harozions" 
are more appropriate to developing countries. A case study of Mekong 
P~oject within ECAFE region illustrated the viability of this approach 
in securing many of the key factors needed for successful cooperation. 
Particularly important factors included reciprocity and additionality. 
The practical lessons from experience also illustrated the vital 
importance of the issue of time (stage of cooperation reached, prospects 
for further advancement being affected by that stage and the political, 
economic and social structure including pressure groups prevailing at 
the time when cooperation begins). This analysis further confirms the 
relevance of the phenomena and issues examined in Parts One and Two 
of this thesis. Reference has been made also to the role played by 
hegemonic powers and transnational enterprises in shaping or trying to 
shape cooperation movements in developing countries, with respect to 
the former and continuing interests. This factor is of special relevance 
to the question of cooperation within the international circle as 
motivated by science and technological needs of developing countries. 
We now turn to apply.our findings to the AGS case in order to 
design a pragmatic approach for ~his sub-regional development 
cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 12 - A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO AGS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
12.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth an operational approach 
to development cooperation between AGS. Such cooperation is directed 
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of cooperation, 
limitations, accepting the existence of individual sovereign States 
and various other practical limitatic•ns. The suggested approach has 
the models best suited to cooperation and complementarity,has the best 
chance of being transferred into reality, and the most relevance to key 
issues relating to the development movement of the AGS. 
Here we apply to the Sub-region the conceptual framework and 
analysis made in Chapter 11, relating to the two main types of 
development cooperation. On the basis of this and the experiences of 
other developing countries an approach to development cooperation which 
is both pragmatic in itself, and pragmatically arrived at, is proposed. 
This chapter begins with reference to Sub-regionalism within the 
Arab-Region in order to place AGS Sub-region within context, and to 
identify the main attributes of this Sub-region. Examination is made of 
the two main approaches being followed towards cooperation and assessing 
which of them seem to be of most relevance and benefits to the AGS case, 
this in the light of preceding analysis and conclusions. 
This analysis ends by exploring, in broad terms, and on a sectoral 
basis, the key opportunities for AGS cooperation, opportunities the 
siezure of which could transalte into practice the proposed approach to 
cooperation and contribute, at the same time, to the achievement of 
needed structural development changes within the Sub-region. 
12.2 The AGS as a Sub-region within the Arab-Region 
Four cooperative groupings which in some sense can be regarded as 
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'Sub-regional' can be identified in the Arab Region, and their 
characteristics and membership were examined in Chapter 6. Two of 
them, it will be noted, are Sub-regional in locational terms by 
accident or coincidence rather than by design. Thus, the CAEU and 
associated ACM were conceived of in comprehensive Arab Regional terms. 
Withdrawals from or failure to ratify membership have-left the CAEU 
and AMC as less than Regional in scope and with only some partial 
locational Sub-regional interests. For example, in the ACM, before 
the expulsion of Egypt in 1981, four of the six members were neighbours 
with some degree of common interest, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria. 
Similarily, OAPEC was designed as a sectoral organisation which 
also, coincidentally, was seen as important to the interests of 
neighbouring oil-producing States in and around the Gulf. 
The Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee {MPCC), on the other 
hand, was a conscious expression of the need for cooperation by 
neighbouring North African Arab countries which also have very different 
political systems. (1) L)bya, never traditionally part of the cultural 
~aghreb, has effectively withdrawn and the MPCC maintains only a nominal 
rather than active existence. (2) 
Most recent is the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC, which is 
very strongly an expression of locational Sub-regional common interests 
(see Chapter 5). 
It is considered by some that an emergence of multiple-Sub-regional 
groupings with the Arab Region is dangerous: 
"The multiplicity of organisations in one region with 
broadly similar functions and identical ultimate objectives 
may result in competition, duplication of efforts, incon-
sistencies and fragmentation. As a consequence, the 
effectiveness of the organisations is reduced." (3) 
In the writer's view, on the other hand, the actual emergency of 
these groups was contemperaneously justified and they do not constitute 
a danger to any long-term regional interests, the real dangers still 
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appearing at a lower level in potentially competing sectoral activities, 
mainly in industry and agriculture. Rather than suppress new Sub-
regional movements, for the sake of hypothetically attractive but 
actually extremely dubious Regional Arab coordination, care should be 
directed to driving relations between the Sub-regions and the Region 
in such a way by which available opportunities should be exploited 
optimally on the light of Chapters 6 and 9's findings. This is also 
necessary given the external impact on the Sub-regions and the Region 
of the superpowers and transnational companies, as noted in Chapters 6 
and 9. (4) 
AGS Common Characteristics and Cooperation: 
The AGS satisfy the orthodox criteria of capability to cooperate 
much better than do other Arab groupings. They are contiguous countries 
with great cultural and political affinities. They also, today, 
possess relatively more stable Governments than do most other Arab 
countries. Their sizes, populations, and levels of economic development 
do not make them vastly unequal, except for Saudi Arabia with a con-
siderably larger area, population and economic power which gives her a 
pivotal role within the AGS Sub-region (see Table 12.1)~ Their 
political and ideological affinities also are not dissimilar. Advantage 
has been taken of these circumstances to form the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in order to overcome the basic common security and economic 
problems that are facing them (see also Chapter 5).- -
Timing for Cooperation: 
The per capita income differences among the 'AGS' has not lead 
to basic differences in the productive structures in these countries. 
They all produce and export mainly one commodity group, oil and gas, and 
have found cooperation within the framework of OPEC and OAPEC to be 
generally viable and fruitful. All this facilitates the development 
cooperat;.i.on movt~rnent at present and h> an argument against do lay. 
Table 12.1 
The Saudi Arabian Pivotal Role Indicators within GCC (%) 
Area 
(000 sq. km) 
Agricultural land 
(000 ha.) 
Population 
(mn. - 1978) 
Foreign trade 
. (~ mn. - 1977) 
Oil Production 
(000 bid. - 1981) 
Oil.Reserves 
(bn. barrels) 
GAS Production 
(cu. m. mn. - 1981) 
Gas Res~rves* 
(cu. m. bn.) 
Accumulated Revenues 
(1973-1980 in ~ mn) 
Financial Assets** 
~ billion (1980) 
Foreign Reserves** 
~ billion (1980) 
* Estimated in 1981 
** In December 
(1) 
Total AGS 
2 0 459.597 
1,162 
11.682 
13,215 
273.9 
88,896 
106.974 
31.550 ., 
(2) 
Saudi Arabia 
2 0 150.000 
1,110 
8.229 
9,827 
167.8 
54,082 
324,884 
94.385 
23.437 
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2:1 
ill 
87.4 
95.5 
74 
62.5 
74.4 
61.3 
60.8 
47.8 
66.0 
88.2 
74 .•. 3 
Differences resulting from the current and individual industrial 
developments might make cooperation at a later time more difficult.(5) 
One observer suggests that collective self~reliance can be 
implemented in the following circumstances: 
"Among the members of the Third World as a whole; 
among the regional components having geographical 
proximity; among countries having similarities in 
levels of development and problems among countries 
having common commodities to sell; among countries 
having common problems sharply posed - for example, 
the incidence of debt servicing.'~6) 
Ideological and political divergence which has threatened the 
feasibility of continued functional cooperation among developing 
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countries as illustrated in Chapters 6 and 11(7) does not exist at this 
stage among AGS which are 'like minded' States; ideological and 
political general similarity is in favour of AGS cooperation. This 
also explains the AGS's present reluctance to have Iraq within the GCC. 
The analysis of motivations behind the establishment of the GCC leads 
to the identification of two main dangers which they perceive to 
constitute common problems, these are security problems and the dangers 
of economic dependence on depleting oil and gas resources.(9) Behind 
these lie the other and varied socio-economic and political motivations, 
explored in Chapter 8, which constitute a strong incentive towards 
development cooperation between them. 
It is, also, in practical terms, easier to reach agreement and 
to harmonize policies among six countries than among twenty-two 
partners (as the situation within the Arab League). 
AGS long term development objectives are directed to .achieve real 
and secured income growth within their socio-cultural and id~ological 
framework. The diversification of their economic base and resource 
income is the process necessary for generating their development 
directed to face the non-oil era. We have to examine these processes 
having in mind at the same time both conceptual and practical frameworks 
493 
derived from other developing countries' experiencep as examined in 
Chapter 11. It is important to note the following before proceeding 
to design a pragmatic approach for AGS' Sub-regional development 
cooperation. 
1. While the AGS Sub-region is one of the most wealthy global Sub-. 
regions Hi relation to monetary GNP and per capita -GNP. howeverp -it 
remainsp at the same time one of the poorest world's Sub~regionsp in 
its human .and natural resources (see Part One) • 
. 2. The Sub-regional economy of the AGS is one of the most limited 
in the whole worldp in terms of development achievements in real 
economic terms and indicators (see Chapter 4). 
3. The AGS seem to have one of the highest Sub-regional proportions 
of foreign economic inputs in its development activities as refiected 
clearly in their international economic relations (see Chapter 7). 
Sub-regional cooperation has therefore to be handled very delicately, 
otherwise it might be disruptive instead of being constructive. 
4. The AGS Sub-region whilst being characterized by common economic 
development needs, constraints and prospects is distinctively different 
from any other Sub-region of the Arab region or region within the third 
world. For example, whilst economic integration in LAFTA could be only 
achieyed through. the m~imu~~ absorp.ti"on · of ·:foreign capital,:. minimal 
. . 
. participation from Governments with integration matrily bas~-d o~ priva:t;~ .. · 
initiativep this associated with the use of tariff instruments as the 
most effective for regional cpoperation, none of these principles •. or 
instruments nor the whole approach of cooperation being followed seem 
to be of relevance to AGS development needs.(10) 
5. AGS constraints on development are more or less uniform in the 
Sub-region. Without potential new resources and because major industrial-
ization programmes other than petrochemical can only be of relatively 
limited range and strength in the absence of any sound base for 
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extensive integrated industrial complexes, the expected development 
achievements within the Sub-region are expected to be relatively modest, 
and not to affect fundamentally the key strategic development activities. 
A proposed viable approach for Sub-regional cooperation must therefore 
not,be cast in exaggerated terms as will be seen in Section 12.5 of 
this Chapter. 
12.3 AGS and the Trade Approach to Cooperation (see also Chapter 11) 
Since any AGS Sub-regional cooperation operates in an environment 
quite different from that of Western Europe in which the EEC was 
established in 1957, we might expect that the integration process would 
also be different. For example, the European assumption based on earlier 
experience was that integration would commence at a low level through 
free trade and then by the process of politicization, gradually move 
through higher levels until a final stage of complete economic union 
has been reached. For many reasons such a progression is unlikely 
to occur in the AGS Sub-region, one primary reason being that the least 
advanced form of integration, a free trade area corresponding to the 
laissez-faire model, cannot promote development in an area where the 
base for intra-regional trade is very weak. It can also be held that 
free trade area, or a customs union with free trade policies, is 
inevitably bound to lead to spatially uneven growth and development. 
If market forces are allowed to operate freely they will tend to 
strengthen the advantages of the more developed activities sectors or 
projects (although in the EEC regional development policies to some 
extent counteract this). However, market forces are not the main 
engine for the development of AGS.economies in the current stage but 
rather State planned or programmed development-oriented policies. 
The irrelevance of the trade approach to the development of AGS 
cooperation can be demonstrated as follows: 
1. ·As is ·accepted in the literature on econQmic integration: 
"the smaller the existing external trade with non-
union members, the smaller the trade diversion 
effect will be. Whether integration is beneficial or 
not depends on the balance between the trade creation 
and trade diversion effects of the arrangements."(ll) 
There appears to be little reason for expecting benefits from 
trade approach through a customs union between the AGS, as the trade 
between these countries has not been impeded by tariffs, but rather by 
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the structure of their economies which produce the same primary products, 
and have a low level of industrialisation. 
The following foreign trade structure reflects this analysis 
and shows the weakness of trade approach by AGS Cooperation Movement 
(see also Chapter 6). 
- AGS inter-Sub-reg~onal trade was 3.9 percent of their foreign trade 
in 1977. 
- AGS inter-Sub-regional exports was 2.9 percent of their total 
exports in 1977. 
- AGS inter-Sub-regional imports was 6 percent of their total imports 
in 1977. 
We can summarise the position as follows: 
(a) AGS inter-Sub-regional trade is composed mainly of re-exports 
(commodities originally produced abroad). 
The same conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of why Saudi 
Arabia relies on some other AGS in importing parts of its needs, in 
particular illustrating the fact that most of Saudi imports from the 
Gulf States are of origins external to the Sub-region for the following 
reasons: ( 12 ) 
- Historic trade relations with AGS. 
Continuing deficiency of Saudi-Gulf Port~ in handling Lhe bulk of 
imports. 
- Most shipping companies prefer to unload their shipment into the 
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most efficient ports with the best facilities provided. 
- Most importing, trade, shipping and insurance companies are very 
well established in other AGS, thus Saudi traders are encouraged to 
arrange their imports through them. 
- Imports from countries with which Saudi Arabia does not have trade 
relations are implemented through AGS. 
- Inefficiency and lack of trade information among Saudi traders. 
(b) Low production capacity and its limited range lead to the weakness 
of trade relations. The Gulf countries need more to create trade 
opportunities rather to free existing trade. 
(c) The agricultural base is formidably weak, thus agricultural 
production and trade in agricultural or food products seem to have very 
little growth opportunities, despite the existence of limited trade 
exchange in fisheries. 
(d) The basic drive towards industrialization has been shown to be 
centred on export oriented industries directed to international markets, 
rather than to Sub-regional or Regional markets. 
(e) Industries planned on the basis of import substitution are similar 
in nature and designed to meet national needs. 
(f) There is very little complementarity in the production and trade 
structure of AGS at present. 
All above mentioned reasons tend to support the conviction of the 
non-viability of trade-oriented approach to AGS case.-
The trade approach moreover implies, even if not explicitly stated, 
necessarily comprehensive cooperation. Common action over external and 
o~vU 
inter-regional trade, inevitably invalues a group in tariff protection 
and common action in finance, prices and factors of production movement. 
A development oriented partial approach can exclude parts of the economies 
of the participating countries while concentrating on these sectors, 
activitien or rn·o.iects of strateg.ic development importance. Such partial 
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cooperation may include anything from cultural agreement to joint 
ventures or projects, and does not necessarily demand (although it will 
allow and encourage) more and more comprehensive integration activities. 
Thus, whilst trade plays the basic role in a comprehensive 
approach, it plays a subordinate role or may not even be present in 
the partial approach. 
The comprehensive approach, which depends on market forces to 
increase efficiency and specialization potentials among industries and 
other activities of the participating countries through the play of 
relatively free competition, is most appropriate for such developed 
Regions or Sub-regions as the EEC where industrial development had 
already achieved a progressive stage with the existence of active 
enterpreneurship that could make the best use of the opportunities created 
by larger markets. 
In the developing countries, and this is particularly applicable 
on AGS where Governments and the public sector are the leading force 
behind development activities through the planning and programming 
of dominant State revenues, and where the private sector is characterized 
by a hesitant and non-adventurous drive within the national economies 
and with a particular reluctance towards productive investment within 
the Sub-regional circle, (given other more immediately profitable 
outlets) it is not logical to assume the applicability of the trade 
approach to the AGS' situation. 
It can also be held that backwash effects are stronger than spread 
effects with a trade oriented approach in developing countries,as 
illustrated by the EAC example (Chapter 11). 
The value of cooperation in trade-relationships is more likely to 
appear in the Regional and International circles, with mutual benefit to 
the AGS Sub-region and its partners. Comprehensive trade cooperation 
will only be feasible and beneficial when structural development changes 
are achieved within the Sub-region and Region although the path to 
such achievement may necessitate some selective and partial cooperative 
trade policies (see Chapter 11). 
12.4 The Development-Oriented Approach 
Cooperation or Integration for AGS: 
As we have noted, many relevant development studies have warned 
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of the disintegrative effects of premature or over-ambitious integration. 
The use of the term 'integration' might therefore be misleading 
especially as it inappropriately portrays the great range of areas of 
meaningful and feasible cooperation open to groups of developing 
countries. 
This seems to be borne out by the many actual examples of Sub-
regional or Regional economic attempts at integration, whether in Africa, 
Asia, the Caribbean or Latin America now found in various degrees of 
serious crisis, of stagnation or in the process of disassociation.(13) 
The Arab Region seems to have had several unfortunate experiences with 
this type of approach, as became clear in Chqpter 6. 
More feasible arrangements for implementation Sub-regionally are 
those which are selective or even experimental in nature, without 
total or permanent commitment especially at early stages of cooperation. 
The cooperation rather .than the integration approach seems to lend itself 
best to these demands, particularly because integration involves the 
surrende~ by member States of individual discriminatory general powers 
and the creation of supra-national central group institutions. Two 
particular factors in the AGS Sub-region tend to strengthen this 
approach; the first relates to the tribalism which prevails strongly 
within the Sub-region and by its nature and spirit stands against solid 
group commitments. The second can be described as psychological; that 
is the fear felt by the smaller countries of the dominance of larger 
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ones. The Saudi Arabian 'pivotal role' indicated earlier, and the 
greater developmental experience and financial power of Kuwait has 
led in other countries to a state of suspicion. This explains, for 
example, the Omani disinclination to sign any firm economic agreement 
with Saudi Arabia or any other AGS, as illustrated in Chapter 5. 
AGS Governments are not expected to be willing to delegate 
national authority to supra-national institutions. This reluctance 
is compounded by the fact that intra-Sub-regional activity constitutes 
but a very small proportion of most AGS total external economic trans-
actions. Governments will not undertake policy harmonisation for the 
sake of furthering Sub-regional cooperation if there is a possibility 
that this may adversely affect what are perceived as more important 
relations with extra Sub-regional partners. Furthermore, the newly 
independent AGS are naturally hesitant about any regional arrangement 
that implies a permanent restraint on their recently acquired sovereign 
rights. 
There is therefore a more positive response to partial Sub-
regional cooperation, rather than to comprehensive integration schemes. 
The cautious attitude towards regional cooperation caused by the 
perception of many failures in other developing regions as well as in 
the Arab world seems to. be creating a general trend in the AGS welcoming 
Sub-regional arrangements that do not imply a permanent general commit-
ment. Without any previous long experience in cooperation at Sub-
regional or R~gional level appears to make it necessary for the AGS 
to go through a learning phase during which the advantages of economic 
cooperation are clearly demonstrated through practical achievements 
on a sectoral basis. It seems that only after this phase will more 
comprehensive and permanent integration policies have a chance of 
acceptance. 
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That acceptance of quite far-reaching and comprehensive cooperation, 
of a kind which could be termed integration, will be ultimately 
necessary if AGS's development aspirations are to be satisfied, seems 
unavoidable in the light of our earlier analysis. At present, sGmething 
much less comprehensive and more pragmatic is possible and desirable. 
Specific goals have to be relatively modest and achievable. despite 
their longer term significance in that as beneficial results are 
obtained there would be positive feedbacks encouraging moves to more 
ambitious cooperative involvement. 
In this setting. and henceforth in this thesis, the term 'cooperation' 
with regard to the AGS will be held to mean 'partial development-
oriented cooperation within an integratory realm'. 'Integratory realm' 
implies that pragmatic, selective cooperative activities. and their 
implementation policies and instruments, will hot be an 'ad hoc' 
assortment but have a significant content of integratory effects and 
increasingly be selected to strengthen a movement towards even more 
beneficial, more comprehensive cooperation for development. 
This approach also allows cooperating countries to use integratory 
instruments of policy, usually regarded as appropriate to comprehensive 
cooperation, at this partial and selective level. For example, the 
liberalisation of trade, of the movement of factors of production and a 
variety of fiscal or other economic instruments can be used partially 
and selectively for limited specific purposes to encourage-the 
success of joint development projects. 
There is no great urge towards political unity among the AGS 
and·, has noted in Part One, these countries are in many different stages 
of economic growth and economic strength. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
in different ways. are the current leaders. whilst Bahrain and Oman 
are the weakest. However, the course of development history proves that 
this position could change over time, leading to different relative 
economic growth achievements. Such situation calls for cautious 
programmed cooperation instead of integration as more likely to 
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achleve equitable benefits, and thus pushing the drive of cooperation 
movement further towards a later integratory movement. Such collaborative 
endeavours could provide valuable learning experiences for national 
leaders and training grounds for the administrators and technical 
staff needed for joint institutions. 
12.4.1 Planned or Programmed Cooperation 
There is a strong theoretical base behind the idea of 
comprehensive planning harmonization, as an instrument by which many 
of the key issues of cooperation can be treated efficiently, and for 
securing equitable distribution of costs and benefits. The balanced 
inclusion of all inter-related sectors, it is maintained, is how 
regional development can be realized. However, the lessons of 
experience, illustrated in the preceding chapter, in addition to the 
specific situation relating to develop~ent planning in the AGS, seem 
rather to justify partial planned or programmed activities for the 
following reasons. 
1. At the planning level it has to be admitted that the AGS has an 
inadequate technical capability for overall planning (see also Chapters 
2 and 4): 
AGS performance in intermediate and long range development planning 
is poor. 
Plan implementation is rarely followed up seriously. 
-The technical base for development planning remains poor. Feasibility 
studies are frequently delayed or incomplete, and project supervision 
is often inadequate. 
Existing statistical compilations are not adequate for good planning. 
The private sector and strategic investment sectors are excluded from 
planning control in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
- Various deficiencies in the AGS planning machinery should be treated 
as of top priority efforts to enable them to handle matters of Sub-
regional or Regional nature in the future. 
2. At the strategic policy level as Dell in discussing the situation 
in Latin America, which also seems to be applicable on AGS, argued: 
"It would be an error to wait upon the elaboration 
of a fully consistent set of goals for all sectors 
within a comprehensive framework. It would be much 
better to begin immediately by setting targets for 
the strategic sectors and by adopting the measures 
required for their achievements. This should not 
prevent work on more thoroughgoing lines from being 
initiated." (14) 
Abdellatif El-Hamd also recognised the problem: 
"We should be realistic, what is required is not the 
coordination of economic plans, but we need to create 
the opportunities for cooperation." (15) 
Although AGS planning capability is at present limited, because 
as noted earlier there is in AGS preparedness to carry forward some 
cooperative activities, and because as argued in this thesis there are 
grounds for believing that a partial and selective approach is most 
appropriate in any case, it is not therefore necessary to wait until 
hypothetically ideal overall planning machinery is ready. Discussion 
of joint projects can even now be examined by joint sectoral committees 
involving national planning groups. (16) Project harmonisation with 
national dev~lopment plans can and must begin, one of the lessons to 
be learnt from the Mekong project (see Chapter 11, section 11.3.2 and 
Ref. 17). As with ASEAN planners, those technically responsible for 
national development plans in the AGS would obtain considerable benefit 
from regular discussion of such harmonisation. In other words, the 
practice of cooperative planning should be just as pragmatic and 
practical as the type of approach being outlined. 
12.4.2 Summary to Approach 
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Based on preceding analysis and argument the approach proposed here 
for development cooperation within AGS Sub-region is a 'Programmed, 
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Partial, Development-oriented approach within an integratory realm. 
Although aims at the beginning should be modest and centred in specific 
areas or projects in the short and medium term, these should be 
designed and chosen for their contribution to long term development 
perspectives as well as to the cooperative movement itself. Such an 
approach is totally antithetical to the theoretical demands to establish 
a Gulf Common Market,(l8) as mentioned in many studies, or calling for 
Gulf Economic Union as proposed by El~Naggar.(l9) Although El-Naggar 
accepts the unsuitability of a trade approach to AGS cooperation 
(including only five AGS, without Saudi Arabia) thus dismissing common 
market and customs Union instruments of policy, he proposes economic 
union ignoring the fact that Union is the last stage of economic 
integration in, and ·which demands a trade-oriented approach. 
The author of this thesis finds the trade-oriented approach 
misleading and unviable for developing countries including the AGS 
Sub-region. The GCC economic agreement as documented in Appendix I has 
been formulated, nominally at least, on the basis of trade-oriented 
approach. Despite the GCC interest in various development activities 
which were included within it, there is still no agreement on the type 
of joint development activities which should occupy priorities within 
the whole cooperative process. The GCC agreement as it stands tends to 
gui-de AGS towards common market type objectives and policies, partly 
- -
because of the misunderstanding of the common market approach which prevails 
among top senior GCC officials. This is reflected in the Assistant 
Secretary General for GCC economic affairs, Dr. Abdullah El Quwaiz's 
statement to the UAE newspaper, Al-Bayan: bn replying to a question about the 
possibility of following EEC approach in the GCC's economic agreement's 
aim of achieving Gulf common market he said that: 
"We don't like to follow the EEC because it is 
complicated, has a long regulations and because 
competition prevails between its member countries."(20) 
At the same time Quwaiz paradoxically approves of these measures within 
the GCC which reflect the process of following the same EEC approach. 
"A study is being undertaken to build up a unified 
customs wall towards the outside world, in 
implementation of the GCC economic agreement."(21) 
The writer of this thesis believes that such misjudgement is at the 
root of the GCC agreement and is convinced of the AGS' need to reshape 
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their economic agreement. As is later emphasized, this must be within the 
trilateral approach referred to in this study, and be partial and 
selective in listing the priorities for cooperation in a thoroughly 
pragmatic and realistic way. The opportunities are there, as examined 
in the next section. 
12.5 Sub-regional Key Opportunities for Development Cooperation 
Theoretical and practical lessons of cooperation experience, the 
facts relating to current development achievements, structural constraints, 
and the basic AGS drive towards creating a sound base for the post-
oil lead logically to the identification of these opportunities for 
creating s~ch a base. Before we examine these mainly on a sectoral 
basis, two key opportunities which are not usually recognised should be 
noted. 
First the 'Finance Industry', through which AGS could, formally, 
in cooperation, gain more than it is now doing of profound experience 
in the play of money - short term financing placement activities, as well 
as in the play of capital - long term financing and investment. Taking 
Regional as well as International circles as the field of operations two 
main objectives could be achieved. First, the building up a strong 
development base through acquiring and gaining highly technical expertise 
in the financial sector, which already has a central but uncoordinated role 
in the development of AGS. Second, contributing much more effectively 
than at present to the creation of a diversified base of economy and 
income through the promising investment opportunities for AGS within 
the Regional and International circles. 
Secondly, much greater coordinated attention could be directed 
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to qualitative joint activities including the infrastructural base in its 
broad sense (e.g. administration, environmental, research, science 
and technology and other human affairs). This direction is motivated 
by the following: 
1. The heart of the development movement must be the human being 
who is the objective of and the means to development. Such joint 
activities on a Sub-regional scale could improve the quality of life 
and opportunities for AGS inhabitants. At the same time such activities 
make a vital impact on the provision of the needed highly motivated 
class of leadership and entrepreneurs to energise the development 
movement whilst also creating the needed productive base for all 
development, human capability. 
An emphasis on non-material, non-directly productive activities, 
in the AGS appears to be, at the present time the greatest real need 
for given Sub-regional development objectives, opportunities and 
limitations. 
Whilst within the Sub-region a qualitative approach is being 
recommended, a complementary quantitative approach for development could 
be applied to the Regional circle as analysed in Chapter 9 and will be 
applied in Chapter 13. The quantitative approach means here basically 
joint productive activities. 
This approach is in disagreement with the fundamentally, and 
we believe, mistaken approach made by many attempts to promote 
integration among developing countries though concentration on 
industrialization as the main driving force for development. Patel 
rightly indicated, there is a: 
"tendency to think too much in terms of economies of 
scale in relation to industrialization - as distinct 
from agriculture, development of common resources such 
as rivers, or of facilities such as scientific research, 
training, transport, power generation and financial 
institutions."(22) 
Patel is certain as is the present author that the pooling of 
demand and resources applies to all these latter areas as much as to 
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industrialization, and a healthy and rapid development of other sectors 
and the efficient utilisation of resources are necessary anyway if 
healthy and rapid industrialization process is to be sustained. (23) 
Potential Sub-regional cooperative activities for development 
do not, of course, end there. In Section 12.5.1 some examples are given 
of a range of joint activities which should have priority in AGS 
development, in its long-term perspective and in harmony with the 
adopted approach. 
These illustrations include sectoral activities relating to 
industrial development, science and technology, fisheries resourc.es 
development,human resources development, development administration 
machinery and financial and monetary activities. 
12.5.1 Cooperation in Industry 
The direction which has been followed by the Gulf Organisation 
for Industrial Consultancy, as sectoral partial cooperation machinery, 
seems, in principle, to be one of the encouraging examples characterising 
current development cooperation among Arab Gulf States. It is also 
wholly in tune with the pragmatic partial development oriented approach 
of this thesis. Industrial development of the Arab Gulf States even 
with Sub-regional cooperation is still likely to have modest results, 
as noted earlier; however, the Organisation for Industrial Consultancy 
could optimise these results given certain directions: 
1. It Bhould undertake more and more programming of AGS industrial 
development by a concentration on possible strategic joint industrial 
projects. 
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2. More concentration should be directed by the organisation towards 
qualitative activities linking industrial development with related 
human resources development, that is strengthening the base of 
industrial science and technology, research and training facilities in 
the light of preceding analysis in Chapters 8-10. International 
cooperation rather than Regional cooperation seem to be needed in these 
fields. Studying and surveying the AGS needs in these areas should be 
given urgent priority, as they are not seen in the list of the 
organisation's studies. It is important to stress here, that whilst 
opportunities for industrial development even in the aggregated Sub-
region are limited by small markets and scanty resources, the continuing 
parallel and competing trend of nationally establishing similar projects 
as steel plants, petrochemicals, fertilizers, cement and other industries 
effectively make this Sub-regional circle even more limited. Present 
trends are economically suicidal. 
3. The organisation if it is to be directed to serve more effectively 
the drive towards the industrialization of Arab Gulf States must not 
ignore the wider potential offered by the Regional approach for 
cooperation, as illustrated in Chapter 9. Thus it could study the 
feasibility of joint agro-industries directed to meet the region's needs, 
in the light of a regionally integrated approach to development (see 
also Chapter 13). Coordination between this organisation and the centre 
of Arab Industrial Development within the-Arab league is vital in this 
respect.A Special section dealing with coordination between the Sub-
region and the Region is proposed within the (GOIC) organisation structure. 
The above proposed direction for Sub-regional industrialization 
necessitate~ also, cooperation within trilateral approach. 
12.5.2 Cooperation in Science and Technology 
The current situation in the AGS is characterized by two main 
features, the first relating to the basic structural constraints examined 
in Chapter 4; second, to a stage of development in which an emphasis 
on qualitative development is required instead of Gn quantitative 
development as has prevailed in the past two decades.(24) 
In such a situation science and technology seem to play a key role in 
meeting future aspirations in diversifying AGS economies, improving 
the quality-of social services and reducing the extent of dependence 
on foreign manpower (see Chapter 10). 
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Technology as an important input and determinant for the development 
of AGS has been reflected in science and technology based sectors such 
as petrochemical industries, sea water desalination plants, oil 
refineries, agriculture, telecommunications and solar energy. 
According to a report compiled by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, 
the contribution of science and technology during the period 1970-75 
accounted for around 10-15 percent of the overall increase in national 
income, the remainder being attributable to the increased employment 
of labour and capital.(25) 
Despite some application of science and technology in all countries 
of AGS to varying degrees, there remain some problem areas in which 
there has continued to be limited application of scientific techniques, 
for example, water resources and the management of fishery resources.(26) 
The establishment of national and Sub-regional scientific and 
technological centres still is an urgent requirement. Sub-regional 
intensive programmes in applied research and development-seem to be one 
of the most feasible cooperation activities centred on resource evaluation, 
management and monitoring, e.g. of oil, natural gas, solar energy, 
fresh water and water desalination, fishery resources and nature 
conservation including pollution. Despite Sub-regional need ioYthese 
activities, efforts should not be confined within it but extend to the 
Regional (e.g. OAPEC) as well as the International circle (OECD countries 
and U.N.). This is one reason why Oman, the only AGS not a member of 
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OAPEC, should formally participate in OAPEC activities. 
12.5.3 Fisheries Cooperation 
The potentials for fisheries development cooperation in the AGS 
are considerable as noted in Chapters 1 and 5. Whilst the waters 
adjacent to the AGS are wealthy in fish including three groups of high 
value in international markets, shrimps, tuna and cuttlefish, the fishery 
resources has been subject to intensive over exploitation, as seen in 
Chapter 5. 
For this reason especially, cooperation in fisheries should be 
centred on infrastructural research and development activities rather 
than immediately on productive activities for the following reasons: 
Oman which nationally has the wealthiest fishery resource has 
shown slight interest in joint productive projects, regarding fisheries 
as lying within sensitive areas of sovereignty involving security. 
Many proposals submitted for establishing a joint fisheries fishing 
fleet, mainly by Kuwait and the Arab Union for Fish producers (Baghdad) 
were not accepted by Oman which preferred to establish its own national 
fisheries joint stock company. Oman even preferred to have contracts 
with Japanese and foreign companies on an ad-hoc but national controllable 
basis rather enter a firm Sub-regional commitment.(27) 
A study of the results of the UN fisheries survey and development 
project (see Chapter 5) to estimate the feasibility of exploitation within 
the project area by a joint trawling fleet found- that: 
"the operating profits calculated were very small even 
although the costs of shore installations and of the 
marketing of catches, have not taken into account ••. 
the operation seems to be not attractive commercially." (28) 
Also the study recommended that: 
"The most promising choices could be tested on a small 
scale (four or five vessels) for two or three years 
before a final decision is made on a large programme 
of investment."(29) 
The same report concluded that: 
"Consideration of investment in large scale trawling 
on the Gulf should await the results of closer studies 
than have been possible up to now on the extent to 
which demersal trawling operations will interfere 
with existing art.isanal methods of capture, and to 
what extent the one is likely to replace the other."(30) 
What is clear is that whilst one promising area is the 
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strengthening and modernization of the artisanal fleets, cooperation in 
fisheries development should be centred around research, training and 
development of artisanal as well as commercial fisheries. The 
establishment at Dubai of a Sub-regional Marine Research Centre is 
consistent with the needed approach (see Chapter 5- Complementary proposals). 
12.5.4 Cooperation on Human Resources Development 
The development of all the AGS faces a severe constraint due to 
scarce labour force supply in relation to demanded needs of development 
activities (Chapters 1 and 9}. Investment in human resources, particularly 
in education and training should therefore have top priority in AGS' 
development cooperation. Joint efforts should be directed to build up 
skilled manpower within joint programmes directed to meet the development 
needs of AGS in various fields. 
Investment in human capital receives less attention in the economic 
literature on absorptive capacity in comparison with material investment.(31) 
Given the state of under-development of human resources and given 
abundant capital in the AGS, one can safely say that additional investment 
in human capital is likely to yield high returns. 
"The distinction between material investment and 
investment in human capital is unsatisfactory because 
it tends to compartmentalize the economy by not taking 
a comprehensive approach to the problem of investment. 
If such a view of investment is adopted, namely one 
that includes investment in human capital, the general 
absorptive capacity would be significantly larger, for 
not only more funds would be channelled into the 
development of human resources but also the scope for 
the productive application of capital would rise in the 
commodity sectors themselves. 11(32) 
Largest investment in manpower, thus, comes to be consistent with other 
demands on finances, not only to meet real long term needs of the 
post-oil era, but also in the short and medium term. 
"Given the frugality of natural endowments outside 
the oil sector, man is the only resource that can be 
developed substantially,"(33) 
and creating high-level skills is probably the soundest direction 
that development could take. 
Attention is already beginning to be paid to the question of 
human resources development (HRD) within AGS. The Saudi Third FYP, for 
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example, stated in the preamble to Chapter 5, 'Human resources Development' 
that: (34) 
"the development of Saudi human resources stands 
at the heart of the development process." 
Education and training are seen to be valuable in their own right, 
but the objective of improving quality is accompanied by another which 
stresses the need to make the system more responsive to the needs of 
the economy (5.2.3.1). The expansion and improvement of the work at 
general education level by the Ministry of Education and the Presidency 
for Girl's Education will take almost 60 percent of the expenditure on 
human resources development, and higher education a further 33 percent 
of a total of SR 130 billion.(35) 
Despite such evidence of the realization of the importance of HRD, 
there is however, some question of the extent and depth of real will 
existing within AGS circles. Field experience illustrates continuing 
inadequacies and difficiencies which exist with1n the current structure 
and need to be tackled. 
1. While very high percentage of general illiteracy still prevails 
(see Chapters 1 and 4) concentration is directed mostly towards higher 
education including prestigaous and westernized universities.(36) 
The Sub-regional Fisheries Training Centre in Kuwa.i t is a good example 
on a misplanned project which is directed to serve non-existing middle 
class fisheries trainees (Chapter 5), whilst the other groups which 
are in dire need of training, artisanal fishermen and fisheries 
development administrators, were ignored. 
2. Despite the nominal inclusion of training inputs into joint 
ventures' agreements, the AGS seem not to follow up effective 
implementation and consequently missed many opportunities put before 
them. 
3. Female participation rate in the AGS labour force is one of the 
lowest in the world and more serious efforts should be directed towards 
the development of women's inclusion into the development movement. 
4. Trade-oriented attitudes widespread among AGS citizens as well 
as the preference which is given to prestigious Government jobs, 
several are a basic constraint towards HRD. Several opportunities 
which have been put before AGS Governments and private institutions 
for training and education are missed because these attitudes. 
5. The {henomenon of idleness also widespread particularly within AGS 
Government bodies, applies especially to national citizens and is 
caused by a reliance on imported labour and skills to run operations, 
while citizens tend only to maintain the prestigious seniority titles 
and exercise only the "act of signature". This also lessens the 
effectiveness of HRD intentions. Special measures and means should 
be adopted to make the best use of and transferring capabilities from 
imported expertise to the local citizens. 
In all, HRD is not merely a matter of nominal realization and 
subsequent expenditure, it is an act of real will based on the deep 
evaluation of the needed structural changes in the human behaviour, 
attitude and quality followed by patient and serious efforts. 
12.5.5 Cooperation for Marine Environment Conservation 
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Cooperation on marine environment conservation which began between 
the AGS and two other countries bordering the Gulf (Iraq and Iran) and 
the Kuwaiti Plan of Action seem to apply to one of the most needed 
joint activities. The nature of various parts of the marine pollution 
problem is Sub-regional if not Regional as the extent of the problem 
is determined by all countries which are jointly liable for and to 
the threats of polluted areas and it is these countries who should 
stand together to tackle the problem, otherwise their individual 
efforts will turn into complete failure. 
A joint programme of action is one of top priority within the 
Gulf Sub-region considering that the threat of pollution to the marine 
environment from deliberate or accidental release of noxious material 
from cargo ships and tankers has become more serious and critical 
every day. Other contributing factors to the pollution problem include 
the increasing discharge of untreated sewage and industrial effluents 
and the use of the seabed for oil and mineral exploration and 
exploitation. It should be stressed, furthermore, that harmful effects 
of pollution extend seriously to human health and wellbeing including 
industrial establishments, and the general pollution effects on the 
marine ecosystem. 
Joint effort covering the integrated needs that constitute a Sub-
regional coordinated effort should be enforced in the light of the 
recent efforts which have been taken by these countries in cooperation 
with the UN (see Chapter 5 0 section 5.4.5). 
The Kuwait plan of action call for the-setting-up of a-Sub-
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regional Marine Pollution Centre (Chapter 5 and Ref. 37) is found to be of 
necessity and is in harmony with the needed qualitative development 
activities within the Sub-region. Such joint effort will contribute 
to improve the human quality as well as the productive quality within 
the Sub-region and preserving the marine resources which are badly needed 
for a Sub-region that depend6nearly completely on a developing oil and 
gas resource. 
514 
The proposed centre should include various components of needed 
activities such as the collection and distribution of information 
concerning oil spills to all participating countries, coordinating the 
monitoring of spills and location of them, the use of satellites and 
remote sensing devices could be made available for such work. The 
development and encouragement of technological cooperation and training 
programmes for combating oil and industrial pollution are of special 
relevance to the proposed centre activities; Sub-region seminars to 
stimulate cooperation in the implementation of Sub-regional proposals 
are also needed. 
It is very clear from the above needed activities that the 
accumulated experience and expertise of developed countries is needed 
and UN machinery's direct involvement in this process has been a vital 
fact. This situation emphasises the role of cooperation at the 
international level in Sub-regional activities. 
12.5.6 Cooperation on Development Planning Administration 
It is this weriter's belief that inefficient Government machinery, 
in all AGS, constitutes one of the most important problems that are 
facing both cooperation and development. This, in addition to the 
severe lack of statistics and information as examined in detail in 
Part 1, requires that a Sub-regional programme is established to develop 
planning machinery in particular and Government administration in general 
and to build up a strong statistical information base. The proposal to 
establish a Sub-regional data bank falls within this context: 
"where the State apparatus is too weak to control ••• 
the operations of productive activities, in accordance 
with the stipulation of an integrative move, the basis 
for cooperation may be safely said to be lacking."(38) 
(and see Chapters 2 and 4) 
The following measures are proposed for the AGS aiming at 
coordinating the base for formulating plans and strengthening planning 
machinery at the same time. It should be stressed that the proposed 
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measures are taken to mean essentially a preliminary effort towards 
planning coordination which could be adopted in future stages of 
cooperation. Such measures in any case make possible the harmonisation 
of Sub-regional activities within individual countries' development 
plans. 
1. To work out a common starting date and duration for their 
development plans; this situation is already followed, unintentionally, 
by S. Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and as announced in the UAE for the 
current FYD plan {1980-85). 
2. Unifying the system of data and national statistics tabulation 
and in a periodic manner, preferably through a specialized statistical 
organ in the GCC or one of its affiliate organizations. 
3. To establish the broad skeleton and sequence of basic information 
to be contained in development plans in order to facilitate future 
comparisons and coordination of plans. 
4. To give attention to project evaluation, to provide detailed 
information about future projects, to standardize the data concerning 
these projects, and to indicate whenever possible in the plans to what 
extent a future project would be dependent on Sub-regional Arab and 
international markets for inputs or output. 
5. To train and develop the skills of planners in general and of 
project evaluators in particular, to support and enhance the activities 
of institutes of planning and m~i~gement development, and to increase 
their professional contacts with international competent institutions 
and consultants. 
6. To prepare constitutional and planning studies necessary to 
reconcile the national sovereignty of each State with the interest of 
the Sub-region and Arab region as a whole. 
The urgent need for the build-up of a strong data and information 
platform for the Sub-region has been emerging all along from this 
research analysis. Many basic gaps still exist involving various 
activities from weather studies, marine studies, resource surveys 
on water, agriculture to industrial, human resources and labour force 
and balance of payments statistics. 
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This results, therefore, in the need to adopt a joint programme 
within the Sub-region to be directed to achieve a strong data and 
information platform which will improve the quality of needed studies 
for sound planning, sound policies, and Sub-regionally based feasibility 
studies would be vastly improved both for national and Sub-regional 
needs. The proposed approach to achieve this objective begins with 
a common assessment of the existing data and information base, 
identifying existing gaps in each of the economic, social and 
technical sectors, identifying needed information and surveys for each 
country and for the Sub-region. The drawing up of a joint programme 
to build up the needed base, including various components of the process, 
could end with the establishment of a Sub-regional data bank, staff 
and training in addition to the needed expertise. UN, international 
as well as Regional bodies could be of special help in this process. 
A final note should be mentioned here; despite the severe lack of avail-
able information and data within the Sub-region, however, there are 
a large amount of studies, surveys, maps, reports and researches that 
exist but are kept unavailable and unused in the drawers of national 
as well as international institutions. This matter necessitates an 
intensive effort that could be done by the GCC secretariat:-: and other 
sectoral bodies, within individual countries as well as other Sub-
regional bodies, to collect all existing available data and information, 
thus bringing to light these studies which have disappeared into 
darkness. 
12.5.7 Cooperation on Financial and Monetary Affairs 
As we have already noted the financial and monetary sector is the 
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main engine and driving force behind national development within AGS. 
Here we refer to the main elements of this sector's cooperative role, 
while some more detailed examination of its role and supporting factors 
within a trilateral approach will be made in Chapter 14. 
At the beginning it is of vital importance to remember that the 
current stage of AGS development necessitates directing cooperative 
investment strategy with special priority to be given to joint 
qualitative activities and projects within the Sub-region. Such 
investment strategy need to be conducted rather with a view to long-
term projected effects than to short-term effects. This is applicable 
to all that has been noted above and examined in Chapter 5 (human 
resources development, research, training, environment preservation, 
etc. ) • 
The emergence of abundant financial resources has been reflected 
in the rapid development of financial and monetary activities in the 
AGS, with national, bilateral and multilateral projects involved. 
The GCC decision to establish Gulf Investment Authority (GIA) seems 
to be particularly important. The success of GIA depends to a large 
extent on the viability of the approach followed through its investment 
strategy. 
In the light of all preceding findings it can be concluded that 
the GIA should follow a trilateral approach that gives special priority 
to productive activities in agriculture and food production in the Arab 
Region for the reasons mentioned in Chaptem8 and 9 (see also Chapter 13). 
At the same time GIA's main interest while investing within the 
international circle, should be centred on activities which contribute 
to the effective transfer of technology as is laid down in Chapters 10 
and 14, as well as strengthening various qualitative changes needed 
within Sub-region development. This, of course, suborainates the question 
of rate of financial returns in its narrowest and most immediate sense 
to a wider investment vision that considers socio-political as well 
as economic long-term aspects and effects of investment. 
The Emergence of Kuwait as a Sub-regional Financial Centre 
(Chapter 5) : 
Qualitative efforts are strongly needed to build up a solid 
financial expertise which will be capable of managing-efficiently 
the Kuwaiti financial market. Despite the vast development achieved 
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in financial and monetary activities, one can describe it rather as 
quantitative than qualitative growth. Concentrated attention should be 
directed towards the latter, otherwise many dangers will appear. Current 
trends as in the Souq Al-Manakh and post-dated cheque system in the 
stock market encourage speculation rather than serious placement or 
investment. (39) The Kuwaiti stock market could play a vital role, also, 
within the proposed trilateral approach through the mobility of financial 
resources needed for Sub-regional, Regional as well as international 
activities. 
Within the Sub-region, the Kuwaiti growing stock market has 
extended its activities to include some Arab Gulf Companies. Two such 
companies have been licenced since 7 March 1981 to operate within the 
Kuwaiti stock market, the Gulf Company for Estate investment (Ajman UAE) 
and the Gulf Company for Agriculture ~evelopment. Both companies 
have been approved by the Securities Committee. (40) 
The Securities Committee has recently approved-toe conditions-by 
which AGS companies can be licenced to operate their activities within 
Kuwait stock market and these conditions are worth noting: (41) 
1. The company has to be established in any of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council States. 
2. The company should be at least two years old. 
3. An achievement of minimum profits in the Company's last budget 
of 10 percent. 
4. The registered companies should apply all regulations issued by 
the Kuwaiti Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Stock Committee. 
A Consultative Committee has been established to regulate the 
application of these regulations. 
Further notes on Kuwaiti's regional and international r0le is 
given in Chapter 14. 
It is important to refer here to the newly-emerging phenomena of 
Islamic banking, in which s. Arabia has taken the leading role (Chapter 
5). While many challenges face it there have been many signs of the 
movement's growth and the Islamic Development Bank is playing an active 
role in the development of Moslem countries - a Regional as well as 
international approach. The same trilateral approach and investment 
strategy which was proposed for GIA are applicable also to the ISD 
case. 
Bahrain has shown a trend towards specializing in offshore 
banking services, which can be defined as: (42) 
"Places - whether countries, areas, or cities - which 
have made a deliberate attempt to attract international 
banking business (non-resident foreign currency 
denominated assets and liabilities) by reducing or 
eliminating restrictions upon operations as well as 
lowering taxes and/or other levies." 
Bahrain is one from 21 international centres which qualify under this 
definition. 
This striking offshore banking development has been necessarily 
integrated with international financial and money markets over the 
last two decades. Bahrain's offshore banks assets doubled between 
1977 and 1978 in an international monetary environment within which 
offshore banking centres share in the total euro currency market increased 
drastically. 
In 1965 the total euro currency market was estimated at ~ 9 
billion (net) offshore centres accounting for a negligible share of 
this total. By 1978 the euro currency market has grown to ~ 375 billion 
of which the offshore share was i 45 billion. (43) 
Within the Sub-region Bahrain should be given its opportunity 
for more development and specialization in off-shore banking. There 
are some signs, on international level, of little unsatisfied demand 
for new offshore centres. There are even some signs at present of an 
excess supply. 
"·If one looks at the existing geographical coverage 
provided by offshore centres, virtually every area 
of the world has a selection of offshore centres 
readily accessible."(44) 
From a Sub-regional viewpoint it would be wise for AGS even to 
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discourage the appearance of other centres within the area, proliferation 
could lead to destructive competition and the misuse of scarce banking 
expertise. 
Bahrain's emergence as a Sub-regional offshore banking centre 
has depended on monetary activities derived mainly from the Gulf area 
and directed to international markets, this made possible by the off-
shore banks' international experience and cooperation. Here again, 
one observes a linkage between the Sub-region and the Third Circle, 
part of its success due to the international inputs - placements, 
opportunities and expertise. 
Monetary Cooperation: 
Within the context of our proposed pragmatic approach for 
development cooperation, 'A programmed partial development oriented 
cooperation' the question of monetary cooperation seems to fit best in 
the shape of joint banking projects, leaving monetary policy matters, 
exchange rates and currency unification etc. at the present stage of 
consultation only, for the following conceptual and practical reasons: 
1. As Dag Hammars Kjold, the Swedish economist suggested, in monetary 
matters in some respects complete freedom is more binding than agreements.(45) 
2. A survey of literature on monetary and fiscal integration conveys 
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the impression that differences of opinion are more pronounced on 
questions of monetary integration than on matters of trade and development 
integration.( 46) 
"It is quite clear the economic profession has not 
reached a consensus on monetary integration."(47) 
3. Meade, in discussing issues relating to a European Monetary Union, 
warned that a monetary union 
"set up as an objective in its own right would make 
the basic objectives of economic union more 
difficult to attain. 11 (48) 
The successful operation of currency integration presupposes a centrally 
integrated monetary and fiscal policy, coordinated wage flexibility, 
and a highly developed regional policy. Since wage rates are not 
flexible downwards, it would be foolish and disastrous 
"to try to fix exchange rates, either within the union 
or between it and countries outside and thus submit 
to the necessity of monetary deflation to adjust to 
a variety of conditions." (49) 
4. Unified exchange rate which was followed by Qatar and Bahrain for 
only one year, 1977-78 proved the difficulty of maintaining such a 
system. As Fleming warned: 
"That if adherence to a unified exchange rate area 
were found to lead to excessive hardships, reactions 
might ensue leading not only to the abandonment of 
exchange rate unification but even to a rejection of 
other forms of economic integration among participating 
countries."(50) 
Research, training and technological activities of banking system 
seem to be of direct relevance to AGS development needs. Cooperation 
within the international circle (OECD and UN) seems to be important 
here. 
In the light of the above considerations, it may advisable to 
concentrate at this stage on modest achievable proposals for monetary 
cooperation in the Sub-region; the following activities are suggested: 
1. Exchange rate coordination: It may be useful to introduce a 
system of exchanging information and ultimately adopting ground rules 
for movements in exchange rates and the coordination of joint 
positions with regard to the major international monetary issues and 
arrangements. 
2. Introduction of a Clearing System: steps could be taken to 
introduce a clearing system between the Gulf countries to enable mutual 
transactions to take place in national currencies and to settle balances 
periodically, also in national currencies. Though these arrangements 
will have modest effects in the medium term, they can be justified 
by long term benefits. 
3. Coordination in Central Banking: the Central Banks may take 
steps towards the evolution of a common strategy to develop banking 
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in the Sub-region and coordinate central banking policies and practices. 
4. Joint Banking (see also Chapter 5): Recent joint banking ventures 
have proved to be successful, despite the short time which has passed 
since they were established. The Gulf Bank, referred to in Chapter 5, 
rapidly established itself in international monetary and financial 
markets and raised its capital from BD 40 million to BD 100 million. 
Assets in 1980 exceeded 3 billion dollars, realizing profits estimated at 
i 15 million (14% of capital). During 1980 the Bank's total loans 
reached round i 1,132 million. The share of Gulf public and private 
sector companies was i 286 million in addition to Bank subscription's 
in securities of$ 5 million. The Arab countries-received 33~7 percent 
o.f the Bank's loans in 1980. (51) 
Such activities lie within the Industry of Money and Finance 
which is emerging in the Gulf as one of the most promising activities 
which should be supported and further developed. 
The adoption of the above first steps in economic coordination 
among AGS could help create conditionn that may ultimately rnake it 
posH.ible Lo com;ider adopting a more progres:c;:ive approach Lo monetary 
cooperation. 
We may conclude that in on-going cooperation between financial 
authorities, the same practical and pragmatically modest approach is 
advised at this stage of development. At the same time more attention 
should be given within these authorities• joint discussions and 
consultations to the following subjects: 
1. An evaluation of Gulf-Arab and international financial joint 
activities during the seventies and the first part of the eighties 
in order to formulate a new future strategy towards cooperation with 
optimum benefits. 
2. The build-up of financial and monetary expertise in cooperation 
with the regional as well as international institutions. 
3. The strengthening of research, training and technological 
activities within the Sub-region financial and monetary system. 
12.6 Summary and Conclusions 
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We hav~ seen in this chapter how all the factors relevant to AGS 
development cooperation, combine to reinforce the application of the 
partial development-oriented rather than trade-oriented approach, as 
examined in Chapter 11. Given the particular characeristics of the AGS, 
identified earlier, it becomes appropriate to adopt a pragmatic 
cooperation approach within an integratory realm. Such pragmatism 
implies a degree of programming which could enable future movement 
towards a more comprehensive involvement to be more successful. 
Key cooperative activities for development include considerable 
emphasis on qualitative rather than immediately materially productive 
sectors within the Sub-region. This is not to exclude the latter 
sectors, as shown in Chapter 5, but rather to insist that priority of 
effort and in time has to be given to those activities vital for 
structural change. For example, although formal recognition is made by 
some countries of the need for human resource development, actual 
achievements are small, and could be vastly increased by vigorous 
Sub-regional cooperation. 
Moreover, what appears from this argument is that the right 
approach for the AGS is not Sub-regionally introverted but deeply 
involves wider cooperation at Regional and International levels. This 
is especially true in relation to the qualitative activities which are 
seen here as most crucial to AGS' development at this stage. 
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CHAPTER 13 - A CASE STUDY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION - FOOD 
PRODUCTION 
13.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 9 we saw how agricultural factors in general, and food 
security considerations in particular, prompt motivation for AGS 
cooperation within the Regional circle. In Chapter 12 an appropriate 
approach for AGS cooperation within the Three Circles wes~ proposed, 
a 'Programmed development-oriented and partial approach'. The question, 
however, which remains to be answered is whether the proposed approach 
~he 
is in fact applicable to~agricultural sector which proved to be of 
special importance within the Regional cooperative movement, and whether 
the present and on-going cooperation movement shows evidence of being 
in harmony with the proposed approach. 
In replying to these questions this chapter examines a case study 
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on food production cooperation within the Region, in which AGS participate 
significantly. Two main issues have to be covered in order to establish 
the relevance of this case study to the central theme of Regional 
Development Cooperation. The first to be examined is the situation 
with respect to the broad income gap which exists between the two Arab 
groups, oil exporting countries and the non-oil group. The second, is 
the relevance of the proposed approach of development cooperation to 
the agricultural sector, in the light of various options available within 
the Arab Regional circle. Then we proceed to examine a case study with 
respect to the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development's 
(AAAID) programme. 
13.2 Regional Cooperation and the Income Gap 
The development gap between two groups of the Arab World is one of 
the basic challenges facing the Arab Rregional development in the 
eighties(1) and for the foreseeable future. 
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The following indicators illustrate this gap: 
1. Changes in the petroleum situation which occurred during the 
1970's were chiefly responsible for the increase in real National 
Product of the Arab Region. In the 7 Arab member countries of OPEC 
oil production increased from 5,05 billion (thousand million) barrels 
in 1970 to approximately 7,61 billion barrels in 1979, accompanied by 
an increase in the average price of oil from ~ 2.285 per barrel in 1971 
to ~ 24 at the end of 1979. These developments explain, to a large 
extent the achievement of a real rate of annual GDP growth of 12.54 
percent during the period (1970-79) with real per capita income growth 
of 9.34 percent. These achievements are higher than the rates 
achieved either in the developed world or Third World countries. In 
the developed countries the annual rate of GDP growth was between 3 and 
5.5 percent, while it was between 5 and 7.5 in the developing countries 
(excluding the petroleum countries).(2) 
2. Whilst the real annual growth rate of GDP of the Arab oil group 
was 17.3 percent during the seventies, it was 5.7 percent in the Arab non-
oil group. The percentage contribution of the oil group to the total 
Arab GDP has increased from 48.8 percent in 1970 to 70.9 percent in 
1979, whilst its population proportion increased slightly, from 27.10 
percent in 1970 to 28.6 percent in 1979 (Table 1:3.1). 
Table 13.1 
GDP Distribution between Oil and Non-oil Arab Countries (1970, 1979) 
1. GDP (Arab) in ~ million 
- Oil group contribution (%) 
- Non-oil group contribution (%) 
2. Arab Population (million) 
- Oil group population (%) 
- Non-oil group population (%) 
1970 
41,190 
48.8 
51.2 
127.78 
27.10 
72.90 
1979 
119,267 
70.9 
29.1 
157.88 
28.6 
71.4 
Source: El Beblawi, H. 'Petroleum Financial Surpluses and World 
Economic System (setting)', In, Oil and Arab Cooperation, No.4, 
1978, (Arabic), Table no. 10, p. 345. 
3. The income gap between the two Arab groups is larger than the 
average gap between developed and developing countries. Whilst the 
income ratio was about 12:1 between developed and developing countries 
it reached an extreme of 74:1 between the two Arab groups. 
4. While real per capita GDP increased from ~ 610 in 1970 to ~ 1876 
in 1979 (+207.5%) in the petroleum group, it moved from ~ 237 in 1970 
to~ 308 in 1979 (30%). The per capita GDP in the petroleum group 
was 2.6 times that in the non~oil groups in 1970, and·increased to 6.1 
times in 1979. (Table 13.2.) 
5. The average per capita GDP for all Arab countries of ~ 755.43 
in 1979 was higher than that of any of the non-oil countries. The 
highest per capita GDP in 1979 was in the UAE with ~ 7092, 74 times 
that of Somalia with a per capita GDP of only~ 96 (Table 13.3). 
Table 13.2 
GDP and GDP pP-r capita in 1970 prices 
Oil countries 
GDP (~ mn) 
Average growth rate 
Per capita GDP (~) 
Average per capita GDP growth rate 
Other countries 
GDP (~ mn) 
Average growth rate 
Per capita GDP (~) 
Per capita GDP growth rate 
Per capita GDP (oil):(Non-Oil) 
1970 1975 1979 
20,108 62,535 84,588 
25.5 6.2 
610 1,590 1,876 
2.1 4.2 
21,082 29,834 34,679 
7.2 3~8 
237 294 308 
4.4 1.2 
2.6 5.4 6.1 
1970-1979 
17.3 
5.7 
531 
Source: Sadiq, A.T. 'Monetary, Financial Policies and Arab Development 
in the Eighties', In, The Arab Planning Institute, Seminar 
1979/1980 on Arab Development Realms in the Eighties, Kuwait 
Jan. 1981, Table no. 8, p. 418 (Arabic). 
These indicators show the very large wealth-gap which exists 
between two groups of Arab countries. The development of the poorest 
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Table 13.3 
Per Capita GDP at 1970 Prices in :t u.s. 
1970 1975 1979 
AGS 
Bahrain 1,100 1,965 1,479 (5) 
Kuwait 3,588 6,835 6,998 (2) 
Oman 387 1,483 1,015 (6) 
Qatar 3,683 7,324 4,067 (3) 
s. Arabia 625 2,663 3,108 (4) 
UAE 5,463 7,029 7,092 ( 1) 
Other Countries 
Algeria 324 664 769 
Iraq 380 904 1,232 
Libya 2,007 3,917 4,896 
Egypt 277 251 289 
Jordan 212 193 266 
Lebanon 602 743 586 
Muritanya 167 224 200 
Morocco 225 363 359 
Somalia 76 81 96 
Sudan 144 133 148 
Syria 269 423 413 
Tunisia 281 600 681 
N. Yemen 75 119 103 
S. Yemen 99 107 116 
Arab Per Capita 338.2 656.7 755.4 
Average Annual Growth 1970-'75 1975-79 1970-79 
rate 
GDP 17.5 6.6 12.5 
Per Capita GDP 14.2 3.6 9.3 
Source: Sadiq, A.T. Op. cit., Table 9, p. 419. 
countries within the Arab region conforms to the general international 
economic strategy of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. 
The AGS are certainly relatively rich at the momentand, as noted earlier, 
already give considerable development assistance especially though 
not only to poorest countries in the Arab region. The extension of 
this into Regional cooperation for development would not only increase 
the effectiveness of this assitance but would significantly multiply 
mutual development benefits, directly in economic terms and indirectly 
through improving Regional and Sub-regional socio-political stability. 
13.3 A Regi~ Cooperation Approach for Agricultural Development 
13.3.1 Arab Agricultural Situation - Background (and see Chapter 9) 
In Chapter 9 it became clear that there were joint interests 
between AGS and the rest of the Arab world in promoting together the 
process of agricultural development. Motivations were supplied by: 
the wider resource base available within the Arab Region; the need to 
gear economic development on the basis of integrating agro-industrial 
activities as the backbone for the whole development process; the 
need for achieving a secured degree of self-sufficiency of food. The 
fact that the oil and energy crisis has been accompanied by the 
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emergence of a food crisis all over the world, has brought strongly the 
concept of 'food security' to the attention of policy makers and planners 
in the Arab Region as well as everywhere in the Third World. 
Agriculture plays an important role in the economy of Arab 
countries, and particularly in the non-oil exporting countries which 
are inhabited by over 80 percent of the Arab population. Agriculture 
is the most important single field of labour for the Arab population, 
for approximately 50 percent of the total labour force in Arab States 
are engaged in agriculture.(3) 
The Arab countries import of food is estimated as being 50 percent 
of the total needs and is estimated to increase by the end of the 
current de~ade to 70 percent. Costs of agricultural imports similarly 
continued to grow during the 1970's.(4) 
The growing needs of the Arab population which reached 157.88 
million people in 1979, from 76 million in 1950 and projected to be about 
208 million in 1985, the growing needs for food commodities in particular 
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and agricultural products in general, all have been causing worries in 
various circles within the Arab World. This situation has been resulting 
from the following factors: (5) 
- increase in prices of many of the imported commodities; 
- increase in rates of population growth, in spite of the fact that some 
countries have decreased their rate of population growth (e.g. Egypt); 
- increase in per capita consumption of food in a number of countries 
(e.g. Egypt rice, Sudan wheat); 
-no parallel increase in agricultural production with increase in 
population growth. 
However, the Regional potential for agricultural expansion, as 
illustrated in Chapter 9, seems to be promising and pavesthe way to a 
possible real Green Revolution in agriculture and food production. 
It is generally accepted that the agricultural area does not 
exceed 4% of the total area of the Arab World, some one thousand 
million feddans, of which 250 million is arable land. The actual 
cultivated area, however, is only about 126 million feddans, leaving 
124 million feddans as the natural domain for horizontal agricultural 
development.(6) 
Althogh agricultural and rural development is an area of major 
economic activity it has never·.·occupied priority in Arab development 
programmes, and even when listed in them, has not been followed up by 
insistence and a real will to achieve real development of a sector 
which has wealthy potential in proportion to other sectors of the 
economy. Agriculture has been especially neglected relative to industry, 
as Sayegh has pointed out:(7) 
"Industrialization has a glamour which agricultural 
development does not possess, and shining new 
factories seem to rank higher than efficient farms 
as show-pieces in the eyes o.f ministers of information 
and of national economy alike." 
The ignoring of the real economic significance of rural society 
and agriculture has had drastic results, reflected on food shortages 
and huge food imports. 
It is the belief of this writer that given the relatively 
greater attention being directed towards the industrial sector and 
finance in the Sub-region, the agricultural sector should be considered 
to be the cor'nerstone and main engine for the development of the Arab 
Region, in the light of both groups joint interests. This sector 
should, therefore, occupy a higher rank within the Regional cooperative 
activities. 
13.3.2 An Approach for Regional Agricultural Cooperation 
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As has been established in Chapter 9 the Arab countries are not 
immune to the dangers of what many see to be an impending world food 
crisis. The AGS, as noted in Part One and in Chapter 9 are especially 
vulnerable. At the same time it was noted that the agricultural 
production potential of the Arab region is considerable. What is needed 
therefore is more than concern but a cooperative defining of their 
needs and of the ways in which these could be satisfied through sound 
pragmatic approaches. 
The heart of the agricultural problem is a structural one (see 
Chapters 2 and 9) and therefore a common market or trade-oriented 
approach cannot successfully produce the degree of structural change 
necessary to obtain successful exploitation of the potential. In 
Chapter 6 the very modest results obtained by the ACM-approach were 
noted, particularly with regard to intra-regional trade in agricultural 
commodities; even these would seem to have only short term influence 
on production structures. 
We can emphasise therefore that a development oriented approach 
is the primary need, trade and markets playing an integral but secondary 
part. Further, a development oriented approach to agriculture requires 
a Regional rather than a Sub-regional emphasis, for reasons mainly 
concerned with the resource base. If however the Regional 
potential is to be successfully developed to the mutual benefit of 
AGS food-security and other Arab countries' development then, as 
already noted in general terms and in other sectors, the qualitative 
inputs obtainable from the International circle are equally crucial. 
Against this established background, this chapter examines two 
particular aspects of current actual cooperation. First we evaluate 
the possible choices of approach as considered by the CAEU. Se8ond, 
we will illustrate the on-going approach for regional agricultural 
cooperation followed by the Arab authority for agricultural development 
and investment. 
The Approach to Regional Agricultural Cooperation in the Light 
of Various Alternatives: 
Whilst agreement on the usefulness and essentiality of 
agricultural cooperation among the Arab States seems to be apparent, 
there does not appear to be a consensus of opinion on the form that 
this cooperation should take. Our main line of thinking, while 
proceeding to explore the approach for regional agricultural cooperation 
will be concentrated on food production and within the context of 
achieving the optimum benefit derived from considerations of comparative 
advantage. 
Alternative Approaches: 
Theoretically, integration-cooperation could take one of the 
following forms in the Arab World (see also 8): 
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1. Total integration and merging all agricultural activities and placing 
them under a single executive authority. This could only be through 
political agreement at the highest level, as it entails the renunciation 
of rwtional supervision of countries' economic activity. This is 
inconcej.vablc outside the framework of a comprehensive integrated economic 
unit. 
2. The second form merely requires freeing trade in agricultural 
commodities from all restrictions, giving each country's products 
free access to the aggregate market. Integration would be achieved 
through the law of supply and demand. ~his form is practiced in 
capitalist systems. 
3. A third approach calls·for agricultural cooperation based.on 
537 
comprehensive Regional planning aimed at achieving definite production 
targets with each country being responsible for playing a specific 
role towards the achievement of this objective. Trade exchange, between 
members of the region, according to this approach, would play its 
natural role to complete the circle of cooperation and benefit all 
the countries of the group.(9) 
This approach has been considered by the CAEU to be ideal for 
Arab agricultural cooperation, accompanied by a realization that it 
is difficult to achieve. However, CAEU has called for agreement on 
general goals and the design of joint actions. 
4. The fourth approach is based on selected groups of agricultural 
commodities, joint activities within the regional framework to be 
undertaken in the light of comparative advantage considerations. The 
approach is known within tne terms used in economic cooperation literature 
as the 'piecemeal approach'. 
In pursuance of Chapters 11 and 12 findings which led to the 
proposed adoption of the 'partial development-oriented approach for 
cooperation' we can proceed to examine the validity of these various 
approaches. 
None of the first three approaches seems to be valid for the 
following reasons: 
(a) In addition to the various considerations mentioned in Chapters 
6, 11 and 12 which called for the adoption of a partial rather than 
comprehensive approach, the lack of practical experience, the social 
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and technical backwardness of this sector, the national political 
consideration~ which drive Governments to consider it their political 
duty to provide food for their own people, mainly from their own 
territories or by independent policies of importing and subsidizing 
food; all th13se considerations tend to support the same piecemeal, 
partial approach. 
(b) The second approach, based on the freeing of trade seems at first 
glance to appear appropriate, enabling the needs of countries suffering 
shortages to be met and reshaping production specialization through 
market mechanisms and competitiveness. However, the AGS experience, 
as well as the structural deficiencies mentioned above, and the results 
of analyses in Chapters 11 and 12 show that trade liberalisation must 
be regarded only as a supporting element in rather than the prime base 
for agricultural cooperation in development. 
It became clear from the evaluation of the Arab Region's food 
problem in Chapter 9 that any regional activities should be centred 
upon tackling this problem, directing food production processes towards 
a more secure end. It is, therefore, logical to choose the piecemeal 
approach, with regional activities based at this stage on commodity 
groups representing specific food gaps in the Arab world, viz. wheat 
and cereals, rice, maize, sugar, sugar products, animal products (meat, 
milk, eggs, poultry and fats) and vegetable oils. The .Regional 
cooperation thus directed could spare the region the expected famines 
that could occur in the view of some projections within the coming decade.(10) 
"If the Arab region aims at achieving self-
sufficiency, then agricultural production should 
increase by 1985-1990 to the following order of 
magnitude: wheat 150 percent, sugar 330 percent, 
animal production 150-180 percent and oil seed 
crops 150-180 percent."(ll) 
General Outlines for Arab Agricultural Cooperation and 
Specialization: 
General proposals for Arab agricultural specialization have been 
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drawn up, based on costs of production, as well as on comparative 
advantages. In the following table of specialization (Table 13.4) we 
can note the absence of AGS. This arises because the only production 
sub-sector in which AGS have a comparative advantage is fisheries. 
Table 13.4 
List of the Arab countries in ascending order according to the cost of 
production per hectare and per ton of agricultural crops 
Rain fed 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Irrigated 
Wheat 
Corn 
Sorghum 
Peanuts 
Sesame 
Sunflower 
Potatoes 
Tomatoes 
Rising Costs 
Syria - Jordan 
Sudan - Syria 
Sudan - Jordan - Syria - Iraq - Egypt 
Somalia - Syria - Jordan - Iraq - Egypt 
Sudan - Syria 
Sudan - Somalia - Syria - Egypt 
Syria - Somalia 
Somalia - Syria 
Syria - Egypt - Jordan 
Syria - Egypt - Jordan 
Main direction of specialization on comparative advantage 
Syria, Iraq, Morocco 
Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania 
Syria, Somalia 
Sudan, Somalia, Syria 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Corn 
Sesame 
Sunflower 
Sugarcane 
Sugar beet 
Potatoest 
Tomatoes) 
Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria 
Sudan, Somalia 
Morocco, Syria 
Syria 
Source: CAEU & FAO; Ref. 12. 
\ 
13.4 The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) 
The establishment in November 1975 of the Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Investment and Development followed 
an initiative based on intensive studies relating to the potentialities 
and prospects for agricultural development within a regional context. 
These studies were conducted in 1975 by the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development to survey Sudan's agricultural potential.(13) Th.is 
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study indicated that Sudan has great potentials in land and water and 
could produce within a few decades the following: 
- 27 million tons of grains (14-fold increase); 
- 12 million tons of oil seed crop (15-fold increase); 
- 2.7 million tons of sugar (27-fold increase); 
3.5 mrllion tons of meat ClO-fold increase). 
These figures are based on 1975 levels of production in Sudan and are 
evidence that the potential is here. Thirteen Arab countries 
participated in the establishment of the Authority with capital fixed 
at K.D. 150 million. These countries include four of the AGS, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar with 64.5 percent capital participation 
(capital) in addition to Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, 
Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. 
Libya finally did not sign the constitutional agreement establishing 
the Authority. Other Arab countries subscribed to its capital as 
shown in Table 13.5. 
Country 
AGS 
S. Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Other Countries 
Algeria 
Sudan 
Iraq 
Syria 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Somalia 
Muritania 
Total 
Table 13.5 
AAAID Participants' Contribution 
Total Contribution 
KD 
64,500,000 
22,500,000 
19,500,000 
15,000,000 
7,500,000 
35,300,000 
1,500,000 
15,000,000 
15,000,000 
50,000 
3,000,000 
600,000 
50,000 
100,000 
99,800,000 
Source: AAAID, Third Annual Report 1979, (Arabic). 
% 
64.5 
22.5 
19.5 
15.0 
7.5 
35.5 
1.5 
15 
15 
3 
1 
100 
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The two main groups involved include the most wealthy capital 
exporting countries as well as the most promising countries in regard 
to agricultural development potentiality. It expresses a joint 
effort by both groups, where the countries having most promising 
agricultural development potentials are encouraged to follow-up 
programmes translating their development aspirations on the one hand 
and contributing to the food requirements of the Arab world on the 
other hand, and whereby the capital exporting countries are obliged 
to provide financial support for Sudan and other countrieo in their 
drive towards agricultural development. 
We examine here the applicability of the Authority's approach in 
its first 'Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in Sudan 
1976-1985', in the light of our proposed approach for development 
cooperation. 
13.4.1 Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in Sudan 1976-1985 
Programme Component Aims: 
1. An ambitious programme, aiming at increasing the irrigated cropped 
area by 0.6 million hectares, was designed to make use particularly 
of unused water resources to allow an increase of the irrigated cropped 
area to over 2. 5 mi 11 ion hectares. ( 14) 
2. The programme aims at settling and cultivating a further 2.0 
million hectares, out of a potential cultivated area of 25 million 
hectares. 
3. In livestock production, the programme aims at increasing meat 
production by 400,000 tons, as against a potential increase of more than 
3 million tons. 
To achieve these objectives the whole programme comprises 100 
-;;. 
___.,~ 
projects, with i.:i total investment estimated at 2.3 )rni.llion 
~--
Sudanese pounds 
(at 1976 prices), and which can be categorised as follows: 
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1. Infrastructure: 
- Projects designed to expand the potentials of Sudanese ports, to 
develop a railway network, a network of passable roads, airports and 
means of river transport. 
- Projects for harnessing Nile water for full utilization of the 
Sudanese portion. Projects for generating electrical power, building 
grain silos, meat and livestock marketing and export installations 
and well drilling for the supply of drinking water for humans and 
cattle in areas remote from rivers. 
- Various educational and vocational training projects to supply 
trained specialists and skills, in addition to other supporting services 
such as agricultural research, advice and credit, along with cooperation 
and marketing organisations. 
The total investment directed to infrastructure projects is 
estimatea to occupy 29% of the total investment programme. 
2. Commercial Projects: 
31 projects in the sectors of vegetable crops, livestock, agro-
industries, secondary industries and services were expected to need 46% 
of the total investment. 
3. Prjects suitable for Sudanese investors: 
Agricultural and industrial projects with an attractive economic 
return, were identified as being only suitable for the Sudanese investor 
and producer. 25 projects, representing 25% of total investments, were 
directed to modernize traditional agricultural production and developing 
a number of agro-industries. 
The balanced distribution of projects was regarded as important. 
Special attention was given to the interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the people in Sudan's rural areas, through investments directed 
to modernise and develop traditional sectors of production.(15) In an 
effort to achieve social justice among the Sudanese people, the 
allocation share of the western and southern regions should account 
for 40% of total investment, while the share of northern and eastern 
regions account for the remaining 60%. It is thought that 
"the proposed investments for the western and 
southern regions are the first serious attempt at 
development for these remote areas of Sudan."(16) 
Implementation Stages: 
With such an ambitious and large programme, it was unavoidably 
necessary from a practical point of view, to harmonize the stages of 
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implementation as well as the design of the basic programme's successive 
investment plans, with the economic objectives of the host country, and 
to review and modify them in coordination with the host country's 
development plan. This has occurred with the Sixth Sudanese Economic 
Development Plan (1977-1983). In addition, special attention is directed 
to what experience and practical considerations feed in from subsequent 
stages. 
First Investment Plan and Follow-up:(17) 
The Authority prepared its first investment plan which was 
approved by Sudanese Government and the Authority Board of Directors 
in April 1980. This plan includes 13 projects with total costs of 
about US $ 2.1 billion. After preparing feasibility studies for four 
projects the Authority established four companies to implement these 
projects: 
1. Arab-Sudanese Company for mflk products 
2. II II II II dairy products 
3. II II II " fruits and vegetables 
4. II II II II starches, insulin and glucose 
The capital of these companies has been distributed principally 
as follows: 
- 25 percent for the Authority 
- 20 percent for the Sudanese Government 
- 12.5 percent for Saudi Arabia 
- 12.5 percent for Kuwait 
- 12.5 percent for Iraq 
- 17.5 percent was left to other countries wishing to participate. 
Total costs of these four projects are estimated to be about 
US i 220 million. The preparatory work and feasibility studies are 
expected to be ready for implementation in April 1983. 
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Six projects are in the stage of feasibility study by international 
consulting companies or are having their studies reviewed: 
1. Legume and pulse production in Northern Province with a proposed 
agricultural area of 60 thousand feddans. 
2. Animal feed production. 
3. Mechanize·d production farm in the south west part of Sudan, with 
a project area of 216 thousand feddan. The project aims at building c:An 
agro-industrial complex. 
4. The evaluation of existing oil seeds production and industries 
and the possibilities of increasing agricultural production. 
5. Rice production. 
6. Animal production. 
The Programme's General Effects: 
It is intended that this programme will lead to the achievement 
of the following objectives:(18) 
-Animal growth rate for the agricultural sector of Sudan of not less 
than 6.5% by the mid-1980s. Whilst achieving this growth rate, and 
necessary investment rates will depend initiallly on the flow of funds 
from abroad, such flow is expected to be replaced by growing national 
savings, thus lessening Sudan dependence on foreign financing. 
"By 1995 national savings will be sufficient to finance 
these investments."(19) 
It is difficult to envisage how Sudan could escape from the cycle 
of continual and increasing dependence on foreign financial assistance 
without such a programme. 
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- Sugar production is expected to increase by more than 700% and wheat by 
over 500%, other major agricultural commodities increasing within the 
range of 100% to 150%. This will be reflected in a changing structure 
of Sudan agricultural exports, as the proportional contribution of cotton 
is expected to decline from 60% to 25% of such exports. 
- Sudan will be able to expand exports of oil seeds, grain, meat and 
fish. The value of these exports in 1985 will have tripled over their 
1973 value (at 1975 prices). 
- With the exception of cotton and gum arabic, all the other commodities 
will be needed by the Arab countries: 
"It is expected that these exports in 1985 will supply 
20% of projected sugar imports into the Arab world, 
50% of meat imports and 40% of oil seed imports."(20) 
The value of these exports would represent two thirds of the total 
value of Sudanese agricultural exports in 1985.(21) 
Programme Finance:(22) 
The first investment plan calls for an expenditure of KD 780 million 
to be distributed and raised as follows: 
KD 75 million, Sudanese contribution to agricultural :projects 
KD 295 million on infrastructural projects -
KD 44 million from commercial loans 
KD 240 million in the form of concessionary loans 
KD 11 million in grants 
KD 410 million in joint ventures to be financed -
40% by the Authority (KD 164 million) 
40% by Sudanese Government (KD 164 million) 
20% by commercial lenders (KD 82 million) 
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To implement this investment plan, the (AFAESD) planned to contact 
a wide range of possible lenders from Governments and private 
commercial institutions. 
13.4.2 AAAID Programme, the AGS and the Regional Cooperation Approach 
to Agriculture 
Four of the six Arab Gulf States participated as main shareholders 
of the Authority with 64.5% participation. AGS appear here in the 
role of investors and not merely as aid donors. 
The approach followed in the Sudan programme seems to be in line 
with the findings of this study relating to the sound pragmatic 
approach of cooperation for development of AGS within the Three Circles -
the Trilateral approach. The approach reflects the adoption of 
programmed partial and sectoral cooperation within an integrated context 
which means: 
1. Whilst the programme is integrated with the economic development 
of the host country Wealing primarily with one sector but repercussions 
on many others) the programme aims, at the same time, to satisfy the 
interests of the investing countries (non-agricultural oil exporting 
group) mainly through improving the availability of food stuffs and as 
an outlet for profitable investment of their surplus funds. This is 
the mutual benefit aspect within the Region. 
2. Making the best use of the agricultural potential of Sudan and 
of Arab surplus capital, as well as of existing organisational capacities 
(the Arab Fund), for achieving real and equitable growth for the Sudanese 
economy and the Arab Region. This covers considerations of relative 
advantage and developmental aspirations. 
3. The striking of a balance between investment-oriented projects to 
achieve a commercial rate of return and development-oriented projects, 
such as infrastructure, research and training services within the same 
programme. This principle applies both to large scale as well as small 
scale projects. 
4. Agro-industrial bases have been built in the project. 
5. Opening the road widely towards progressive self-sufficiency 
in food. 
Project Assessment: 
It is not our intention to assess in details the possibilities 
of success for such a newly-born and ambitious seeming project. This 
will not be possible for many years. We can however, identify some 
of the factors necessary to guarantee its success. 
1. Utmost cooperation from the Sudanese Government Part. 
2. Political stability of Sudan. 
3. Availability of financial resources in and contributions by the 
Sudanese Government as well as by the Authority and international and 
private financial institutions. 
4. Managerial as well as technical cabilities. 
5. Protection of the programme from political disturbances, of the 
kind which recent Arab history has unavoidably been witnessing, e.g. 
withdrawal of investment from Egypt. 
It is worrying to note that while the Authority was established 
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in 1976, the administrative structure and the management posts in AAAID 
were not settled as of April 1978, which may induce delay in implementing 
the plan. More urgency is required in establishing these basic 
elements. 
Nevertheless, what can be said is that all the problems 
associated with these factors would imperil any development activities. 
We can safely assume that associated uncertainties will have less serious 
effects in a framework of institutionalised pragmatic cooperation 
between partners who all have much to gain than they would have in an 
individualistic, laisser faire situation. 
Two final notes can be added: First, it is very clear that 
unless cooperation includes inputs of the needed elements that are 
only available within the international circle as was illustrated in 
Chapter 10 (financing, expertise markets, equipment and technology) 
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one cannot expect complete success for the project. We see, therefore, 
that even cooperation within the regional context inspires dynamically 
the need for cooperation within the ·international circle. 
Second, the AAAID programme in following a piece-meal development-
oriented approach for cooperation has a sound basis on conceptual 
as well as practical considerations. Moreover, in practice, all 
participating countries and institutions are committed to mobilise their 
joint efforts in order to make the programme succeed, and in so doing 
pave the way to motivate extension to include some other Arab-
agricultural countries. 
13.5 Summary 
In illustrating and examining practical aspects relating to the 
development cooperation within the regional context, the study of 
the existing cooperation platform, through the assessment of income 
structures and economic development cooperation evaluation has produced 
two main results: 
1. The existence of a wide income gap between the oil producing and 
non-oil producing groups. Productive efforts, mainly in agriculture, 
on a joint cooperation basis are of vital importance within the 
movement to narrow this income gap. 
2. The assessment of possible approaches within the Arab-Development 
Cooperative Movement, with respect to agricultural cooperation, has 
proved the non-viability of the trade-oriented approach and tend to 
support the same conclusions arrived at earlier viz, the viable approach 
for Sub-regional cooperation is one that is 'Development Oriented, 
Partial and Programmed'. This approach has been proved to be operational 
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through OAPEC as shown in Chapter 6 and AAAID projects as examined 
in this chapter. 
FAO, on reviewing the recent situation with respect to food 
security situation in the Near East proposed many measures which could 
be adopted to achieve food security within the regional cooperation 
context, and in doing that, FAO stressed the importance of AAAID 
programme in increasing food production within the Arab Region: 
"As regards joint efforts to develop production 
within the region, a principal example is the Basic 
Programme of Agricultural Development in Sudan 
(1976-1985). Sudan is considered as the potential 
bread basket for the whole Arab World."(23) 
In examining questions relating to cooperation in agriculture, 
conclusions include the following: 
- The viability of a piece-meal, partial approach, based on commodity 
group production, with basic food commodities occupying the priority 
within regional activities in the light of food security problem. 
- The AAAID programme seems to support the above-mentioned approach and 
could contribute fundamentally to solving of food security problems 
and narrowing the income gap within the Arab World at the same time. 
The same programme, despite directed within the Regional circle also 
created the need for cooperation within the third 'international' 
circle. 
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CHAPTER 14 - INVESTMENT STRATEGY WITHIN A TRILATERAL APPROACH 
14.1 Introduction 
It is the financial surpluses that have been achieved by the AGS, 
especially during the nineteen seventies which have shaped the type 
of development that prevails within the national economies of AGS. It 
is also these same surpluses and their developmental impact, Sub-
regionally, Regionally and Internationally, that now necessitate 
the adoption of a trilateral approach to AGS development cooperation. 
In Part One as well as in Chapter 5 of Part Two examination of the 
resource base and development achievements and cooperation within the 
Sub-region has shown the emergence of a rapidly growing financial 
sector with strong indications of a growing movement towards financial 
and monetary specialization within the Sub-region. At the same time it 
is due to this sector that there have emerged some most successful 
partial and sectoral development cooperation schemes, as reflected in 
the joint development projects initiated by OAPEC as well as the joint 
financial institutions within the region (Chapter 6). The abundance of 
capital as a determinant factor for AGS development has been found to 
stimulate cooperation within the regional context, where capital is 
joined with other development determinants available within the region 
(mainly labour, national resources and markets). This illustrates the 
wide opportunities for Regional cooperation on sectoral bases as 
industry and agriculture. 
Earlier analysis has shown, also, the direction of large portions 
of AGS' financial surpluses towards the international markets in which 
investment and placement opportunities exist which are not available 
within the AGS' national or Sub-regional economies, or even within the 
Region. Income from investment abroad has been eme~ging as an important 
substitute to 0il income (Chapter 6) and this process has, therefore, 
motivated AGS to establish joint financial institutions with the 
participation of regional and western financial institutions. 
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To summarise, we can say that it is financial surpluses, derived 
from the oil export process, that make the trilateral approach particularly 
relevant to AGS development. It is to these surpluses, also, that 
the em·ergence of the industry of finance owes its existence. 
All such preceding analysis assumes the existence of abundant 
financial surpluses in the AGS. It becomes important, therefore, to 
analyse quantitative aspects of the financial surpluses and to examine 
the type and geographical distribution of their deployment within the 
three circles. At the same time the need emerges to identify problems 
that face investment of financial surpluses within regional and 
international circles. 
This chapter begins with a quantitative analysis of the financial 
surpluses using data derived from balance of payments, particularly current 
account surpluses, foreign financial assets and reserves, in addition 
to the Governments' public budget. This is followed by examining the 
framework inter-relating oil production policy and the investment of 
derived financial surpluses. This is succeeded by an analysis of the 
type and geographical distribution of financial surpluses investments 
abroad. Since the issue 'of financial cooperation within the Sub-region 
was already discussed in Chapter 12, we proceed to examine the situation 
with respect to regional and international circles, whilst bearing in 
mind the need within the Sub-region for pooling their financial surpluses 
and the rational trend of financial and monetary specialization. 
14.2 Quantitative Aspects of Surpluses 
It is impossible, given the available information, to arrive at 
very precise or accurate estimates for the financial surpluses that have 
been invested by AGS all over the world. This result, to some extent, 
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comes from the high degree of confidentiality which is given to such 
activities, and also because the bases for computing these surpluses 
are different from country to country, this resulting in very wide 
margins of difference between the various estimates that have been made. 
The only safe approach is through analysing the balance of 
payments estimates, particularly the items representing current account 
surpluses and derived reserves in addition to the public budgets of the 
Governments. This does not enable us to conclude precise figures for 
financial surpluses that are available for investment but has the 
advantage of highlighting the contribution of current account surpluses. 
It is there surpluses in particular which have found their way abroad 
through loans, grant assistance and investments or are reflected in 
changes in the size of foreign exchange reserves. 
14.2.1 Current Account Analysis 
Registered annual current surpluses for the four richest AGS 
during the period 1973-79 increased from 5.727 billion dollars in 1973 to 
34.891 billion dollars in 1979 (Table 14.1). The AGS current account surplus 
reached its first peak in 1974 with 34.335 billion dollar:-;, growl;h thereafter 
slowing down but climbing to a second peak in 1979 (Table 14.1). 
Accumulated current account surpluses for three AGS (S. Arabia, 
Kuwait and UAE) during the period 1973-80 reached 189.719 billion 
dollars with 47.3 percentage for Saudi Arabia, 35.8 percent for Kuwait 
and 16.9 percent for UAE (Table 14.1). 
This growth of surpluses is explained mainly by the price revolution 
that raised petroleum prices by more than four times during the period 
from last quarter of 1973 and the beginning of 1974; and the second 
big rise occurred in 1979. 
As a result AGS oil income in current terms increased by 17.3 
times in 1980 over 1973 from 8.551 billion dollars in 1973 to 148.196 
billion dollars in 1980 (Table 14.2). This development was reflected 
S. Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Total 
Table 14.1 
AGS Balance of Payments Current Account Surpluses (Goods, Services and Transfers) 
(In US ~ millions) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1,748 2,595 20,405 14,752 16,110 15,489 3,895 13,053 3,439 
1,527 ·1 ,967 8,220 6,598 6,971 5,546 7,075 15,193 16,488 
632 828 4,151 3,190 4,111 2,735 1,694 5,332 9,972 
323 337 1,559 1,064 1,218 718 958 1,313 n.a. 
4,230 5,727 34,335 25,604 28,410 24,398 13,622 34,891 29,899 * 
* Excluding Qatar 
Source: IMF, Balance of Pa~ments Year Book, Vol. 31, Dec. 1980. 
Central Banks and Monetary Agencies of AGS, g_co11omic Bulleti!}, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1981. 
()1 
U1 
U1 
Table 14.2 
AGS Financial Surpluses' Related Indicators 
:ill US millions 
1973 1980 
Oil Income 8551.5 148196.3 
Budget Surpluses 2292.4 29116 
Current Account* 5727 34891** 
Foreign Assets 7594.9 106937.3 
Reserves*** 4423.5 31550.6 
Notes: * 
** 
Four Countries (S. Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar) 
1979 
*** Reserves minus gold 
Sources:. Appendix Tables 22 and 27. 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
1980:1973 
17.3 
12.7 
6 
14 
7 
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in the total AGS accumulated oil revenues reaching 492.983 billion 
dollars at the end of 1980 (Table 14.3). S. Arabia received 66 percent 
of total AGS accumulated oil revenues followed by Kuwait with 15.8 
percent, UAE with 11.7 percent, Qatar with 3.8 percent, Bahrain with 
2.1 percent and Oman with 0.6 percent (Table 14.3). 
Available estimates indicate that the cash surplus available for 
disposition from 1975 to 1980, exceeded the current account surplus 
because of substantial net external borrowing by some of the oil 
exporting countries.(!) 
14.2.2 Foreign Financial Assets 
Total foreign assets of the AGS increased between 1973 and 1980 by 
1308.5 percent. Saudi Arabia is responsible for 89.8 percent of the 
total increase (:ill 89202 mn. out of :ill 99378 mn.). Saudi Arabia has the 
greatest volume of foreign financial assets volume. Its proportion of 
AGS holdings increased from 68.2 percent in 1973 to 88.2 percent in 
1980, followed by Kuwait, but whose proportional importance decreased 
from 21.8 percent in 1973 to 6.3 percent in 1980. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
had 95 percent of AGS total financial assets in 1980 (Appendix Table 22). 
The economic importance of the growing AGS financial assets (the most 
Table 14.3 
AGS Accumulated Financial Surpluses and Related Indicators 1973-1980 
(In $ US millions and percent) 
Accumulated Budg. Surplus Accumulated Reserves 
oil revenues current account 
1973-1980 (1980) 1973-1980 (1980) 
% % % % 
S. Arabia 324,884 66 6,285 21.6 89,738 47.3 23,437 74.3 
Kuwait 77,879 15.8 16,409 56.4 67,968 35.8 3,928.4 12.4 
UAE 57,606 11.7 3,679 12.6 32,013 16.9 2,014.7 6.4 
Qatar 18,720 3.8 2,216 7.6 n.a. 
-
343.4 1.1 
Bahrain 3,224 0.7 125 0.4 n.a. - 953.4 3.1 
Oman 10,670 2.1 402 1.4 n.a. - 873.7 2.7 
189,710* 100 
Total AGS 492,983 100 29,116 100 31,550.6 100 
F. Assets : Accumulated Oil Revenues (22%) 
* S. Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar 
Source: Tables 14.1, Appendix Tables 22, 23 and 27. 
F. Assets 
(1980) 
% 
94,385 88.2 
6,773.8 6.3 
2,713.7 2.5 
928.7 0.9 
1,184.3 1.1 
987.8 1.0 
106,973.7 100 
c.n 
c.n 
-..:1 
Table 14.4 
Foreign Assets and GDP 1980 
AGS 
s. Arabia (~ bn.) 
Kuwait (~ bn.) 
UAE (~ bn.) 
Total (~ bn.) 
Industrialized Countires 
U • S • ( $' US bn • ) 
U.K. (£ bn.) 
W. Germpny (DM. bn.) 
Japan (Yen. bn.) (1979) 
France (F.F. bn.) 
Source: Appendix Table 22. 
( 1) 
GDP 
106.333 
25.677 
13.454 
145.464 
2576.6 
223.05 
1494.7 
219058 
2754.9 
IMF, IFS Yearbook 1981. 
(2) 
Total Net F. Assets 
94.385 
6.774 
2.714 
103.873. 
56.3 
3.777 
115.6 
-720 
413.2 
(2):(1) 
Ratio 
88.7 
26.4 
20.2 
71.0 
2.2 
1.7 
7.7 
-0.3 
15.0 
c.n 
CJl 
00 
satisfactory basis for estimating AGS financial surpluses) is reflected 
in their ratio to total GOP. Joint foreign assets of S. Arabia, Kuwait 
and UAE constituted in 1980 nearly 71 percent of their total GDP with 
the highest percentage (88.7) for Saudi, followed by Kuwait with 26.4 
percent and UAE 20.2 percent. 
In the Western industrialized countries this percentage was 
comparatively much lower with 2.2% for U.S., 1.7 for U.K. and 7.7 for 
W. Germany, -0.3 for Japan and 15.0 for France (Table 14.4). 
It is worth mentioning within this context that Ghalib estimated 
that total OPEC identified accumulated financial surpluses between 
1974-80 reached~ 322.74 billion.(2) This estimate included official 
as well as private sector and based on a variety of sources noted under 
Table 14. 8. 
Total financial surpluses are often estimated on the basis of 
identified foreign assets for OPEC countries. It is worth noting that 
AGS foreign assets constituted 65.5 percent of total OPEC foreign 
assets in 1980 as reflected in the following Table 14.5. 
While it is impossible to know with any degree of precision the 
breakdown of these assets between the official and priva~e sectors of 
the OPEC nations, the private and quasi-private sector is believed to 
account for 20% of OPEC's total foreign assets. (3) 
On this basis one can estimate AGS's total accumulated financial 
surpluses including those of the private sector to reach ~ 211.4 billion 
at the end of 1980. This means that the value of registered foreign 
assets as shown in Appendix Table 22 (~ 106.9 bn.) represents only some 
50 percent of the above estimated financial surpluses. 
14.2.3 Reserves 
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Total AGS reserves (minus gold) increased in 1980 by 613.3 percent 
over 1973, while total world reserves increased by 184 percent during the 
same period. Saudi Arabia is responsible for 73 percent of the total 
Table 14.5 
AGS and OPEC Foreign Assets (1980) 
{~ billion) 
s. Arabia 101 
Kuwait 63.0 
UAE 28.0 
Qatar 9.0 
Oman 0.987 
Bahrain 1.184 
1. Total AGS 203.171 
2. Total OPEC 310.000 
1:2 65.5% 
Sources: - Appendix Table 22. 
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- Ghalib, S. 'OPEC's Gross Foreign Assets and their International 
Deployment', In, Arab Financial Markets, edited by Peter Field 
and Alan Moore, London: Euromoney Publications, 1981, p. 10. 
increase of AGS reserves (US dollar 19,690 million out of ~ 27,127 mn. 
dollars). 
Saudi Arabia reserves represented 74 percent of AGS reserves in 
1980, followed by Kuwsait with 12 percent then UAE with 6 percent 
(Appendix Table 22). 
AGS' aggregate reserves (including gold) have grown in 
proportional world importance, constituting 2 percent of total world 
reserves in 1973 and 7 percent in 1980. 
Saudi Arabia occupied the sixth rank among all countries' reserves 
in 1980 (5.2 percent) following West Germany (11.5%), France (6.8%), 
U.S. (6%), Italy (5.8%), Japan (5.7%). Saudi Arabia world comparative 
percentage increased from 2 percent in 1973 to 5.2 percent in 1980 
{Appendix Table 25). 
AGS total reserves bring them collectively to the second rank among 
all world countries after W. Germany in 1980. 
If we compare the AGS reserves situation with the total world 
situation in general and industrialized countries in particular, the 
following results are arrived at, derived from Appendix Table26. 
1. Total Reserves: GDP 
While AGS' (four countries) total reserves constituted 20 percent 
561 
of their total GDP in 1980 the corresponding percentage for the fourLop 
industrialized countries was only 4 percent, Saudi Arabia occupied the 
highest rank, reaching 22 percent. (Appendix Table 26). 
2. Total Reserves Ratio to Imports: 
While AGS aggregate reserves proportionately come to 59 percent 
of the value of total imports in 1980, the corresponding percentage 
for the total world was 23.8 and was 27 percent for the four industrialized 
countries. 
In analysing the development of oil exporting countries' comparative 
importance, the IMF Annual Report of 1981 indicated that the median ratio 
of oil exporting countries' reserves to their total imports has risen 
from (0.26) in 1971-73 to (0.47) in 1979-80, while in contrast the same 
ratio h~d fallen for industrial and non-oil developing countries to 
(0.15) and (0.23) respectively.(4) 
The reserves of oil expmters, as deflated by world export prices, 
increased from SDR 18 billion (i US 21.7 billion) in 1973 to SDR 47 
billion (i US 59.9 billion) in 1980 (176%) reflecting the sharp increase 
in their current account surpluses. 
"Holdings of real reserves have. thus increased 
significantly only in the oil exporting countries." ( 5) 
In illustrating how AGS foreign reserves are held, we can refer to 
the example of Qatar. Data as of the end of fiscal year 1974 (ended 
January 14, 1975) ~~dicates that about 55 percent of total reserves 
assets was in the form of foreign currency bank deposits while more than 
37 percent was in the form of bonds and other fixed income securities; 
the rest consisted of gold, real estate, and claims on regional 
organizations. (6) 
14.2.4 Budget Indicators 
AGS total oil revenue is estima.ted to have reached US i 94.33 billion 
in 1980, while their joint budget accounts resulted in a surplus of US i 
29.116 billionp corresponding to 30.8 percent of total oil revenue 
with Kuwait budget surplusp notablyp reaching 80 percent of oil 
revenues (Appendix Tables 23 & 24). 
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In reviewing Kuwaiti financial indicators development exemplifying 
the general situation for AGS, Appendix Table 24 indicates that Kuwait 
budget surpluses represented 54 percent of total revenues during the 
period {1973/74-1979/80) and 95 percent of these surpluses were trans-
ferred into foreign assetsD while this ratio was 63 percent in 1973/74 
(Appendix Table 24). 83 percent of total investment income in 1977/78 
was derived from external financial assets. Investment income which 
reached KD 384 million in 1977/78 grew by nearly 45 percent annually 
on average between 1973/74 and 1977/78. (7) 
In addition to the points made in Chapter 6 on the growing 
comparative importance of investment income as an alternative to oil 
income; which averaged 82 percent of public income in Kuwait during the 
period between 1969/70-1980/81, we can note that investment income now 
occupies the leading rank among non-oil income sources. According to 
some sources investment income in 1981/82 is even predicted to exceed 
oil income in Kuwait. (8) One may seriously doubt the accuracy of such 
prediction in the light of what is known of recent ratios between investment 
income and oil incomeD however, such prediction illustratesthe importance 
of investment income to current and changing overall income structure. 
14.2.5 Real Value of Oil Revenues 
Some final qualification of the value of oil r·evenues is necessary 
in order to make more meaningful this quantitative analysis of AGS' 
financial surpluses. The real value of financial surpluses can be 
arrived by deflating the nominal value of surpluses in accordance with the 
rate of inflation of import prices during the relevant period. The 
depreciation of US dollar against other currencies is also involved. 
Such correction explains the continuing declining trend of AGS 
current account surpluses between 1974-78 (Table 14.1). 
This decline in AGS surpluses was not only the result of real 
increases in the value of imports, it was also because the rise in 
nominal oil prices averaged less than the general rate of inflation. 
"In fact, the dramatic,change in world income 
distribution brought about by the oil price increases 
in 1974, have been reversed by a continuous deterioration 
in the OPEC countries' terms of trade since 1974." (9) 
According to some sources the annual decrease in the real value 
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of AGS financial surpluses is estimated to be about 13.7 percent during 
the period 1972-80, this in relation to trends in the import prices 
during the same period. ( 10) 
The nominal value of oil prices increased during the period 1974-80 
by 200 percent, however, as the Secretary General of OPEC has indicated: 
"While oil prices has increased, by an annual 
nominal rate of 20 percent between 1974 and 1980, 
these prices had been deflated by the annual rate of 
inflation in the industrialized countries to 9.2 
percent, then deflated again by the depreciation of 
dollar. against other currencies to 7 percent.( 11) 
Special care should be directed to avoid the illusion of the 
existence of exaggerated accumulated financial surpluses in the AGS and 
careful judgement has to be applied to the real rate of oil prices 
increases. These lost almost a quarter of their oil purchasing power 
in the period 1974-79, as Table 14.6 shows. 
1970-73 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Table 14.6 
OPEC Terms of Trade 
1974 = 100 
Oil Prices Import Prices 
20.3 70.3 
100.0 100.0 
98.4 112.8 
105.7 114.6 
113.9 125.2 
116.6 144.0 
116.6 151.5 
Terms of Trade 
29.5 
100.0 
87.2 
92.2 
91.0 
81.0 
77.0 
Source: Willet, T.D. 'Structure of Opec and the Outlook for Inter-
national Oil Prices', The World Economy, Vol,2, No. 1, Jan. 1979. 
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In spte of OPEC's accumulating nominal savings, there has 
therefore been no parallel rise in real investment. The rise in OPEC's 
savings increased the flow of financial assets, rates of interests went 
up and a general increase in prices followed. 
"OPEC surpluses are being continuously 
eroded 0 "(12) 
and the same has been true for the AGS. 
14.2.6 Summary Quantitative Analysis 
That analysis which is possible of the financial surpluses proves 
the growing phenomenon of the AGS' moanting financial and foreign assets. 
These certainly can contribute to the development of the industry of 
finance in the Sub-region. However, this and other development, seems 
not to be realisable without cooperation based on a trilateral approach 
as is further examined in this chapter. The basic factual position for 
this examination can be summarised thus: 
1. AGS oil revenue increased by 1980 over 1973 by 17.3 times, (from 
8.551 billion dollars to 148.196 billion dollars, and total 
accumulated oil revenues reached 492.983 billion dollars in 1980. Saudi 
Arabia had 66 percent, while Kuwait had 15.8 percent and UAE had 11.7 
percent. As a result current account surpluses during the period 
1973-79 increased from 5.722 billion dollars to 34.891 billion dollars. 
Accumulated current account surplus for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE 
reached between 1973 and 1980 nearly 189.719 billion dollars with 47.3 
percent for S. Arabia, 35 percent for Kuwait and 16.9 for UAE. 
2. AGS financial assets grew between 1973 and 1980 by 1308.5 percent 
with S. Arabia responsible for 90 percent of this increase. Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait constituted 96 percent of total AGS foreign assets in 1980 
(88% for S. Arabia). The economic importance of AGS' foreign assets 
is reflected in their value proportional to total GDP, which for Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and UAE collectively reached 71% of their joint GDP in 
1980. This compares with 22% for US and 27% for the UK. 
3. AGS total reserves increased by 613.3 percent between 1973 and 
1980 while world total reserves increased by 184 percent. 
Saudi Arabia is responsible for 73 percent of AGS increase and 
constituted at the same time 74 percent of total AGS followed by Kuwait 
12 percent and UAE 6 percent. 
AGS collectively reached in 1980 the second rank among all world 
countries in their volume of total reserves following West Germany. 
Saudi Arabia alone occupied the sixth rank. 
AGS total reserves constituted 20 percent of their total and GDP 
while corresponding percentage for industrial countries was 4 percent. 
AGS total reserves percentage to total imports was 59 percent 
while the corresponding percentage for total world was 23.8 percent. 
4. Budget Indicators: AGS joint surplus which reached 29 billion 
dollars in 1980 corresponded to 30 percent of total oil revenues with 
the Kuwaiti budget surplus reaching 80 percent. 
Kuwaiti .accumulated budget surpluses constituted 54 percent of 
total revenues. 95 percent of Kuwaiti surpluses were transformed into 
foreign assets. 83 percent of investment income of Kuwait was derived 
from foreign assets. 
565 
It is in this context that we have to examine the foreign 
investment activities of the AGS. clearly of critical importance to their 
development, and to consider how trilateral cooperation is relevant. 
14.3 Investment Strategy - The Broad Conceptual Setting 
In this examination of the conceptual basis for investment strategy, 
special attention is directed to illustrate, in broad terms, the economic 
role of financial activities, the real meaning of financial surpluses, 
the close interrelation between oil production policy and investment 
policy, in addition to defining the key terms, 'investment' and 'placement'. 
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14.3.1 Economic Effects of Financial Activities 
It is important to illustrate the economic importance of 
financial activities of AGS in relation to their strategic development 
objectives. 
On a national basis 9 and in any economy, the financial sector 
plays a vital role in fulfilling the function of intermediation between 
supply and demand. It is also well established that economies of scale 
are as relevant to financial intermediation as are economies of scale 
in factors of production in other sectors. The recent development of 
the role being played by the financial sector is shown very clearly in 
its initiation of development activities as well as the financing of 
implementation. Cooperation in the financial sector could make even 
more effective than on a national basis the whole development process 
and there are signs of this appearing already. 
Moreover, financial activities, particularly those relating to 
investment as has appeared many times earlier; can themselves play a 
wider developmental role as a sector nominated to lead the whole 
development process in economic diversification on the road to build 
up a non-oil era development base. 
The conscious utilization of the export of capital exports and 
of associated investment activities as a means in itself to promote 
economic development seems to be rarely discussed both in the literature 
on economic development in general, as well as in relation to AGS and 
capital exporting countries in particular. 
The many signs of the growing importance of income earned by AGS 
Governments and private investors from their foreign assets were ill-
ustrated in Chapter 7 and earlier in this chapter. It is expected that 
"In a few years income on investment receipts may be 
a major factor in their current account."(13) 
Despite the direct relevance of foreign investment to the 
development process designed to diversify the non-oil resources of 
income, such foreign investment as such is never stated as an integral 
part of the development plans of AGS. This absence is probably due to 
jurisdictional considerations within AGS' Governments and the desire 
to maintain the confidentiality of investment policies and decisions. 
However, nothing can justify the parallel absence of programming such 
activities and policies. 
In analysing the basis for investment strategy within a trilateral 
approach two important conceptual issues have to be considered. The 
first relates to the interrelation between the investment of oil 
revenues' surpluses and oil and gas production policies. The second 
issue relates to the real meaning of the term 'investment'. 
14.3.2 Economic Framework for Investment and Oil Production Policies 
The economic criteria that are proposed to be used in formulating 
oil production policies in relation to investment activities are: 
1. The real rate of return (i.e. net of inflation) that the 
Government making the decision can earn on investing the proceeds of 
selling extra oil that it takes out of the ground. 
2. The rate of increase that it expects in the real price of crude 
oil (again, net of inflation). 
This means that AGS should, in the light of purely economic 
considerations, substitute investment in the oil and gas industry by 
national, Sub-regional, Regional or International investments, only if 
the return on these other assets is higher than the appreciation of 
oil in the ground. Otherwise the AGS would be well-advised to conserve 
oil for the future. 
Similarly when considering national internal, current and 
development financial requirements, policy makers of AGS should only 
produce oil and gas over and above these requirements if real rate of 
return on non-national investments is greater than real rate of increase 
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in oil prices. 
However, wider and more pragmatic considerations prove to play a 
vital role in directing oil production policies. The size of AGS' oil 
revenue surpluses which have resulted (in the recent period during 
which the countries rather than oil companies have made the decisions) 
from the difference between revenues derived from oil and gas exports 
and those countries domestic needs have been determined not only by 
economic desires for Regional and International investment but also by 
a wider sense of AGS responsibilities towards Arab development as 
well as to the international economic community. 
In other words itseems that the AGS oil production policies have 
been adopted for broad commercial reasons strongly influenced by socio-
political factors, political inputs, rather than conceived in strict 
economic terms. Current oil and gas production and development in AGS 
is not even determined by a depletion policy. 
Oil and investment policies are therefore better described within 
two general parameters: 
"An upper limit on the rate of extraction and monetization 
of petroleum is set jointly by the expected rate of real 
growth (i.e. y~~d) of international investments and of 
real capital formation in AGS domestic activities. A lower 
li~it on the extraction of petroleum will be the irr-
educible energy needs of industrial clients abroad and 
domestic needs." ( 14) 
Since AGS' petroleum production policies can be_ observed already 
to be taking into consideration wide international economic needs, it 
would be logical to set the related financial surpluses and the linked 
potential development within a similarly wide regional and international 
context, i.e. the trilateral approach to development cooperation. 
A cooperative strategy for oil and gas production could then 
appear, based on AGS development needs, recognising the present facts of 
international involvement, and consciously programming a trileral approach. 
In order to pave the way for such an operational strategy joint under-
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standing is vital between the highest policy makers among the three 
circles, based upon the enormous potentials to translating trilateral 
interests into development reality in an equitable manner. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait seem to play jointly the pi voted' role 
in oil production policies within the international responsibility 
conside:r'ations and their reflections on oil revenue surpluses and invest-
ment activities. 
"If Saudi Arabian policy remains committed to meeting 
the world's rising import needs fully, it alone will 
have to bear most of the burden of expanding supply 
from the middle or even early eighties onwards. The 
Saudis, in such circumstances, might look for some 
assistance from elsewhere in supporting further growth -
in the world economy, and in its imports of crude oil. 
If so, the first fellow-member to whom Saudi Arabia might 
turn to seek such burden-sharing might logically be its 
neighbour Kuwait, with its greater potential to expand 
production and even capacity more readily than any 
other exporter except the Kingdom itself." (15) 
(See also Chapter 1, Table 1.7.) 
The political factor international responsibility appeared very 
~, 
clearly in the Saudi oil output increase. following the Gulf War as -7 
reflected in Table 14.7. 
~ First 
-:;·- -... 
Saudi Arabia 7.7 
Kuwait 1.9 
Iraq 2.4 
Sub Total 12 
Iran 5.6 
Table 14.7 
Oil Production 
(Million barrel/day) 
1978 ~ 
half_ Second First _Second 
8.9 9.2 9.8 
2.9 3.3 3.5 
2.3 2.6 2.5 ----' 
14.1 15.1 15.8 
4.9 2.5 3.7 
I 
I 
Source: Sadiq, A.T. 'Monetary and Financial Policies and Arab Development 
in the Eighties', Arab Planning Institute, Seminar 1979/80 
on Arab Development Realms in the Eighties. Kuwait, Jan. 1981, 
p. 324. 
14.3.3 Concept of Financial Assets and Surpluses 
In assessing the real economic value of accumulated financial 
assets it is very important to avoid the misleadinmyused meaning of 
surpluses in the case of AGS. 
1. The. accumulated large financial assets of AGS are not a 
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reflection of industrial and technological power and productivity as is 
the case with most of developed OECD countries. It is rather the 
product of the depletion of natural assets and their conversion into 
financial assets, which must then be used to create real assets, both 
physical (infrastructure, industrial capacity, etc.) or human (education, 
training and improved health conditions). 
2. Investment and Placement: The term investment has been used in 
the.:economic literature to describe both activities relating to r-:i ther 
financial portfolios and direct investment or those relating to the 
process of addition to capital goods. However, this use seems to be 
misleading, as it is of vital importance to identify the difference 
between two different kinds of activity. The first type essentially 
means no more than the growth of financial assets in a broad spectrum 
including all liquid money and quasi-money, less liquid securities, 
as well as the still more illiquid claims and debts. Such activities 
should logically be called 'placement'. By contrast the second type 
of activities are directed towards the use of financial surpluses to add 
to capital goods should be termed 'investment'~ ( 16) 
Although, the term 'investment' will be taken to mean both Lypes, 
examination of the strategy will clarify both types. 
Kuwait has now the most sophisticated financial sector in the Gulf 
area and it occupies also an important place in the Regional and Inter-
national market. 
The Kuwaiti Dinar is thought to have been emerged as the third 
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most important bond market in 1978 after those in Dollars and Deutchmarks. (17) 
The financial sector in Kuwait comprises the Central Bank, seven 
commercial banks, (18) three specialized banks, nineteen investment 
companies and five insurance and reinsurance companies. 
Kuwait as a Trilateral Financial Centre: 
The role of Kuwait as a Sub-regional, Regional, as well as 
International financial centre has received the main attention so far of 
financial specialists. Kuwaiti financial institutions also play a 
growing role within the Gulf and broader Arab circles as well as the 
International circle through their financial reserves and assets being 
invested abroad. The consolidated balance sheets of the Kuwaiti financial 
institutions, show that whilst investment companies hold as much as 60% 
of their total assets in foreign assets, about half of the commercial 
banks' total assets are in foreign holdings, which also represent a 
quarter of the assets of specialized banks which have a special domestic 
mandate. (19) 
14.4 Finance and Investment Cooperation in the Sub-region 
As we have seen, the AGS, with their considerable financial surpluses 
have been able to build up their financial sector. This is not only one 
of the leading sectors in their national economies but also is playing now 
and will in the future a vital role in the Sub-regional, Regional and 
International circles. Some specialization has been eme~ging_ as noted in 
Chapters 5 and 12, Kuwait as a capital market, Bahrain as a money market, 
whilst Saudi Arabia is promoting the growth of Islamic banking and 
associated financial activities. The case of Kuwait in particular 
illustrates the growing financial maturity which is now developing. 
The State of Kuwait, the first Gulf oil producing country to take 
full ownership of its oil sector, leads the other Galf countries in 
establishing the necessary financial institutions capable of directly 
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dealing with its petro-dollars. Currently Kuwaiti investment 
institution agencies manage more than 50% of such funds, while at the 
same time instructions are given to foreign agencies on how to invest 
their money. (20) Abudhabi, Saudi Arabia, and even Oman are following 
the lead of Kuwait towards managing their own oil funds, whilst Qatar 
and Bahrain also are pressing for greater control. 
The process of gaining control over assets is accelerating as money 
filters down to private Arab investors. 
They now hold according to some estimates, about 17 percent of 
the ~ 350 billion of external assets held by oil producing countries, 
i.e. some ~ 59 billion and they are prepared to use these funds externally 
and aggressively. 
"Just like their demands for larger shares of the 
profits in refining of crude oil, the Arabs are now 
talking about 'refining' their petro-dollars through 
their own financial institutions to increase the 
profits from their 'crude capital'." (21) 
says Nichol Krul, general manager of Gulf and Occidental of Geneva, a 
money management company for UAE and other Arab countries. 
In Kuwait in particular there is a new breed of aggressive and 
outward=looking Arab money managers, who are prepared not only to be 
present in foreign transactions but to participate in them. (22) 
In discussing the possibilities of the Kuwaiti Dinar playing a larger 
international role that might reflect positively on its development, 
El-Beblaw$ believes that the Kuwaiti Dinar can, successfully, serve as an 
international unit of account, even if it could not fulfil any reserve 
asset function bectK.?se: 
"Not only because the Kuwaiti economy is extremely 
small and hardly diversified, but it is also because 
it is technically difficult to make the K.D. available 
for international transactions." (23) 
El-Beblawi believes that if Kuwait succeeded in establishing the Kuwaiti 
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Dinar as an increasingly acceptable unit of account, this followed by 
an ability to insist on len~ing only in K.D. this would remove the first 
danger of the erosion of her financial assets.(24) 
This evolving situation illustrates what has been achieved outside 
the national circle already by Kuwait and what other potential development 
of the financial sector is open to the AGS as a whole. 
14.5 Investment Within the Regional Circle 
14.5.1 Background 
The preceding analysis in Chapters 9 and 13 on motivation for 
regional cooperation illustrated the potential for wider and more efficient 
productive investment activities for Arab Gulf States that are available 
through regional cooperation. Examples of sectoral cooperation 
opportunities have been examined with respect to agriculture and industrial 
sectors. 
From Chapter 13 economic considerations as well as a sense of 
regional responsibility and international circles calls for efforts to be 
directed towards lessening the gap among rich and poor countries, together 
appear to strengthen the incentive for AGS to invest within the Arab region. 
In this section we discuss some important issues fundamental to a 
sound understanding of the operational aspects of cooperation within the 
Regional circle. 
Although the Regional circle mainly includes the Arab region, in 
this discussion, it does not necessarily exclude other developing countries 
in general and the Islamic world in particular. 
Many economists and financial specialists in the Arab world consider 
the Arab region to be the most suitable outlet for Arab financial surpluses. 
Nashashibi strongly supported this belief for the following reasons: 
"The only reasonable outlets for Arab oil producers to 
achieve a meaningful degree of direct productive investment 
lie within the Arab region itself. A strong economic 
consideration emerges, besides the political and social, to 
harmonize the long-term investment interest of the oil 
producers with the development needs and potentials of 
the capital-needy countries in the region." (25) 
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However, a sound approach to regional and international investment 
activities should rely heavily on practical economic as well as political 
considerations which influence the investor's decision in relation to his 
sense of regional identity and the type of investment considered. The 
investor compares both political and economic dangers to and expected 
real returns on his ventures when deciding to invest in either or any 
of the available circles. What then, in broad terms, are the 
conditions which tend to encourage AGS investment within the Region. 
14.5.2 The Basis for AGS Investment within the Region 
By and large oil surplus funds have been, as will be seen in the 
coming analysis, hitherto placed in OECD countries, even though some 
maintain that the Regional circle provide joint-directed investments of 
AGS with the best comparative advantage in relation to profitability and 
security. 
However, there remain many constraints facing such investments. In 
the Arab countries a draft general agreement for the encouragement of the 
flow of Arab capital into the Arab world was prepared by the General 
Secretariat of the Arab League and was submitted to the Economic and 
Social Council in its session of February 1980. However, ratification was 
delaYed for more studies and consultations. The general reluctance to 
sign such agreement, does not necessarily reflect-the absence of an Arab 
will to invest within the region, it rather reflects a dislike of holistic 
binding agreements and a greater preference for specific projects and 
partial joint development activities, as illustrated in Chapter 6 and 
characteristic of the approach proposed here for cooperation. 
W.ith preference be]ng given to profitability and security with a 
low risk element, a minimal necessity for managerial and technical 
experience, the Arab capital exporting countries have found it sometimes 
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rationally attractive to invest in mortgages and real estate. These, 
unfortunately, encourage financial speculation which diverts resources 
to non-productive activities. This has harmed Arao economies and economic 
development and created a parasitic group of speculators. (26) 
A deficient knowledge of investment opportunities and the weakness 
of investment bodies within the Region and, above all, the negative 
and polluted political atmosphere prevailing between the Arab countries, 
have led the AGS to recycle a basic part of investments and placements 
which were channelled to Arab Investment banks and companies into OECD 
countries. 
The Arab institutional framework necessary for the achi everncJnt 
of active inter-Arab investment activities is considered to be 
insufficient, for coping with the increased accumulation of surpluses. 
The negative aspects of Arab financial institutions can be summarised 
thus: (and also see 27) 
1. Most of these institutions are relatively under capitalized, and 
therefore have a limited capacity to extend financing. 
2. Arab commercial banks, relatively under-capitalized have been largely 
involved in short-term trade finance, to the neglect of medium and long-
term project finance. 
3. Many Arab financial institutions involved in investment concentrate 
on 'placement' asopposed to 'real investment', and this predominantly in 
Western financial markets. 
4. Little effort has been spent by Arab financial institutions to 
identify, and develop Arab investment opportunities to the point of ready-
financing. Instead these functions have been mostly undertaken by 
foreign houses. 
5. Arab financial institutions in general suffer from a lack of 
sophistication in their managerial and technical capabilities in inter-
national finance and investment. 
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6. Many of the Arab financial institutions work under anachronistic 
irrelevant restrictions and regulations. 
and 
The CAEU itself has stated: 
"Arab financial mechanisms are as yet not only too 
rudimentary but also extraverted, i.e. essentially 
oriented towards the outside world." 
"Arabs must then begin by evolving a legal, economic and 
financial milieu that is reasonably homogeneous and 
offers scope for the movement of capital, men and 
products to take place with the sort of fluidity that 
has been achieved, gradually and not without difficult, 
inside the EEC." ( 28) 
The only way in which public and private Arab finance can develop 
along this path involves Regional cooperation. 
Investment in the Developing World: 
Investment in other Third World countries of AGS surpluses is 
theoretically backed by the advantage of finding wider absorptive capacity 
and more opportunities for investing in productive projects. Nashashiby 
also considers that the very process of administering AGS development 
assistance as an integral component of commercial investment would 
produce complementary benefits from development and investment outlays: 
"The combined return on the total investment can become 
attractive for Arab direct investors on commercial criteria."(29) 
In many countries in the Far East, in Brazil and Argentina, for 
example, there are hardly any restrictions on investment, and very few 
restrictions on the repatriation of funds. Unlike most countries, there 
are no obstacles to foreigners owning more than 50 percent shareholdings. (30) 
However, recent experience showed that direct investment in the 
developing countries has been associated with the following problems: (31) 
1. Direct productive investment in these countries very often implies 
that the related infrastructure also has to be supplied by the investor; 
this is hardly possible for the AGS. 
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2. The shortages of local skilled labour and managerial capability can 
be great and sometimes represents an unsurmountable bottleneck; this 
already is a constraint within the AGS. 
3. The investor in most cases has to depend on export oriented projects 
to achieve successful operating levels; again the AGS has its own 
problems in this respect. 
4. As Arab direct investment in these countries is obliged to lean on 
foreign technical collaboration much of which has to come from West~rn 
enterprises and multinationals then the role of Arab direct investors in 
many cases has been diminished to that of a silent capital provider only. 
5. Financial markets in developing countries are often rudimentary, 
ru1d direct investors would have to secure their working capital financing, 
as well as other required financing from their own resources. 
6. Foreign investment regulations, in addition to monetary and fiscal 
regulations, can be very unstable and sometimes unpredictable, whilst 
Government intervention in foreign-owned enterprises is on the increase 
in most of these countries. 
7. Finally, published regulations with respect to foreign investment 
do not, in many cases, accurately reflect the true state of prevailing 
conditions. 
Despite the many convincing arguments for Third World direct invest-
ment by the oil producers, there are considerable economic and non-
economic obstacles and risks. These have been,and will contfnue to be, 
a limiting factor to large-scale Arab direct investment in these countries. 
Analysis of investment within the broad-Regional context gives two 
important results. First there are many hindrances to and constraints on 
successful investment, including economic, social, organisational and 
legal frameworks prevailing within the Region. Unless, therefore, 
serious efforts can be made to tackle such constraints, and these may be 
within the regional capacity, the effective operational aspect of the 
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proposed regional approach to cooperation will be hindered. 
The· second relates to the need for the International circle's 
cooperation, even for investment at the Regional level. The Regional 
activities' need for international technology, managerial capacity, 
marketing and sometime financing is especially significant. The 
effectiveness of regional cooperation is determined to some extent by the 
cooperation provided from the international circle, this again supporting 
the adopted trilateral approach. We turn, now, to discuss situation 
with respect to cooperation within this third circle. 
14.6 Investment Within the International Circle 
14.6.1 Background 
In this section we will discuss the incentives for AGS to practice 
investment activities within the International Circle, using examples to 
illustrate both the opportunities for cooperation and problems that face 
such cooperation, ending by identifying the basis for successful 
cooperation. In so doing it will be valuable to refer to our earlier 
conclusions on the motivations for such cooperation as we examine the 
type and geographical distribution of AGS investment in the International 
circle. 
Potential motivation for cooperation within the third circle, both 
for Sub-regional and Regional investment purposes is created by: 
1. The technological gap: as the technological gap between all Arab 
countries and the developed world is great, cooperation between both sides 
cannot be evaluated solely in terms of commercial gains. Evaluation of returns 
must also recognise social and qualitative benefit flows from investment on the 
development process,and this could provide good, lasting and strong 
relationships. 
2. The current national based erection of industrial plants is not 
leading to viable enterprises, and is doubtful whether they meet the 
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crucial test of being able to sell profitably. Here lies a field for 
genuine partnership rather than pseudo-commercial contract relationalism 
between western enterprises and those of AGS. The dubiousness of the 
present huge expenditures on imported pe-tro-chemical plant and labour 
suggest that wise external investment is sometimes better than so-called 
domestic investment. 
3. Many analysts recognise that investment even within the Arab 
region as a whole does not offer obvious rates of return, to the active 
AGS' investor, comparable to portfolio and real estate investment in the 
industrialised countries. (32) Within the AGS Sub-region, opportunities 
are too limited; implemented expenditure in development projects, even in 
long-established sectors such as social infrastrucural provision, tends to 
fall short of investment allocations (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.3). 
Moreover, and as expressed by the Kuwaiti Minister for oil: 
"I can't imagine that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or any other 
oil producing country in a similar situation would 
undertake industrial projects merely for the sake of 
providing employment. The truth is that every 
additional job provided by a project will have to go to 
a non-national, and this will in turn entail consider-
able added investment in services and infrastructure 
Locals constitute less than 10 percent of the labour 
force." (33) 
4. Recent experience of AGS investment activities shows that the 
Arab investor, whether Government or private, has been forced to look 
abroad for financial opportunities, 
"as openings for investment in the Middle East were 
limited, and the sums involved were, and still are, 
simply too large for a single region to absorb, whether 
the opportunities and expertise available locally." (34) 
5. The following reasons tend to support investment cooperatiort with 
Western industrialized countries: (35) 
1. Western economies have achieved, during a prolonged period of 
development and innovation, outstanding technological breakthroughs from 
which direct investors can benefit indirectly. Such technology is 
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greatly demanded by the relatively under-developed oil-exporting countries 
(see Chapter 10, section 10.7). 
2. Direct investments in developed countries will undoubtedly contribute 
towards the growing need for final products that are imported by the 
oil-exporting countries, committed as they are to ambitious development 
plans which require a wide range of producer·· and consumer goods primarily 
exported by Western countries. 
3. Western economies represent large marketing outlets for most 
products as compared to such outlets in developing countries. The 
average demand of one European city may well exceed that of a whole 
African state. In addition, Western economies have advanced infra-
structure (transportation, communications, and so forth) which improve 
the quality and profitability of these markets (see Chapter 10, section 
10.6.2). 
4. The financial markets of the West cater efficientiy to working 
capital needs as well as to the diverse financial requirements of Western 
corporations. 
Given this situation and the unsatisfied demand for capital ih 
the industrialised developed countries the mutual benefits which would 
come from internationalcooperation are clear. Many cases of collaboration 
between financial institutions are already known. 
Joint Arab-European banking institutions have proved to be of vital 
importance in motivationg the creation of financial initrative in the Arab 
world. 
-, 
"In fact, once the European-Arab consortium banks.such as 
UBAF, BALL and European Arab Bank have fulfilled their 
training purpose and produced a new generation of 
experienced middle managers with the aim of rising to the 
top of world banking, the scope of action of western 
financial institutions will be limited since the field 
will be clear for the private commercial banks of the 
Arab world."(3fi) 
Joint Arab-foreign banks have been playing a vital role in advising 
the Arab Investor towards various fields and types of investments abroad 
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in addition to their role as a mediator in chanelling the Arab surplus 
money into viable investments. (37) 
14.6.2 Types of Recent Investment of Financial Surpluses 
In the following we will illustrate recent trends of investments 
by their types and financial market areas. Information on the dis-
position of the current account surpluses of the oil exporting countries 
including AGS continues to be uncertain, as noted in the IMF Annual 
Report of 1981, due to the lack of complete balance of payments statistics 
for some members and similar gaps in the coverage of other data for AGS.(38) 
(See also Chapter 7,) 
It has already been made clear that AGS' financial resources 
surpass the capacity of most AGS efficiently to absorb them in the form 
of physical capital formation. As a result surplus financial resources 
were channelled abroad, invested in various forms and have been distributed 
within many international financial circles. A substantial volume of 
petro-dollars have flowed to non-Arab Muslim countries and other 
developing nations, as well as to the industrialized west in one form 
or another, e.g. bank deposits, fixed interest securities, shares, 
property, direct financial, commercial or industrial ventures and joint 
companies and banks. As information on the deployment of AGS' financial 
surpluses is not available in much detail, we have to rely mainly on the 
available information on Opec investments. (39) 
International Deployment of OPEC's Financial Surpluses: 
Estimates of the deployment of the Opec's financial surplus 
identified in 1980 and during the years 1974-1980 are shown in Table 14.8 
and Table 14.9. The salient points are these: 
- 60% of all financial surpluses have been deposited with U.S., U.K. and 
other industrial countries' banks (W. Germany, Switzerland, France and 
Japan), with U.K. euro-currency deposits taking up 42.4% of total 
surpluses, U.S. with 16.6%. 
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Table.14.8 
Deployment of OPEC's Identified Financial Surpluses 1980 and 1974-1980 
(i billion and %) 
- U.S. (domestic) 
Bank deposit and other portfolio 
Other 
- U.K. (domestic) 
Sterling Bank deposits 
Other 
Bank deposits in other countries 
U.K. euro currency bank deposits 
Other industrial countries 
- International organisations and gold 
- Other 
Investment in other industrial 
countries 
Loans to developing countries 
- Total Identified 
1980 
~ billion 
14.5 
13.0 
1.5 
3.3 
1.4 
1.9 
45.9 
14.8 
31.1 
4.9 
21.6 
16.5 
5.1 
90.2 
% 
-( 16.1) 
(14.4) 
( 1. 7) 
( 3.7) 
( 1.6) 
( 2.1) 
(50.9) 
( 5. 4) 
(23.9) 
(100) 
1974-1980 
~ billion 
59.74 
53.54 
6.20 
12.90 
3.80 
9.10 
137.0 
54.2 
82.8 
14.4 
98.7 
322.74 
% 
(18.5) 
(16.6) 
( 1.9) 
4.0) 
(42.4) 
( 4.5) 
(30.G) 
(100) 
Source: Ghalib, S. Op. cit. Based on World Bank, OECD, U.S. Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve Statistical Releases and U.S. 
Department of Commerce Survey of Current Business. 
Table 14.9 
OPEC's Identified Financial Surpluses: Bank deposits vs. other investments 
and flows 1979-1980 
Identified financial surplus 
Bank deposits 
Other 
U.S. (domestic) 
Portfolio investments 
Other 
U.K. Investment 
(i billion) 
Other Industrialized countries 
Loans to LDCs 
International Organisations and gold 
Source: Ghalib, S. Op. cit., Exhibit 1.10, p. 16. 
- 1979 1980 
60.9 90.2 
40.0 46.1 
20.9 44.1 
2.0 15.7 
(3.3) (14.2) 
(-1.3) (1. 5) 
1.0 1.9 
8.7 16.5 
9.6 5.1 
-0.4 4.9 
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- Other portfolio placements including Treasury bonds, notes and 
private notes, domestic stocks totalled only 5 percent. 
- International organisations and gold totalled 4.5 percent. 
- Investment in other industrialized countries, constituted 30.6 percent 
of OPEC's financial surpluses. 
- 1980 changes over 1979 witnessed a noticeable increase of placements 
in U.S. with direct investment rising nearly five fold from $ 35 million 
in 1979 to ~ 173 million in 1980. 
After the U.S. (non-bank deposits) investments in and loans to 
other industrial countries notably W. Germany and Japan also rose remarkebly 
by ~ 7.8 billion. (40) 
Consequently, a change towards non-bank deposit investments, 
mainly direct investment seem to be emerging. 
Of this major part of OPEC financial surpluses which have been 
channelled into western countries, a considerable percentage has been 
placed in highly liquid forms, but this is beginning to change. 
The main forms of AGS investments abroad now include: 
1. Equities: Insisting on getting a better return on their cash, both 
Governments and wealthy individuals have been showing readyiness to invest 
far more money in equity and equity related investments, thus moving 
toward longer-term investments and away from their normal, short-term 
investments of weeks or months. In addition, they are seeking more 
balanced diversification. (41) 
Recent moves into stock ownership entails greater involvement in 
control and management entails. Kuwait has pioneered the way in managing 
their own money, the most financially sophisticated of the AGS and always 
more inclined towards equity and property. It is thought that: 
"the days of passive investment in Government bonds and 
notes will very soon be over."(42) 
Almost as a rule, Arab Governments- limit their equity participation 
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in Western companies to small, unobtrusive holdings which are easily 
disposable. Thus Kuwait the most sophisticated investor, owns 4.9 percent 
of the equity of hundreds of leading American coporations a level just 
below the level at which full disclosure is required by the securities 
and exchange commission. (43) 
Indeed major acquisitions have been very rare considering the amount 
of funds available. Some of these rare deals that are known are Kuwait's 
1974 takeover of Britain's St. Martin's Property Corporation and a 15 
percent stake in Daimler Benz, along with shareholdings in German Steel 
Companies and in Japanese Corporations. (44) 
2. Bond Market: This traditional short-term investment with no less 
than 30 percent of Arabs' Petro-dollars Assets, is becoming less 
popular because of the depreciation of some currencies and the eroding 
of profits because of inflRtion. 
3. Stock Market: It is noticeable that stock markets are attracting more 
attention, with high technology industries expected to exert a growing 
attraction to Arab money in spite of the heavy development costs involved. 
This type of investment is often welcomed by the major industrialized 
countries, as Arab money has been investing in such industries as petro-
chemicals, electronics and pharmaceuticals. (45) 
The Distribution of Investment: 
In broad terms we will explore the general distribution of Arab 
financial investments between various finanncial centrS!s,. 
,/--
United States of America: 
/ 
I 
tThe United States has been receiving important components of all 
I 
Arab capital exporting countries in the form of financial investments, 
i 
since\it has a tremendous capacity for absorbing finance and great flexibility 
in its money markets. As shown in Table 14.~ 18.5 percent of OPEC 
financial surpluses (1974-1980) were invested in the U.S. 
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Type of Investment in the U.S.A.: 
Mark Liland, Assistant Budget Secretary for international Affairs 
announced that OPEC total investments in the United States reached at the 
end of June 1981, 69,790 million dollars, distributed as follows:(46) 
u.s. million 34,910 in Government Financial liabilities represented 50 percent 
II II 6,150 in company bonds ) 
) 21 percent 
II II 8,470 in company shares) 
II II 13,870 deposits with banks 20 percent 
II II 617 in direct investment 1 percent 
II II 5,773 other forms 
The very small cumulative share of direct investment is obvious. 
However, as information relating to foreign investments is of special 
confidentiality, it is difficult to get the accurate information of flows 
other than these shown in the published figures. However, David Mizrahi 
Editor in Chief of Middle East Report, New York, thinks that official 
Orte 
statistics of U.S. financial authorities disclose only between;third and one 
fourth the actual figures. He said that Saudi Arabia investments in the 
U.S. might have reached 100 billion dollars, Kuwait 55 billion and UAE 
45 billion. (47) 
Other Areas: 
British markets are well known to most Arab investors, but there is 
general recognition that the pound sterling is over-valued and many 
investors move away from investment in British industry as a result of 
its recent poor productivity record.(48) 
Within the 'free financial zone' whose activity lies outside the 
frontiers of countries, three main instruments of debt has been known 
ranging from short to medium and long term; London dollar Certificates of 
Deposits (CDs) represent the most important of short term instruments 
while eurocredits are medium term and eurobonds long term. Since all 
these are exempted from withholding taxes and foreign exchange 
restrictions, the international investor, including the Arab investor 
has taken a special interest in these outlets. 
"After surveying actual conditions prevailing in these 
markets, we can safely conclude that they have always 
been rather limited in capacity, particularly with 
regard to medium and long term investments."(49) 
Japan with a relative strong economy and currency (Yen), within 
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OECD countries, a large absorptive capacity and industrial development, 
is thought now to be attracting more Arab investments. The limits of 
U.S. and Europe financial markets to continuing absorption of oil countries' 
financial surpluses, and Arab investors' outlook to get acquainted with 
the other part of OECD, are also motivating factors to invest in and \vi th Japan. 
14.6.3 Broad Aspects of International Investment Cooperation 
Three basic issues are considered here in ord.er to illustrate the 
types of and basis for viable cooperation. These include first some 
examples on potential cooperation fields; second reference is made to some 
problems facing such cooperation and the third includes thf~ broad ba:;i:: 
for successful cooperation. The last two issues are formulated jointly 
under the basis for successful cooperation. 
14.6.3.1 Examples on Potential Cooperation: 
1. One of the most important areas for cooperation between financial 
institutions in both groups include interchange of technically qualified 
staff between these instit~tions. In certain particular financial fields 
where there is a shortage of people with adequate experience exchange of 
staff as well as the training of Arab staff in western institutions would 
greatly improve efficiency, for instance as foreign exchange operations. 
2. Assistance from foreign institutions and organisations may be 
needed at several stages of investment of projects' development. 
Initially, foreign organisations may be involved in undertaking feasibility 
studies. The next stage is the cooperation in the supply of plant and 
technical know-how. When the project is completed, however, there 
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remains ample need for cooperation, especially in management and 
marl<eting; development of management know-how is an essential ingredient 
of long term cooperation. Such interaction also helps to extend the 
frontiers of knowledge and, in turn, the quality of goods and services 
thus produced. 
3. Within the trilateral approach, AGS-Arab and international joint 
investments in development projects within the region in conjunction with 
technology supplied with western countries represent one of the major 
avenues to true financial recycling in the Arab region and the rest of 
the world. 
"The modality envisages that AGS would provide a 
substantial part of the capital funds for joint projects, 
while the non-oil producing country furnishes land 
and infrastructure facilities. Western countries 
would provide the needed technology and equipment and 
would possibly take part in financing." (50) 
In this way, absorptive capacity in the region could be increased 
significantly through the effects of cooperative process on some of the 
most important factors covered by this concept; ente~preneurial and 
managerial capabilities, technical know-how, marketing and demand 
opportunities.(51) 
14.6.3.2 The Basis for Successful Cooperation: 
In the light of recent experience on Euro-Arab cooperation, some 
specific points need to be tackled before any honest long term successful 
cooperation can be established within the third circle. 
The first point relates to business behaviour. Businessmen in 
dev~loped countries are, until now, thought to have been largely trade 
minded';-, concentrating on selling. It is becoming realised that in both 
\ 
\ 
sides' longer term interest they must become development-minded also.(52) 
Eukopean companies have been critized to have too often in the past 
/ 
I loa::; at development in the Arab world from a purely 
~------------
"short term profit point of view to the detriment 
of the Arab economies concerned. It cannot be a 
coincidence that the vast majority of feasibility 
studies prepared for the Arab world have grossly 
underestimated the cost of the project and, at the 
same time, grossly overestimated market demand. 
Moreover, these studies are too often ill conceived 
and incomplete in their technical details. Such 
experience leads to a lack of trust between us and 
is in nobody's interest in the long run."(53) 
The second point relates to discrimination in pricing. Imported 
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inflation to AGS is perceived by them to be a growing danger and in this 
context a comparison can be made between the rise in the. weighted 
consumer price index of the ten most important industrial countries with 
the increases monitored by OPEC in the prices of commodities imported. 
"The combined consumer price index of the industrial 
countries showed the following rises: 12.5 percent in 
1974; 10.9 percent in 1975; 7.9 percent in 1976. 
The price rises of commodities imported into the 
OPEC countries appear to be much higher: 55 percent 
from 1973 to the end. of the first quarter 1975; 
followed by another 21 percent to the end of the first 
quarter 1976 and a further 30 percent between mid-
1976 and mid-1977." (54) 
Although the two price series are not fully comparable for a number 
of technical reasons, the OPEC study concluded by saying: 
"When we observe the consistently large difference 
between the price increase charged to OPEC countries 
and the price increases in commodities traded between 
the industrialized countries, we are bound to conclude 
that an element of price discrimination in trade between 
the industrialized countries and OPEC countries as a 
group has existed for some time. "_(55) 
This trend led Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Minister of Planning, to 
advise that: 
"Suppliers, and those who provide finance to manufacturers 
and exporters, should seek to establish longer term 
positions rather than attempt to cream off high 
profits on a 'fast bulk' basis."(56) 
The third point covers the question of European concern as to the 
potential cconomlc and political influence·that might accrue to the Arabs 
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through the investment of their petr-dollars. This concern is under-
standable, but there are many signs providing that the behaviour of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar Governments in the international markets 
and the extent of aid given by Arab countries to developing countries, 
reflect a full commitment to international responsibility rather than 
to purely selfish interests. 
"Total resources have multiplied tenfold to 
i 25,000 million, and lending by Arab funds now covers 
the entire developing world, with loans for projects 
now functional in 78 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, southern Europe and the Caribbean. In the UAE, 
disbursements for foreign aid comprise 10.2 percent 
of the gross national product, in Kuwait 5.3 percent 
and in Saudi Arabia 5.2 percent. This compares to the 
recommended OECD percentage for its member countries 
of 0.75 percent of GNP. Surely this aspect of Arab 
investment must be given the attention it deserves, for 
it is this that can contribute in a truly meaningful 
way to the development of Arab-European cooperation." (57) 
The fourth point relates to the recent emerging state of uncertainty 
for international investments which has resulted from many restrictions 
on international capital transactions. The changing balance of payments 
situation, especially for the major industrial countries have been 
significant factors in determining capital controls. This experv-_··ience 
has been accompanied, also with the imposition, against foreign investors, 
at any time, of controls or limits on investment returns. The adverse 
impact of controls can be seen to operate by affecting both risk and 
rate of return for the investing countries. By distorting investments 
patterns, these controls could have an adverse impact on the countries 
in which investments could be made as well as the investors themselves. 
Examples of national laws that affect the rate of return on international 
investments are seen in terms of special taxes on foreign-owned investments, 
limitations of repatriation of profits and interest. These include 
equalization taxes on foreigners' investments and special withholding 
taxes on interest and dividends paid to foreigners that are not applied 
\ 
l 
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to citizens. These taxes reduce the rate of return to investments 
(see Chapter 9) and discourage investment itself. 
The above situation creates certain limits on investment and joint 
cooperation within the international circle and, therefore, necessitate 
a joint effort to reform the framework, particularly the legal aspects, 
of investment activities. 
To summarise, it is of vital importance, on the light of recent 
experience of Euro-Arab Cooperation aspects, that discrimination in 
pricing for imported commodities or, technology, should be avoided and 
seen to be avoided. Coopeation should be based on long term and 
development-oriented viewpoints which take into consideration AGS socio-
psychological development. Legal reforms are needed to remove the present 
state of uncertainty and mistrust. Otherwise it will be very difficult 
to create a healthy environment for investment cooperation. 
14.7 Investment Strategy within a Trilateral Approach 
Assuming the continuation of the build up of oil revenue surplus 
to the actual financial needs of AGS local economies, as well as payments 
for goods and services, the following objectives for AGS' investment 
strategy are proposed: 
1. The build up of technological know-how, managerial and marketing 
experience needed to strengthen the base for the post-oil era • 
. 
2. Establishing real income generating projects within the three 
circles to substitute for the comparatively weak productive opportunities 
within the Sub-region. Medium and long term investments are necessary 
here. 
3. Investment returns that can continue to be available to finance 
AGS' Government expenditures, either developmental or current. 
The following directions are proposed for investment activities 
in order to achieve the above objectives: 
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1. Priority should be given for long term investments located in the 
Arab region while benefitting, at the same time, from international 
inputs mainly in technology and management of these projects. Special 
attention should be given to agriculture for the reasons outlined in 
Chapters 9 and 13. The Sudan project is typical of the projects that 
seem to be reasonable within this context (see Chapter 13). The pre-
requisites in the field of infrastructure must be satisfied before 
successful and long term regional investment activities for AGS can be 
guaranteed. 
2. AGS investments in the developed world, particularly Europe, USA, 
and Japan, should, for medium and long term benefit, be designed to 
tap, firstly, technological managerial and marketing experience and 
marketing outlets, and be less concerned at achieving immediate 
profit. Even in the medium term genuinely profitable opportunities would 
be more likely to be created in this way. 
Consequently, it seems justifiable to concentrate on direct share-
holding, but within certain limits, for instance up to 10%, appropriate 
to AGS' existing administrative capacities. Choice should be centred 
on activities with larger inputs of technology, including managerial skills, 
and research. particularly for those activities which match with AGS' needs. 
3. General investment principles should nevertheless be maintained 
with different priorities allotted accordance with the balance of 
- -
objectives associated with each type of investment. These three principles 
are security, profitability (return) and liquidity. 
In maintaining the principle of security for the financing of imports 
of goods and services, some financial resources should be directed to 
placements primarily assuring liquidity and security and only secondarily 
the rate of return. 
The remaining resources can be invested on a medium and long term 
basis, geographically distributed for reasons of security and in the light 
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of considerations mentioned above. 
AGS investment ventures jointly with developed world but to be 
located in the developing world seem to be justified by the facts of 
availability of labour forces and of markets, particularly for industrial 
ventures. 
An up-to-date example can be given of this. Nomura Securities, 
Japan's largest securities house, is working on a plan to 'recycle' 
Arab oil money into Japanese investment projects to establish joint 
venture light industries in China. The main idea behind such a trend is 
"to combine petro-dollars with Japanese technology 
and Chinese resources and labour. Nomura and its think-
tank subsidiary would provide the financing expertise and 
carry out studies on the feasibility of joint ventures."(58) 
The industries being considered include plywood, textiles and light 
machinery such as sewing machines.(59) 
14.8 Summary and Conclusions: The Trilateral Approach for AGS Investment 
Strategy 
Part Four of this thesis has been devoted mainly to exploring a 
pragmatic approach to functional aspects of AGS cooperation i.e. what can 
be termed 'vertical' aspects. Practical and operational elements in 
functional development cooperation were considered and some examples were 
included. In Chapters 13 and 14 in particular there was defined a pragmatic 
approach judged to be viable and appropriate to the AGS' case when designed 
on the basis of 'piece-meal, development-oriented and programmed 
cooperation'. 
Part Three concerning the geo-economic, spatial aspects of development 
cooperation, i.e. the horizontal plane of cooperation led to the need 
to examine operational aspects of the proposed approach. 
Chapter 13 concentrated-on the sectoral operational characteristics 
of the proposed approach with special reference to agriculture and from 
which it was demonstrated how development cooperation through a deliberately 
593 
selective approach to specific problems - i.e. the piece-meal approach, 
and, for example, food production for food security, but also through 
medium or long term programming, could operate. 
The particular example of the application of this approach to food 
production also indicated that it could lead more valuably to structural 
changes, rather than merely commercial changes, both in the Sub-region 
and the Region. The AAAID programme is a striking applied example 
of the pragmatic approach proposed, illustrating the 'vertical' functioning 
aspects and the Trilateral 'horizontal' elements. 
Such programmes and operations require key inputs through investment. 
The argument therefore, proceeded to lay-down the basis for a rational 
and practical strategy for AGS investment as the main driving force for 
the whole cooperation movement. 
As investment strategy constitutes the cornerstone for the 
application of the proposed approach, it was important to examine quantitative 
aspects of AGS finances, in particular the oil-exporting countries' 
financial surpluses. A conceptual framework of inter-relations between 
oil production policies and the process of investment of derived 
financial surpluses was outlined and an important and highly relevant 
distinction was drawn between 'placement' and 'investment' are built. 
Within the Sub-region successful cooperation can include the trends 
towards both the coordination of its financial industry and its internal 
specialization. The trilateral based components of the AGS' emerging 
industry of finance, were also seen to be necessary for future progress. 
Investment activities within the Region were analysed in terms of 
their advantages and constraints, the region understood to extend to non-
Arab developing countries in some respects. Reference was made to the 
basic conditions for successful AGS investment activities within the 
region, but analysis also proved the need for AGS investment coopeation 
within the International circle. 
In exploring the key conditions for successful AGS investment 
activities within the International circle, current investment trends 
were identified together with the incentives for cooperation as well as 
the associated problems. 
We can conclude that the AGS' financial surpluses that have been 
created and are likely to continue in the foreseeable future have been 
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the driving force behind the creation of a strong financial industry 
within the AGS, based on investment activities. This industry in itself 
has its own direct and indirect vital effects on the economic development 
of AGS and their post-oil era strategy. The further development of this 
industry should make the optimum use of and benefit from the Three Circles. 
Continued Sub-regional cooperation and specialization is beneficially 
compatible with cooperatively pooling financial resources for investment 
in productive activities within the Region. At the same time the AGS 
need to rationalise their placements and direct investments within the 
International circle, in particular for Sub-regional and Regional 
technological advancement. A pre-condition for all this is a healthy 
politico-contractual-legal atmosphere, and if this is to be achieved 
then serious high-level efforts in Trilateral cooperation need to be made. 
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CHAPTER 15 - CONCLUSION 
The research on which this thesis is based was dedicated to an 
exploration for the most viable approach to and for Arab Gulf States' 
development cooperation. In order to establish a sound research 
methodology it was found necessary to discard a great part of recently 
expressed and published opinions relating to this and associated 
subjects as being founded on prejudicep lack of realism and blind 
imitation of approaches to cooperation designed for other purposes 
and other regions. 
The.topic relates directly and indirectly to the heart of the most 
important and fateful question facing the AGS in their development drive. 
This drive necessarily involves the diversification of their economies, 
in order to achieve the optimum benefits during what is essentially a 
transition period between the pre- and post-oil eras. This in turn means 
the build up of self-sustaining economic growth and development whichp 
founded on a solid and diversified economic base, can be maintained even 
when oil and gas derived wealth declines. 
In order to establish whether and how cooperation can significantly 
' contribute to such a development processp it was important to lay down 
the basis on which a secure and meaningful take-off could occur. Part 
One of this thesis was therefore dedicated to the examination of the 
structure of AGS' resource base and their development achievements to date. 
It is an obvious and fundamental fact that the various aspects of a 
development cooperation movement as well as the design of a viable 
approach to such a movement should be based on the structural characteristics 
as well as the structural needs of these countries. 
As analysis proceeded it was found that the AGS development 
movement and its structure already involves a wide range of development 
cooperationp activities which have been directed to three 'geo-economic 
circles', the Sub-region, the Arab region, and International. This 
situation necessitated examining the main features of development 
activities and economic relations within these three circles in order 
to establish where the AGS stand. This examination and evaluation, 
conducted in Part Two was of special relevance to the process of 
identi.fying and designing a proposed approach to AGS development 
cooperation. 
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During this phase of analysis, many signs emerged of the existence 
of strong potential motivation to cooperation, based on a •trilateral' 
approach involving all three gee-economic circles. The examination of 
the scenario of recent cooperation development within the three circles 
also established the basic facts about the kind of approach which would 
seem to be most viable for the AGS and showed also to what extent 
economic relationships actually necessitate a trilateral strategy for 
cooperation. 
The above findings motivated further analysis of the real needs 
of the AGS for development cooperation, in the light of recent economic 
theories and literature relevant to the question of cooperation. Thus, 
Part Three was devoted to explore more fully the potential motivations for 
AGS cooperation within the three circles, based mainly on their 
development needs and the availability of development determinants. 
·Selective sectoral analysis, was carried out, especially of agriculture, 
industry in addition to an examination of some key development determinants 
such as labour and markets. Questions relating to absorptive capacity 
and economics of scale were discussed in their relevance to AGS 
development needs and constraints. 
It appeared therefore from the analytical sequence of Parts One to 
Three that not only is there strong potential moti va·_ tion for AGS 
cooperation but there is also evidence that the AGS are in some respects 
trannforming into reaLity this potential motivation to cooperation within 
the three circles. 
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Up to this point an emphasis had appeared on the 'horizontal' 
basis for development cooperation, i.e. on the spatially defined geo-
economic circles of the Sub-region, Region and International. Attention 
needed to be turned to what can be termed the 'vertical' aspect, i.e. 
the functional and morphological characteristics of development cooperation. 
Relevant questions include: which, if any, of the already known forms 
of economic cooperation or integration are appropriate to the AGS?; 
what may be learnt from the functioning of actual examples of economic 
cooperation or integration that will help to design an operationally 
successful approach for the AGS? 
Part Four was devoted largely to an examination of these subj~cts 
and the need emerged to discuss the basic aspects of investment strategy. 
\ 
In the case of the AGS the field of finance and investment is especiall1 
important, both in the context of trilateral cooperation, and of the 1 
\ 
structure of AGS economies. '" Thus the structure of the arguments--
developed in this thesis became completed. 
It should be noted that this research has concentrated, in the 
main, on only one decade, that of the nineteen seventies. It is the 
author's belief that this period of time has been of critical importance 
as it witnessed the most dramatic and meaningful development achievements 
in the AGS; it has witnessed also the application of many forms of 
development cooperation, either within the AGS Sub-region or within the 
Arab-region. During this period of time there have also occurred the 
most dramatic developments with respect to AGS' international economic 
relationships particularly with regard to petroleum trade and investment. 
Political international relationships have had no less significant 
characteristics. Consequently, from the point of view of time, the 
period of the 'seventies can be held to have probably shaped the whole 
of the AGS development prospects for the foreseeable future. This shaping 
of the future, directly, and indirectly through affecting relevant 
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attitudes, must be apprec.iated in proposing an approach to cooperation 
as it provides the basis for analysing the stages of cooperation already 
reached and the prospects for further advancement. 
Each chapter of this thesis ended with a summary and preliminary 
conclusions. We turn now to establish the key findings without 
necessarily restricting examination to the previous sequence of analysis. 
1. AGS economies are characterized by many common features. In 
particular there is almost complete dependence on oil and gas and 
related activities, without any serious indication of this sector's 
decreasing importance relative to other sectors, even within the frame-
work of a deliberate diversification movement. This diversification 
movement has had but modest achievement and it is still at an infant 
stage. However, there are significant signs that the financial sector is 
becoming the driving force in a development cooperation process based upon 
investment strategy. Such a strategy reflects the growing ability of 
what can be termed the 'industry of finance' through the financialisation 
I 
finru\cial surpluses ihto 'industrial 
\ ' ,, ~-'/ 
Chapters~~. 10 _and 14). AGS have 
---~ 
of their economies, to translate AGS 
money 1 instead of • funny money 1 (see 
a strong financial position with considerable public budget and financial 
surpluses and a stable balance of payment with continuing current 
account surpluses. Kuwait and the UAE rank among the countries with the 
highest per capita incomes in the world. 
This wealth however, has not resulted from the same processes of 
wealth creation found in the history of economic development and 
advancement of the wealthy industrialized countries. Those processes 
involved the growth of real productive capacity and inter-related tech-
nological advancement which generated national savings that in turn 
stimulated sustained economic growth. The AGS could be said to have had 
financial wealth thrust upon them. 
Nevertheless, AGS develop~ent by the end of the 'seventies had some 
noticeable fulfilments in a variety of economic and social sectors. 
A wave of industrial projects, export-oriented and for import-
substitution has been spreading all over the Sub-region and even 
agricultural development has some achievements. Deeper examination ( 
and evaluation of these achievements in real terms, however, has shown 
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that within these development movements there appear drastic deficiencies, 
characteristically in the qualitative aspects of both industrial and 
agricultural development. Illustrative analysis of both sectors has shown 
the true nature of development direction and achievements. 
In AGS industrial development, despite the 'showy' big push 
reflected in the many huge industrial complexes mainly in the field of 
petrochemicals constructed or planned all over the AGS Sub-region the 
indispensible qualitative base Qncluding training facilities, research, 
technical expertise and managerial capacity) is not being given 
sufficient attention or effort. Agriculture is constrained by structural 
limitations associated in particular with the severely limited resource 
base and the whole growth in agriculture is heavily subsidized from oil 
revenue. Agricultural development has, in fact, achieved very modest 
and somewhat distorted results as illustrated by Saudi Arabia (see 
Chapters 2 and 9). The large scale and intensive use of imported labour 
at all levels up to managerial capacity in addition to the importation of 
almost all other factors of production except those relating to capital, 
energy and one group of raw-materials - hydrocarbon - particularly for 
industrial plants but also in agriculture, all this tends to negatively 
affect the development process. What is happening, very largely is 
development diversion rather than development creation. 
This distinction, recently made in economic integration theory, 
is between on the one hand, a creative situation in which economic activity 
leads to a growth of mutually supportive and growth stimulating inter-
linked operations within a system, and on the other hand, where economic 
activity is associated with few internal linkages, remains dependent 
on uncoordinated inflows of key factors from outside the system, and 
therefore can do more to encourage development outside than inside the 
system-diversion. 
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The emerging priority for the AGS, therefore, is to close the 
existing gap within the area of qualitative development activities in order 
to ensure the ability to build up real development creation rather 
than development diversion. Structurally limiting factors to AGS 
development represented by the smallness of markets, the very weak 
physical (except for oil, gas and fisheries) and human resource base 
can be shown to play a vital role in fuelling the potential motivation 
for development cooperation. 
2. Exploring the potential motivation for AGS' development cooperation, 
in the light of development determinants and with reference to particular 
sectors including agriculture and industry, it showed .that a combination 
qf economic and political factors tend to encourage AGS Sub-regional 
cooperation. The Sub-region has many attributes favourable to cooperation 
such as relative similarity of economic, social and political structures 
geographical proximity, political and security dangers. Th8 emergence 
in the Sub-region of the industry of finance increasingly inter-linked 
as well as specialising, creates a further vital opportunity to the Sub-
region for pooling their efforts relating to their financial surpluses 
and to follow up a strategy of investment that could contribute to needed 
development structural changes, mainly of qualitative nature within the 
Sub-region (see Chapter 8). 
However, AGS cooperation within the Sub-region is found to be subject 
to much the same development constraints which limit the development 
opportunities in the individual countries even though the same is enlarged. 
Although the Sub-regional circle tends to widen the area for 
diversifying the AGS economic base, however, the Sub-region's common 
structural needs for development diversification has been found in fact 
to stimulate a move towards cooperation on a yet wider scale, in Arab-
regional circle. The Arab region offers, in particular a larger 
and more diversified resource base. The analysis of development 
determinants within the regional context, such as labour, the 
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agricultural and raw material resource base, markets and absorptive 
capacity, and economics of scale, showed the great opportunities - and 
need- for cooperation within the Region. The possibilities for enlarged 
and new productive activities, given some pooling of Sub-regional 
pooled investment capabilities and the linking of such investment with 
the Arab region's labour and available diversified resources are very 
considerable. To some extent, a flow of investment from the AGS to the 
Region is already happening, but cooperative coordination of development 
rather than simply commercial projects within the Region could bring greater 
quantitative and qualitative fulfillment (see Chapters 6, 9 and 13). 
3. AGS cooperation within the Regional circle can be shown to have 
many potential opportunities for joint productive activities, which 
would also be development oriented. However, the countries of the Arab 
region still have their economic development characterized by an infant stage 
of industrialization and many other structural constraints. The most 
important group of these constraints includes inadequate technical 
expertise, weak managerial capability and experience, and poor science 
and research capabilities. Hence, even the Regional circle has severe 
limitations as illustrated by the limiting factor imposed by the Regional 
market on many industrial sub-sectors (see Chapters 9 and 10). All these 
factors tend to extend the motivation to cooperation outward to the wider 
international circle which constitutes the main source for tackling 
Regional constraints on development. This circle is defined as 
including the OECD develop'.'!d countries and the U.N. agencie:-; (see below). 
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Arab regional dependence on this International circle as defined here has 
been growing during the 'seventies as reflected in the region~foreign 
trade relations (see Chapters 6 and 10). 
From ·the above analysis. with respect to motivation to cooperation, 
it has become clear that the facts of AGS-Sub-regional, Regional and 
International relationships, and the opportunities given by cooperation, 
in association with forcible development determinants, tend to support 
a development-cooperation approach which is trilateral. 
Two brief points of explanation and qualification have to be 
added here. The exclusion from the present definition of the International 
circle both of the 'Eastern bloc' (the COMECON countries) and of the 
non-Arab Third World, is justifiable on practical grounds in the context 
of this study. It does not imply that economic relationships between the 
AGS and these two 'geo-economic' zones will not be maintained or grow. 
It is however a fact of life that the realistic possibility of close 
economic and financial cooperation, let alone even partial integration, 
between the AGS and the totally differently organised structures of the 
Communist countries is extremely remote compared with the possibility 
of such cooperation with OECD countries. Further, given the importance 
attached in this study to the AGS' qualitative (in the wide sense) needs, 
it has to be recognised that most other developing countries and regions 
have comparatively little to offer. These balances· of advantage are of 
- -
course relative rather than absolute and refer essentially to the 
specific subject of development cooperation. 
The second point refers to dependence. All that need be stated 
here is that the author regards the economic interdependence of the AGS 
and the Regional and International circles not only as inevitably the 
result of theeconomic structure of the AGS (as examined earlier) but 
also as necessary to AGS' development. Such interdependence on the 
basis of cooperation is the only feasible path away from unbalanced and 
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harmful dependence. 
4. One of the main objectives of this research has been to explore 
a pragmatic approach to development cooperation within the Sub-region. 
The appropriateness of both the trade-oriented and development-oriented 
approaches to AGS development strategy has been examined, on the basis 
of theory and experience relating to forms of and approaches to 
cooperation, and the facts relating to Sub-regional, Regional and 
International economic relationships. The conclusion is that a 
'development-oriented approach based on selective but on piece-meal and 
programmed joint activities' for the Sub-region has proved to be more 
relevant and viable than the trade oriented and holistic approaches. 
The lessons of experience support the viability of the above-
mentioned development-oriented approach first based on conceptual analysis. 
These lessons were derived from developing countries' experience with 
respect to development cooperation and integration in general, and 
illustrated by analysis of recent Arab economic integration and 
cooperation activities, the EAC experience and the Mekong project in 
ECAFE region in particular (see Chapters 11 and 12). 
-, 
Events in the Arab world have proved the complete failure of '----------
attempts to use the trade-oriented approach which was imported from 
other developing countries and from the EEC system, as reflected in the 
ACM fortunes. The CAEU approach of comprehensive planning which was 
derived from the COMECON model, equally appears of little use in the Arab 
region. 
In considering the comprehensive planning approach and the factors 
which prevent its successful implementation within the AGS, it was, 
however, found that 'programmed and partial planning', of 'the selected 
and agreed development activities' is more viable for the Sub-region 
than anything more comprehensive (see Chapter 12). The individual 
countries' weakness in planning and development administration \'Jas one 
important reason behind favouring partial rather than comprehensive 
planning. The structure and inter-relationships of AGS Sub-regional 
and Regional trade which have found to be very weak, intra-Sub-region 
trade comprising 2% of total trade, while 5% for the Region, their 
trade and payment systems and their development needs, all of these 
basic factors t'avour a non-trade-oriented approach (Chapter 12). 
Examples of partial development-oriented cooperative activities 
were drawn from the Arab-region and ECAFE region. OAPEC with its joint 
development projects and joint financial institutions, which were 
adopted within the Region during the 'seventies, as well as the AAAID 
programme for food production in Sudan, are examples of relatively 
successful joint development activities and thus support the case for 
the viability and operationality of a partial development approach. 
Sub-regional involvement in these activities, moreover, was a key 
contributing factor to their establishment. The ECAFE Mekong project 
has shown how key elements in such successful cooperation, such as 
reciprocity and additionality, could be provided. 
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The relative simplicity of such joint activities, compared with 
more ambitious and comprehensive integration combined with their 
development importance, appears to neutralize all but the greatest 
political conflicts from affecting their basic operations. The Mekong 
project and MAID programme also illustrate the inter-related activities 
that arise from such cooperation and which necessitate some degree of 
planning coordination to ensure the harmonisation of basic inputs into 
the cooperation activities. This is far easier to achieve, within a 
'partial, piecemeal, development-oriented programmed approach', than are 
the highly complex institutionalised arrangements necessary for 
comprehensive planning. 
The author concludes that attempts at full economic integration 
have too often led to disintegration, as developing countries' experience 
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suggests. It is therefore proposed that 'cooperation within an integratory 
realm', a process which is not fragmentary or ad-hoc but designed to 
establish a firm basis on which increasingly greater viable and acceptable 
integration could be later built in the right approach to be followed, 
this argument is developed in Chapter 12, Section 3. 
5. In linking these findings with those relating to the proposed 
'horizontal' trilateral approach to cooperation for development 
interest must centre on the medium- and long-term and structural 
changes needed for true development rather than on short-term rapid 
and obvious material returns from cooperation. 
In this respect the author disagrees with many development 
specialists who appear to exaggerate the urgent need of developing countries 
to feel the blessings of cooperation at a very early stage in order to 
secure their commitment to cooperation. The author's view is that this 
could distort the selection of joint activities towards the choice of 
apparently quick yielding production projects which would not produce the 
structural changes needed for development or reconcile competing interests · 
within the cooperation movement's relevant circle. There are some signs 
of such misleading pressures within the Sub-region as reflected by the big-
push with industrial, national and collaborative projects (see Chapters 
4, 9 and 10) and also reflected in parts of the on-going Sub-regional 
cooperation movement (see Chapter 5). 
The AGS, in their urgent desire to establish a post-oil prosperous 
future are now in some danger of under-estimating the time-span during 
which oil and gas revenues will continue to be considerable and which can 
be used for sound developmental preparation for the future. It is not 
necessary for them, unlike many developing countries, to seek for 
immediate material returns from cooperation. 
6. The establishment of the GCC seems generally to be relevant to and 
in harmony with our proposed approach. However, priority seems at the 
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moment, reflected in the GCC's proposed economic agreement, to be given 
to the trade-oriented approach, concentrating on the free movement 
of trade and other factors of production. The same trend, as was shown 
in Chapters 5 and 12, characterises some other recent aspects of AGS' 
bilateral, multilateral and Sub-regional cooperation movement. 
However, it is worth noting, firstly, that the GCC's decision to establish 
the Arab Gulf Investment Authority, with capital of one billion US 
dollars subject to annual increase, seems to be of special relevance to 
our proposed approach. The Authority's main objective has 'been stated 
as the transfer of AGS financial power into economic power through 
greater contributions to regional and international economic development. 
In the industrial sector it is suggested that to integrate the GCC's 
Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting's feasibility studies of 
joint industrial projects within the Sub-region with those studieG 
directed to explore feasible joint agro-industrial projects within the 
Arab region. This illustrates the fact that joint industrial cooperation 
within the Region can be proved to serve AGS development in better ways 
and within more promi·sing potentials. AGS, in this context, could be 
the location for many agro-industries such as pesticides, fertilizers, 
tractors and agricultural equipment, this based on their comparative 
advantage. 
Cooperation to meet AGS structural needs for qualitative changes 
and advancement such as on human resource development,-sciehce and 
technology activities and environment preservation were found to occupy 
highest priority as providing key opportunities for Sub-regional 
cooperation. Consequently 'qualitative' joint activities directed to 
create and develop AGS infrastructure, in its broad meaning, including, 
the industry of finance, human resource development, research, science 
and technology as well as physical infrastructure, is regarded as highly 
relevant to our proposed approach and could be decisive in shaping the 
outcome of Sub-regional cooperation for development. 
6. The AGS' agricultural resource base, in general, and for food 
production in particular, is very weak and agricultural development 
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faces many structural constraints represented in scarce water, soil and 
other development determinants. These severely limit agricultural potential 
and make prospects for lowering the dependence of the AGS on food imports 
most unpromising. 
Given the serious food security problem which is expect to affect 
the whole world and the great weakness of the AGS position, consideration was 
given to how food production and development needs could be met within the 
Regional rather than the Sub-region circle. Perception of the food 
security problem is already stimulating AGS national interest in this 
direction. 
Special attention was directed to the resource base within the 
Region as a whole and the food security problem was found to be most 
easily tackled by cooperation to develop Regional food production 
potentials, on the road to achieve basic self sufficiency within the 
Region. 
The Sub-regional fisheries resource base was found to be relatively 
rich and to provide a basis for joint cooperation activities, especially 
in non-directly productive activities. These include infrastructural 
areas (research, development administration base, training etc.) directed 
to artisanal rather than to commercial industrial fisheries development. 
In both agriculture and fisheries; the need to involve the 
cooperation of the Third, International circle, especially at the 'qualitative' 
level is also important. 
7. While the examination of AGS' Sub-regional, Regional and Inter-
national economic relationships and cooperation has shown many signs of 
realization in the AGS of the benefits which could be derived from such 
t~ooper·nl.i.un, i.l. cannot be ua.i.d at the moment that there are many actual 
activities based on a solid platform of development cooperation. 
Movement in this direction so far has rather reflected the emerging 
compartmentalised needs which are being met on an ad-hoc basis, this 
associated with many deficiencies of performance, deficiencies which 
could be less severe and ultimately eliminated through a more solid 
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and fruitful cooperation movement. The Regional movement of labour 
provides a clear example (see Chapter 9, Section 9.3). Freedom of action 
is to some extent limited by commitments already made. Within the Sub-
region the scale and number of installed or planned industrial plants 
raise the question of what opportunities remain for joint industrial 
projects? Despite the emergence of some joint productive industries 
within the Sub-region, two main proposals can be suggested. First, Sub-
regional industrial cooperation should give more attention to the needed 
qualitative aspects of the industrialization process, as opposed to the 
mere construction of plants, such as industrial management, marketing 
and technological, training and research. A joint programme directed to 
achieve this objective is already proposed ~o be implemented by the 
(GOIC) in coordination with GCC secretariat and various relevant bodies 
within the individual countries. 
Secondly, the GOIC is not advised to limit its interest entirely 
within the Sub-region. Although its terms of reference refer mainly to the 
AGS, there should be at least some further development of communication 
with the Regional Industrial Development Centre in order to coordinate 
various studies in the light of the general broad frameworks laid down 
by the Regional bodies. Agro-industries for example could be of special 
interest both to the AGS and the Region as a whole. The GOIC can proceed 
in this way to extend its already established lines of interest as 
indicated in Appendix 2. 
The cooperation movement within the Sub-region haf; ~>hown ~;orne 
encouraging signs of realising the need to improve the capability of it0 
human resources by establishing many Sub-regional research and training 
centres, so far mainly in agriculture and fisheries. Not only is more 
careful planning for such projects need as, discussed in Chapter 5, 
but the principle should be extended to other sectors. 
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The establishment of the GCC should not encourage the AGS to become 
self-isolating collectively within the Sub-region. 
The proposed trilateral approach calls for AGS to balance their 
Sub-regional interests with those of the Region on the solid basis of 
mutual benefit. For example, analysis has shown that many potential 
dangers to both Sub-region and Region could arise out of unresolved 
questions of the movement of labour (see Chapter 9). The vulnerability 
of AGS and the Arab region in relation to food security creates a strong 
need for cooperation, for economic as well as political reasons (Chapters 
8, 9 and 13). AGS would be wise, therefore, not to lessen their 
regional interest and to create within the GCC secretariat a special 
agency to maintain coordination between Sub-regional and Regional 
activities. 
8. In examining operational aspects of the proposed approach for 
trilateral AGS development-oriented cooperation, the AAAID regional 
programme directed to meet food security needs was given particular 
attention. The attainment of food security, through the development of 
the promising potentials within the Arab region is found to necessitate 
cooperation within a trilateral approach. The AAAID programme which 
combines the investment capability of these Arab countries with financial 
surpluses with the potential agricultural resources of other countries 
in the Arab region also needs the expertise in technology, finance, 
organisation and marketing which is only available from the third circle 
(see Chapter 13). This illustrates the geo-economic implications of 
operational aspects of the proposed approach which is directed carefully 
through trilateral cooperation and could lead to another OAPEC type of 
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joint agricultural activities within the Region. 
9. Despite the failure of the many integratory efforts based on the 
trade-oriented approach, there are some successful examples of Regional 
cooperation, most noteworthy being the OAPEC joint projects and the AAAID 
food production programme. Efforts to ease the movement of some factors 
of production, mainly of capital and labour in both directions are also 
encouraging. It is apparent that the growth of oil derived financial 
wealth in the 'seventies, (see Chapter 14), has enabled the petroleum-
exporting countries including AGS to play a fundamental role in shaping 
development in the Arab region. The demand for labour, the flow of aid and 
direct investment, and the initiation of joint Regional projects through 
OAPEC and AAAID are all creating some motivational momentum to Regional 
development cooperation. At the same time they tend to reduce the 
institutional disparities between Arab countries and increase their 
openness to one another and to the rest of the world. 
However, these activities, so far, have been more accidental than 
deliberate in their selection, fragmented and hazardous, rather than on 
the solid grounds needed for regional inves tment strategy. Such a 
strategy, as opposed to tactics of short term investment, would be directed 
towards large-scale programmes on an Arab regional scale and development 
and problem orientated. All this requires a favourable investment 
atmosphere and a sophisticated approach to investment, as discussed in 
Chapter 14. 
To summarize our conclusion in a few words, one can say that 
following research concerning the approach to and opportunities for AGS 
cooperation, given the primary objective of strengthening the AGS for 
the post-oil era, a particular approach is proposed, characterized as: 
trilateral, partial, piecemeal, development oriented and following~ 
cooperation movement within an integratory realm. 
The cooperation movement should be directed above all to tackle 
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structural constraints and so strengthen the foundations for development. 
On these foundations the AGS can then build self sustaining economies 
for the post-oil era. This emphasis on the building of foundations 
also requires a particular pattern of investment: 
1. Top priority should be given to 'qualitative' aspects of 
development activities. 
2. Locating investments in productive sectors within the Region, 
and giving priority to Regional agricultural and agro-industrial activities 
with the inclusion of International inputs in order to build up the 
science and technological base within the Region. 
3. Investments located within the International circle should be 
directed to benefit the Sub-region and the Region through the transfer 
and acquisition by experience of technical and technological expertise. 
4. All above cooperation activities should be based on the principles 
of reciprocity, additionality and equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits, this is applicable particularly to the third circle. Special 
attention should be directed to utilise the machinery and dialogue of 
cooperation in the third circle so as to diminish the hegemonic super-
powers and giant transnational companies' pressures directed to divert 
cooperation activities to serve their own interests rather than those 
of both parties (see Chapter 11). 
Within the Sub-regional and Regional activities AGS are invited 
to give special attention to ways in which development cooperation could 
meet the needs of less developed and poorer areas to lessen the current 
large income gap. Within the Sub-region, Oman and Bahrain have the 
weakest economic structures and prospects, whilst in Egypt for example 
within the Region, the bread subsidy alone swallows up the whole of 
the g 700 million the Suez Canal generated last year (The Observer, 
10 October 1982 and see Chapter 13). There is a mutuality of interests 
involved. 
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Ultimately, the success or failure of any cooperative movement which 
involves, as here, more than one country, will be decided by the political 
determinant. This appeared very clearly in the examination of many 
issues such as the movement of labour, markets and the flow of investment. 
From a dynamic point of view, political relationships and changes in them, 
within the Sub-region, Region and International circles, have critical 
effects on the opening up or limiting opportunities for cooperation. 
The Palestinian problem in particular is crucial in its direct 
and indirect affects on the creation of a healthy or polluted atmosphere, 
both political and economic, for cooperation. The recent suspension of 
the Euro-Arab dialogue and the Arab petroleum boycott in 1973 of countries 
seen as supporting Israel, are recent incidents demonstrating the effects 
of the Palestinian problem involving the third circle• Within the Region, 
the decision to suspend Egypt from Arab League activities following the 
Camp David agreement, destroyed the progress made to Regional cooperation 
for arms production. 
This is not the place to discuss the nature of the Palestinian 
problem. Nevertheless there is ample evidence that if development 
cooperation of a viable kind is to succeed, even for the AGS, it requires 
a Trilateral approach. This in turn is only possible on a sound basis 
if all the parties involved, including the OECD contribute with a strong 
will and enthusiasm to the resolution of the tragedy of Palestine. 
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APPENDIX I THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL ECONOMIC AGREEMENT 
In order to co-ordinate and unify the economic, fiscal and 
monetary policies of the Gulf States as well as the commercial and 
industrial laws and customs regulations in force within them, the 
governments of the member-states of the GCC have agreed on the following: 
Art. 1: The member states will allow the import and export to 
each other of their agricultural, animal, industrial and natural 
resource products of national origin. All agricultural, animal industrial 
and natural resource products of national origin of any member state will 
be treated as national products of all member states. 
Art. 2: All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource 
products of national origin of the member states will be exempt from 
customs duties and relevant fees. Charges collected for specific 
services, such as storage, transportation or unloading fees, will not 
be viewed as exempt dues if they are collected on local products. 
Art. 3: An industrial product will be considered to be a product 
of national origin only if the value added to this product within a 
member state is no less than 40 percent of the final value of the 
completed product, and only if citizens of the member states own no 
less than 51 percent of the industrial facilities producing it. Every 
commodity enjoying exemption from customs dues in accordance with this 
agreement must be accompanied by a certificate verified by the 
government authority concerned. 
Art. 4: A minimal joint customs tariff will be drawn up and 
applied with regard to the outside world. One of the objectives of the 
unification of the customs tariff will be put into effect gradually 
within a peridd of five years beginning on the date this agreement 
goes into effect. Agreement on the gradual steps to accomplish this 
shall be r~achod within a period of one year from this same date. 
Art. 5: The member states will provide all necessary facilities 
for the transit of the goods of any member state to any other member 
state, free of dues and taxes of any kindp except those collected for 
specific services, such as storage and unloading fees •. 
Art. 6: The transit between the member states of goQds banned 
from entering any one state under local regulations,· shall be 
prohibited. Customs authorities of the member states shall exchange 
lists of such goods. 
Art. 7: The member states shall co-ordinate their commercial 
policies and relations with other nations and regional economic 
groupings and associations in an effort to come up with conditions for 
equal treatment in the trade between the member states and these nations 
and groupings. In pursuance of this objectivep the member states shall 
take the following steps: co-ordinate policies regarding the creation 
of the strategic food stockpile; conclude joint economic agreements 
with other nations in situations which serve the common interests of 
the member states; seek to create collective bargaining power to back 
up the bargaining position of member states with foreign authorities 
with regard to the import of basic needs and the export of principal 
products. 
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Art. 8: The member states shall agre~ on such executive principles 
as will ensure treatment by any member state of the citizens of all 
other member states as if they were its own citizens without any 
differentiation or discrimination. 
Art. 9: The member states shall encourage their respective 
private sectors to embark on joint ventures to link up the economic 
interests of all citizens in all possible domains. 
Art. 10: The member states shall cooperate and coordinate their 
development plans to attain full economic integration. 
Art. 11: The member states shall seek to co-ordinate their 
policies in all phases of the oil industry, including extraction, 
refining, marketing, export, pricing, exploitation of the natural 
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gas resource and development of alternative sources of energy. The 
member states shall seek to develop common oil policies and positions 
vis-a-vis the outside world as well as within specialised international 
agencies. 
Art. 12: To accomplish the objectives set forth in this agree-
ment, the member states shall: co-ordinate industrial activity and 
formulate policies and methods conductive to industrial development 
and diversification of their respective prodttctive bases on principles 
of integration; draft uniform industrial laws and regulations and 
intensify guidance of their respective local productive facilities to 
satisfy their respective needs; distribute industrial capacity among 
themselves on the basis of relative merit and optimum economic return 
and promote the development of basic and complementary industries among 
them. 
Art. 13: In the context of co-ordination efforts, the member 
states shall attach special importance to launching and supporting joint 
projects in the fields of industry, agriculture and services, using public, 
private or mixed funds so as to accomplish productive integration and 
joint development on sound economic principles. 
Art. 14: The member states shall co-operate in developing areas 
of technical co-operation with a view to acquiring a genuine ability 
to support and promote applied research and science technology and adapt 
technology brought from abroad to the needs of the region and its progress 
and development aspirations. 
Art. 15: The member states shall prepare ways and means to bring 
in new technology, adopt its most suitable elements or adapt them to fit 
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the diverse needs of the member states. The member states shall 
whenever possible conclude joint agreements with the appropriate 
foreign governments or scientific or commercial institutions to achieve 
these objectives. 
Art. 16: The member states shall draw up policies and carry out 
co-ordinated programs of technicalp professional and vocational 
training on all levels of specialisation and shall develop educational 
programs on all levels so that education and new technology shall be 
tied in with the needs of national development. 
Art. 17: The member states shall seek to co-ordinate their efforts 
in the field of manpower resourcesp and shall draw up uniform standards 
and classifications for the various types of vocations and professions 
in the various sectors of the economy, so as to avoid harmful competition 
and draw optimum benefit from human resources. 
Art. 18: Each member state shall accord means to transport of 
passengers and goods belonging to the citizens of other member states 
that same treatment it accords its own transport resources. This 
includes exemption from all dues and taxes of any kind, but does not 
cover means of local transportation. 
Art. 19: The member states shall co-operate in the fields of 
land and maritime transportation and communication, and shall seek to 
co-ordinate and carry out infrastructure projects such as seaports, 
airports, water and electricity stations and roads in a manner suited 
to the common economic interest and conducive to the integration of 
economic activity; the member states shall seek to co-ordinate their 
air transportation policiesp and develop areas of possible joint effort 
on all levels in the domain. 
Art. 20: Each member state shall allow the ships and boats of 
all other states to use the various facilities of its seaports and shall 
gi Vf~ them the same preferential treatment accorded to its own ships 
and boats when they stop or anchor in its seaports, with regard to 
dues, services, guidance, loading and unloading, maintenance, repairs, 
warehousing and other similar services. 
Art. 21: The member states shall seek to draw up joint law and 
regulations affecting investments so as to accomplish the laying 
down of a common investment policy aimed at directing their foreign 
and domestic investments in a manner which will serve the interests 
and aspirations of their peoples for progress and development. 
Art. 22: The member states shall co-ordinate their fiscal, 
monetary and banking policies and shall develop co-operation between 
monetary funds and central banks, including efforts to establish a 
common currency to complement the desired economic integration among 
them. 
Art. 23: The member states shall seek to co-ordinate their 
foreign policies with regard to the granting of assistance to inter-
national organisations or on a regional .basis for development. 
Art. 24: Differences in the levels of development of the member 
states and local development priorities shall be taken into account 
in the implementation of this agreement and the formulation of measures 
based thereon. Any member state may be given a temporary exemption 
in cases of necessity dictated by temporary local situations or 
circumstances. However, any exemption shall be for a limited period 
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of time according to a decision of the Supreme Gulf Co-operation Council. 
Art. 25: A member state- may not grant a non-member st-ate any 
preferential treatment in excess of such as is provided for in this 
agreement. 
Art. 26: This agreement shall go into effect four months 
following its approval by the Supreme Council; this agreement may be 
amended with the approval of the Supreme Council. 
Art. 27: Provisions of this agreement shall take precedence 
over local laws and regulations in the event of any inconsistencies 
arising in the course of implementation. 
Art. 28: The provisions of this agreement shall take the place 
of similar provisions of bilateral agreements of the member states. 
Source: The Arab Economist, Vol. xiv, No. 150, March 1982, pp. 63-67. 
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APPENDIX II - INDUSTRIAL CONSULTANCY ORGANIZATION 
Studies 1978-1980 
The following is a list of studies being fulfilled by the 
organization. that highlight its current activities relating to industrial 
coordination. 
A. Chemical and Petrochemical Sector 
Study no. (1/1-1978) Demand-Supply Forecast and market strategies 
for petrochemicals in the 1980's. 
Study no. (2/1-1978) Construction. Production and distribution 
costs for petrochemicals. 
Study no. (3/1-1978) Prefeasibility study for joint project for 
Carbon Black production. 
Study no. (4/1-1979) Prefeasibility study for producing intermediate 
and finished petrochemical products. 
Study no. (5/1-1979) Prefeasibility study for producing (lube oil) jointly. 
Study no. (6/1-1979) Prefeasibility study for joint project on 
combined fertilizers N.P.K. 
Study no. (7/1-1980) Economic feasibility of some intermediate and 
finished petrochemical products. 
Export-oriented joint projects. 
Local-marketed joint projects. 
Study no. (8/1-1980) The Economics of Aroma.tics production in the 
Arab Gulf Area. 
Study no. (9/1-1980) Possibilities for natural petroleum gas 
utilisation. 
Study no. (10/1-1980) Investment opportunities of Silicon Industries. 
B. Mineral and Engineering Sector 
Study no. (1/2-1979) The development of the iron and steel industry 
in the 1980's and a pre-feasibility study for joint ventures. 
Study no. (2/2-1979) The development of the Aluminium industry in 
the 1980's and a pre-feasibility for joint ventures. 
Study no. (3/2-1979) Technical and feasibility study for the aluminium 
joint project to be established in Bahrain. 
C. Building Materials Sector 
Study no. (1/3-1978) Technical and Economic feasibility for 
the setting-up of fibre glass joint projects. 
Study no. (2/3-1979) Technical and economic feasibility of 
glassware. 
Study no. (3/3-1979) The feasibility of cement production-
expansion during the 1980's in the UAE. 
D. Technical and Economic Studies 
Study no. (1/4-1978) Industrial cooperation among the Arab Gulf 
States (types, forms and its encouragement). 
Study no. (2/4-1979) Measurements and specifications in the AGS. 
Study no. (3/4-1979) Contracts and industrial licenses. 
Study no. (4/4-1979) Technological aspects of the iron and steel 
industry. 
Study no. (5/4-1980) Incentives and forms of inqustrial 
development. 
Source: Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, Industrial 
Cooperation in the Arab Gulf. Vol. 1. No. 1, April 1980, 
pp. 5-6 (Arabic). 
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Table 1 
Bahrain: Summary Balance of Payments Estimates, 1975-80 
(in millions of Bahrain dinars) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
Merchandise trade -3.2 -63.3 -76.0 -69.1 
Exports, f. o. b. 475.8 600.5 731.5 737.3 
Petroleum (391. 8) (463.9) (573.9) (589.8) 
Other and re-exports (84.0) (136.6) (157.6) (147.5) 
Imports, c.i.f. -479.0 -663.8 -807.5 -806.4 
Crude oils (-240.9) (-272.2) (-357.8) (-338.8) 
Other imports (-232.9) (-387.6) (-444.9) (-453.4) 
Non-monetary gold (-5.2) (-4.0) (-4.8) (-14.2) 
Services and private 
transfers (net) -77.1 -79.7 -91.3 -102.5 
Service receipts 47.6 70.4 89.0 128.8 
Service payments 34.7 -50.1 -61.4 -81.1 
Private transfers (net) -90.0 -100.0 -118.9 -150.2 
Current Balance -80.3 -143.0 -167.3 -171.6 
Source: Bahrain Monetary Agency and IMF staff estimates 
1979 
-17.6 
928.3 
( 751. 3) 
(177.0) 
-945.9 
(-476.0) 
(-469.3) 
(-0.6) 
-44.6 
146.8 
-85.0 
-106.4 
-62.2 
Est. 
1980 
100.0 
1,455.0 
(1,235.0) 
(210.0) 
-1,345.0 
(-758.2) 
(-586.6) 
(-0.2) 
-22.2 
181.1 
-100.3 
-103.0 
77.8 
0} 
CiJ 
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Table 2 
Kuwait: Balance of Payments, 1975-78 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Year Ended December 31 
Trade balance (net) 
Exports, f.o.b. 
Oil sector 
Other (including re-exports) 
Imports, f.o.b. 
Non-monetary gold (net) 
Services (riet) 
Service receipts 
Investment income 
Service payments 
Other investment income 
Travel 
Other services 
Unrequited transfers (net) 
Government 
Private ' 
Current account balance 
1975 
6,083 
8,479 
(7,893) 
(586) 
-2,293 
-103 
823 
1,768 
(1,282) 
-945 
(-73) 
(-204) 
(-128) 
-1,069 
-793 
-276 
5,837 
1976 
6,424 
9,607 
(8,885) 
(722) 
-3,074 
-109 
1,064 
2,230 
(1,631) 
1,166 
(-103) 
(-249) 
(-175) 
-538 
-223 
-315 
6,950 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait and IMF staff estimates 
1977 
5,040 
9,523 
(8,722) 
(801) 
-4,305 
-178 
971 
2,627 
(2,007) 
-1,656 
(-192) 
(-307) 
(-286) 
-1,247 
-877 
-370 
4,764 
Est. 
1978 (1) 
5,216 
10,233 
(0,388) 
(845) 
-4,703 
-314 
1,252 
3,215 
(2,529) 
-1,963 
(-2501) 
(-368) 
(-342) 
-1,253 
-820 
-433 11 
5,215 
(j) 
w 
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Table 3 
Bahrain: Services and Private Transfers 2 1975-80 (in millions of Bahrain dinars) 
Est. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Service receipts 47.6 70.4 89.0 128.8 146.8 181.1 
Transportation 10.0 14.2 20.0 15.2 15.7 26.6 
Travel and tourism 18.1 23.9 26.1 50.2 53.2 40.4 
Investment income 18.0 26.4 30.2 41.4 45.2 75.7 
Government and BMA (6.9) (14.6) (15.6) (18.0) (19.9) (35.6) 
Commercial banks (9.1) (9.8) (12.1) (21.2) (23.4) (37.6) 
Other (2.0) (2.0) (2.5) (2.2) {1. 9) {2.5) 
Foreign government missions 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 3.1 3.4 
Other services (OBUs) 0.5 4.7 11.2 20.3 29.6 35.0 
Service payments -34.7 -50.1 -61.4 -81.1 -85.0 -100.3 
Transportation -3.8 -5.3 -7.5 -3.9 -8.1 -3.2 
Travel and tourism -18.0 -23.0 -25.6 -46.4 -35.6 -42.·6 
Investment income -11.7 -20.3 -24.9 -28.9 -35.1 -51.0 
Government and BMA ( -1.1) (-7.3) (-7.8) (.-6.1) (-5.7) (-12.6) 
Commercial banks (-6.7) (-7.9) (-10.3) (-17.7) (-25.3) (-33.1) 
Other (-3.9) (-5.1) (-6.8) (-5.1) (-4.1) (-5.3) 
Government missions abroad -1.2 -1.5 -3.4 ~1.9 -6.2 -3.5 
Other services 
Private transfers (net) -90.0 -100.0 -118.9 -150.2 -106.4 -103.0 
Receipts 
- -
1.2 0.3 
Payments (workers' remittances) -90.0 -100.0 -120.1 -150.5 -106.4 -103.0 
Total -77.1 -79.7 -91.3 -102.5 -44.6 
-22.2 
Memorandum item: Freight and 
insurance on imports -27.9 -58.1 -53.4 -49.9 -46.9 -58.7 
Sources: Bahrain Monetary Agency and IMF staff estimates 
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Table 4 
S. Arabia: Non-Oil Current Account 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1970 1971 
I. Merchandise and non-montetary gold -794 -801 
I 
Exports, f.o.b. 7 7 
Imports, f.o.b. -783 -799 
Private sector (-556) (-614) 
Government (-227) (-185) 
Non-monetary gold -18 -9 
II. Services (net) -143 -149 
Receipts 193 214 
Investment income (61) (68) 
Other (132) (146) 
Payments -336 -363 
Freight and insurance (-79) (-80) 
Other private (-148) (-177) 
Other government (-109) (-106) 
III. Private outward t~ansfers -160 -186 
IV. Total (I+II+III) -1,097 -1,136 
Prov. 
1972 1973 1974 
-1,163 -1,941 -3,702 
15 32 38 
-1,168 -1,960 -3,723 
(-819) (-1,579) (-2,804) 
(-349) (-381) (-919) 
-10 -13 -17 
-139 -309 -94 
316 547 1,818 
(105) (205) (1,218) 
(211) (342) (600) 
-455 -856 -1,912 
(-117) (-196) (-372) 
(-221) (-352) (-453) 
(-117) (-308) (-1,087) 
-228 -324 -420 
-1,530 -2,574 -4,216 
Sources: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook and IMF staff estimates. 
Prel. 
Est. 
1975 
-6,530 
60 
-6,570 
(-4,732) 
(-1,838) 
-20 
-431 
2,964 
(2,200) 
(764) 
-3,395 
(-920) 
(-575) 
(-1,900) 
-588 
-7,549 
~ 
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Table 5 
Kuwait: Estimates of Investment and Saving 1972/73-1975/76 
(in millions of Kuwaiti dinars at current prices) 
Year ended March 31 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 
Public investment 102 93 113 
Private investment 52 54 63 
Increase in stocks 1 -1 7 
Gross domestic investment 155 146 183 
Net export of goods and services 841 1,329 2,440 
Total savings 996 1,475 2,623 
Total savings: in per cent of GNP (18.3) (83.4) (82.7) 
1975/76 
140 
106 
9 
255 
1,911 
2,166 
(61. 8) 
Source: IMF. K~wait- Recent Economic Developments, SM/79/57, Feb. 23, 1979, 
Table 1, p. 2. 
m 
J.l:> 
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Exports 
to Saudi Arabia Exports 
from ... 
1. Saudi Arabia 
-
2. Bahrain 203.9 
3. UAE 111.8 
4. Qatar 9.1 
5. Kuwait 446.2 
6. Oman I 0.2 
Total 771.2 
I 
Table 6 
Inter-Gulf Exports (1977) 
US million 
Bahrain UAE Qatar 
056.1 6.2 2.9 
-
14.3 9.1 
21.8 
-
56.4 
2.5 2.3 
-
16.3 89.4 36.6 
- 4.0 -
996.7 116.2 105.0 
Kuwait 
7.7 
13.3 
11.3 
0.1 
-
-
32.4 
Source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, op. cit., Table no. 5, p. 15. 
Oman Total % 
17.2 990.1 45.6 
0.3 240.9 11.1 
128.3 329.6 15.2 
-
14.0 0.6 
4.0 592.5 27.3 
-
4.2 0.2 
149.8 2,171.3 100 
I 
~ 
!.\:) 
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Table 7 
AGS Exports P~rcentage World (1977) 
~ Bahrain Kuwait· Oman Qatar Saudi UAE (1878) Arabia 0 
Developed Market Econ. 18.0 58.5 90.1 75.9 70.6 82.6 
Developing Mkt. Econ. 75.9 37.0 9.4 24.1 23.9 16.5 
Centrally planned Econ. 3.9 2.1 0.0 0.9 
Not distributed 2.2 2.4 0.5 5.5 
Africa Developed Mkt. 
Africa Developing-Mkt. 0.1 0.8 3.7 0.7 1.0 
North Africa 0.1 0 • .6 0.3 
America Developed IV!kt. 2.3 1.0 15.4 8.6 11.0 15.1 
America Developing Mkt. 5.9 9.1 5.2 7.5 8 .• 6 
LAFTA 5.8 0.5 3.0 0.3 
CACM 
Asia Developed Mkt. 14.9 22.2 51.2 23.4 19.0 26.0 
Asia Developing Mkt. 75.8 30.3 0.3 15.2 15.4 6.9 
Middle East 72.9 8.5 0.3 1.0 3.6 3.7 
Asia Cent. Plan. 3.0 0.8 
Europe Developed Mkt. 0.7 32.5 23.5 43.8 39.5 41.2 
EEC (Nine) 0.7 29.2 16.1 39.4 33.0 35.0 
EFTA 0.0 7.5 0.7 2.1 2.6 
Eastern Europe USSR 0.3 0.9 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Saudi Arabia 51.1 3.7 
Kuwait 
UAE 3.6 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
U.K. 0.2 8.2 1.1 2.8 4.2 5.9 
Japan 14.9 22.2 51.2 23.4 19.0 26.0 
France 4.2 3.8 18.0 9.6 12.7 
u.s. 2.3 31.2 15.4 8.6 9.5 15.1 
Germany 4.8 2.9 6.4 
Italy 3.7 6.3 7.3 2.5 
Korea Rep. 6.6 
Source: U.N., Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1978. 
Table 8 
Oman: Recorded Non-Oil Exports, 1974-78 (1) 
(in millions of rials Omani) 
Composition (total) 
Dried dates 
Dried limes 
Flour 
Fish 
Other 
Direction (total) 
Gulf Emirates (3) 
India 
1974 
0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
Iran 0.1 
Iraq 0.1 
S.audi Arabia 
Other and unstated 
1975 
1.1 
0.2 
0.6 
0.3 
1.1 
1.0 
0.1 
1976 
1.4 
0.1 
1.3 
1.4 
1.3 
0.1 
1977 
1.5 
0.1 
1.1 
0.3 
0.1 
1.5 
1.4 
0.1 
-
-
0.1 
1978 
6.1 
1.3 
0.8 
0.5 
3.5 (2) 
6.1 
Sources: Customs Department and Directorate General of National Statistics 
(1) Does not include re-exports. 
(2) Mainly asbestos pipes (approximately RO 2.8 million) and domestic tobacco. 
(3) Mainly United Arab Emirates, but including Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. 
0') 
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Table 9 
Bahrain Foreign Trade with AGS (%) 
Imports 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Saudi Arabia 0.8 37.4 40.2 40.8 .63.4 51.0 41.2 0.8 0.9 32.1 7. 5 . 11.7 10.4 
UAE 14.8 1.9 3.5 4·.2 
Source: U.N., International Foreign Trade Statistics. 
Table 10 
Kuwait Exports to Saudi Arabia as Percentage of Total Exports 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
18.9 0.7 1.2 1.7 0.7 1.3 3.7 4.4 
Source: U.N., International Trade Statistics. 
Exports 
1974 1975 1976 
5.4 7.4 14.6 
3.4 6.3 7.1 
1977 
51.1 
3.6 
1978 
21.6 
11.9 
O"l 
~ 
CJ1 
Table 11 
AGS Imports Percentage World (1977) 
~ Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UA/t.-g Arabia m 
Developed Market Econ. 72.8 73.3 66.6 81.6 67.3 68 5 
Developing_ Market Econ. 21.4 20.9 32.1 16.8 23.1 21.0 
Centrally Planned Econ. 5.9 5.8 1.3 1.6 2.2 3.3 
Not distributed 0.0 o.o 0.0 0.4 7.5 7.2 
Africa Developed Mkt. 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 
Africa Developing Mkt. 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.4 
North Africa 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6 o.o 
America Developed Mkt. 12.2 14.5 7.1 9.6 19.3 10.9 
America Developing Mkt. 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 
LAFTA 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.2 
CACM 0.4 0.2 0.0 
Asia Developed Mkt. 15.5 19.8 13.6 26.7 11.9 20.2 
Asia Developing Mkt. 20.1 19.4 30.8 16.0 21.7 19.6 
Middle East 5.0 3.0 19.7 10.7 14.3 7.1 
Asia Central Plan. Ecnn. 5.5 2.7 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 
Europe Developed Mkt. 39.9 37.4 43.3 44.5 35.4 36.5 
EEC (nine) 35.8 32.0 40.0 38.8 30.8 34.7 
EFTA 3.2 2.8 2.4 4.9 2.6 1.6 
Eastern Europe USSR 0.3 3.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.5 
Japan 15.5 19.8 13.6 26.7 11.9 20.2 
U.K. 19.6 9.9 23.1 18.9 6.2 16.0 
u.s. 12.0 13.6 7.1 9.6 19.1 10.9 
Germany, F.R. 5.9 9.3 6.5 7.1 8.6 9.2 
India 3.1 3.8 4.9 2.2 4.4 
France 3.0 2.1 5.7 3.4 2.9 
Italy 3.3 5.0 2.8 6.3 3.5 
Netherlands 2.1 4.7 3.4 4.5 3.0 
Kuwait 4.6 
Saudi Arabia 2.7 
UAE 14.7 4.6 
Source: U.N., Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1978. 
Country* 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Somalia 
Uganda 
Table 12 
Projected output of secondary sector with and without economic cooperation, 1970 2 
1975 and 198o 
(Millions of 1960 dollars) 
Secondary output Increase in Secondary Output 
without with Cooperation 
,. 
cooperation 
1970 1975 1980 1975 1980 1975 1980 
224.5 '307 .9 442.6 52.0 71.7 359.9 494.3 
145 .• 0 . 192.3 253.8 42.6 113.7 234.9 367.5 
148.5 164.1 180.1 17.8 39~2 181.9 219.6 
26.1 36.0 49.7 22.4 58.9 48.5 108.6 
9.0 11.8 15.7 6.2 11.0 18.0 26.7 
101.0 142.3 200.7 53.3 73.2 195.6 273.9 
United Republic of Tanzania 98.8 127~2 163.2 47.5 105.0 174.7 268.2 
Zambia 520.0 647.4 793.4 172.3 239.9 819.7 1,033.3 
Total, above 1,272.9 1,629.0 2,079.2 414.1 712.6 2,043.1 2,792.1 
-----
Percentage 
increase of 
output in 
1980 
when cooperating 
17% 
45% 
22% 
118% 
70% 
36% 
64% 
30% 
34% 
Sourc-=: U.N., Cooperation for Economic Development of Eastern Africa, Repor~t of the Eastern African Team, Development 
Implications of Cooperation. ST/ECA/140 Part III, New York, 1971, Table 3, p. 7. 
* See next page 
(j) 
~ 
-..3 
Table 12 (continued) 
* Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are not included because no 
multinational industries serving the Sub-regional market can be 
identified for these countries. For Mauritius, the outcome will 
depend very much on the possibility of diverting exports of sugar 
from the United Kingdom and other European countries to the 
Eastern African market. For Burundi and Rwanda, though multi-
national industries have been identified, the available national 
accounts are not sufficiently reliable to yield meaningful 
projections. 
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Table 13 
Projected gross domestic product with and without economic cooperation, 1970 and 1980 
Without economic cooperation With economic cooperation Per capital GOP 
Gross domestic prvduct Gross domestic product percentage 
Country Millions of Per capita Millions of Per capita increase in 
1960 dollars (dollars) 1960 dollars (dollars) 1980 in case 
of cooperation 
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 
Ethiopia 1,558.9 2,491.4 63.2 82.8 1,558.9 2,750.2 63.2 91.4 10.4 
Kenya 990.2 1,552.3 92.5 109.9 990.2 1,962.7 92.5 139.0 8.3 
I 
Madagascar 679.7 845.3 100.7 95.0 679.7 957.6 100.7 107.6 13.3 I 
. 
Malawi 206.0 342.0 45.2 56.3 206.0 561.2 45.2 92.3 63.9 
Somalia 109~5 166.8 39.0 48.6 109.5 233.9 39.0 68.2 40.3 
Uganda 683.9 1,135.4 81.2 109.5 683.9 1,383.3 81.2 133.4 21.8 
United Republic of Tanzania 829.5 1 ,251. 7 64.9 74.5 829.5 1,715.3 64.9 102.1 37.0 
I 
Zambia 971.1 1,507.9 225.3 259.0 971.1 2, 251.1 225.3 386.7 49.3 
Total, above 6,028.8 9,292.8 80.4 97.2 6,028.8 11,815.3 80.4 123.6 27.0 
_j 
Source: Ibid. Table 4, p. 7. 
~ 
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Table 14 
Projected rates of growth of gross domestic product with and without economic cooperation, 
1970-1980 
Country 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Somalia 
Uganda 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Zambia 
Total., above 
Source: Ibid. Table 5, p. 8. 
(Percentage per annum) 
Without economic 
cooperation 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
4.8 
4.6 
2.2 
5.2 
4.3 
5.2 
4.2 
4.5 
4.4 
Per capita 
gross domestic 
product 
2.7 
1.7 
-0.6 
2.2 
2.2 
3.0 
1.4 
1.4 
1.9 
With economic 
cooperation. 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
5.8 
7.1 
3.5 
10.5 
7.9 
7.3 
7.5 
8.8 
6.9 
J?er capita 
gross domestic 
product 
3.8 
4.2 
0.7 
7.4 
5.7 
5.1 
4.6 
5.6 
4.4 
m 
CJ1 
0 
Table 15 
Projected rates of growth, by sector, with and without economic cooperation, 1970-1980 
(Percentage per annum) 
Country Primary Secondary Tertiary A B A B A B 
Ethiopia 3.6 4.1 6.5 8.2 6.2 7.7 
Kenya 3.9 5.2 5.9 9.7 4.8 7.6 
Madagascar 2.6 3.3 2.0 4.0 1.9 3.4 
Malawi 4.3 7.0 6.7 15.3 6.0 12.9 
Somalia 3.3 5.1 5.7 11.5 5.8 11.5 
Uganda 3.8 4.9 7.1 10.5 6.5 9.4 
United Republic of Tansania 3.7 5.4 5.1 10.5 4.6 9.2 
Zambia 4.8 9.4 4.3 7.1 4.7 10.7 
Total, above 3.7 4.8 5.4 8.4 4.6 8.4 
29.7% 55.5% 44.6% 
Source: Ibid, p. 9, Table 8 
Note: A = without economic cooperation; B = with economic cooperation 
O'l 
tJl 
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Table 16 
Projected investment with and without economic cooperation, 1970 and 1980* 
Investment 
Without economic cooperation With economic cooperation 
Year Millions Annual Investment/ Millions Annual Investment/ 
of 1960 ·rate of ·income of 1960 rate of income 
dollars growth, ratio dollars growth, ratio 
1970-1980 1970-1980 
{percentage) {percentage) (percentage) (percentage) 
1970 831.0 13.8 1,325.3 22.0 
1980 1,289.8 4.4 13.8 2,729.9 7.5 23.1 
Source: Ibid. p. p, Table F · 
I 
* Based on the eight countries in East~rn Africa listed in note no. 26 of Chapter 8. 
m 
CJl 
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Table 17. 
A. Comoarjson between 'Typical' Size of Pla11t in Different Countries (Size Measured in Terms of Numbers Employed) 
Median Median employment in corresponding industries in specific 
Industry employment countries as a percentage of median employee in U.K. 
in U.K. U.S.A. India Egypt Spain Pakistan Iran Iraq 
% % % % OL ,o % % 
Canning & preserving qf 
fruits and vegetables 354 52 51 89 56 57 31 74 
Grain mill products 206 74 68 58 42 115 56 62 
Sugar 805 98 136 252 262 246 62 N.A. 
Beer 273 170 68 87 112 68 39 N.A. 
Soft drinks 76 57 134 180 94 116 102 106 
Tobacco and cigarettes 2038 101 118 126 130 124 98 110 
Cotton spinning 331 82) 718 658 N .A.) 214 296) N.A. 
Cotton weaving 197 402) N .A.) 143) 
Woollen & Worsted 243 106 512 508 134 318 379 N.A. 
Rayon, Nylon, etc. & Silk 560 408 N.A. ?.63 356 N.A. 108 N.A. 
Leather footwear 241 . 143 281 •82 98 78 N.A. 123 
Made-up textile goods 95 87 82 86 N.A. 56 72 89 
Sawmills and Plywoods 81 108 102 556 62 82 89 106 
Wooden Containers 71 106 116 87 76 N.A. 91 92 
M:mut·actures of furniture 145 162 67 71 36 68 67 72 
Paper and board 527 82 201 142 87 146 N.A. N.A. 
Leather tanning 123 262 146 105 82 82 73 94 
Rubber 1027 98 79 98 96 45 36 N.A. 
Paints and Varnish~s 260 67 121 101 N.A. 36 39 N.A. 
Soap 1211 43 76 65 16 12 11 46 
Matches 227 212 418 106 108 296 107 N.A. 
Petroleum refining 2200 118 N.A. 142 N.A. 125 N.A. 166 
Glass 750 102 78 102 56 106 46 N.A. I m Cement 658 54 172 185 106 179 109 N.A. C)l Fertilizers 240 69 418 1389 370 398 N.A. N.A. t.:l 
Iron & Steel 2340 201 697 134 178 118 N.A. N.A. 
continued ••• 
Table 17 (continued) 
1. Where the median size is indeterminant because of open ends, the 
average size of the largest class was taken as an alternative. 
2. N.A. = not available. 
Source: Metwally, M.M. 'The Case for Arab Economic Integration' In, 
L'Egypte Contemporaine. No. 376, April 1979, pp. 212-213. 
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Table 18 
A Comparison between Size of Egyptian (Domestic) Market and Typical Size 
of Plant 
Article 
1. Rubber tyres and tubes ( th. ) 
2. Steel (th. tons) 
3. Pig iron (th. tons) 
4. Steel sheets and strips (th. tons) 
5. Primary Aluminium (th. tons) 
6. Copper (worked) (th. tons) 
7. Zinc (tons) 
8. Ball and Roller bearing (th. 
dollars) 
9. Electric Motors (th. dollars) 
10. Electric transformers (th. 
dollars) 
11. Typewriters (thousands) 
12. Electric domestic washing machines 
( th.) 
13. Electric domestic vacuum cleaners 
(th.) 
14. Electric domestic refrigerators 
(th.) 
15. Agricultural trac.tors (50 to 50 
H.P.) (assembly only) 
16. Agricultural tractors (all types) 
manufacturing (th.) 
17. Passenger Cars (assembly only) 
(th.) 
18. Passenger Cars (manufacturing) 
( th.) 
Typical Size 
of Plant in 
U.K.* 
1200- 2000 
600 
700 
206 
40- .· 80 
15- 30 
8600 
10000-20000 
19000-46000 
17000-43000 
150- 450 
203- 509 
192- 546 
240 
2650 
60 
60 
300 
Present Size 
of Egyptian 
Market 
377 
200 
220 
98 
3.2 
7.5 
5500 
557 
2086 
1233 
7 
2.7 
2.5 
14.7 
1500 
2.5 
6 
6 
* The typical size of plant is defined here as the average size in the 
range in which 50% or more of the industry's employment is 
concentrated. 
Source: Met/lly, M.M. Table 4, p. 215. 
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'fable 19 
A Comparison between Size of'Arab Market and Typical Size of U.K. Plants* 
Article 
1. Rubber types and 
tubes ( th. ) 
2. Steel (th. tons) 
3. Pig Iron (th. tons) 
4. Steel sheets and strips 
(th. tons) 
5. Primary aluminium (th. 
tons) 
6. Copper (worked) 
(th. tons) 
7. Zinc (tons) 
8. Ball and roller 
bearings (th. dollars) 
9. Electric motors 
(th. dollars) 
10. Electric transformers 
( th. dollars) 
11. Typewriters (thousands) 
12. Electric domestic 
washing machines (th.) 
13. Electric domestic 
vacuum cleaners (th.) 
14. Electric domestic 
refrigerators 
15. Agricultural tractors 
( 40 to 50 H . P . ) 
(assembly only) No. 
16. Agricultural tractors 
(all types) manufacturing 
( th.) 
17. Passenger cars (assembly 
only) ( th.) 
18. Pansenger cars (man-
ufacturing) (th.) 
Typical Size 
of U.K. 
Plants 
1200- 2000 
600 
700 
40-
15-
8600 
206 
80 
30 
10000~20000 
19000-46000 
17000-43000 
150- 450 
203- 509 
292- 548 
?resent Size 
of Arab 
Market 
3200 
1650 
1600 
298 
10 
20 
10000 
3500 
600•) 
8000 
30 
40 
14 
240 - 60_ 
2650 4700 
60 12 
60 66 
300 6!) 
No. of Plants 
Possible within 
Present Arab 
Market 
two or three 
two or three 
two 
one 
none 
one 
one 
none 
none 
none 
none 
.:1one 
none 
none 
one or two 
none 
one 
none 
* The present size of Arab market is measured by domestic production + 
imports - exports. An average for the period 1970-1973 was taken. 
Source: Metwa.lly, M.M. Table no. 5, p. 219. 
Table 20 
DevelopmP.nt of Trade Balance of Basic Food Commodities in the Arab World for the Years (1960-64) (1970-74) (1974-78) 
Quantity in tons -Base year (1960-64) = 100 
Food Group Commodities Average (1960-1964) Average 1970-1974 Index Average (1974-1978) Index 
·Trade Balance Trade Balance Trade Balance 
Cereals (grain) 3,374,032- 7,072,5'77- 209.6 13,000,258- 385.3 
Wheat 2,620,680- 6,377,783- 243.4 10,770,116- 411.0 
Rice 29,160+ 63,268- 317.3 605,348- 2175.9 
Other 782,512- 631,426+ 80.7 1,624,794 207.6 
Sugar 1,290,100- 1,437,503- 111.4 2,416,645 187.3 
Goats & sheep (head) 627,260- 1,599,545- 255.0 3,356,869- 535.2 
Meat (fresh & frozen) 26,302- 50,601- 1.92.4 254,615- 968.0 
Eggs 7,653- 21,844- 285.4 55.466- 724.8 
Animal fat 69,008- 105,639- 153.1 179,169- 259.6 
Butter 21,231- 49,033- 230.9 98,857- 465.6 
Cheese 22,462- 37,167- 165.5 68,127- 303.3 
Oil seeds 110,943- 240,782- 217.0 384,136- 346.2 
Tobacco (not manufactured) 18,960- 34,541- 182.2 54,160- 285.6 
Source: Arab Economic Unity Council, Gerie!'al Secretariat, Food Dilemma and Fo.od Sec•.lrity in the Arab World, Part I, 
Amman, 1980. Table No. (4-74). 
m 
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Table 2~ 
Self-Sufficiency and.Per Capita Consumption Annual Changes of Basic Food Items in ECWA Area (1970-1977) 
(In percentage & kg) 
Self-sufficiency Consumption 
Item Average Growth Av. Growth Av. 
1970-1977 1970 1976 1977 1970-1977 1970-1977 
Wheat 57 69 54 39 -4.2 4.0 
Rice 20 24 13 15 -13.6 2.6 
Legumes 92 92 90 98 -0.7 6.0 
Sugar 6 8 6 5 -6.2 4.6 
Oil seeds 51 50 64 37 -1.7 -0.3 
Meat 54 58 55 50 -1.8 1.3 
Poultry meat 64 81 36 38 -4.7 16.1 
Eggs 74 78 67 74 -1.5 3.8 
Dairy products 61 65 60 56 -2,3 2.4 . 
Fish 102 101 99 99 -0.6 -0.4 
Source: ECWA, 'Regional Food Security, In, Agriculture and Development No. 2, 
May 1979, Table 1, p. 78. 
m ()r 
00 
f'orelg;-. 
A:;.,;.cts 
(n..-t) 
~. :.:-a~!.l 
:'c-tal 
Rcservcos 
- Gold 
1973 I s,ts3 -:.;; . .:.:. 3, 1~1 
t974 I 20,129-.e .::.~X· :A,t53 
1975 I 39,323 ~.:.:· 23.193 
I'J76 I 52,255- ;::.':'·.! ~6.900 
1977 I st,4f)C.9 ;..: .:t-:- ::-9,903 
1978 I G1.668 :;..:.::: !.9,2'00 
1979 I c..t.83$ E-?.::.: 19,237 
I9BO 1 94,38~ .;s.:..: ..:"J,ol37 
Ku..-ai t 
F. 
% Asset~;; 
" 
Re::.t:rves 
84.70 J 1,655.9 21.80 380.6 
87.1·1 I 2,806.9 11.30 1,?49.2 
sa.20 I 3,154.1 6.91 t,as1.s 
es.12 I 3,128.7 5.21 t,?ot.e 
86.25 I 4,371.8 6.47 2,883.1 
81.34 I 4,Bb6.5 1.10 2,500.4 
76.89 I 5,191.6 7.13 2,e?o.o 
74.28 I 6,773.8 G.33 3,928.4 
U.A.E. 
F. 
% Assetfl 
" 
Reserve$ 
8.61 I 360.28 s.o1 91.1 
7.69 I 1,376.9 5.~a 452.9 
s.67 I 2,405.5 ~.27 987.9 
s.a2 I 3,719.3 6.20 1,906.5 
a.32 1 !)33.6 o.ao soo.J 
10.59 I 583.4 0.85 su.s 
11.47 I 911.3 1.25 1,432.3 
12.45 I <!, 713.1 2.5.: 2 ,01-J. 7 
~ 
AGS ftnancial Assets and Reserves 
( 1973-1989} 
(In U.S. million dollar) 
Qatar 
F. 
% Assets 
" 
Reserves 
2.01 I 115.9 1.53 33.6 
Oman 
F. 
s Assets 
" 
Rest-rves 
o. 76 I 144.2 1.90 106.4 
2.79 1 18B.J 0 .76 63.7 o.39 I 109.1 v-44 191.4 
3.76 I 325.0 o.n 96.7 0.37 I 104.2 o.23 237.e 
6.08 I 431.5 o.72 129.3 o.41 I 91.5 a .1s 307.0 
2.31 I 505.5 o.75 161.7 o.47 I 311.2 o .as 418.9 
3.44 I 632.8 o.92 210.1 o.89 I 215.1 o.J< 387.4 
5.73 I 111.1 o.9a 2ee.o 1.1s I ~4.3 o.7s 577.0 
6.39 I sc:a. 1 o.87 343 • .a L09 I 987.8 o.92 873.7 
3anrain 
F. 
,.; Assets 'I Reoerve~ 
l.41 I 115.6 1.52 64.0 
1.181 ~38.1 Q.96 131.3 
Q.90 356.7 0 .78 298.5 
o.9B I -l09.4 o .se 436.4 
1,.21 I •21.2 o .6> 503.9 
1.6-l I ~s.1 o .eo 493 . .: 
2.31 1 619.7 o.as 613.9 
2.77 I 1,184.3 Lll 953 . .:1 
Source: TMF, Inte-mationul Financial Stntislica, Annual Report 1981 and Vol. XXXIV, No.8, August 1981 
" 
F. 
k:.:;et5 
Totfll AGS 
" 
Te>tal 
Rcscrven ~ 
1.45 I 7,~94.88 100 4,423.5 100 
o.a1 I za.sae.g 100 16,241.5 100 
1.101 45,669.!:, 100 26,296.A 100 
1.391 60,035.4 100 31,381.0 100 
1.461 67,544.1 100 3.4,670.9 100 
2.10 I 66,511.9 100 23,603.1 100 
2.4-;, I 72,816.6 100 25,018.2 100 
3.0~ I 106,971.3 100 3Ls5o . .,; 100 
0') 
CJ1 
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Table 23 
AGS Basic Financial Indicators 1980 
(IN US ~ billion) 
Oil Revenues Budget Surplus Trade Balance Current Ace. Surplus 2:1 
( 1) (2) (3) (4} 
Saudi Arabia 52.095 6.285 +59. 96 6 32.315 12 
Kuwait 20.410 16.409 +12.850 15.495 80 
UAE 13 •. 236 3.679 +12.408 9.371 28 
Sub Total 85.741 26.373 +85.224 57.181 30.8 
Qatar 5.221* 2.216 + 4.043 n.a. 
Oman 2.531 0.402 n.a. n.a. 16 
Bahrain 0.540 0.125 + 0.117 n.a. 23 
Total AGS 94.033 29.116 
- -· 30.8 
Notes: * Total revenues 
Source: Central Banks and Monetary Agencies of AGS, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1980. 
Transferred into US dollars by the author. 
4:1 
62 
76 
71 
66.7 
m 
m 
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Table 24 
Kuwait Financial Indicators 
(In million of KD) 
Total 
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1973/74-1979/80 
(1) Total. Revenues 
(2) Oil Revenues 
(3) Investment Income 
(4) Overall Surplus* 
(5) Financing 
(6) Domestic & Change 
in cash balances 
(7) External loans, 
investments and 
other assets 
7:5 
4:2 
4:1 
7:2 
6.94.1 
584 
89 
162.4 
-162.4 
-59.7 
-102.7 
63 
27.8 
"23.4 
17.6 
2726.6 2550.2 2992.7 3050 
2534.8 2234.6 2598.2 2399.6 
152.1 262.5 329.4 384 
1587 1509.6 1513.8 1134 
-1587 -1509.6 -1513.8 -1134 
-199 -84.7 -29.9 -66.0 
-1388 -1424.9 1483.9 -1068 
Notes: * Total Revenue - (total expenditure and net domestic lending) 
3647 
2186.7 
522 
1753 
-1753 
-16 
-1737 
80.2 
79.4 
6923 
880 
4545 
-4545 
-191 
-4354 
96 
65.6 
Sources: - IMF, Kuwait- Recent Economic Development, SM/79/57. Feb. 23, 1979, Table 13, p. 31. 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1981. 
- IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Vol. V, 1981. 
22583.6 
2619 
12204.8 
-12204.8 
-646.3 
11558.5 
94.7 
54 
O'l 
(j') 
1-' 
Table 25 
AGS and Selected DeveloEed Countries Total Reserves Including Gold 
(Millions of SDRsJ 
1973 % 1980 % % 
All countries 152,413 100 354,495 100 
u.s. 11,919 8 21§480 6 
Japan 10,152 7 20,165 5.7 
France 7,070 5 24,302 ·6.8 
W. Germany 27,498 18 40,975 11.5 
Italy 5,335 4 20,477 5.8 
AGS 3,520 2 25,036 7 100 
S. Arabia 3,215 2 18,536 5.2 74 
Kuwait 45 0.02 3,169 0.9 12.6 
UAE 76 .04 1,600 0.4 6.4 
Qatar 34 .02 286 0.1 1.1 
Bahrain 61 .04 753 0.2 3.0 
Oman 89 .05 692 0.2 2.8 
Source: IMF, IFS -Yearbook 1981. 
1980:1973 
250.7% 
61:1 % 
(j) 
G'l 
t\j 
Table 26 
AGS and Total World Reserves and Economic Indicators (1980) 
(In US billion dollar) 
S. Arabia 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Qatar 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Total four AGS 
Total AGS (six) 
Total World 
u.s.A. 
U.K. 
W. Germany 
Japan** 
Total four 
industrial zed 
countries 
( 1) 
Total Reserves 
23.437 
3.928 
2.015 
0.343 
0.874 
0.953 
30.254 
31.550 
452.126 
27.396 
21.492 
52.260 
75.719 
176.867 
(2) 
GDP 
106.333 
25.677 
13.454 
n.a. 
4.877 
n.a. 
150.341 
2576.6 
531.9 
762.9 
913.8 
4785.2. 
(3) 
Imports 
30.151 
7.054 
9.074 
1.311 
1.692 
4.003 
53.2195 
1898.7 
253 
123.2 
174.2 
101.2 
651.6 
1:2 
Ratio 
22 
15.3 
15 
17.9 
20* 
1.1 
4 
6.9 
8.3 
4 
1:3 
Ratio 
77.7 
55.7 
22 
26.2 
51.6 
24 
59 
23.8 
10.8 
17.5 
30 
74.8 
27 
Notes: * This proportion is for the aggregate of four AGS only, S. Arabia, Kuwait, 
UAE and Oman. (Their total reserves are ~ 30.254 billion, their GDP is 
$ 150.341 billion.) 
** Japanese statistics are for 1979. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1981, from many tables. 
Percentages are computed by the author. Rates used are SDR = 1.27541 US dollar. 
0) 
(j') 
w 
1973 1974 1975 
Saudi Arabia 5100 22600 25700 
Kuwait 1900 7000 7500 
UAE 900 5500 6000 
Qatar 400 1600 1700 
Oman 177.5 843 .. 9 1080.2 
Bahrain 74 262 280 
Total AGS 8551.5 37805.9 42260.2 
I 
Table 27 
AGS Oil Income (1973-1980) 
(In ~ U.S. million) 
1976 1977 1978 
33500 42400 35800 
8500 8900 9200 
7000 9000 8000 
2000 2000 2000 
1316.4 1396.1 1325.1 
395 437 495 
52711.4 64133.1 56820.1 
1979 
57522 
16863 
1862 
3643 
1837.3 
777 
82504.3 
Sources: - IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook; Vol. V, 1981, p. 449. 
1980 Total 
102262 324884 
18016 77879 
19344 57606 
5377 18720 
2693.3 10670 
504 3224 
148196.3 492983 
- Central Banks and Monetary Agencies of AGS, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1981, Table No. 7. 
% 
66.0 
15.8 
11.7 
3.8 
2.1 
0.6 
100 
Dr. Khasaal El Gasem, 'Income and Financial Surpluses of Arab Oil Producing Countries', Al Bayan File, 
Petroleum Issues, Centre for Middle East Researches, No. 3, Dec. 1981, Table No. 1, p. 35. (Arabic) 
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